

Lectures on the TACTICS OF CAVALRY

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN.

with Notes

by
Major. A. J. Barker Beaumont



quo non præstantior alter
Are ciere viros, martemque accendere cantu

VIRGIL

London.
WILLIAM H AINSWORTH.
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LECTURES.

ON THE

TACTICS. OF, CAVALRY.

AND

Elements of Manteuvre

FOR

A CAVALRY REGIMENT.

WITH TWENTY-THREE PLATES.

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TO
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
ADOLPHUS FREDERICK
DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE,
Governor-General of Hanover, &c.

&c. &c. &c.

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GRATEFUL AND OBEDIENT SERVANT,

N. LUDLOW BEAMISH.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

AFTER the appearance of Major Johnston's excellent translation of Count von Bismark's "Lectures on the Tactics of Cavalry," the following Work may be considered an almost unreasonable demand upon public attention; yet, although the Translator is aware of his inability to do more justice to the original than has been already done by that intelligent Officer, he is induced to hope, that the circumstance of the author's work being here presented in a more complete form, together with the addition of some Observations upon the Text, will render the present Translation not wholly unacceptable.

The "Lectures on the Tactics of Cavalry" are the result of a minute inquiry into that branch of

the service by the Author, to whom was committed the re-organization of the Württemberg cavalry in 1816 :—the Work was first published in 1818 ; in 1819, a second edition (from which the present translation has been made) appeared ; and in 1821, its celebrity procured for it a translation into French.

The “ Elements of Manœuvre ” appeared in 1819, as a separate work ; but were afterwards made an Appendix to the Lectures, as in the present translation.

The principal improvements in Cavalry Tactics, which the Author has introduced, are the substitution of sub-divisions for threes ; the addition of a skirmishing division to each squadron ; and the establishing one description of Cavalry only. The advantages of these several changes are fully exhibited in the “ Lectures ; ” and the New System of Tactics is illustrated by Plates.

It may, perhaps, be considered, that the Translator has been guilty of illiberality to the Cavalry service, in the view which he has taken

of the comparative merits of that service and the Infantry ; but, however great his partiality for the Cavalry may be, he could not help feeling that prejudice should be laid aside, in the investigation of truth.

In employing the word *strategics* for *strategy*, which is more generally used, the Translator has followed the steps of M. de Malortie, in his translation of Bulow's " Spirit of the Modern System of War." The word *strategics* appears, also, to assimilate better with that of *tactics*, and the plural termination is equally justifiable in each.

The Translator is under obligations to many Friends, for their assistance in the progress of his Work ; the valuable books, important information, and interesting military details, with which he has been supplied by them, have afforded him advantages of which he is highly sensible.

18th June, 1827.

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“Reading and Discourse are requisite to make a Souldier perfect in the Art Military, how great soever his practical knowledge may be.”

Observations on Military Affairs, by General Monk, Duke of Albemarle.

T.

LECTURES

ON THE

TACTICS OF CAVALRY.

LECTURE I:

TACTICS — STRATEGICS.

A Definition.

SO many opinions have been expressed upon tactics, strategics, and on the art of commanding armies in general, that the young soldier who has not been supplied with the necessary preliminary information on the subject, must receive therefrom confused and incorrect ideas (1).

(1) The different opinions which have been expressed upon tactics, strategics, &c., are the natural consequences of the progressive improvement in the mode of making war. The heavy tactics of Tilly, which were pre-eminent at the beginning of the seventeenth century, gave place to the improved system of Gustavus Adolphus; the regular and gentlemanly tactics of the generals of the *Augustan age*, who sang *te deum* if they gained a few leagues of country, or took *one* fortified town in a campaign, yielded to the progress of science, and the genius of the great Frederick, in the eighteenth century: the wars of the French

The qualifications which a consummate general should possess, may be divided into two branches, one of which can be acquired, but the other must be innate: that is to say, into the scientific part, or that which can be mathematically constructed; and into the philosophical part, or that which depends only upon the sound judgment of a well-regulated understanding.

The difference is as great, as that between knowledge of a thing, and ability to carry it into execution; but the possession of one only of these qualities falls short of the *ideal*, and both united in one man, are indispensable to form the perfect general.

The greatest generals have always been scientifically educated. Cæsar, Turenne, Montecuculi, Frederick II., &c., &c., were all authors (1).

Revolution next introduced a more rapid and vigorous mode of making war, and the campaigns of King William and the Duke of Marlborough are now no longer considered by us as the *ideal* of military science and exertion. The Archduke Charles, Bulow, and Jomini, have ably laid down and exemplified the rules of modern tactics, and so far as the art of war is capable of being established upon fixed principles, have clearly defined and demonstrated it.

T.

(1) Xenophon deserves a high place in the list of literary commanders: the *Cyropædeia*, the *History of the Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks*, the continuation of the *History of Thucydides*, all shew, that the author was not only a skilful commander, but an elegant historian.

Pyrrhus has generally been considered one of the greatest masters in the art of war; he wrote both on tactics and strategics, and his works on these subjects were extant in the time of

It has been remarked, that the greatest generals have often composed regulations, wherein they have entered into the most minute details of the service; and that, on the contrary, men who have never commanded a company, have written on the higher branches of tactics, and have given directions for the remodelling of whole armies. Nay, many only sit behind their desks, and draw up critical military histories out of the despatches of the army.

The axioms, abstract ideas, and mathematical formula relating to war, are to be treated of as a science, to be logically developed, and laid down as principles; but the talent to apply these principles at the head of an army, to employ practically that which the science of war teaches theoretically, is more than science—it is that great art which Theobald calls the *transcendental* part of the art of war.

It is a partial undertaking to describe a war wherein one has not served, and the facts of which have not been received from the general commanding. The commander-in-chief of an army is always dependent upon the commissary-general. The commissariat rules the resolutions of the general with despotic power.

Observers who are distant from the scene of war, are always apt to blame the general who does

Plutarch; even Hannibal spoke of Pyrrhus as the most learned, and the greatest captain that had ever existed. T.

not support their eager interest in events by rapid movements, and a quick succession of engagements, ignorant of the endless difficulties which are opposed to him—great falls of rain—impassable roads—which often in one week, change the moral condition of the troops in such a manner as to render them scarcely recognizable. When the soldier, exposed to all weathers—marching through morasses by day, lying on the wet ground in cold nights, in tattered clothes, barefoot, wretched and miserable, the horses without shoes or forage, the soldier struggling with hunger, in consequence of the provision wagons being unable to proceed; in fine, when an army combats against all these disadvantages, and is thereby paralysed in its operations, the distant critic remains ignorant of the facts, because the commander of the army refrains out of prudence, from stating in his official reports the true condition of the troops. It is usual, and it is easy, to judge by the event, and not by the preceding circumstances*.

More difficult is the task of the general, rightly to appreciate and feel present critical circumstances, with wisdom to form a suitable plan, with force and rapidity to carry it into execution.

* Voltaire says, “Un general victorieux n’a point fait de fautes aux yeux du public, de même que le general battu à toujours tort, quelque sage conduite qu’il ait tenu.” Also, Frederick the Great, “in truth, *fortune* alone determines *fame*, he who is favoured by her is applauded; he who is slighted by her, is condemned.”

AUTHOR’S NOTE.

There is no art which requires more natural gifts than the art of war: mind and body must here co-operate, and both must be sound and vigorous; the talent to seize, as it were with one glance, the advantages or disadvantages which may arise from the situation of ground or troops, and to single them out from all other objects (*coup d'oeil*); this characterises the man born to become a general.

This *coup d'oeil*, namely, that comprehensive one which, in unexpected results, and in the most violent changes of fortune and calculation, enables the general to discern quickly, and to judge correctly of his situation, and then with firm determination to extort, as it were, from fortune, what she will not freely give; or prudent and judicious, to extricate himself from a dangerous position—this is not to be acquired (1), this can be reduced to no

(1) The author does not appear to be supported in this position by writers on tactics. “It is the general opinion,” says the author of the ‘*Essay on the Art of War*,’ “that the *coup d'oeil* does not depend upon ourselves; that it is a gift of nature, and that practice will not give it to us; in a word, that we must bring it into the world with us, without which the most piercing eyes see nothing, and we must grope about in utter darkness:—this is a mistake, we have all the *coup d'oeil* in proportion to the degree of understanding which it has pleased Providence to give us: it is derived from both, but what is acquired refines and perfects the natural, and experience ensures it to us.”

Essay on the Art of War—London, 1761.

In the “*Nouveau Dictionnaire Militaire*,” the true *coup d'oeil* is stated to be, “sometimes a gift of nature, but also the fruit of study, of application, and of an extreme desire to do well; it

general formulæ, nor be delineated upon plans and *black-boards*, but is in the strictest sense of the word, *military genius* !

is, after all," says the same author, " what may be called, *secret judgment*."

Monsieur Guiber observes, " De là il s'ensuit que les officiers supérieurs ne sauroient trop s'attacher à *former le coup d'oeil* des officiers qui sont à leurs ordres, à exposer eux-mêmes le leur, à le fortifier contre les illusions que les différences de terrain produisent," &c.—*Essai General de Tactique*.

The Chevalier Folard gives us, " Le coup d'oeil reduit en principes & en methode."—*Observations sur la guerre d'Eryce*.

The King of Prussia issued special instructions to his officers of cavalry, relative to the *coup d'oeil*.

The author of the *Military Mentor* devotes a whole chapter to the *acquiring the coup d'oeil*.

The great Grecian commander, *Philopæmen*, who is so conspicuous in history for the extent to which he possessed this quality, was more indebted to his own application, study, and constant observation, than to any peculiar *gift of nature*: it was his constant practice, when travelling, to examine the nature and extent of every post, pass, and spot, of any importance, which he met with, and imagining the country occupied by an enemy's army, to go through all the dispositions necessary for its defence.

Cyrus is said to have pursued *hunting* in his youth, more for the purpose of *acquiring the coup d'oeil* than for the pleasures of the chase. But nothing can be more conclusive on this point, than the opinion of that able and experienced general, the archduke Charles—in the preface to his *Grundsätze der Strategie*, he thus expresses himself, on the subject of the *coup d'oeil*:

" But that penetrating *coup d'oeil* which embraces all things, is possessed by him only who, by profound study, has sought out the nature of war; who has acquired a perfect knowledge of its rules, and who is, as it may be said, identified with its science. The faculty of deciding with confidence, is only to be found in that man, whose own experience has proved to him the truth of acknowledged maxims, and who knows how to apply them; in

But genius must be cultivated—without reflection and actual experience, without being

him, finally, who feels in his positive knowledge, a conviction of the infallibility of his judgment.” *Grundsätze der Strategie erläutert durch die Darstellung des Feldzugs, von 1796, in Deutschland.*

The *coup d'oeil* appears to exist totally independent of *perfection of sight*. Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick II., and Napoleon, all possessing the military *coup d'oeil* to the greatest extent, were *short-sighted*.

“La” (at Wilna), “couché sur ces cartes, dout sa *vue courte*, comme celle d’Alexandre le Grand, et de Frederick II. le forcait de se rapprocher ainsi, Napoléon suivait des yeux l’armée Russe.” (*Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande-Armée pendant l’année 1812, par M. le General Comte de Segur. 1—179*). Zisca, the famous general of the Hussites, “whose name,” Mosheim tells us, “became a terror to his enemies,” gained his most celebrated battles of Kamnitz and Ausig, when, totally *blind*; “ne pouvant,” says Folard, “plus voir par les yeux du corps, il voit tres clair des yeux de l’esprit.” Gilpin, after describing the wound which so nearly proved fatal to him, thus continues: “He was now totally blind; his friends therefore were surprised to hear him talk after his recovery, of setting out for the army, and did what was in their power to dissuade him from it, but he continued resolute: ‘I have yet,’ said he, ‘my blood to shed,’ let me be gone.” Zisca had at this time one of the most powerful armies opposed to him that Sigismund had yet brought into the field. At the battle of Kamnitz, January 13, 1422, he appeared in the centre of his front line, guarded, or rather conducted by a horseman on each side, armed with a poll-axe, when his officers informed him that the ranks were all well closed, he waved his sabre round his head, which was the signal for battle, and his troops, rushing to the charge, completely defeated the Imperial army. At Ausig, his extraordinary presence of mind and well-directed rebuke, prevented the retreat of his irresolute troops, and changed the fortune of the day. His masterly retreat from Prague soon after, at the head of his little band of four hundred men, who were obliged to cut their

corrected and enriched by science, genius can only be considered as a happy natural talent (1).

Tactics are the art of placing troops in positions, for battle, and of manœuvring them with advantage: simple positions and movements of troops are called evolutions, the combination of evolutions is called a manœuvre; and the art of applying these manœuvres to the operations of war, in such a manner as to attain the object in view, is called tactics.

Strategics are the science of designing and determining the plan and course of operations of a war.

Tactics are the *art*, strategics the *science* of war. way through some thousands of the enemy, is an almost unparalleled instance of judgment and intrepidity. See Lenfant's *Histoire de la Guerre des Hussites*. *Diarium Belli Hussitici*, by Byzinius. Life of Zisca, in Gilpin's *Lives of Reformers*. Theobald's wars of the Hussites, &c. T.

(1) "We shall find," says the Archduke Charles, "proofs sufficient in the pages of history, that those commanders of armies whose talent was rather *acquired* than *natural*, have, when they united perseverance and boldness, with discernment in their projects, triumphed over those who had nothing beyond genius to trust to."—*Gründsatze der Strategie*.

Perhaps, after all, the rarity of great generals is more owing to want of opportunity, than to the absolute deficiency of men possessing the talent to command. It has been said, that "the situation makes the man;" and we see frequent instances of persons filling high public stations with credit, and even celebrity, who, without having had opportunity or means of distinction, would have carried on "the noiseless tenor of their way," to the end of the chapter.

The science being the product of the understanding, can only be acquired by study; but for the art an innate talent is requisite, which indeed can, and must be cultivated, yet can never be acquired by those who are deficient in natural talents, no more than a man can be a great musician without having any natural talent for music. This is self-evident: and daily experience shews that on many occasions, extremely well-informed officers, who have composed unexceptionable plans of operation, possess neither the talent to conduct, nor to dispose their troops when in the field of battle; nay, many officers of high rank are incapable of manœuvring a squadron on the parade, while, on the contrary, officers who are unable to form any plan of operation, often lead their troops to victory with wonderful ability (1).

The line of demarcation between *strategics* and *tactics* is thus still more accurately drawn.

(1) "When Napoleon (says M^r de Segur), had a great object in view, he never devised any other than a vague plan, preferring to take counsel of opportunity, a system more conformable to the promptitude of his genius."

History of Napoleon's Expedition to Russia.

"Suwarroff," the Archduke Charles tells us, "had no plan of operations except an instinct, which taught him to seek out the enemy wherever he was to be found;" and yet this unscientific commander, in his celebrated campaign in Italy, reduced all the fortified places in Lombardy and Piedmont, and in the space of five months gained as many great battles.

Suwarroff's rapid style of proceeding, obtained him the title of "*Marshal Forwards*," from the Germans.

Strategics are the design, *tactics* the absolute execution of the operations of war.

Tactics, or the art of war, require high and rare natural talents. *Strategics*, or the science of war, an acute and well-regulated understanding.

Great experience and actual warfare are necessary to the formation of the tactician—in peace, the place of exercise and the autumn drill, are his school; but the strategist can continue his studies throughout all seasons, in his room (1); for tactics are the talent of commanding troops, strategics the science of forming a plan for the operations of war.

The union of art and science in one general, forms the perfect commander.

The difference between art and science is in itself clear. When the human mind produces works which strike the senses, and that not by judgment and inference, but solely by means of an innate power of invention and creation, in such a manner that certain universal principles can be from thence deduced and systematically laid down, that is an *art*; when, on the other hand, chiefly by the aid of higher intellectual capacities, that is, of the understanding, a system of truths is deduced by means of correct combinations from the most

(1) "On peut," says Puysegur, "sans guerre, sans troupes, sans armées, et sans 'être obligé' de sortir de chez soi, par l'étude seule, avec un peu de géométrie et de géographie, apprendre toute la guerre de campagne, depuis les plus petites parties jusqu'aux plus grandes."

Art de la Guerre par Puysegur, T. I. Avant propos, p. 2.

T.

simple and undeniable principle, and is established, that is a *science*.

Art changes or renews itself as often as the elements from which it originates. Music, painting, sculpture, for example, change in proportion as they degenerate or advance.

That which is scientific is, *a priori*, absolute and clear, and always exists unchangeable in itself.

Euclid's Elements of Geometry; after thousands of years, still remain an invariable standard.

This definition of art and science, explains at the same time the art of war (tactics), and the science of war (strategics); it simplifies the ideas, and renders what is to follow clear and intelligible.

Tactics, or the art of war, suffer changes by every system which a new war may produce. Strategics, or the science of war, act always by unchangeable rules.

The object of war is ever the same; but the manner of carrying it on is subject to changes.

The tactics of the ancients consisted in pressure and percussion; the invincible Macedonian phalanx was, however, obliged to yield in the end to the tactics of the Romans; the perfection of fire arms has done away with deep formations; the heavy fire of artillery has changed walls into ramparts; and the invention of *ricochet firing* has added *traverses* to them; the wars of the French Revolution mark the *seventh* period of the art of war since the invention of gunpowder, and it will not be the last.

Strategics containing acknowledged truths, indicate on every theatre of war the points and lines which in defensive warfare must be maintained, and in offensive must be attained; it is not in the power of the general to alter these strategical points and lines; he who deviates from them will always be obliged to yield to him who conforms to them, unless the one commander can advance with such superior force from his basis of operation, that the defensive rules of his adversary become inapplicable. If the superiority of one is so decisive, he may without risk proceed by the shortest route to his last object of operation, and there dictate peace; neither fortifications nor armies can then check him in his gigantic course, and he can be conquered by nothing but a war of the people.

It is astonishing what trouble has been taken to point out and determine the line of demarcation between strategics and tactics: a difference has been made between strategical and tactical manœuvres; nay, it was even maintained that manœuvres out of cannon shot, or out of the view of the enemy, were strategical, and that the manœuvres within this limit were tactical: it was further said, that tactics treat of the movements of an army whose immediate object is an actual engagement; that strategics, on the other hand, comprise the movements of an army so far as they are performed by marching: a difference has also

been made between tactics and the art of war, and they have been represented as subjects of a totally different nature, whereas they are evidently one and the same thing (1).

(1) The author's definitions of tactics and strategics are clear and true; attempts to give them a more limited form have been generally unsuccessful. Bulow says, "I define *strategics* the science of the movements in war of two armies, out of the visual circle of each other, or if better liked, out of cannon-reach; *tactics* are the science and movements made within sight of the enemy, and within reach of his artillery." The Prussian General, however, soon after gets himself entangled in his own definitions; for he tells us, that the marching forward in order of battle previous to an action is a part of tactics; and yet this, he allows, "may be performed out of reach of the enemy's cannon." It may also take place out of sight of the *front of his line*, which is the author's explanation of the words "*visual circle*;" there are likewise cases, he admits, "in which an army is so near an enemy, that, though there is no possibility of being perceived by him, it is nevertheless necessary to be in a state of defence, and prepared to manœuvre; for instance by night, or in a wood:" such manœuvring would according to the author's definition come under the head of *strategics*, whereas it is evidently an operation of *tactics*. See Bulow's Spirit of the Modern System of War, translated by General Malortie.

"Strategics," says the Archduke Charles, "are the *science* of war; they construct plans, they determine the march of military enterprises, they are properly speaking, the science of commanders-in-chief. Tactics are the *art* of war; they teach the manner in which great designs can be executed: this art is indispensable to every commander of a corps.

Grundsätze der Strategie.

The French translators of the Archduke's book are not, however, at all satisfied with these definitions of his Imperial Highness, and make the following note thereon.—"La distinction faite par l'auteur pour définir deux branches d'un même science.

In fine, strategics have been rejected as an inappropriate term, being derived from the Greek word *Στρατηγος* which signifies General (Feldherr) (1); and the expressions *higher and lower tactics*, have been substituted.

Every military operation (and every movement of an army which is directed against an enemy, is, according to Bulow, a military operation), can only be considered correct, when it is designed and executed according to the principles of strategics and tactics: that is to say, when first the most powerful objects and lines have been chosen according to the principles of strategics, thus the enemy not being able to impede us upon any side or upon any point, perfect safety of operation is

nous parait un peu trop recherchée. Pourquoi ne pas dire que la stratégie est l'art de diriger ses masses sur les points décisifs, et la tactique celui, de les y engager!" (*Principes de la Stratégie*). An observation which only proves that the French translators are ignorant of the difference between *art* and *science*.

The French have their *grande* and *petite tactique*, which are in fact only other words for strategics and tactics. Monsieur Guibert says "Il faut diviser la tactique en deux parties; l'une élémentaire and bornée, l'autre composée et sublime."

Essai general de Tactique, 1—6.

Major James, in his Military Dictionary, emphatically says, "Strategics are the *soul*, tactics the mere *body* of military science." Count Bismark's definitions are, however, more comprehensive, tactics are purely the *art*, strategics the *science* of war.

T.

(1) *Στρατηγος* is better rendered into German by the word *Heerführer* (leader of an army), which is its literal signification, being derived from *Στρατος*, an army, and *αγω*, to lead.

T.

therefore ensured; secondly, when the movement and position of troops, whether it be on a march, in camp or cantonments, is conducted according to those rules of tactics which permit of an advantageous engagement at any moment.

Every military operation, and every manœuvre, must therefore be established upon the principles of strategics, and executed according to the art which we are taught by tactics.

If strategics design not only the plan of operation for a campaign, but also the plan of each particular operation in it; if they mark the determined points and lines, the possession of which is necessary in order to gain the intended object; tactics teach by what positions, movements and engagements, these projects of strategics can be executed.

When a general neglects the application of strategical principles, we see battles take place which have no other object than to increase his military reputation by a new victory.

History tells us of entire campaigns in which several bloody battles have been fought, without however any important results, because those battles did not take place on strategical points.

As well in regard to strategics as tactics, every military operation may be divided into three parts.

Strategical into, first, the *subject* or *basis* of operation; second, the *object*; and third, the *lines* of operation.

Tactical into; first, *position*; second, *movement*; third, *engagement*.

By *basis of operation*, is understood those strategical points which are connected with each other by means of secured lines (roads of communication): these points (subjects), must be fortified, in order to collect therein the indispensable means of carrying on the war, and to secure them against any enterprise of the enemy.

An army acts *defensively* when it confines itself to the maintaining of those strategical points of which it is already in possession; and on the other hand, its operations are *offensive*, when it advances from these points, in order to gain other strategical points.

The points which are to be attained in offensive warfare, are called *objects of operation*; and the lines (roads), by which they are attained, *lines of operation*.

Let *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, be strategical points which in defensive warfare are to be maintained, but from which, in offensive warfare, the advance is made; in the first case, they form with the line *A, B*, with which they are united, the extreme *lines of defence*, and in the latter the *basis of operation*; and if an attack is made upon the *object of operation*, *C*, then the lines *a C*, *b C*, *c C*, *d C*, become *lines of operation*. (See plate I).

To continue the analysis. An army consists of three different descriptions of troops; artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

Each description of troop is complete in itself; each has its distinct character: the gunner, for example, is in battle directed only by the art which he practises; the infantry perform their duty quietly and collectedly; the cavalry, impelled by excitement, boldly and impetuously!

From these characteristics, the qualifications may be deduced which the leaders of different kinds of troops should possess.

Many nations of antiquity were partial to the cavalry, and so long as the art of war was yet in its infancy, or more properly speaking, so long as the sword, bodily strength, dexterity and personal courage gained the victory, battles were generally decided by the cavalry (1). It is, however,

(1) The number of cavalry in the armies of ancient nations was always diminished as those nations advanced in civilization and military discipline. When the Roman discipline was at its greatest height they had little cavalry; it was the same among the Greeks and Persians, in the time of Cyrus; and under the empire of Alexander the Great; as the Roman discipline relaxed, and their cavalry increased, the empire approached to its decline and fall. "La marque," says Folard, "la plus évidente et la plus assurée de la décadence des armes dans un Etat, et que la barbarie et l'ignorance s'y introduisent, est le grand nombre de cavalerie qu'il met en campagne." (*Histoire de Polybe*). Among undisciplined and unenlightened nations, the cavalry is the *first* arm; among those where discipline and illumination have advanced, it is the *second*; but a second so necessary to the operations of the first, that no victory can be perfected without its assistance. "C'est la

metaphysically true, that the fire of youth, which is so significantly personified by the cavalry, soon subsides ; particularly since the judicious practice of the ancients has been departed from—that of giving the command of this arm to a person only of youthful high-promising talent—to a truly war-like character.

Among the ancients, the General of cavalry was always the second in command of the army : this situation was given to men of the most brilliant genius, and was looked upon as the school of a Commander-in-chief. Hannibal commanded the cavalry in his father's army, and when he became Commander-in-chief, he entrusted it to his brother Asdrubal.

The greatest commanders of modern times must no doubt have recognised this truth, for Seidlitz, in his thirtieth year, was made General of Cavalry by his great king.

Buonaparte recognised and followed this maxim: he was, however, less fortunate in the choice which he made ; for Murat was nothing more than a bold soldier, without any talent for command (1).

Cavalerie," says the author of the *Essai Général de Tactique*, "qui décide souvent les combats, et qui souvent en complète les succès : c'est elle qui protège l'infanterie dispersée et battue : c'est elle qui fait les courses, les avant-gardes, les expéditions rapides, c'est elle qui tient la campagne ; toutes ces opérations sont nécessairement du ressort de la cavalerie, à cause de la célérité de ses mouvemens." T.

(1) Murat is thus emphatically described by M. de Segur,

More energy—more youth*—is required for attack than for defence: defence is often merely matter of necessity; a single man is easily excited to ward off an attack, but the attack itself always requires resolution; consequently, attack supposes more self-confidence (so entirely the characteristic of youth) than defence.

“Tel etait Murat, roi cheatral par la recherche de sa parure, et vraiment roi par sa grande valeur et son ineputisable activite : hardi comme l'attaque, et toujours arme de cet air de superiorite, de cette audace menacante, la plus dangereuse des armes offensives.” *Histoire de Napoleon, et de la Grande Armee*, 1-362.

* By youth, nothing more is understood here than that strength of will which is peculiar to the truly military character at any age; there are youths of 60, and old men of 20 (1).

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(1) Souwaroff was 70 years of age at the time of that retreat from Switzerland, which has justly been considered one of the most extraordinary military attempts on record; but nature had formed this intrepid General for war, and the infirmity of his body had no effect on the vigour of his mind. “Souwaroff,” says M. de Laverne, “etait doue d'une presence d'esprit imperturbable, d'un courage qui, comme celui des heros de l'Arioste, ne laissait point de comparaisor. Beaucoup d'esprit, et une etonnante perspicacite jointe a une longue experience, lui avaient donne une connaissance profonde du coeur humain. Il avait une volonte decidee; qu'aucun obstacle ne faisait fléchir; et cette volonte constamment tendue vers le but de sa fortune militaire et de sa renommee, devait d'autant mieux atteindre ce but, en brisant ce qui s'y opposait, qu'aucune passion ne detourna jamais Souvarof de son unique passion, la gloire.” (*Histoire de Souvarof*, 455). Je donnerois,” said Moreau, “toutes mes campagnes pour celle de Suisse du General Souwaroff.”

The predominating principle of cavalry, however, consists in attack ; for even in a defensive position, the real attack of the enemy can only be averted by an anticipatory attack (1).

(1) The truth of this principle was strongly evinced in the brilliant cavalry affair at Benavente, in 1808, which is one of the few instances on record, where one body of cavalry *awaited the charge* of another, and although in the second charge the squadrons which were attacked were not driven from their ground, as in the first charge, it can alone be attributed to the nature of the ground over which the British advanced ; and there can be no doubt that *cæteris paribus*, a body of cavalry which *awaits the charge* of another, cannot fail of being defeated, if it is attacked with boldness and impetuosity. For the following detail of the affair at Benavente, the translator is indebted to an officer who was engaged in the several attacks made by the British cavalry on that day :—" The cavalry having retired to Benavente, and the bridge over the Esla having been destroyed, the outlying picquet, consisting of 110 men, including 50 of the 10th Hussars, under the command of Colonel (now General Sir Loftus) Otway, was posted in the village of Castra Nuevo. At day-break, on the morning of the 28th December, Colonel Otway, on reconnoitring the enemies' position, perceived the whole of the French cavalry moving down the hill on the opposite side of the river, for the purpose of trying the bridge ; finding it impassable, they returned up the hill, but soon after, having endeavoured several times to find a ford, they plunged into the stream, and swam across. Colonel Otway, having previously sent to apprise Lord Paget of the enemies' apparent determination to cross the river, instantly called in his advanced posts, consisting of 20 men, stationed about a quarter of a mile up the river, and a party of the same strength at the bridge—these he immediately united, and at the same time sent orders for the 50 hussars in the village, to join him without delay ; he then retired towards Benavente, distant about two miles, disputing every inch of ground with the enemy, whose force amounted to between 6 and 700 men, of Buonaparte's best cavalry, (the Chasseurs of the Guard). Within half a mile of the

In this principle, is directly contained the characteristic of cavalry; and hence it is easy to infer why this arm so seldom possesses Generals of distinction, especially in those armies where chance or seniority appoints the Generals of cavalry.

town he was joined by the 20 German hussars, making his whole strength only 60 men. With this small force, Colonel Otway was determined to make a stand, judiciously conceiving that the further advance of the French might cause a surprise of the British cavalry in their quarters, and perhaps effect its destruction before the men could have time to assemble; he accordingly took up a position on the road near the town, having his flanks protected by the mud walls of some gardens in the suburbs—the country was quite open from thence to the river—the French continued slowly to advance—the British picquet still holding its ground: at this moment Colonel Otway was most opportunely reinforced by 60 men of the infantry picquet; and seeing that the enemy had halted one squadron considerably in advance of the rest, he resolved to take advantage of this disposition, by instantly charging the squadron thus advanced. The French cavalry *awaited the charge*—the British troops rushed on with tremendous impetuosity, and completely routed the enemies' squadron, the officer commanding which was killed on the spot. The second squadron of the French now coming to the relief of the first, obliged the picquet to retire with precipitation to its former position. General Stewart now fortunately arrived to its assistance, with a squadron of the Germans, upon which the picquet rallied, and the General placing himself at the head of the Germans, gallantly advanced to the attack. The French cavalry a second time *awaited the charge*; but here the unfavourable nature of the ground tended to diminish considerably the force of the British attack, for having 200 yards of wheat land to cross, in which the horses were fetlock-deep in clay, before they could close with the enemy, they came up blown and exhausted; however, notwithstanding this disadvantage, the charging squadron produced a considerable effect on the French

Without a bold commander, cavalry will furnish nothing worthy of remark for the annals of history ; and a General who does not partake of this conviction, can only succeed, when his adversary's ideas are more obscure and erroneous than his own, and when he is more unskilful and more remiss.

If it must be allowed, that the cavalry in the last wars has seldom performed any actions of importance, or decisive of the battle, the cause is less to be attributed to the cavalry itself than to the Generals who commanded it ; and directly, in this particular, an injustice seems to have been done, for the *species* has been blamed for what the *individual* has committed ! The injustice was continued, for the unskilful Generals remained, and the cavalry sank continually lower.

Thus is the immortal neglected and sacrificed on account of the mortal—the cause, on account of the person !

In the meantime it was wished that the event of a battle should be less determined by chance ;

with the sabre ; and by intermixing with the enemy, caused great confusion in his line. Both parties now retired to collect their scattered men, and restore order ; when Lord Paget, having arrived with reinforcements, supported by the 10th and 18th hussars, gallantly led the British squadrons a third time to the charge. The French made some feeble resistance, but were at length completely routed, and driven into the river, with the loss of 55 men killed and wounded, and 70 prisoners ; amongst the latter was General Lefebre Desnouettes, colonel of the Chasseurs of the Guard."

and attention was directed to the infantry, which, though not so brilliant in the results which it produces, is yet more certain, and for that very reason is to be considered as the principal branch of an army: the excellences of the infantry have remained nearly the same in all ages, whereas the cavalry always vacillated in proportion to the talent of its commanders.

We very rarely meet in life with men at the same time rational and unreflecting, but abundance of such as are rational and reflecting (1).

(1) This combination may appear somewhat paradoxical, and indeed, the German terms (*vernünftigen unbesonnenen*) do not admit of a comprehensible translation into English; the author evidently means to say, that a man possessing reason and prudence, seldom acts with temerity, or with what is generally understood by *dqsh*, a passage not containing precisely the same idea, but somewhat analogous to it, occurs in Hamlet's instruction to the players: "For in the very torrent, tempest, and (as I may say) whirlwind of your passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give it smoothness."—(*Hamlet, Act III. Scene II.*) Wallenstein seems to have possessed this happy combination of opposite qualities. Sarrazin, in describing the character of this extraordinary man, says, "To *boldness*, or rather *temerity*, in the conception of his plans, he united *prudence* and activity in their execution."

(*La Conspiration de Valstein*, 635).

The Peninsular war shewed that our gallant Commander-in-chief fully possessed this rare union of qualities so essential to the perfection of a great General. "The French commanders in Spain," says Colonel Jones, "were little fitted to appreciate that combination of *prudence* and *boldness* so happily blended in the conduct of their opponent." After citing the action of Fuentes de Honor, as the strongest exemplification of this fact, the author

A sufficient number of clever Generals of infantry have been found in all armies, and at all times, but very seldom *one* of cavalry.

The famous Macedonian phalanx withstood the numerous cavalry of Darius. The Swiss have proved that good infantry is invincible.

The English in India, and the French in Egypt, never feared those swarms of cavalry which Lloyd considers the best, because they attack irregularly.

Murat was unable to overcome with his cavalry a close mass of 10,000 isolated Russian infantry, which retreated like a blazing ball; on the 14th August, 1812, over the small plain on the other side of Krasnoe (1).

continues, " This contrasted conduct offers the highest display of *prudence*, judgment, and *boldness*, forming so pure an example of the legitimate use of battles, as must have been incomprehensible to the French commanders of the revolution, and by such they were constantly foiled, and the superior force under their command rendered of no avail."

Account of the War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France, by John T. Jones, Lieut.-Col. Corps of Royal Engineers.—xiv.

T.

(1) It is amusing to read M. de Segur's apology for the French cavalry on this occasion. After stating the many ineffectual attempts of Murat to break the Russian squares, and confessing that the French cannon alone was able to "breach this living fortress," he thus concludes, with all the consistency of his countrymen: "La cavalerie Française eut l'honneur de cette journée. L'attaque y fut aussi acharnée que la défense opiniâtre; elle eut plus de mérite, n'ayant à employer que le fer contre le

When such examples are supported by the calculation of how expensive cavalry is in proportion to infantry, it therefore very naturally follows, that the cavalry daily loses in its consequence.

The cavalry will, probably, in future times, only maintain the rank of frigates, and will no longer occupy a place in the order of battle: it will only be considered serviceable in reconnoitring, advance-posts, advance-guards, rear-guards, convoys, &c., until some eminent talent on a throne discerns its strength—out of the whole body of officers, places the cleverest, most resolute, steady, and boldest at its head, and in future wars overcomes those nations, who, following the spirit of our time, (which is ever less productive in truly warlike characters), neglect the cavalry*.

The first generals of every age were always impressed with a conviction of the importance of cavalry, and sought to give it a preponderance.

* The Russians have, according to Wilson, 80,000 regular, and 40,000 irregular cavalry. If a *Scidlitz* was at their head, what results would astonish the world in the next war!

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

fer et le feu; le courage éclairé du soldat Français étant d'ailleurs d'une nature plus relevée que celui des soldats Russes, esclaves dociles, qui exposent une vie moins heureuse, et des corps en qui les frimas ont emoussé la sensibilité."—(*Histoire de Napoléon*, &c. 1. 260). To this frozen sensibility and docile slavery, the Russians were, however, indebted for the preservation of their country.

T.

Epaminondas was indebted for the greatest part of his fame to the Thessalian cavalry. King Philip, and his son Alexander, sought the friendship and assistance of this famed cavalry, which so essentially contributed to their victories.

But all commanders of armies have not known how to derive advantage from the cavalry, which is best qualified for great and rapid enterprises, because but few possessed the art of seizing the true moment when to employ, and when to spare, their cavalry.

Hannibal shines in both respects. If he employed his cavalry to great advantage on the day of battle, and his finest victories, although not always gained by cavalry, were, however, constantly prepared and completed by it; his attention was perpetually directed after the battles to the preservation of this decisive, but very expensive, and delicate description of troops. After the battle at the Trasimenus, where he conquered Flaminius, and after he had penetrated to the territory of Adria, he had the horses washed with old wine, and bestowed great attention, that their wounds and bruises should be healed.

The Romans must have often paid dearly for the deficiency and bad condition of their cavalry; and Hannibal said of it, that this cavalry appeared to him as little to be dreaded as if the hands and feet of the horsemen were tied (1).

(1) This *bon-mot*, which is attributed to Hannibal by Livy and

Hannibal—the renowned Hannibal, was acquainted with cavalry, and knew how to profit by

Plutarch, arose from the extraordinary conduct of the Roman horse at the Battle of Cannæ, who immediately upon being engaged with the Carthaginian cavalry, *dismounted*, and *fought on foot*. This undepiable proof of their just claim to the title of *dragoons* is thus recorded by Polybius. “When the Spanish and Gallic cavalry, advancing from the left wing of the Carthaginians, approached near the Romans, the contest that ensued between them was then indeed most warm and vehement, such as resembled rather the combats of barbarians, than a battle fought by disciplined and experienced troops; for, instead of falling back and returning again often to the charge, as the custom was in such engagements, they were now scarcely joined, when, *leaping from their horses, each man seized his enemy*.”—(*Hampton's Polybius*, Vol. I., c. XII., p. 216.) This was certainly a most unaccountable fancy of the Roman dragoons, for being armed with swords, the longest of which was not more than thirteen inches, they could have no possible chance against even indifferent cavalry. Ancient writers state that the Romans were particularly successful in this dismounting process. “*Quo haud dubie superat Romanus*,” says Livy. Niebuhr, however, seems not only to doubt the alleged advantages, but also the fact of their fighting on foot. “When we consider this circumstance,” says he, “it seems inconceivable how, with their arms, they could even be equal to troops of the line, to say nothing of their deciding the battle.”—(*Römische Geschichte, von Niebuhr*, Vol. 2, 204. Note). Cæsar tells us of that ancient and warlike people, the Suevi, that they “often dismounted during the battle, and then mounted again, the horses being accustomed to *remain in their places, and wait for them*.”—(*Comm. L. IV.*) The modern cavalry practice of *linking horses* was, it appears, in those days quite unnecessary. Instances have occurred of cavalry being effectually opposed by dismounted horsemen armed with lances, a case of which kind is mentioned by Procopius, who tells us, that two Generals of the Emperor Justinian, not having sufficient force to resist the Persian cavalry, caused their horsemen to dismount, and forming on foot, to oppose their lances to the ene-

it; even from the Numidian cavalry, of which historians say, none of worse appearance could be found, and which may be compared to the irregular Cossacks of the present day—even from it, Hannibal knew how to derive such great advantages.

The horses of these Numidians were thin, small creatures, without saddles, and threw up their heads; the horsemen, who were badly clothed, managed their horses with a strap of leather, or a whip(1).

my's cavalry. "The Persians," he says, "halted, not knowing what to do; they could not break the battalion of lancers, for the horses were frightened at the points that were presented to them, and the Persians retired in disgrace without producing any effect."—(*See Sec. Hist. c. VIII*). Froissart says, "A la bataille de Cressy, le Roi d'Angleterre fit faire un grand parc près d'un bois derrière son ost, et la mettre tous chars et charettes, et fit entrer dedans ce parc tous ses chevaux, et demeura chacun homme d'arme et archer *a pied*."—(*Liv. I., c. 24*). Pere Daniel also, in his *Histoire de la Milice Française*, quotes the following passage from the same author. "Les Anglais se tirèrent sur les champs, et firent trois batailles *a pied*, et firent leur chevaux et tout leur harnois dans un petit bois qui était derrière eux, et s'en fortifierent."—(*V. I. 222*). The same thing occurred at the battle of Cocherel, in the reign of Charles V.; also at the battle of Agincourt, in 1415; and there are many similar instances in the reign of Charles VII. The horsemen of those days, however, made better infantry soldiers than the Roman cavalry at Cannæ, and by the depth of their formation and superior discipline, opposed a most effectual resistance to the enemy.

T.

(1) On the Trajan Column the Numidian horsemen are represented in a state of almost perfect *nudity*, having no covering

It was not until the victories of the formidable Hannibal had devastated Italy, that the Romans began to improve and increase their cavalry.

but a small mantle like a Capucin's; both man and horse seem to have belonged to the days of Adam—neither bridle, saddle, girdle, sword, or whip. Montfaucon gives the following explanation of one of these exhibitions of *la belle nature*; the horseman to which he alludes is mounted on a small, slight horse, from which a Roman soldier is endeavouring to drag him by the hair. “L'image qui suit nous représente un cavalier Numide, qu'un soldat Romain prend par les cheveux et abbat à terre: il a toutes les marques d'un cavalier de cette nation, tout son habit n'est qu'un petit manteau sur les epaules qui flotte en l'air, ensorte que son corps est tout nu, ce qui revient à ce que, dit Claudien, des cavaliers Numides; qu'ils branlent des javlots de la main droite, qu'ils etendent leur manteau de la gauche, et qu'ils sont nus: il n'a ni javlot, ni lance, cette arme lui sera apparemment tombée des mains. Le cheval n'a ni bride, ni selle, ni poitrail, ni croupiere à la maniere des Afriquaines. Il ne faut point s'etonner qu'un grand homme à pied puisse prendre un cavalier Numide par les cheveux, car les chevaux des Numides, dit Strabon, sont petits, mais legers à la course; ils sont dociles à un tel point qu'avec une baguette on les mene comme on veut, et qu'il y en a même qui sans etre attachez suivent leur maitre comme des chiens.”—(*Antiquité Expliquée*, T. IV., c. VII., l. III., p. 88). Under these circumstances, one must not be astonished, as the learned Benedictine says, to see a Roman foot soldier seize a Numidian horseman by the head; and perhaps it was with this intention that the cavalry of Varro dismounted at Cannæ. Folard treats this representation on the Trajan Column as “*une pure reverie de sculpture*,” and says, he is persuaded that “although the Numidians might have been thus clothed in their own country, yet that in the armies where they served, they must have been lightly dressed, like the hussars of his time.” There is no doubt, however, that the Numidian cavalry managed their horses *without bridles*; for Polybius, in describing the order of battle

The battle in which the Carthaginian general Xantippus made Regulus prisoner, was decided by cavalry.

In this battle the Carthaginians had 12,000 infantry, and 4,000 cavalry; the Romans, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry. The Romans were old tried soldiers. Xantippus had just raised his

at the Ticinus, expressly states, that "Hannibal threw into the centre of his line all the *bridled* and heavy cavalry, and placed the *Numidians* on the wings, that they might be ready to surround the Romans."—(*Hampton*, l. 178). Ancient authors called these horsemen *gens inscia freni*, from this ignorance of the use of the bridle, which indeed was common to all the African nations.

"Hic passim exsultant Numides, gens inscia freni;
Quis inter geminas per ludum mobilis aures
Quadrupedem flectit non cedens virga lupâtis."

. *Silius Italicus*, lib. I., l. 215.

The author of the "*Relation du Royaume d'Issiny*" (as quoted by Folard) gives the following description of the people of that country, the situation of which, however, baffles the translator's research. "Ils ne mettent a leurs chevaux ni frein, ni bride, ni selle, ni rien—tout est nu, et qu'avec une petite baguette, ils les conduisent ou ils veulent. Il y en a qui se servent d'une corde, qu'ils leur mettent autour du cou en guise de collier, et qui leur tombe un peu sur le poitrail." Strabo also speaks of this sort of bridle; but we need not go further for examples than the sister country; indeed, the Irish peasantry seem to have brought this mode of *equitation* to great perfection, for they may be seen not only perfectly managing a horse with a single rein, or rather, straw rope, but sometimes like very Numidians—"ni bride, ni selle, ni rien."

army ; but he calculated upon his cavalry, chose a plain, and—won the battle (1).

Hannibal gained the battle on the river Ticinus, in Italy, by his cavalry only (2).

(1) It is more probable, that Xantippus was indebted for this victory to his 100 *elephants*, than to his 4000 horses. The Roman infantry exceeded that of Xantippus by 3000 men. It was, as the author observes, composed of veteran troops, and had been so admirably drawn up by Regulus, in dense columns, that no cavalry, however superior in number, could have made any considerable impression upon it. The fault, however, which the Roman General committed, in not leaving intervals between his columns, sufficiently great to allow the elephants of the Carthaginian army to pass through, brought on the destruction of his troops, and caused the loss of the battle. “The greatest part of the Romans,” says Polybius, “were trodden down in heaps, under the enormous weight of the elephants.”—(Vol. I., c. III., p. 42). Antiochus Soter was indebted to the same means as Xantippus for the victory which he gained over the Galatians. He was, however, more conscientious as to the cause. “When,” says Lucian, “the Macedonians, after the victory, placed a crown upon the head of Antiochus, he said to them, ‘we ought to blush with shame at boasting of a victory of which sixteen beasts have all the honour.’”

T.

(2) This fact cannot be admitted as a proof of the advantage that cavalry has over infantry in action, which is evidently the application of it here intended by the author. The Battle of the Ticinus was, in point of fact, a *cavalry action*, for although Scipio brought some wretched light armed troops to support his cavalry, they took to flight at the commencement of the battle, “being apprehensive,” says Polybius, “that they would be instantly borne down by the Carthaginian cavalry.” The cavalry of Hannibal was always superior in *quality* to that of the Romans, and was here so much so in *number*, as considerably to outflank that

Polybius expressly says, "The Carthaginians owed not only their victory of Cannæ, but all their more early victories, to the preponderance of their cavalry, and thereby gave a lesson to all nations how advantageous it is to surpass the enemy in cavalry"(1).

of Scipio. The Carthaginians had the stronger motive of fighting, as it were, for their existence. Retreat was impossible to them, and death was preferable to submission to the Roman yoke. Nothing, indeed, but the height of imbecility could have caused Scipio to hazard an engagement under such disadvantageous circumstances.

T.

(1) This observation, coming from so deservedly celebrated a writer as Polybius, would carry with it much weight, and be almost conclusive of the author's argument, if the assertion was supported by facts. The defeat of the Romans at Cannæ, however, and on all other occasions in this war, can alone be justly attributed to the ignorance of their generals, and the want of discipline of their troops. If Varro had taken advantage of his superiority in numbers at Cannæ, by extending his line, and outflanking Hannibal, instead of forming his legions into deep masses, and thereby diminishing his front, the result of the battle would, in all probability, have been very different. The conduct of Varro, on this occasion, appears quite inexplicable. Completely deceived by the pretended retreat of the skilful Carthaginian, whose inferior numbers gave him no hope for success, but in stratagem, the consul not only suffered his centre to advance into the very heart of the enemy's line, but completed his own destruction by weakening his flanks to support it; until at length, the whole of his numerous legions were caught in the trap which had been artfully prepared for them. Even when the consul perceived the stratagem of Hannibal, he made no effort to restore the battle, but thinking that his personal safety was of more importance to the republic, than the result of a battle which might

The best Roman generals of that time, Fabius, Plancus, &c., avoided plains, on account of this deficiency in cavalry, and took up their positions upon hills.

determine the fate of the empire, he betook himself to flight, and gave the undisturbed possession of the field of battle to the conqueror. The small superiority *in numbers* of the Carthaginian cavalry, which only exceeded that of the Romans by 400, could never have decided a battle where 40,000 infantry were opposed to *double that number*; in fact, it was not until the Roman infantry had been already surrounded and thrown into confusion, that Asdrubal, at the head of the Numidian horse, assisted to complete that destruction, which the incapacity of Varro had brought upon the Roman army. Polybius must in this case have formed his judgment *after the event*, which, as our author truly says, “*is usual, but easy*.”—(p. 4.) The many defeats which the Romans experienced in their wars with Hannibal, have been principally caused by the want of ability in the generals who commanded them. Scipio lost the battle of the Ticinus by his imprudence in attacking, without any support, a body of cavalry superior both in number and discipline to his own. Sempronius fell into the ambuscade which Hannibal had prepared for him at the Trebia, from the unpardonable oversight of omitting to reconnoitre the country in which he was about to be engaged. Flaminius, notwithstanding the example of his predecessor, fell a sacrifice to the same want of precaution as the Trasimenus; and Varro, at the battle of Cannæ, was an easy victim to the stratagem of his more skilful adversary. The disparity of the two armies, in point of discipline and experience, should also be considered. Adam Smith is disposed to attribute the losses of the Romans in the second Punic war, altogether to the circumstance of their troops being *new levies*. “From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war, the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three Great Generals, who succeeded one another in the command, Amilcar, Asdrubal, and Annibal: first, in chastising their own

Meanwhile the Romans sought to amend their errors, and gradually to re-establish a proportion between the cavalry and infantry. At the battle of Zama, in Africa, the cavalry of Scipio amounted to the fourth part of his army. That of Hannibal was smaller in number, and was therefore overthrown, and when the victorious cavalry of the Romans, having returned from the pursuit, attacked the Carthaginian phalanx in flank and rear, 20,000 men were cut down in one moment, and Carthage became subject to Rome (1).

rebellious slaves ; afterwards, in subduing the revolted nations of Africa ; and lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which Annibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army. The Romans, in the meantime, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had not, during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence ; and their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies, which Annibal encountered at Trebia, Thracimenus, and Carage, were militia opposed to a standing army. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than any other to determine the fate of those battles."

Wealth of Nations, Vol. II. B. V. c. I. p. 62.

T.

(1) The numerical superiority of Scipio's cavalry at the battle of Zama, no doubt contributed much to perfect his victory, and to render it more brilliant ; but the injudicious order of battle which Hannibal adopted, gave to his adversary those advantages to which he is principally indebted for success. Indeed, the Carthaginian general seems to have been on this day deserted by his usual ability in tactics and fertility in resource. Instead of availing himself of his superiority in infantry, by opposing Scipio with

It would be easy to adduce many instances from that great age, in which the characteristic of cavalry shews itself like that splendid development of a powerful mind, which, since the use of fire-arms has kept the combatants at a greater distance from each other, becomes more and more lost.

More importance is attached to positions than to battles, and it is considered greater, frequently, even more honourable, to avoid than to give battle. Examples always descend in their operation, from the greater to the less; therefore, it is not to be wondered at, that single divisions of troops should exhibit more skill in avoiding a charge than in executing one, indeed, the instances of troops coming into absolute contact, and fighting with the bare sword, become every day more rare. It is the age of prudence, for prudence is always the excuse of that body, which not awaiting the charge of the enemy, previously retires.

It is only on that fine period when the system of chivalry was the system of war in Europe, that one dwells with pleasure.

a greater front than that of the Roman army, he formed his troops into three lines without intervals. The ponderous columns of Scipio attacked the first line with impetuosity, drove it upon the second, which being formed without intervals, was carried away with the fugitives of the first line, and, if the soldiers of the third line had not presented their spears to their flying comrades, the whole army of Hannibal would have been one mass of confusion. "Hannibal," says Folard, "*fut vaincu, et il devoit l'être.*"

T.

At this epoch, tactics consisted in the combats of knights ; personal bravery, bodily strength, and dexterity, determined the battles : the knights were covered with iron, rode none but entire horses, carried lances, swords, and clubs.

One is powerfully arrested by the magnanimity of this (in its true meaning) iron age.

Odd as what is termed chivalry may appear, still we must allow it was high-spirited to fight for opinions, when they were regarded as true and just.

Without some particular opinion no character is worthy of respect, and every independent character is not without peculiarities and oddities. The more uniformity we meet with in the characters of individuals, the less national character exists : the individual Englishman is odd, but there exists in England a national character.

Fighting was pleasure to the old knights, but they preferred fighting on account of their opinions ; the more the object had of the spirit of adventure in it, the more gratification did they experience.

Religion, which had its champions among the knights, was one of the strongest of these causes.

Loyalty and friendship were held sacred by them, and the colours of their mistresses the highest stimulus of their valour ; and although our young men of the present day become effeminate from love, and think they have a right to withdraw from danger on account of a wife and children, yet

among the knights these circumstances increased their valour.

Tacitus tells us of the Germans, "when it comes to an engagement, then is it a disgrace for the prince to be excelled in valour; a disgrace to his followers not to equal him in bravery.

"Most young noblemen voluntary join other tribes who are engaged in any sort of war, if the tribe to which they belong remains long at peace; for repose is unpleasant to these people, and honour is easiest acquired in danger.

"The companions of a prince contend amongst themselves for the preference in his favour: to have outlived him in battle, and to have returned home, dishonours and disgraces for ever; to stand up for him, to protect him, to attribute to him only the renown of their own heroic actions, is their most sacred obligation: the princes fight for victory, and the companions for the princes."

Who does not willingly dwell on such noble images? Surely we should not endeavour to destroy that which has descended to us from former times: that is strength, and strength is needful to a nation!

The system of chivalry did not disappear at once, but assumed by degrees the form of our present cavalry.

Charles VII. of France, established the first standing cavalry, in the year 1445 (1).

(1) "Ce fut en 1445," says Père Daniel, "qu'il fit ce Régle-

This example was approved of, and could be so much the easier followed, because the preponderance of the great monarchies no longer permitted knights to wage war on their own account, they therefore willingly entered the service of others, by which they obtained occupation, pay, and, at the same time, food for their ambition.

Of all the nations which have had cavalry, both of ancient and modern times, the European, and of them the German, are those which have brought it, if not in number, yet in internal organization, to the greatest perfection, and have executed with it the boldest enterprises.

The Spaniards owed their victories at the conquest of America, next to their fire-arms, chiefly to their cavalry, on account of the fear which the horses caused among the inhabitants of Peru and Mexico, to whom these animals were quite unknown*.

ment, après avoir beaucoup délibéré sur ce sujet à cause des inconvéniens qu'on en apprehendoit. Le projet fut de réduire la gendarmerie à quinze compagnies, qui seroient commandées par autant de capitaines et entretenues en tems de paix, et en tems de guerre, et de congédier tout le reste. *Hist. de la Milice Francoise*, i. 153. T.

* In the present wars, revolt of the Spanish colonies from the mother country, nearly all the victories of the Independents are determined by cavalry(1).

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(1) Captain Brown, in his "Narrative of the Expedition to South America," says, "the men in General Paes's province are now the only troops which the Royalists dread to encounter ;

At the battle of Ceuta, which Prince Eugene gained over the Sultan Kaara Mustapha, the German cavalry cut down, or drove into the Theisse, more than 10,000 Turks.

When the Duke of Alba entered the Netherlands in 1567, he brought with him 10 squadrons of lancers; this Alba was, indeed, the first who

their horses being so swift of foot, that they surprise the enemy in camp during the night, when they are supposed to be leagues distant" (p. 88). This swiftness of the South American horses is fully corroborated by Captain Head, in his late highly interesting publication; it really makes one giddy to hear this author talk off galloping from morning to night, and tiring from "ten to twelve horses a day;" even a cart attached to the horse does not appear to check his tremendous pace: "the rate," says he, "at which the horses travel (if there are enough of them) is quite surprising: our cart, although laden with twenty-five hundred weight of tools, kept up with the carriage at a hand gallop." This is almost equal to the pace of the "headless horseman," as recorded in Mr. Crofton Croker's "*Irish Fairy Legends*." Captain Head, however, accounts most satisfactorily for the almost supernatural speed of the horses on the Pampas, by informing us that "they cannot trot." (See *Head's Journey to the Pampas and Andes*). Though not such fast gallopers, the Persian horses appear to be capable of bearing more fatigue, and of going longer journeys, than those of the Pampas. In a recent work, which has been attributed to the enlightened author of the '*History of Persia*,' the writer says, "the marches they (the Turkumans) perform are astonishing! according to their own accounts, some have gone 40 fersekhs (140 miles) within 24 hours; and it was ascertained, on most minute inquiry, that parties of them, in their predatory inroads, were in the habit of marching from 20 to 30 fersekhs (70 to 105 miles) for 12 or 15 days together, without a halt."—*Sketches of Persia*, vol. ii. p. 19.

had brought his cavalry into such a state as to act with order, and in masses ; but his opponent, Maurice, of Orange, exceeded him. As he was at first deficient in cavalry, the Netherlanders caused troopers to be raised in Germany, who had neither complete armour, nor lances, and signalized themselves under the name of German horse ; even the French called them *reiters* (horsemen).

From the superiority which Maurice knew how to give this German cavalry, he conquered in the field of Tornhout, Tiel, &c.

At the battle of Leipsic or Breittenfield, Sept. 7, 1631, Gustavus Adolphus had apprehensions on account of the excellent Austrian cavalry, which, under the command of the bold Pappenheim, appeared formidable to him (1) ; his cavalry 9000 in number, proportioned to 13,000 infantry, without reckoning the 15,000 Saxons, was not, it is true, inferior in discipline and bravery to the cavalry of Tilly, which amounted to 13,000 ; but it was not so well mounted.

If Tilly lost this battle, in which both armies

(1) Naylor states, that Gustavus “ could not conceal his uneasiness, when he compared the accoutrements of his own cavalry with those of the imperial cuirassiers ; the latter being completely cased in iron, and mounted upon large and powerful chargers, while his own, for the most part, were destitute of armour, and rode on horses comparatively weak and diminutive.”—*Civil and Military History of Germany, by the late Francis Hare Naylor*, 1-555.

were of equal strength, namely, 37,000 men (1), the cause is not to be attributed to his cavalry, but to the faults which he himself committed, and which the bravery of his old experienced regiments, whom he sacrificed, could not restore (2).

Charles XII. occupied himself most particularly with his cavalry, and taught them to execute the evolutions with incredible rapidity; in 1707, he rode two horses to death at the review of a regiment; in the winter of 1705 he compiled a new Regulation-book. Indeed the cavalry, under him, acquired an *eclat* till then unknown, and he brought it to such perfection in the northern wars, that it became quite formidable.

(1) Historians do not agree as to the numbers of the contending armies at this battle: *Harte*, who professes to follow *Chemnitz*, says that "the Swedish army consisted of 8,000 foot and 7,000 horse, the Saxons in nearly equal strength, though 4,000 were cavalry;" the imperial army he makes 44,000. *Gualdo*, 19, makes the force of the allies amount to 40,000. *Puffendorf*, iii. 29, contents himself with saying, 'Supra septuaginta quinque millia bellatorum patentissima planitie concurrebant.' T.

(2) *Franchville* (422) states the errors of *Tilly* to have been, directing his efforts against the fugitive Saxons, without attending sufficiently to the situation of *Pappenheim*, who had been repeatedly repulsed by the Swedish right wing, forming his infantry into ponderous masses, thereby contracting his front, and exposing himself to be turned, and placing his artillery in such a situation in rear of his army, as to render it, in a great measure, unserviceable. It must, however, be recollected, that *Tilly* was completely forced into this battle by the impetuosity of *Pappenheim*; and that his character, at this period, had undergone a complete revolution. According to the testimony of contemporary writers, 'his courage and confidence, the result of victory in 36 decisive

In the reign of Frederick the Great, the cavalry reached the highest perfection, and was truly invincible.

Under the command of General Seidlitz, the cavalry no longer appeared as a stop-gap, and frequently an inactive one in the line of battle, but as an active co-operator in the victory, which, like the overflowing stream, carried away and destroyed every thing before it with irresistible force; but General Seidlitz always kept a mass of cavalry together, and possessed the secret of hitting the right time for boldness, and that for precaution: how bold and brilliant he appears at Rosbach and Zorndorf, how circumspect and cautious at Kunersdorf!

Seidlitz was certainly a perfect cavalry general; a century frequently passes over before a second is formed in the same army; this is no hypothesis—it is experience (1).

engagements, at once forsook him, and the guilt of Magdeburg overshadowed his soul, leaving it a prey to the most gloomy anticipations' See *Schmidt*, v. 4. *Harte*, ii. 16. *Puffendorf*, iii. 29.

T.

(1) For the following short account of the life of Seidlitz, the translator is indebted to a late German publication, intitled *Real Encyclopädie*, &c., a work containing much useful information, and considerable research:—

“ Seidlitz (Fred. Wilh. von) a Prussian general of cavalry; colonel of a cuirassier regiment; inspector general of cavalry in Silesia; knight of the Black Eagle; born at Klene, 1722. When yet a boy his many venturous pranks announced the future bold horseman: at seven years old he rode between the sails of a

A great cavalry General (that is, a General who possesses the talent of manœuvring masses of

windmill, which was in full action ; in 1738 he entered into the king's service ; was taken prisoner in the first Silesian war, but soon after liberated. At the age of 23, he was made Major ; took the Saxon general von Schlichtling prisoner at the battle of Hohenfriedburg ; and particularly distinguished himself at the battle of Sorr, in 1745. In 1755 he was made Colonel commandant of a cuirassier regiment : at the battles of Lowositz and Collin he confirmed the former proofs of his courage. In 1757, he drove Marshal Soubise out of Gotha in such a hurry, that he was able to entertain his king with the dinner which had been prepared for the dainty Frenchman. His boldest and most successful command was at Rosbach, in 1757, where he commanded the whole cavalry, and gained this memorable battle: Frederick, in deserved acknowledgment of his services, promoted him, in his 35th year, to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and knight of the Black Eagle. After the battle of Zorndorf, where he took several batteries with his cuirassiers, the king embraced him, and said, " For this victory also, I have to thank you." After the surprise at Hochkirch he covered the retreat ; at the battle of Kunersdorf he was obliged to leave his position, so happily chosen, in consequence of an order from the king ; the battle was lost, Seidlitz was wounded, and brought to Berlin. In consequence of the loss of this battle being openly attributed to the untimely order which the king had given to this general, Frederick became cold towards Seidlitz, and did not allow him to take any part in the war for several battles ; they were, however, soon after reconciled, and Seidlitz concluded his warlike deeds at the victory of Friedberg, in 1762. He died in 1773.

" Under a figure of Seidlitz, in Germany, is the following inscription :—' This is the image of the noble Seidlitz, general of the Prussians ; of friends of men, the kindest ; of heroes, the bravest : he loved his king, he loved truth ; too great for honours obtained by flattery ; too great for riches obtained by plunder ; benevolent, he spared the lives of men ; brave, he never spared his own. Ye warriors, cut roses for the altar with your swords—

cavalry) is as rare a phenomenon as a great Commander-in-chief*. The movement of cavalry requires a quick *coup d'œil*—a calm, firm mind—a boldness sometimes rash, sometimes cautious—in a word, a great deal of talent.

Often is boldness (which decides when exhibited at the proper time) destructive, when the general excites himself and his troops unseasonably.

The movement of cavalry at a trot is three times quicker than that of infantry in quick march, therefore, Ziethen's answer to his king, applies to a cavalry general, "the moment I see the enemy, my dispositions are already made" (1).

ye generals, sacrifice—ye friends, weep!"—*Real Encyclopädie*, vol. 9, pp. 69-70.

T.

* It is false, if maintained, that the word General—General officer, signifies the art of commanding all descriptions of troops: it has never yet been required from the leader of an orchestra that he should play on all the instruments; the use—the application of different kinds of troops, a General should know; but the commanding of them is as different as *knowledge* and *execution*. Frederick the Great said to Prince de Ligne, "Votre General Nadasdy m'a paru un grand General de cavalerie."

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(1) Zieten was one of the favourite Generals of Frederick the Great, and colonel of the celebrated *Death's-head Hussars*: he served upwards of 70 years, and died in 1806, at the age of 86; "uniting," says his biographer, "wisdom with courage, contempt of danger with perseverance, dexterity with presence of mind, and activity with the most perfect command of temper; he conceived his plans with the progressiveness of the rising storm, and executed them with the rapidity of the thunderbolt." (*Life of de Zieten, translated by Beresford*). Zieten's partiality for a

Since these Lectures, as the title denotes, are intended to treat merely of the tactics of cavalry, the author, in pursuing that intention, cannot be expected to describe the intelligence, and the necessity for the higher professional knowledge which Generals of infantry require, especially in unfortunate actions, out of which, infantry has so much more difficulty in retiring than cavalry.

The reputation of the cavalry, for example, is not effected, if it retires even in disorder after a repulse: whereas obstinate perseverance is required from the infantry; even under the most unfavourable circumstances, it can never suffer itself to fall into disorder with impunity; and once in disorder, once thrown out of a position, order is difficult to re-establish.

Imprudence committed in cavalry is not followed by such fatal consequences, and cavalry even put to flight, often re-appears in a few moments, con-

military life betrayed itself at a very early period. "Whenever a soldier passed through Wustrau on a furlough, a circumstance that rarely happened, young Zieten followed him closely, could never sufficiently admire him, and was eagerly solicitous of the honour of imitating and resembling him; the Prussian soldiers it is well known, wore their hair in a *queue*; every Saturday young Zieten requested his father's leave to go to Ruppín, a German mile from Wustrau, where a soldier of the garrison, with whom he had formed an acquaintance, dressed his hair *à la Prussienne*, and made him a large *queue*, well stiffened and powdered, which served to ornament him for the ensuing week: he was at this time only nine years of age," (*Ibid.*).

fidant and victorious; this is caused by the rapidity of its movement; whereas, and precisely on account of the slow movement of the infantry, the most experienced presence of mind is required to perceive the true movement which determines battles.

An open flat country is the ground upon which cavalry appears in its full perfection; great rapidity in all manœuvres is its first and most eminent quality, and by which it has obtained that superiority which so many fields of battle testify. *But a leader is necessary, in whose personal qualities rests the inexhaustible source of all successes.*

This has been acknowledged time out of mind—acknowledged even by those men who were prejudiced against the cavalry; as for example, Folard, who is indeed convinced of the worthlessness of cavalry, and believes that an army can exist right well without it; but however, with great naïveté confesses, that cavalry which is good and brave, and whose commander knows its strength, and has courage to put it in motion, would at any time ride down extended battalions.

“Infantry,” says Folard, in another place, “can never stand against cavalry, particularly since the former have given up the use of the pike. In the Spanish wars of the succession, in 1701, an officer of that nation was seen to dash, with 100 horse, through a battalion of English (which are certainly

not despicable troops), and to return back, in order to renew the attempt (1).

Also General Lloyd, who is against having much cavalry, because it is very expensive and of little use, contradicts himself eight pages afterwards, "If your infantry is bad," he observes, "your cavalry and infantry must be increased, as these are two means of keeping the enemy at a certain distance."

Montecuculi knew well the superiority of cavalry. "The most important act of an army," says this General, "is the battle; and the most effective force which operates therein, is the cavalry: it must consequently decide the event. If the cavalry is beaten, the battle is irretrievably lost: if on the other hand it is victorious, the victory is

(1) In the passage alluded to by the author, Folard is speaking of the *Spanish cavalry*, and not of *cavalry in general*; in justice to the Chevalier's consistency, it is but fair to give the context.

"Si la cavalerie Espagnole," says Folard, "connoissoit sa force, il n'y a rien qui pût lui résister, à moins que de combattre dans un endroit resserrée en lignes redoublées, et avec tant de troupes qu'on pût la casser et rompre la violence de son choc avant qu'elle pût atteindre à la dernière. Quant à l'infanterie, elle ne sauroit jamais résister contre *cette cavalerie*, encore moins depuis la suppression des piques." (*Commentaires sur Polybe, vol. 4. liv. iii. chap. xiii. p. 125*).

The appearance of the Spanish cavalry in later times does not altogether merit such an eulogy.

always complete(1); the battle of Würtzburg, in 1796, supports this position; it was determined by cavalry(2): but from the battle of Marengo, in 1800, may be shewn how ineffective the cavalry is, when deficient in a suitable commander.

The false point of view in which many Generals of cavalry have considered their force, has often done it irreparable injury.

(1) And yet the same author tells us, “ *L’infanterie est comme la base et le soutien de l’armée, soit pour les batailles, soit pour les sieges, et c’est avec elle que les Romains et les Suisses ont fait des choses si admirables. L’infanterie doit donc faire la principale force, et la plus grande partie de l’armée.*” (*Memoires de Montecuculi, liv. ii., c. ii., p. 242.*) This is very like inconsistency.

T.

(2) The battle of Würtzburg, was one of the few instances in modern times, where cavalry decided the victory: the gallant passage of the Mayn by Wartensleben, at the head of his cuirassiers, is worthy of a cavalry General; “this brave veteran,” says the Archduke Charles, “impressed with the importance of the order which he had received, dashed into the Mayn at the head of his cavalry, and swam across.” It is worthy of remark, that in this action, as well as in the affair at Benavente, the French cavalry awaited the charge; the archduke, after describing the attack of the Imperial cavalry under Prince Lichtenstein, adds, “this manœuvre was completely successful: the French cavalry, which had awaited the charge without stirring, was overthrown,” &c. Much blame is attributed to Jourdan for the loss of this battle, as he not only divided his force, but suffered his left wing to remain entirely unprotected; he also placed his cavalry in the first line, and opposite to that of the Austrians, which was much more numerous.

T.

On the day of battle, at that lucky moment when fame is to be acquired, the cavalry should never be spared; but the greatest attention must be paid thereto, in order that it may appear on such a day, vigorous; this, however, can only be accomplished by keeping up the condition of the horses, for the difference between horses and men is essential: and it should not be left out of view, that there is no room for acting upon the moral feeling of horses, and their good-will is never to be taken into the account: the soldier may be animated by eloquence; and, by flattering his sense of honour, he may be excited to new deeds and new efforts; but not so the horse. Cavalry, exhausted by unusual fatigue, require months to recover: horses certainly have stronger constitutions than men, but extraordinary exertions have also their prescribed limit; if this is carried to excess, the loss sustained from horses, exhausted through want of forage, often amounts in a few nights to an incredible pitch; and the bivouacs, when left in the morning, become images of horror.

A horse neglected in shoeing, for example, is generally unserviceable for the whole campaign. By far the greatest number of horses which the cavalry send to the depôts have bad feet, more than the half of which become totally unserviceable.

The fine imposing appearance of the cavalry, is now lost for the whole campaign: that such is the case is acknowledged, and does not admit of con-

tradition, but the real cause thereof is never looked for in its origin—the personal influence of the commander.

“This subject is so interesting, so important, so characteristic, and has such determining influence on the success or miscarriage of military operations, as the histories of all ages prove, that it does not appear unnecessary to call attention to it.

LECTURE III.

TACTICS OF CAVALRY.

TACTICS consist in position, movement, and attack.

There are positions and movements in battle, as well as out of battle. In the following lectures we will return to the subject; and first, only treat of the important positions in battle, and of the battle itself.

We will pass over the establishment, organization, and all that belongs to the equipment and formation of the individual man and horse, in order to bring a regiment to the unity of identity (*Einheit der Identität*), so that it may be like a manageable machine in the hands of the General.

These are the proper elements of the service: and are founded, partly on the national character, and partly on the taste and will of the commanders.

These are generally considered elements of tactics, and are called *Elementary Tactics*; but if tactics be the art of war, what is here understood as

elements of the service, cannot be considered as belonging to them.

The equipment and formation of recruits is no art, else every commissary and corporal would be a tactician.

Although Marshal Saxe derives the word tactics from the Romans marching in time (*tact*) (1); we understand something more, at present, from tactics, than riding and drill. These are the mechanism of war.

Horsemanship.—The formation of horsemen in general, is very important, and is to be considered as the foundation of the edifice of tactics; but no more tactics, than a foundation is a building. Pure military operations in actual war, respecting troops, belong to tactics: in peace, these can be no more tactics than strategics; for military operations can naturally never be thought of in peace.

Strategical objects are attained in war by means of the position, movement, and attack of troops.

The elements of service are now prescribed in all armies by means of regulations: and these

(1) The gallant Marshal was but an indifferent etymologist; the word *tactics* has nothing to do with *tact* or *tactus*; it is simple Greek—ἡ τακτική (τέχνη), the art of drawing up troops, from *τασσω*, to arrange in order.

On opening an Anglo-Saxon Grammar which has lately appeared, the translator met with a derivation that may vie with the Marshal's. *Tense*, says a note, comes from *tensus*, stretched!—it used to come from *temps*.

should be so perfectly formed, that from the private soldier to the colonel of the regiment, all duties should be determined therein, and clearly expressed. Such a work may perhaps be thus divided.—

ELEMENTS OF THE SERVICE OF CAVALRY.

FIRST BOOK, OR CODE.

- (A) *Military Law.*
- (B) *Discipline*, clearly and correctly detailed, as the basis of warfare.
- (C) *Justice, id est*, an explanation of the relation in which the soldier stands to the civil and criminal laws, together with instructions for the Judges on Courts Martial.

It must be pointed out where the soldier, as citizen of the state, is subject to its laws ; for it is unjust to punish him for offences which are not military offences, with that severity which characterises military law. Offences may therefore be divided into military and civil.

SECOND, OR SERVICE BOOK, in two Parts.

PART I. *General duties of the service*, or Regulation Book, with forms of Reports, Rolls, &c. &c.

PART 2. *Particular duties of the service, or interior economy of a regiment, with drawings and explanations of the arms and appointments of man and horse.*

THIRD, OR EXERCISE BOOK, in four Parts.

PART 1. DRILL OF THE DRAGOON.

Chap. 1. *Drill of the dragoon on foot.*

2. *Drill of the dragoon on horseback.*

3. *Instruction of the remount.*

4. *Use of the arms on horseback.*

PART 2. SQUADRON DRILL.

Chap. 1. *Drill of the squadron on foot.*

2. *Drill of the squadron on horseback.*

3. *Formation of skirmishers.*

PART 3. REGIMENTAL DRILL, or Manœuvres of a Regiment.

Chap. 1. *Formation from line into column, one movement.*

2. *Formation of lines, three movements.*

3. *Evolutions in lines, five movements.*

4. *Inspection and Review.*

PART 4. MOVEMENTS IN EXTENDED LINES.

Chap. 1. *Formation of column, one movement.*

2. *Deployment of the column, two movements.*

3. *Manœuvres in lines, six movements.*

FOURTH, OR, FIELD SERVICE BOOK; containing the whole Out-post Duty.

Petty warfare.

Advance-Guards.

Rear Guards.

Field Guards(1).

Reserve-Posts.

Advance-Posts.

Patroles.

Reconnoitring.

Convoys.

Requisition System.

Conduct in Winter Quarters.

*Ambuscade, &c. &c. &c.**

* The author has completed the third and fourth Books, according to the form here given.

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

The Fourth Book has been translated into English, and published, by the translator of the present work.

T.

(1) In the German *Feldwache*; the translators of Scharnhorst's "Military Field Pocket Book," have objected to the literal translation of this word, as being of *too general* a signification, and have substituted that of *outguard*; with what advantage it would be difficult to point out: indeed, *outguard* appears the more *general* term of the two, as it might apply with equal right to any of the guards outside the camp; whereas *field-guard* is, by its name, clearly distinguished from the rest. (See "*Military Field Pocket Book*," translated from the German of General Scharnhorst, by Captain Haverfield and Lieutenant Hoffman, 1811). The only terms used in our service, are *in-lying picquet*, *out-lying picquet*, and *advance-post*; whereas, in Count Bismark's system, there are *field-guard*, *assistance-post*,

Real examples, taken from the histories of particular wars, might follow the theorems as proofs of their correctness: while the names of those officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, who had distinguished themselves, being mentioned in the book, would excite the ambition of the young soldier; and this Fourth Book of the Elements of the Service, might become the Mentor of the army (1).

As in the artillery, the *matériel* is distinguished from the *personnel*; the former being applied to the

picquet, and *detached-post*. The field-guard is nearly synonymous with our out-lying picquet, but as he uses the term picquet to express a small post which is detached from the field-guard, it has been thought more intelligible to preserve the literal translation of the word *Feldwache*.—(See *Bismark's Field Service Instruction*). The field-guard of Bismark is the *grande garde* of the French, being the principal guard outside the camp, and from which all the other posts, picquets, &c. are detached.

T.

(1) This suggestion of the author's is highly worthy of attention, and might be beneficially adopted in the British service. A book, containing not only regulated theoretical manœuvres, but practical illustrations of their utility and application, would be a most desirable addition to our military works. How many young officers of cavalry are there who periodically act their part in the complicated movements of Dundas, without knowing the application of a single manœuvre? Nay, even arrive at the art of repeating the words of command, and present the appearance of comprehending their ultimate design, yet would be much puzzled if called upon to explain the object of their orders, or to

guns, ammunition, wagons, &c., and the latter to the effective men: and as, according to Theobald, the distinction holds good with regard to the art of war in general, the ammunition and provisions being considered as *matériel*, and the army itself *personnel*; we may, therefore, in a more limited sense, apply the same distinction to the cavalry.

The horses, horse appointments, and arms, will, in that case, form the *matériel*; and the men, in its true meaning, the *personnel*: and, in fact, this difference is easily seen.

Just as the most able artillery can do nothing with unserviceable guns, so can neither the most experienced cavalry have confidence with bad horses; and the campaign of 1812 has shewn, that cavalry, once dismounted, is no longer formidable to the enemy (1).

demonstrate the application of them. This disadvantage to the officer, and injury to the service, might be easily remedied by the addition of explanatory notes to each manœuvre, shewing its application in reference to the enemy, and illustrating its utility by citing cases where it had been successfully employed. The unmeaning intricacy of our present cavalry manœuvres, the theoretical part of which is incomprehensible to a young officer, adds much to perpetuate this ignorance of the principles of drill; movements more simple, and consequently more practical, would be easier understood, and easier performed; and the young officer, instead of being early disgusted with the study of manœuvres, would be encouraged in acquiring a knowledge of them, from a conviction of their utility. T.

(1) The original organization of *dragoons*, who, as Johnson

Napoleon had, in Moscow, about 10,000 dismounted cavalry, among whom was the author, then ill. They were formed into companies, battalions, and regiments, and armed like infantry;

says, are “a kind of soldier that serves *indifferently* either on foot or horseback”*, is, notwithstanding its generally acknowledged inutility, still most unaccountably persevered in: we have our instructions “how to dismount and form battalion,” which process has been neatly illustrated in a plate by an officer of the life-guards†; and the French have most elaborate regulations “*pour les dragons*.” In the year 1804, the French lost thirty good regiments of cavalry by making *dragons à pied* of them. The report made to the Minister of War, by the Generals who were charged with the revision of the then existing regulations for the cavalry, states, “*Les dragons étant rendus à leur première institution, et sa Majesté desirant qu'ils soient en état en mettant pied à terre, de se former en bataillon, nous avons pensé qu'il falloit rapprocher le plus possible leur ordre de bataille à cheval de celui qu'ils doivent prendre à pied*”‡, &c. The accomplishing of which object was so contrived as to render them unable to act in conjunction with other cavalry.

The system pursued in our service, though not quite so absurd as that of the French, is certainly very objectionable. An illiterate John Bull, or a classical Kerry Boy enlists, let it be supposed, for the dragoons, having been previously inveigled into this loyalty, by the Recruiting Serjeant telling him that he is always to *ride on horseback*. He proceeds to drill with both eyes and ears open for instruction, and both indeed are necessary to the comprehension of the varied lectures which he is destined to receive. The Riding Master tells him to turn his toes in §—

* *Tatler*.

† See *Instructions for Young Dragoon Officers*, by Major Tyndale, *First Life Guards*. London: 1796.

‡ *Ordonnance provisoire sur l' Exercice et les Manœuvres de la Cavalerie*. 1 Vendémiaire, an. xiii.

§ “Toes up and turned in.”—*Military Equitation*.

but after the first three days' retreat from the Kremlin, this fine organization, like so many others, was destroyed. The men dispersed right and left from the road, in search of provisions, and either fell into the hands of the Cossacks, or were killed by the inhabitants.

the Drill Corporal tells him to turn them out*; the Adjutant cautions him to keep six inches from his neighbour†; the Serjeant-Major insists upon his touching him‡; the Captain orders him to form squadron—the Major to form battalion! So that between cavalry and infantry, squadron and battalion, neither the patience of John, nor the Latin§ of Pat, can enable them to comprehend such antagonistic instruction. What can be the object of this dove-tailed drill? Surely it would be sufficient to teach dragoons so much of infantry manœuvres as might enable them to mount guard, escort deserters, and hunt *Rockites*, without setting them to march round a muddy field with sharp spurs on, at the imminent peril of opening a vein *en route*! The dismounting days of Varro, Henry V., and Cromwell, are gone by. The British infantry has established its independence: and there can now be no necessity for increasing its strength, by the addition of such nondescript animals as *dismounted dragoons*. To make the same man effective in both branches of the service, is impossible. The very circumstances which lead to his excellence in one, will prejudice him in the other; and the consciousness which a dragoon now feels, that the existing cavalry regulations permit the possi-

* "The toes a little turned out, so that the feet may form an angle of about 60 degrees.—*Position of the Soldier on foot*.

† "Six inches from knee to knee."—*Dundas's Cavalry Regulations*.

‡ "Taking up his touch, and dressing at the same time."—*Sir H. Torrens's Infantry Regulations*.

§ "And yet they say every cow-boy amongst them can speak Latin."—(*Story's Wars of Ireland*, vol. ii., p. 194). Which commendation is repeated by Dr. Smith, in his *History of Kerry*; and used by Mr. Moore, as an apology for his Latin quotations in "*Captain Rock*."

How much more importance the cavalry itself attaches to the *matériel* than to the *personnel*, may be seen from this, that its strength is never reckoned, as in infantry, by the number of men, but by the number of horses*.

Gustavus Adolphus recommended his cavalry to make crooked cuts at the heads and necks of the enemy's horses, in order, by wounding them, to cause confusion in the ranks (1).

bility of his being reduced to the level of a foot soldier, must effectually destroy that feeling of *identity* between the rider and his horse, which should be the object of every cavalry officer to encourage.

T.

* The artillery count their strength by guns, the infantry by bayonets, and the cavalry by horses.

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(1) The author, no doubt, alludes to the battle of Leipsic in 1631, where, according to *Harte*, Gustavus "ordered his dragoons to advance quickly, without discharging their carbines till within pistol-shot of the enemy, and to aim their blows at the heads and necks of the horses." This does not, however, appear to have been the general mode of attack of the Swedish cavalry, but practised on this occasion, in consequence of the superiority of the Austrian cuirassiers, to whom it was opposed: Gustavus imagining, that the Austrians might thus be more easily dismounted, and that then, their unwieldy armour would render them incapable of further exertion.

See HARTE. GALETTI. *Hist. de Gustave Adolphe*.

T.

In modern times, also, commanders of battalions have, with great success, ordered their men to aim at the horses of the attacking cavalry; adding, as a reason, "if the horse is down, the rider is no longer formidable."

Bulow details circumstantially, in his "Spirit of Modern Warfare," the effect which the want of forage has upon the movement of an army: "One imagines himself ruined," he says, "on reading the calculation of General Tempelhoff, and sees the enormous number of horses which an army requires; one fears that they would eat down a whole quarter of the world."

Therefore, it should be the particular care of cavalry officers to preserve the *matériel*. The horses must have rest and time to eat; they must be kept well shod; and the horse appointments preserved in the best order.

Cavalry has seldom occasion to send effective horses to the rear, in consequence of not having a sufficiency of men; but it oftener occurs that dismounted men are retained. The *personnel* appears of less importance, not on account of itself, but because, if there are means of keeping up the *matériel*, the *personnel* is never deficient; in fact, a dragoon well understands, under the pretext of foraging, how to take care of himself. Hence comes the constant complaint, "The cavalry plunder!" because cavalry officers would rather tolerate what cannot indeed be well prevented,

than neglect their duty—the support of the *materiel* (1).

This is one of the evils attendant on war.

(A) *Position of Cavalry.*

CAVALRY can only act offensively. Offensive operations require strength and energy; defensive, prudence and precaution.

Cavalry must have open ground, in order to display its force, or employ its energy. According to Theobald, this ground should be level and hard, or a gentle declivity.

The point which it is to defend, must either be in its front or flank, in order that the whole force of the charge may be directed there, when the point is threatened. Infantry, on the contrary, must be placed upon the line which it is intended to defend.

(1) *Pour établir le corps d'une armée, il faut commencer par le ventre.* “If this plain rule,” says Tempelhoff, “be once forgotten, there can be no military operations.” Both the cavalry and infantry soldier acknowledges the truth of the French maxim: and if the former illustrates more practically his belief in the adage than the latter, it is more to be attributed to opportunity than want of will. Frederick the Great gives us an amusing instance of obedience to this “first law of nature.” Speaking of an affair in the neighbourhood of Pless, he says, “During the skirmish, some pigs were heard squeaking in the village of Pless. This was the signal of a truce: the *pandours* left the Prussians, and ran to the village, to kill animals, which they were fonder of eating than they were of fighting.”

History of My Own Times, 1—124.

T.

It follows from this, that cavalry is never judiciously placed when in front of natural obstacles, but should be always at a distance, in order that a charge may be executed with force ; for example, behind villages, defiles, small woods, &c. To place cavalry as a protection to it behind a battery, is only to sacrifice it without an object : it would be better placed sideways, because cavalry acts much safer in flank attacks ; especially in oblique lines.

One of the first operations on the day of battle should be to place a large mass of cavalry in several lines, at a certain point, which, under the command of a General, should support the moment of attack with the rapidity of lightning. This General should receive his orders only from the Commander-in-chief, and should be, in every sense of the word, a General of cavalry.

It is not always agreed on where the cavalry should be placed in battle. It was long the custom to place it on the flanks : but this disadvantage arose, that the troops could not support each other ; and if the cavalry was beaten, the wings of the infantry remained without support (1).

(1) “ *La méthode aujourd’hui,*” says Folard, “ *est de se ranger sur deux lignes, je ne disconviens pas que cette méthode ne soit bonne, quoiqu’on voie rarement que les lignes se succèdent, tout dépend des têtes. Si une première ligne est battue, à moins d’une grande valeur et d’une conduite égale dans les chefs, il est rare que la défaite d’une première ne cause celle d’une seconde.—* (*Commentaires sur Polybe*). The Chevalier then proposes his

It is probable, that this separation of cavalry from infantry, gave rise to the opinion of cavalry being unnecessary; and, in fact, the two services appeared, in this manner, like corps acting independently, which supported each other so little, that it might rather have been said, each fought alone. If the cavalry was beaten, the infantry thought that it was lost, and no longer stood firm. This led the Generals to direct their

mode of reciprocal support, and recommends, that the cavalry should be placed in one line, flanked and protected by platoons of infantry, two of which he places behind each squadron, and a company upon each flank. Bulow says, "the cavalry ought to be placed behind the infantry, unless particular circumstances modify this rule: when posted in a second line behind the foot, it preserves the advantages of spring and vigour."—(*Spirit of the Modern System of War*). "In order that cavalry may be completely successful," says the Archduke Charles, "it is necessary that the first line should be followed by a second, and, if possible, by a third line of fresh troops."—(*Grundsätze der Strategie*). Jomini, however, will not assent to this necessity, and says, "La cavalerie déployée sur trois lignes, dans un espace flanquée, offre de graves inconvénients. En effet, les deuxième et troisième lignes, déployées derrière la première, partagent les dangers du feu d'artillerie, et d'une déroute sans pouvoir être mises en action: j'aimerais mieux des divisions de cavalerie disposées en colonnes, par escadrons, et placées suivant le terrain, que trois grandes lignes de cavalerie, qui sont presque toujours immobiles, et très-difficiles à manier."—(*Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires*.) On these conflicting authorities, it is difficult to form a judgment, but "*in medio tutissimus ibis*;" therefore, suppose we place the cavalry in one line, supported by columns of squadrons at quarter distance.

attention to the cavalry, and he who had a superiority in cavalry, endeavoured, in the first instance, to overthrow that of his opponent, in order to insure the issue of the battle.

In the thirty years' war, Gustavus Adolphus generally placed platoons of infantry in the intervals of his cavalry, because the Austrian cavalry exceeded his, and he wished, by that means, to strengthen his own.

This *mélange* of the two arms has found defenders, but without reason: if the cavalry was overthrown, the infantry, which was of no service to it, was lost (1).

(1) The destruction of the infantry did not, however, always follow that of the cavalry: a remarkable instance to the contrary occurred at the battle of Mollwitz, where Frederick tells us, that "two battalions of grenadiers, which had been placed between the squadrons of the right, maintained their ground, after the defeat of the cavalry, and joined the infantry in good order."

History of the Seven Years' War.

Defoe, whose circumstantial detail of the parliamentary wars, in his "Memoirs of a Cavalier," has always been considered authentic, states, that the Scotch, in the time of Charles I., adopted the same system of placing platoons of infantry between their squadrons of cavalry. They, however, had a description of foot, better suited to the purpose than either that of Frederick or Gustavus. "The Scotch parties of horse," says the Cavalier, "had always some foot with them; and yet, if the horse galloped, or pushed on ever so forward, the foot were as forward as they; which was an extraordinary advantage." "These," he adds, "were those they call *Highlanders*; they would run on foot, with their arms and all their accoutrements, and keep very good order too; and yet keep pace with the horse, let them go at what rate they

Frederick imitated this disposition in the battle of Molwitz, but confessed that it was defective.

The field of battle itself shews, in most cases, the proper situation for cavalry; where this is not the case, it must be placed in one mass behind the infantry. The rapidity of its movement allows of its being employed, unbroken, in many places during the battle.

would.”—(*Memoirs of a Cavalier*, vol. 2—87). In another place, he says: “I cannot omit taking notice, on all occasions, how exceedingly serviceable this method was, of posting musqueteers in the intervals among the horse, in all this war. I never knew a body of horse beaten that did so.”—(vol. 3, p. 119).

The labouring classes of the Irish, according to Mr. Gordon, are, or at least were, in the year 1798, gifted with a peculiarity of physical power, which would have made them very effective in this tactical *mélange*. “Their swiftness of foot,” says this historian of the rebellion, “and activity, in passing over brooks and ditches, were such, that they could not always, in crossing the fields, be overtaken by the horsemen; and with so much strength of constitution were they found to be endued, that to kill them was difficult; many, after a multitude of stabs, not expiring until their necks were cut across.” This latter *cat-like* property of his countrymen seems, however, to have rather startled the reverend author, for he adds:—“In fact, the number of persons who, in the various battles, massacres, and skirmishes of this war, were shot through the body, and recovered of their wounds, has greatly surprised me.”

See History of the Rebellion in Ireland, in the year 1798, &c.; by the Rev. James Gordon, Rector of Killegny, in the diocese of Ferns, &c. &c.; twenty-five years an inhabitant of the county of Wexford.—Hurst: 1801.

T.

By this arrangement, more solidity is given to the line of battle, not to mention, that the soldier, in the first line, will fight with more spirit, when he knows there is a numerous support in his rear; while an opposite effect is necessarily produced on his opponent.

Whoever has observed the reflections of a common soldier, will acknowledge the truth and justice of this principle.

“Small divisions of light cavalry,” says the Archduke, “placed behind the first line of the infantry, are sufficient, in order to pass through the intervals, when the advancing or retreating enemy lays himself open.”

If this maxim is followed, and the remaining masses of cavalry united on one point, and under the command of a talented leader, then the cavalry will do wonders.

The Archduke Charles further says, “The General to whom the cavalry is entrusted on the day of battle, should never be induced, by the representation of other Generals, to divide the mass of his cavalry, nor attempt to give them insufficient assistance with the fragments of it.”

The Austrian Generals seldom followed this principle; on all open parts of a position, in all plains through which a column of infantry had to march, the cavalry was divided throughout it: the latter lost its solidity, and the former did not decide the battles.

(B) *Movement of Cavalry.*

THE movement of cavalry must be rapid and unexpected, and bear the character of determined confidence.

It must be endeavoured, by outflanking the enemy, to come upon his flank unexpectedly, in order that no time should be afforded him for a counter-movement. .

This is more easy to perform against cavalry than infantry, because infantry can always form squares before the cavalry can charge.

It appears, therefore, more advisable, first, to try the solidity of the infantry, by single detachments, thereby fatiguing it, and thus reserving to the cavalry the advantage of the charge; for the failure of a charge is annoying, and re-acts very disadvantageously.

This object is best attained by echelon movements.

Some innovators have proposed employing the close column against infantry. By that, the last division, which suffers less of the fire, drives forward the leading divisions, according to the proverb, "One wedge drives the other!" But since the perfection of fire-arms, it has been found necessary to give up deep formations in such attacks.

There are cases where a sudden attack might be so decisive, that it would be a fault to lose the favourable moment by first deploying; it is then

indifferent in what manner the enemy is attacked, whether in open or close column, or in line; in order or disorder:—an example of which we have in General von Römer, at the battle of Mollwitz. But this is only an exception to the general rule.

The Austrian army, under Field Marshal Neuperg, was nearly surprised by the King, at Mollwitz, April 10, 1741.

General Schulenburg commanded the Prussian cavalry, and General von Römer the Austrian.

When General von Römer arrived, he observed that the Prussians were wheeled by squadrons to the right, in order to gain the village of Herrendorf, on which their right wing was to rest. Without deploying, but in column as he was, General Römer attacked his adversary at full speed, and consequently overthrew him (1).

Both the cavalry Generals fell in this battle.

Flank movements may be executed in various ways. The Archduke Charles, and Theobald, justly recommend placing regiments in column behind the first line.

(1) It should, however, be recollected, that the Austrian cavalry was, on this occasion, *three times stronger* than the Prussian, and ought to have defeated it under any circumstances. "Römer," says Jomini, "le chargea en pleine carrière et en colonne. Les trente escadrons qu'il menait, culbutèrent facilement les dix escadrons Prussiens, dont chacun présentait le flanc gauche."

Traité des Grandes Operations Militaires, 1—11.

But—and particularly against cavalry, the enemy may be surprised, by a change of front performed at a gallop, or by a formation in an oblique line.

Tried and experienced regiments are necessary for its performance, which is always presupposed.

Echellon manœuvres have many advantages, because they favour much the formation of oblique lines. An echellon from the centre would greatly facilitate in outflanking the enemy (1).

(1) The successful attacks of cavalry at Strigau and Kessel-dorf, are supposed to have been made *en echellon*; but some writers have expressed doubts of that order of battle being originally intended on those occasions; and appear to think that it arose solely from accidental circumstances. The author of the "Essay on the Art of War," suggests the probability of the *echellon* advance of the Prussian cavalry at Strigau and Hohenfreidburg, being caused by its having to pass through the infantry by squadrons, to attack the Austrian foot; and that "the first squadrons moving on at a brisk trot, and the last endeavouring to form line with them, an oblique position was thus gained, and they approached the enemy *en echellon*."

General Warnery is very strenuous in his recommendation of this order of battle; which, though possessing many advantages, must yet, altogether, depend for success upon the effective charge of the first squadron; for if that squadron is routed, the next may be taken in flank, at the very moment that it is advancing to the charge. Some further observations on the *oblique* order of battle will be found in a note on the eighth Lecture.

(C) Engagement of Cavalry.

A CHARGE of cavalry is very uncertain, and the least unexpected resistance often causes it to fail.

Hence it follows, as a rule, to surprise the enemy when possible, but to guard well against a surprise.

The first can be effected by rapid movements upon one or both flanks of the enemy, or even upon his second line, if we have superiority of numbers: the latter is effected by uniting the whole force; in order to keep up a superiority, and placing the troops in one, two, or three lines, according to circumstances; at the same time, taking care to guard the flanks.

The attack itself must be performed with that impetuosity, which can alone ensure success.

But because the charge requires the application of every power, and the cavalry is thereby brought to a great pitch of excitement, which is succeeded by the opposite extreme of exhaustion; and that the effective charge is the immediate result of the greatest exertion, and thereby the line is lost on account of the unequal strength of the horses; therefore, at the moment when the gallop is increased into the charge, no means must be left untried, to excite that spirit of enthusiasm, even to ferocity, which all brave cavalry possesses during an attack.

Strength is exhausted in the application, and in proportion to it ; so that after the maximum of exertion, that of exhaustion follows*. We must, therefore, endeavour to secure success, before the excitement subsides.

Cavalry is never weaker, nor easier to overcome, than after a successful charge.

Before the horses recover their breath, and before the men are again able to exert themselves, tumultuous noises are heard—each individual wishes to relate to his friend or comrade what has particularly happened to him—but no word of command is attended to. In vain the trumpets sound the *appel* ; in vain the senior officers exert themselves to re-form the line ; should a fresh force of the enemy appear at such a moment, the attacking party will retreat as quick as they before advanced. But a second line, pushed forward afterwards, at a trot, would provide against such misfortunes.

If the enemy could be engaged on all points, and then a fresh line advanced, then, as at Würzburg, victory would be always certain.

Whoever has seen the fine and numerous cavalry of the Allied Powers, in 1813 and 1814, must have regretted that no General-in-Chief was placed at its head. What would not such cavalry then have performed ?

* *Principles of Strategy*.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

A victory is not brilliant—not perfect, where cavalry do not follow it up; but the loss of a battle is destructive—fatal to the enemy, which is determined by cavalry (1).

(1) The battles of Salamanca and Marengo furnish us with brilliant illustrations of this fact: in the former, the rapid and well-directed attack of Major-General d'Urban and Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey, upon the left of the French line, was the principal cause of its defeat;* and the furious charge of the German cavalry, under the Baron de Bock, on the 23d, completed the destruction of the enemy's columns. On this day, the gallant Germans are said to have successively charged two columns of French infantry up a hill, both of which they completely routed, and afterwards obliged a third to throw down their arms.—(See Colonel Jones's *Account of the War in Spain*, &c. *Correspondence from the Theatre of War in the Peninsula. London Gazette*, &c.) In the latter case, if the Austrians had followed up their first successes, by pressing their numerous cavalry on the French lines, Buonaparte would not have had occasion to boast so often of the victory of Marengo. The results of this day exhibit two important truths, which the author of this work so justly impresses upon his readers—the inefficacy of *superior numbers* without an *able leader*, and the efficiency of a small force, commanded with *judgment and bravery*. The Austrian cavalry at Marengo, was, at least, double that of the French, and yet the latter decided the victory. The following authentic account of General Kellerman's decisive charge on that day, is attached to a highly instructive little work, lately pub-

* While the Portuguese cavalry under General d'Urban, and Colonel Hervey's squadrons of the 14th Dragoons, supported Lord Wellington's masterly attack upon the French left, the cavalry under Sir Stapelton Cotton attacked the enemy in front, and drove him from one height to another, constantly gaining upon his flank: the British cavalry afterwards made a most brilliant and successful charge against a body of French infantry, which was completely cut to pieces—in this charge, the gallant General le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade.

lished by an Officer of Artillery: it is given on the General's own testimony, and must therefore be read with peculiar interest.

“The action was commenced—Dessaix had driven back the enemy's tirailleurs on the main body; but at the aspect of this formidable column of six thousand Hungarian grenadiers, our troops hesitated. I was advancing in line, even with them, on the right of the road, being rather concealed by some vineyards, and observing every thing which passed. It was, no doubt, at this instant, that Dessaix received his death wound; for after a tremendous discharge from the enemy, I perceived our line waver; it bends, and is on the point of giving way: the Austrians pursue in haste; they are in disorder, and in confidence of victory: I perceive this; I am in the midst of them, and they have laid down their arms. All this passed in less time than it has taken me to write these half-dozen lines.” “This column of infantry,” he continues, “was flanked on its left by a body of 1200 horse; and, as if they had been paralysed, they remained motionless and passive spectators of a catastrophe, which they might have averted at the moment; I saw this, and stopping the advance of half my column, I replaced them in line, before they had engaged, and sent them against the cavalry, which was, by this manœuvre, kept in check. Thus did 200 men cause 6000 grenadiers to lay down their arms.”—(*Notes on the Campaign of the Army of Reserve, in 1800, p. 52. Note.*) It has often been asserted, and is generally believed, that the advance of Dessaix's corps at Marengo, changed the fortune of the day; but the above statement shews, unquestionably, that, unaided by the effective charge of heavy cavalry, under Kellerman, the French infantry would have been totally unable to overcome the numerous Austrian columns.

T.

LECTURE IV

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE ENGAGEMENT.

THE art of attack is the most difficult part of tactics. The moments for attack must be shewn, as well as those of position and manœuvre; but that tranquillity and calmness, which is so necessary for ensuring success, does not extend to the engagement itself.

The human heart plays too important a part in this collision, to admit of this part of the art of war being brought under one regular point of view.

The cause can certainly be nowhere found but in the human heart, of two lines of cavalry resolutely advancing to the charge, and when arrived from fifty to sixty paces from each other, one line suddenly going about, and taking flight (1).

(1) Guibert gives the following excellent description of what generally occurs at an affair of cavalry: "Communément un de

Will it not be granted, also, that many Commanding Officers, instead of being calm and composed, fall into a passion, and *scream* instead of commanding; thereby not only confusing their troops, but also themselves; so that, at last, they know not what they are about. It is not, however, to be denied, that courage is capricious, and that troops will fight better on one day than another.

When Marshal Saxe has already remarked, that the same troops who were beaten behind intrenchments, have gained the victory when they made the attack, we may well be of his opinion, that nothing is more variable than the courage of a soldier.

deux escadrons allant à la charge, ou n'arrive pas sur l'ennemi, ou ne l'attend pas. Celui dans lequel se trouve la moindre quantité de courage, flotte, se dérange, tourbillonne par les ailes, fuit, ou ne rend plus qu'un combat très-court et sans vigueur. Mais lorsque les deux escadrons ne sont composés que d'hommes et de chevaux aguerris et exercés au même point, voici comment se passe leur charge: les rangs s'enchassent mutuellement, les chevaux cherchent d'eux-mêmes les intervalles; les cavaliers se joignent corps à corps, tout se mêle au point que les escadrons passent les uns derrière les autres, et dans cette mêlée ce sont alors les chevaux les plus agiles et les hommes les plus adroits qui décident le combat."—(*Essai Generale de Tactique*, 1—187. Note). The second charge of the British cavalry at Benavente, may be considered as an illustration of the latter case alluded to by Guibert.

It is no easy matter to alternate the days of courage and of timidity—*à tempo*, as they say in the fencing school.

Great example, the constant coolness and composure of the officer, who is placed at the head of the troops, the confidence of the private soldier in his leader, and the belief that he does nothing without an object, control the irresolution of the soldier, and are the means of counteracting the capriciousness of courage.

The Commander, as has been already shewn, should use his utmost exertions to excite the enthusiasm of his troops at the moment of the charge; but there should be no necessity for increasing his own courage.

The soldier is a severe observer, and judge of his officer: he does not expect from him the qualifications of a combatant; but with much more reason, those of a Commander!

It would be an interesting thing for the philosopher to observe the moment in which battles are determined.

This moment takes the young soldier by surprise, while the veteran foresees, nay, often knows, the result of the battle before it has begun.

This presentiment is founded, partly on the moral condition of the troops, which may have arisen from previous misfortune, or want of pro-

visions, but oftener on their want of confidence in the capacity of their leaders.

The winning or losing of a battle depends often upon some small, unimportant accident, not taken into the calculation of the General*.

* Von Brettschneider relates :—"The great discovery which I here communicate to the world more than fifty years after it took place, is nothing less than the cause why the battle of Kollin was gained. I was at that time with the Saxon *chevaux legers* : we stood in order of battle, on this said day, from morning till noon ; on a rising ground, indeed, but, however, a little covered by the extensive summit of the mountain, behind which we could no more see the enemy than they could see us. On our right flank, the cannon roared so incessantly, that we could hear but little of the fire of small arms. Immediately near us, a village was set fire to, which the Croats had occupied : we, however, remained quite at rest, and without any occupation. Before me, as I stood in the ranks, was a shady tree, under which Colonel Von Benkendorf, of Prince Charles's regiment, had established his dinner-table. This circumstance made a deep impression on my memory, because the ham which the Colonel was eating, and the *garde du vin* which he emptied, appeared to me of more importance than anything else. Scarce had he finished his bottles, when, behold ! the aide-de-camp of Field-Marshal Daun rode along the front, bringing an order to all Commanders of brigades and regiments to retire, naming the place where we were to re-assemble at. He had scarcely gone, when Colonel Benkendorf rode up to the top of the hill ; and coming back with a red face, called out—"The enemy is coming on !—those that wish, may retire ; but let all brave fellows follow me !" So we all followed him, because we were all brave fellows. We Saxons rushed in upon the infantry, and cut them to pieces. The Austrian regiment St. Ignon, which stood by us, followed our example ; and so, by degrees, the whole of Nadasty's cavalry. The battle was won : if we had followed the aide-de-camp's order, it would have been lost. Now, the grand problem is :

The circumstances, by which troops lose their self-possession, are often inexplicable.

Marshal Villars relates, that at the battle of Friedlingen, the French infantry had completely broken the Austrians, and pursued them through

Whether, if Colonel Benkendorf had not finished the last bottle, he would have taken this daring step? 'I say, *quod non*: because it yet always annoys me to think that, in the most extreme anxiety of my stomach, the man should eat and drink before my nose, without taking the least notice of me and my wants. Thus is the victory of Kollin, like many thousand other great events in this world, to be attributed to the bottle*.

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

* Von Brettschneider's story throws quite a new light on the battle of Kollin; and all his readers must agree in the deductions which he has made from Colonel Benkendorf's bottle. It is strange that so curious a fact should have eluded the inquiries of both Lloyd and Tempelhoff. The latter, who has given a most detailed account of the battle of Kollin, thus alludes to the conspicuous part taken by the Saxon Colonel on that day:—"The most important events frequently take their rise from the merest trifles, as was the case in this battle. Had it not been for Lieutenant-Colonel B——, of the Saxon regiment of cavalry, happening to observe that the ground between Kretzoeor and the Wood could not be maintained by cavalry, and that General Nadasti perceived the justice of the remark, and that infantry were ordered to take up the ground; that cavalry would, in all probability, have been routed by General Zieten; and General Halser, when he had taken possession of the village of Kretzoeor, might have taken their army in flank and rear."—(*Tempelhoff's History of the Seven Years' War*). Jomini is also silent as to the immediate cause of Col. Benkendorf's valour. However, Brettschneider's story is not the less worthy of credit, for we have a striking instance, in later times, of the great effect produced by artificial spirit. "On the 16th May," says Müller, "Buonaparte ordered the bridge of Lodi to be stormed. The French grenadiers and carabineers being chiefly selected on this occasion, drank deep of brandy, and then obeyed the commands of their chief, under a shower of grape-shot."—(*Science of War*, vol. iii. p. 400).

"Quid non ebrietas designat?"———says Horace.

"——— in prælia trudit inertem."

l Epist. 5—16.

T.

a wood, into a plain on the other side of it, when somebody suddenly called out, "We are cut off."

Some squadrons, which were seen by this victorious infantry, at that moment in the rear, and which were erroneously imagined to be the enemy's cavalry, caused it to fly in the greatest disorder, and even without being either attacked or pursued, and notwithstanding all the trouble of the Marshals and Generals, nothing could bring it to stand again.

Had not the French cavalry, at the same time, completely routed the Austrians, and retained the victory, Marshal Villars would have lost the battle.

Modern history furnishes sufficient examples to shew, that troops, who, like solid walls, have withstood the hottest fire, and could not be overcome, yet have retired precipitately, after the Commander has ordered the retreat.

The whole scene is changed.

When a few minutes before, great lines were seen, the army now appears vanishing in columns of retreat, the thundering of the cannon ceases, all is solemn stillness.

It can be easily imagined, what effect all this must have upon the minds of the soldiers, and this is the psychological part of war.

If a battle is once irretrievably lost, any attempt made to restore it, is fruitless; the bravest regi-

ments yield to the attack, even when they have a decided advantage in point of numbers.

The whole mental tone is as rapid in its changes as fortune: when a man has no longer any hope of success, every exertion is irksome to him, and he shrinks from danger; only a few individual characters resist this impulse, but they are hurried away with the rest.

The astonishing result of the battle of WATERLOO, may be explained by this cause; the moral force of both armies was equal: the French had even a stronger motive; they fought for their existence: nor did the physical force in the evening preponderate to their disadvantage, for they brought forward against the attack, on their right flank, a corps of the army which had not yet been under fire; and yet, once the line of battle was lost, what unprecedented disorder and flight!

If from 15 to 20,000 men had been placed in Genappe, with determined orders either to die there or check the victory of the enemy, farther misfortune might have been prevented.

A few cannon-shots, and the bugle of the Prussians, were sufficient to make the flight general(1).

(1) The French translation of this work contains the following note upon the above statement of the author:—"Les pertes énormes que les alliés ont éprouvées dans cette journée, prouvent de reste avec quelle valeur les Français ont combattu leurs innombrables ennemis. D'ailleurs, n'étaient-ce pas ces mêmes Prus-

Where, but in the human heart, can the causes of this be found? Psychology can alone explain it.

siens que nous avons si souvent battus?—n'étaient-ce pas aussi ces Anglais qui n'avaient jamais osé nous attendre que derrière des retranchemens inexpugnables, et qui ne nous attaquaient que quand ils étaient des plus nombreux?"—(*Tactique de la Cavalerie, traduit de l'Allemand, par Max. J. de Schauenburg, Chef d'Escadron, &c. c. iv. p. 61. Note*). This allusion to the English troops, is, perhaps, the most striking instance of assertion without fact, that has ever appeared in print. There are few actions on record, where the troops of England and her allies have been opposed, even in *equal numbers*, to those of the French, and it would be difficult to point out *one* where they have been *superior*. Indeed, our most celebrated victories over the French have been gained with an *inferiority* of force that is quite extraordinary. At the battle of CRESSY, August 1346, Edward's army was not *one-fourth* of the French: at POICTIERS, the Black Prince had only *twelve thousand men*, not one-third of whom were English, and the army of King John, of France, amounted to upwards of *sixty thousand*: at AGINCOURT, 1415, the French army was *four times* greater than the British: at BLENHEIM, 1704, the French brought into the field near *sixty thousand men*, and *ninety* (some say *one hundred*) pieces of cannon; the allies had, at most, *fifty-two thousand men*, and only *fifty-two* pieces of cannon: at RAMILLIES, 1706, the allied army amounted to *thirty-five thousand* infantry, and *twenty-nine thousand* cavalry; to which the French opposed *forty thousand* infantry, and *thirty-five thousand* cavalry: at OUDENARDE, 1708, the French army exceeded that of the allies by *twelve thousand men*: at MALPLAQUET and MINDEN, they were also superior in number, with the advantage, in the former action, of a *triple entrenchment*. The battle of FONTENOY might almost be added to the list, for it was the *Irish brigade*, and not the French, which gained that victory. To continue the inquiry: at MAIDA, July 1816, Sir John Stuart's gallant corps of *four thousand eight hundred men*, without a single squadron of cavalry, defeated the army of General Reynier, consisting of

Great preparation is necessary for the moment upon which the loss or gain of a battle depends.

Frequently—when the battle has already continued for many hours, along the entire line, the General endeavours to destroy some weak point of his adversary; and this is that high talent,—that cool, experienced eye—that gifted glance—which no *study* can teach, but must be *innate*:

seven thousand infantry, and three or four hundred cavalry: at CORUNNA, 1809, Sir John Moore's exhausted army, after a retreat of 200 miles, under all the disadvantages of position, want of cavalry, and artillery, defeated troops who were superior both in number*, and previous moral force: at BAROSSA, 1811, Sir Thomas Graham's fatigued army of four thousand men, completely routed that of Marshal Victor, which was nearly double the number: eighteen thousand three hundred British troops, at TALAVERA, in 1809, sustained, unbroken, the utmost efforts of forty-eight thousand French:—in fact, it was not until the Spring of 1813, that the contending armies, in the Peninsula, were on any thing like an equality. The result of that equality is well attested by the victories of SALAMANCA, VITTORIA, THOULOUSE, &c. &c. WATERLOO now comes to complete the picture. At that battle, so glorious to the English troops, the army of Napoleon, according to the lowest enumeration, amounted to eighty thousand men; the Duke of Wellington had not more than sixty-five thousand. The French regiments were the very elite of their army, whereas, most part of the British troops had never before been engaged. "The moral feelings of the English," as a celebrated writer observes, "were depressed the night before the battle, below their ordinary tone, and those of the French exalted to a degree of confidence and presumption unusual even

* At Corunna, Soult's army was near thirty thousand men, well supported with cavalry and artillery. Sir J. Moore had only fifteen thousand men; his cavalry was all embarked, and the number of his artillery was very inferior to that of the French.

not only not to miss the point and the moment, but also to have the disposable force so arranged,

to the soldiers of that nation"*. Yet, under such disadvantages, was that splendid victory gained, and the fate of Europe decided.

“ Yes—AGINCOURT may be forgot,
And CRESSY be an unknown spot,
And BLENHEIM's name be new;
But still in story and in song,
For many an age remembered, long
Shall live the towers of HOUGOMONT,
And field of WATERLOO !”

*Scott's Waterloo.**

As to “ *retranchemens inexpugnables*,” without recurring to MALPLAQUET, where, as some writers say, the French had made for themselves a *perfect citadel*, it will be quite sufficient to remind M. de Schauenburg, of Marshal Soult's entrenched position on the Nivelle, in 1813. The account of Lord Wellington's attack on that formidable line of works, completely reverses the fact which M. de S. wishes to establish; indeed, the French did not even *wait for us* on that occasion (which he gives the British credit for doing, when so circumstanced), but fled almost at our approach. “ The position on the Nivelle,” says Colonel Jones, “ had many great natural advantages; it was taken up with judgment, and neither labour nor expense had been spared, for three months, to strengthen it to the utmost.” Marshal Soult had, besides, 70,000 men, applicable for its defence; this position was, however, carried with trifling loss, by those troops who, M. de Schauenberg tells us, can only beat the French, when they are either *more numerous*, or behind *impregnable entrenchments*. The honesty of his countryman Guibert, is more laudable: this enlightened writer speaking of the defeat of the French at Cressy, Poitiers, &c. thus concludes: “ *Aucune nation n'a perdu de batailles aussi honteuses, aussi decisives, que la nôtre, (the French) aucune n'en a gagné si peu de decisives et de completees.*—(*Essai General de Tactique*, 1—176). Such authority is conclusive. T.

* *Paul's Letters to his Kinsfolk.*

and to be able to take the command so instantaneously, that it can act on the right point at the right moment.

Hence, prudent *Général*s endeavour, when this moment of decision approaches, and when they perceive the superiority of the enemy's force, to escape this *crisis*, and draw off their army before the charge, and consequently, before their lines are broken ; and this is called *breaking off a battle*.

But to conceive, and ably to execute, this resolution, requires a soul unswayed by passion — *a real military character*.

It was by such conduct that the Crown Prince, now King of Wirtemberg, rendered himself so illustrious at Montereau, the 18th Feb. 1814.

The battle of Witepsk, in July, 1812, was broken off by the Russians in a similar manner (1).

While the conqueror, content with having driven off his adversary, retires triumphantly over

(1) Napoleon was completely deceived by the well-organized retreat of the Russians from Witepsk after the battle of the 27th, and Murat was unable to make him believe they had evacuated the strong position which they had taken up on the cessation of the engagement. “ En effet, le 28, dès l'aurore, Murat fit dire à l'Empereur, qu'il allait poursuivre les Russes. Napoleon persévéra dans son opinion, s'obstinait à pretendre que toute l'armée ennemie était là, et qu'il fallait avancer prudemment. Enfin, il monta à cheval ; chaque pas détruisit son illusion : il se trouva bientôt au milieu du camp que Barclay venait d'abandonner.”

Segur, 1—208.

T.

the field of battle, time is afforded the conquered to continue his retreat without great loss, which cannot be endangered, because his regiments remain still in order, and fit for action.

By a resolution of this kind, the Commander loses the confidence of his army, as little as they lose their courage, which is so much more likely to happen, when they wait for a serious decision, because this is always accompanied with great loss.

In the bulletins of the army, it is then said, "*From important considerations, the army has taken up a stronger position;*" and this is in general so true, that such an army, in a very short time after, acts imposingly on the offensive.

When both sides have fought obstinately, without any result as to the decision of the battle, that is an indecisive battle; and both armies, therefore, not with much unjustness, claim the victory, as neither has been beaten! Both Generals then date their dispatches from the field of battle, and retire respectively, as was the case at Eylau, in February, 1807 (1).

(1) Although the French remained on the field of battle after the battle of Eylau, which is generally considered a proof of not having been beaten, they were obliged, in consequence of that battle, to retreat behind the passage of the Passarge, to Ostrolenka, Hohenstein, and Allenstein. Near Ostrolenka, they were again engaged with the Russians, who sustained a considerable loss. "No historical detail," says Naylor, "is more liable to error, than the description of a battle;" the truth of which must

The most difficult point in the attack instruction of cavalry, is to determine when infantry may be attacked, in the safest and most advantageous manner. According to Theobald, the attack cannot well be made, sooner than when the infantry evince disorder, or shew openings; and this appears right (1).

It is true, that according to the laws of mechanics, a line of cavalry, in motion, ought to ride down a line of infantry, if it might be supposed, without psychological reference, that troops could be considered as perfect machines.

When it is necessary to attain a great result, there can be no doubt, that brave cavalry, under the command of a chief, who is intrepid, and impressed with the necessity of conquering, will overthrow any infantry (2); but success thus gained, is attended with considerable loss.

have been fully experienced by the French, in the late war, for Buonaparte's battles were all *victories*, and his deluded subjects scarcely knew the truth, until new conscriptions demanded fresh food for his ambition.

T.

(1) If infantry is supported by artillery, and formed in squares, it is almost impossible for cavalry to break them, unless they waver or shew openings. The successful charges of the Prussian cavalry, at Hohenfriedburg, Zorndorf, Kesseldorf, and Rosbach, were made against infantry, which had been already in disorder, and we have many instances, in the late war, of the impregnability of infantry formed in squares.

T.

(2) The translator cannot here subscribe to the opinion of the

From the superior tactics of the infantry, and their advanced state, it is very difficult for cavalry to attack it with advantage.

author, whose estimate of the power of cavalry, is evidently affected by his partiality, and natural prejudice for that branch of the service. Without speculating upon probabilities, which only tend to mislead the judgment, a true conclusion as to the comparative merits of cavalry and infantry can be at once drawn, by referring to facts. Miltiades, in the plains of Marathon, with 10,000 Athenian *infantry*, overcame the Persian army, consisting of 100,000 foot, and 10,000 horse. The Persian cavalry at Plateæ, was completely defeated by the *infantry* of Pausanias. Alexander the Great was indebted for all the crowns of Asia to the *Macedonian phalanx*; with this *infantry*, he overturned the whole empire of the Persians, and made his victories resound along the banks of the Ganges, the Hydaspes, and the Indus. Rome owed all her conquests to those famous legions, which were the basis of her armies, and the neglect of this *infantry*, was the epoch of her debility and decline. The military reputation of Russia was established by means of her *infantry*, the organization of which, in the days of Peter the Great, enabled her to cope with, and ultimately to subdue, the hero of Sweden. The heroic deeds of the *Swiss infantry*, in the reign of Charles the Bold, Louis XII., and Francis I., proved the total inefficiency of cavalry against steady, determined *infantry*. "At the battle of Dreux," says Père Daniel, "the Swiss infantry sustained, for a length of time, the cavalry of the Prince de Condé; and after their battalions had been broken and penetrated; they rallied, repelled the cavalry of the Count de Rochefoucault, bade defiance to a host of Lansquenets, which attacked them, and finally, having been assailed, on all sides, by fresh squadrons of Reiters and French cavalry, retired by platoons, in good order, still making front occasionally to the enemy, and opposing them, some with their swords, others with *stones*, which weapons they were obliged to substitute for their pikes, that had been nearly all broken. In this manner, they joined the right wing, to the admiration of both armies."—(*Histoire de la Milice Française*,

These superior tactics of the infantry, consist in the quick formation of masses, and in a well supported and destructive fire.

tom. ii. liv. x. p. 221). This is one, of many instances, where the Swiss *infantry* proved itself *invincible*. Henry of Navarre, Gustavus, Weimar, Turenne,—those masters in the art of war—were so sensible of the incompetency of cavalry to overcome infantry, that they endeavoured to remedy the inefficiency of the former, by strengthening the intervals with platoons, thereby clearly admitting the inferiority of cavalry.

The British army furnishes us with many brilliant examples of the power of *infantry*: perhaps, the most extraordinary on record occurred at Minden, August 1, 1759. In this battle, *six regiments of English infantry*, supported by two regiments of Hanoverian guards, charged *sixty squadrons of French cavalry*, which they drove before them, without any other assistance than their own artillery. At the battle of Fontenoy, the French cavalry was totally unable to overcome the British infantry, and had not Marshal Saxe brought up the Irish brigade to his assistance, the Duké of Cumberland must have gained the battle*. Sir John Stuart beat Reynier, at Maida, by *infantry* alone. At the battle of Fuentes de Honor, in 1811, the allied army retired, by squares, for more than two miles, repelling every effort of General Montbrun's cavalry, which was obliged to give up the pursuit, leaving above 500 horses dead or disabled†.

* The Abbé Ma-Geoghegan, in the singularly eloquent dedication of his "History of Ireland" to the Irish brigade, thus alludes to the battle of Fontenoy; "Mais pourpui rapeller des tems reculés? Pourquoi chercher vos héros dans les regions éloignées? Souffrez, Messieurs, que je vous montre ce beau à jamais mémorables dans les fastes de la France; que je vous ramène dans jour les champs de Fontenoy, si précieux a votre gloire; ces champs où, mêlés à l'élite des Frangois, le vaillant Comte de Thomond à votre tête, vous chargeates avec tant de courage des ennemis redoutables, animés par les regards de l'auguste Souverain qui vous gouverne, vous contribuates avec tant de succès à fixer un victoire qui jusqu'alors avoit paru douteuse."

*Histoire de l'Irlande, par M. l'Abbé Ma-Geoghegan.
Epistre Dedicatoire, vi.*

† See Colonel Jones's account of this battle.

Hence results two grand principles for cavalry, on all attacks they may make against infantry; that is, supposing that external circumstances,

At EL-BODON, September 1811, a body of British and Portuguese infantry, not exceeding 1500 men, nearly unsupported by cavalry and artillery,* not only resisted, but *attacked* and *repulsed* between thirty and forty squadrons of French cavalry, supported by fourteen battalions of infantry, and six pieces of cannon*. The French army are not without similar examples: the grenadiers of Buonaparte's guard resisted every attack of the numerous Austrian cavalry at Marengo. General Kleber's little corps of 2000 men, though surrounded by 25,000 Turkish cavalry, at the battle of Mount Tabor, 1799, was perfectly impenetrable. But if these, and many similar existing examples were wanting, the battle of Waterloo is alone sufficient to prove, that the best and most intrepid *cavalry* is totally unable to make any impression upon *infantry*, which is formed to receive, and determined to resist it. "The most distinguished courage of the French officers," says Captain Batty, "who daringly exposed their persons to draw on the fire of the English infantry, before their regiments approached near the squares, could not prevail." —(*Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815*, p. 204). The 30th regiment, on this memorable day, sustained several charges of the French cuirassiers, who, "protected by their iron breastplates, galloped up to the very bayonets of the infantry, hoping that some heart might fail, and that the smallest opening might be made, through which they could penetrate; but not, in a single instance, did they succeed in making the least im-

* The allied troops engaged at El-Bodon, were the 2d battalion, 5th and 77th regiments, the 21st Portuguese, and three squadrons of the 1st German hussars. The Portuguese artillery men were cut down at their guns at the beginning of the action.

The Duke of Wellington's General Order of the 2d October, 1811, contains the following memorable words, relating to this gallant affair: "It is impossible that any troops can at any time be exposed to the attacks of numbers, relatively greater than those which attacked the troops under Major-General Colville and Major-General Alten, on the 25th September."

such as continued rain, in consequence of which the arms (as at Grossbeeren, and Dresden, in August, 1813) miss fire; or long continued want and misfortune have not enfeebled the moral element, in this case, cavalry has only to ride boldly forward in order to obtain success. But on the other hand, where the moral element has not been weakened, a charge of cavalry, in line, will seldom succeed. In the ninth lecture this subject will be resumed. Here it is sufficient to state, that the first principle to be followed is, to suffer the effect of cannon fire (case shot), to precede the charge; and second, that infantry should never be attacked when it has taken up that favourable position, which resolutely expresses, *only come on!* Cavalry should, rather, endeavour to surprise infantry, during the march.

For, if the infantry to be attacked is resolute, and exhibits no weak points, it is not so much

pression⁹². The *infantry* is the base and foundation of all armies; it is that commanding power, which may be called the *soul* of war; and although the cavalry is an accessory, without which few victories can be brilliant or complete, it is yet but an *accessory*, and must ever be considered as such.

T.

* *Boyer's Second Usurpation of Buonaparte*. The determined resistance of the British squares at Waterloo, is thus beautifully described by the distinguished author of *Paul's Letters to his Kingsfolk*. "Yet under such a fire, and in full view of these clouds of cavalry, waiting, like birds of prey, to dash upon them, where slaughter should afford the slightest opening, did these gallant troops close their files over the bodies of their dead and dying comrades, and resume, with stern composure, that close array of battle, which their discipline and experience taught them afforded the surest means of defence."—p. 150.

prudence as duty to consider, before proceeding to the attack, or, if the gain would be proportioned to the loss.

In such cases, the same object is often attained by *manœuvring to surround the enemy*, which movement does not, certainly, afford the amusement of a massacre:

There are officers who place great value upon such a massacre, and expect this spectacle from the cavalry, under all circumstances.

It is, doubtless, a truly grand sight, when a line of cavalry, determined for the charge; rushes like a tempest over a plain, breaks in upon the infantry, and destroys it like a hurricane.

On the 25th March, 1814, at Fère Champenoise, several French squares were completely cut to pieces.

At the battle of Denewitz, 6th September 1813, the Prussian cavalry cut down two regiments of French infantry.

At Riedau, on the 1st May, 1809, the regiment of Baden Dragoons, under the command of Colonel Von Heimroth, made a charge on a battalion in square, which it completely annihilated.

At the battle of Cateau, in Flanders, 26th April, 1794, Colonel Prince Von Schwartzburg, at the head of six Austrian and twelve English squadrons, attacked a column of French infantry. Two thousand men were cut down; 22 guns, 29 ammunition wagons, and 136 horses taken; to-

gether with *Chapuy*, the General commanding the column, and 277 men (1).

On the 22d August, 1796, the Archduke Charles, with cavalry alone, beat Bernadotte, at Teiningen.

(1) The English squadrons here alluded to by the author, were composed of the Blues, the 1st, 3d, and 5th Dragoon Guards, and Royals; these, with the Austrian Cuirassier regiment of Zetchwitz, formed the right wing of the allied army at Cateau, and were detached by the Duke of York, under the command of Lieutenant-General Otto, to turn the enemy's left flank. The attack was completely successful, the French were soon thrown into confusion, and the slaughter was immense. The 7th Hussars, and the 14th Light Dragoons, also distinguished themselves on this day; they were posted on the left of the line, and were sent, with two squadrons of Archduke Ferdinand's Hussars, under the command of Major Stephanitz, to observe the enemies' column which was advancing from Prémont and Marets; the allied squadrons attacked the enemies' advanced guard with tremendous impetuosity, and completely defeated the French column; 1200 men were left dead on this part of the field, ten pieces of cannon and eleven tumbrils of ammunition were taken. The conduct of the officers commanding the cavalry on this day, is thus alluded to by his Royal Highness the Duke of York, in his dispatch of the 28th April, 1794:—"I cannot sufficiently express my thanks to Lieutenant-General Otto, for the manner in which he conducted the cavalry of the right wing, as well as to Prince Schwartzburg and Colonel Vyse, for the spirit and gallantry with which they led on the troops." In the Duke's dispatch of the 26th, he says, "the behaviour of the British cavalry has been beyond all praise." Our brave countrymen were here the greatest sufferers; their number was under 9000, which gallant body was, at one time, surrounded by upwards of 50,000; yet, notwithstanding this great disproportion, they boldly cut their way through the enemy, and effected their retreat.

Marshal Saxe, tells us of two Austrian battalions having been sabred by a swarm of Turks, at the battle of Belgrade:—"Except Count Neuperg, who commanded these battalions, and who had the good-fortune to be mounted; and an ensign, who, with his colour, held by my horse's tail, and was a great burthen to me, no one escaped."

At Melazzo, the victorious Austrian infantry, notwithstanding their fire and steadiness, were surrounded by the Spanish cavalry, and cut to pieces.

The elector, Frederick William the Great, beat the Swedes, at Fehrbellin, with 5000 horses and 12 guns, although they were superior in number.

The Duke of Vendomme, with his cavalry alone, annihilated the Spanish infantry at Marseilles.

At the battle of Mons-en Puelle, the cavalry of Philip the Fair attacked the Flemish infantry; their leader, William Von Jülich, and the greater part of this infantry, perished on the spot.

Many examples of this kind are to be found in history, but those are still more numerous, where attacks of cavalry against infantry have failed.

At Waterloo, all the efforts of the French cavalry were fruitless (1); on this account, it is

(1) The gallantry of the French cavalry at Waterloo has never been exceeded; "in vain," says Boyce, "with unexampled courage, the French cavalry walked their horses round the British squares, and dashed at the slightest openings;—in vain, when

always necessary to observe, whether the *appearances are favourable*, and that is precisely what, as the commencement of this lecture has said, can be submitted to no rules, but is innate talent, and makes the art of attack the most difficult problem in tactics.

The fortunate termination of a battle, depends

they arrived within a short distance, a few of them rushed on, and would have nobly sacrificed themselves, by receiving the fire of their opponents, while the main body waited to charge on the British ere they could re-load their pieces, or fill up the chasms. The cool intrepidity of the allied infantry, baffled every attempt to break them.”—(*Second Usurpation of Buonaparte*). No battle, in which the British have ever been engaged, shewed more clearly their decided *physical* superiority over the French, than the battle of Waterloo, for these very *Cuirassiers*, of acknowledged bravery, chivalrous intrepidity, and having the advantage of defensive armour, were totally annihilated by the English heavy brigade. “Lord Edward Somerset,” says Captain Batty, “with the invincible brigade of household troops, consisting of the Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, and first Dragoon Guards, rushed forward against the *mailed* cavalry of the enemy, and swept the intruders from the ground they had so rashly ascended, driving them up the opposite heights, back into their own line.”—(*Hist. Sketch of the Campaign of 1815*, p. 98). “Notwithstanding,” says another eloquent writer, “the weight and armour of the *Cuirassiers*, and the power of their horses, they proved altogether unable to withstand the shock of the heavy brigade, being literally *rode down*, both horse and man; while the strength of the British soldier was no less pre-eminent, when they mingled and fought hand to hand. Several hundreds of French were forced headlong over a sort of quarry, or gravel pit, where they rolled a confused mass of men and horses.”—*Paul’s Letters*, p. 154.

upon the good dispositions which have been previously made.

Whoever attacks without these favourable appearances, acts from passion; and passion leads to ruin.

If, however, the disposition of the battle is correct, and conducted according to principles of tactics and circumspection, delay is unnecessary; and the execution of the attack itself, should wear the stamp of that bold and intrepid confidence, which, as has been shewn, always extorts the victory.

Without this impetuosity, the attack of cavalry will not be followed by brilliant results.

Consideration is only to be used by a Commander *before* the execution of the charge; when once the trumpet has sounded for the attack, all consideration should cease, except that of inspiring his troops.

He must, at this moment, resemble a young, courageous, thoughtless man, indifferent as to the issue of his actions; just as the Counts of Alençon and Flanders, at the battle of Cressy, August 26, 1346, who dashed upon the enemy, at the head of their cavalry, shouting "*à la mort.*"

The importance of *certain days* is felt; for which reason, on the day of battle, Generals remind their troops of former triumphs, in order to impart to their army the same feeling which then led them to victory.

"The sun of Austerlitz rises!" was said on all sides, at the battle of the Moskwa, September 7, 1812 (1).

At the battle of Vittoria, June 21, 1813, Lord Wellington reminded his army, "that they were the brothers of the heroes of Trafalgar, and that they had before them the vanquished of Salamanca."

History has preserved the most important speeches which Generals have made to their troops on similar occasions. "Soldiers," said Buonaparte, to his troops, at the battle of Marengo, about six o'clock in the evening, as he flew through the ranks, "Soldiers! remember that it is my custom to sleep upon the field of battle!" and fortune, which up to this moment had been unfavourable to him, immediately changed (2).

(1) "Le jour parut, l'empereur, le montrant à ses officiers, s'écria : «Voilà le soleil d'Austerlitz!»"—(*Histoire de Napoléon, &c. par M. le Général Comte de Segur*, i., 389). This was, however, rather an unhappy observation of Napoleon's, for the sun, as M. de Segur relates, rose *opposite* to the French, "Il se levait," says this general, "du côté des Russes, nous montrait à leurs coups, et nous éblouissait." T.

(2) The Emperor Sigismund's manner of exciting his troops, was very different; when he had determined on attacking the camp of the Taborites, he led his army to the ascent, and cried out, "Yonder lie your provisions!" "The hungry veterans," says Gilpin, "rushed on; the camp, thinned by numerous outposts, was instantly entered; and the Taborites could only die in its defence." *Lives of the Reformers*, 1—266.

The brave veteran, Picton, had an odd way of complimenting

Hannibal and Scipio, both endeavoured to stimulate their armies, before the battle on the river Ticinus.

The former even made some prisoners fight each other, in front of his line of battle, in order to animate his troops by the sight of a combat (1).

the men of his division, previous to an engagement. The learned author of a late account of the war, in 1812, 1813, tells us, that at the battle of Vittoria, where the third division so gallantly carried the bridge in front of Puente Nueva, this intrepid General, "mounted his horse; and putting himself at the head of his troops, waved his hat, and led them on to the charge, with the bland compellations of, '*Come on ye rascals! come on ye fighting villains.*' An address which proved most effective, for the bridge," continues the author, "was carried in a few minutes."—(*Personal Narrative, &c., during the war, in 1812, 1813, by an Officer late in the Staff Corps Regiment of Cavalry, p. 304*). English Generals have never been famed for making long speeches to their troops, and the best style of harangue is, certainly, as M. le Clerc says, "that which is suited to the time and place." This author cites a most pertinent address, made to his men, by an old British officer who commanded before Cadiz, in 1702: the Spaniards were advantageously posted, and great exertions being required, on the part of the British, the General found himself under the necessity of haranguing his troops, an operation which he was not at all in the habit of performing; he, however, got out of the dilemma in the following manner:—"Would it not be a disgrace," said he, "*for you Englishmen, who live on good beef and pudding, to be beaten by those rascally Spaniards, who have nothing to eat but oranges and lemons?*" "An appeal," says Le Clerc, "perhaps better than if the General had made the most eloquent harangue."

T.

(1) History does not authorise us in placing this construction upon the circumstance to which the author alludes. Hannibal's intention does not appear to have been, that of endeavouring to

It is important to elevate the moral force previous to a battle.

Napoleon caused the Eagles of the Guards to excite his troops by the simple means of making two men fight ; but, from the comparison which he drew between the situation of his army, and that of the prisoners, to shew them, that they had no alternative, but to *conquer or die*. The story is thus told by Polybius :—"Hannibal, wishing to animate his troops, contrived the following expedient: having assembled his forces, he brought before them the prisoners taken in the Alps, who were loaded with chains, emaciated with hunger, and mangled with blows ; he ordered some suits of Gallic armour, horses, and rich military habits, to be set before them ; he then demanded which of them would try their fate in arms against each other, on condition, that the conqueror should possess the spoils which they saw, while the vanquished should be released from his miseries, by death. All shewed the utmost eagerness to engage : and lots being ordered to be cast, every one prayed that the lot might be his : when the combat was decided, the Carthaginians agreed with the captives, in thinking, both the conqueror and conquered equally happy."—(*Hampton, i., 175*). Hannibal, now finding that his contrivance had produced the desired effect upon the troops, proceeded to draw a comparison between the situation of the prisoners, and his soldiers. Livy, who always puts a speech in the mouth of his generals, thus gives Hannibal's oration on this occasion :—" Si quem animum in alienæ sortis exemplo paulo ante habuistis, eundem mox in æstimanda fortuna vestra habueritis, videmus, milites ; neque enim *spectaculum* modo illud, sed quædam veluti *imago vestræ conditionis* erat. Ac nescio, an *majora vincula, majoresque necessitates* vobis, quam captivis vestris fortuna circumdederit," &c.,—(*Lib. xxi., cap. xliii.*). No more powerful appeal could be made to the exertions of the Carthaginians, than this illustration of the only alternatives which their situation admitted ; and Hannibal's object was fully answered by the result. Cyrus employed an analogous expedient to make the Persians revolt against the tyranny of Astyages.

be covered with crape, when they marched out of Paris, in 1815, which was not to be taken off until the enemy had been defeated.

The moral force of the soldier is often raised by increasing the physical. Before the battle of Höchstett, in 1704, Marlborough remained quietly in his calash, occupied about his linen, and when the Generals mentioned to him that all was ready for the attack, and that the army awaited the signal with impatience, he answered, "The provisions are not yet given out!"

Before the battle of Leuthen, December 5, 1757, Frederick tried every possible means of raising the depressed courage of the Silesian army: the king appealed to the sense of honour of the officers, talked to the private soldiers, caused provisions to be distributed, and even wine was employed as a means of cheering the spiritless troops*.

After a good breakfast, a man goes into battle with much more courage than he does fasting.

The battle of the 3d May, 1809, at Ebersberg, on the Traun, would not have taken place, if Massena had not had a capital breakfast, at Lins, which the town gave him *gratis*! (1).

* History of my own Time.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(1) This mode of elevating the moral force of an army is no less ancient than excellent. Leonidas and his gallant Spartans regularly dined before the battle of Thermopylæ. "Come, my friends," said the hero, "let us dine cheerfully, in the hope of supping together in the other world;" this polite attention to the wants

Battles which take place in the afternoon, are generally more violent than those which begin with sun-rise; but the latter are more decisive. A battle which is already decided at mid-day is more perilous to those who have lost; because, in proportion as the strength is exhausted, the courage is weakened.

Whoever has been in such situations, can easily understand the miracle in *Joshua*—one really believes that the sun stands still.

If, in former times, Generals depended upon certain favourable omens, often even to superstition*: this might have been done, in order to ac-

of the stomach has not, however, always had like results. Sempronius led his army into battle, at the Trebia, before his troops had taken any food; and after a march of forty successive days, the army of Souwaroff also arrived at the same place, in 1799, and was attacked by Macdonald, before the men had got anything to eat; Souwaroff, however, *gained the victory*, "because," says the historian, of that campaign, "Macdonald was not Hannibal, and because Souwaroff was not Sempronius."

T.

* Wallenstein*.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

* The credulity of Wallenstein exceeded belief: not a plan was embraced, nor an enterprise attempted, without the advice and sanction of Seni. "There were some," says the *Swedish Intelligencer*, "that said, that even by the skill of some in the starres, (wherein, besides others, he made use of Kepler, a great master), and by the Chaldeans' art, was foresignified his times and fates to be come." (i. 12). A ridiculous incident is mentioned, in the History of the Hussite Wars, which contributed not a little to check the absurd superstition of the reformers: "The clergy had expressed their dislike to a piece of ground, where Zisca lay encamped, and he was given to understand, that fire would certainly descend from heaven, the next day, upon the accursed spot, if he did not instantly decamp; the tents were immediately torn up, and the ground entirely deserted. In the morning, when every one expected to see the devoted

quire a mastery over the minds of the army ; but there is a feeling in man which gives him a presentiment of good and bad fortune.

Strength exhausts itself, so also does fortune ! So long as the General is supported by the goodwill of fate, the most insignificant circumstances appear to be combinations of good luck ; but afterwards the wrath of fate follows the same General : then the most able arrangements, the most correct plans of operation, in a word, the speculations of strategics are wrecked by all the minute circumstances, which in tactical proceedings now only combine to produce misfortune. If ever any General experienced this coincidence of circumstances to produce misfortunes, it was Buonaparte, who hung so long on Fortune's girdle, at the opening of the campaign of 1815.

That passage of the Old Testament, " and they were smitten with blindness," enters into the life

spot overwhelmed with a tempest of fire, such a deluge of rain fell, as if sent on purpose to turn the prophecy into ridicule ; it afterwards became a common jest in the army, that the prophecies of their clergy, and the completion, were as opposite to each other as *fire* and *water*." See *Gilpin, Theobald, &c.* Even historians have not all escaped this superstitious contagion, Lotichius tells us very gravely, that " Wiblenger, a shoemaker, who commanded the insurgents in Upper Austria, was possessed of a secret to make himself *invulnerable* : in the engagement with Pappenheim, a cannon shot struck his side ; but instead of injuring him, it recoiled like a tennis-ball from a racket. In the following page, however, the author informs us, that this extraordinary personage, in spite of his secret, was killed by a pistol !" (i. 464). " Circumstances," says Naylor, " so contradictory, could hardly have been recorded by the same writer, had he not supposed that some part of the cobbler's body was exempt from the charm, like the heel of Achilles."

of almost every individual ; great and small, renowned and unknown, almost every man experiences a time when an incorrect judgment of his situation leads him into errors, which undermine his good fortune, and, as in a storm, drive him from his path.

The more elevated the station of the man is, the more critical is this moment.

Commanders generally forebode the crisis of their good fortune.—Thus did Hannibal forebode the loss of the battle of Zama ; he endeavoured to negotiate, but the proud Scipio laid the conditions too high.

Tilly, the hitherto unconquered Tilly, was dilatory and irresolute before the battle of Leipzig, and committed faults there ; an internal feeling presaged to him his misfortunes.

Attila rationally retreated before the walls of Rome with a conquering army, for an internal feeling told him, that in Rome he would find disgrace and death.

Frederick the Great, in the war of the Bavarian Succession, knew “ that fortune would no longer be favourable to him.”

When fortune leaves the General, it is time that he should cover himself with the mantle of wisdom and moderation ; that is, *make peace !*

It is, above all things, difficult to judge correctly of the crisis of fortune, and then rightly to operate ; so much the more, because the passions, particu-

larly those of ambition and pride, these dangerous confederates, who delight too much in the present, arrest the operation of reason, flatter the understanding, and corrupt it, and thereby interrupt the cool calculation of future events.

A too warm imagination, which withdraws itself from under the authority of reason, always causes its own punishment.

LECTURE V.

ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY.

HISTORY shēws us, that great Commanders have usually handed down to posterity, the accounts of their wars and deeds, generally in the shape of *memoirs*; but for the most part, without stating the principles upon which they have acted.

The art of war was grounded upon custom and prejudice. The Generals, who were, at the same time, authors, endeavoured, rather to please, than to instruct; they, perhaps, understood not the art of instruction, and, consequently, transmitted to us, only *their own* customs and prejudices.

Systems first arose, when, in later times, men became partisans, through the study of those memoirs.

As no body of instruction had yet been formed, either for the art or the science of war; as there was, in general, little scientifically known on the subject, and, consequently, only the mechanical

part of war was spoken of and written on ; there arose a kind of anarchy, and each defended the customs and prejudices of that General, whom he had chosen as his model.

The warmth and enthusiasm displayed in support of the chosen model, rose in proportion as the ideas failed in that clearness, which determined a man's own judgment.

The less ideas of his own a person possesses, the more warmly does he defend those of another.

That period is particularly interesting, because it is the commencement of scientific illumination ; but we meet in it not only great errors, but even what is always in the train of anarchy—the animosities of the opposite parties.

Breze, for example, takes it very ill, that Folard should declare himself in favour of the formation of small squadrons ; and denies him all pretensions to logic, because Folard is bold enough to say, that what the great Condé had said of great squadrons, was no article of faith ! Breze considers this sentence as logically false, as that with which St. Augustin (who belonged to the few men that had written a true confession), endeavoured to prove, in the fifth century, that *Mary* had only one son, and, consequently, *Christ* had no brothers ! “ The mother of our Saviour,” says St. Augustin, “ had only one son, for the lioness gives birth to only one whelp.”

Breze farther contends, that the Prince of Condé, who often fought at the head of the French cavalry, had more right to pronounce judgment upon this subject than Folard, who never led even a single squadron.

Paradoxes always arise out of theories which are not the result of experience.

Mr. de la Balme takes the field still more violently against the Chevalier, and denies him all opinion.

The Marquis of Silva and Bonneville, on the other hand, support Folard.

In order to be independent of cavalry, the former wishes that *chevaux de frise* should be placed in front of infantry; the latter is for lengthening the musquets of the second and third rank, in order to keep off the charge of cavalry.

That period, in which the supporters of certain customs and prejudices endeavoured to reduce them to a system, and contended amongst themselves, proves the want of solid principles.

This time is, however, not long past; and, alas! it must be said, that even at the present day, certain prejudices prevail, not only with regard to form and tactics, but also among the different branches of the service.

The infantry officer, feeling his value, because every regular action displays masses of infantry—because the maintaining or the seizing of a strong

or important point, or, generally, the principal labours of the victory are the effects of the renowned deeds of the infantry—is thereby easily induced to think, that except a few light cavalry, for the sake of brilliancy, the rest may be dispensed with.

The cavalry officer, proud of the history of all centuries, which proves, undeniably, that without cavalry, no victory can be brilliant; and that a beaten army, unless followed by cavalry, cannot be considered as beaten : but that a victory, which is determined by cavalry, is always complete—often runs into a reproachable haughtiness.

Towards the artillery, both arms conduct themselves without jealousy ; and only on precipitate retreats, where it is often so difficult to protect and save it, do they wish the artillery far away (1).

(1) The claims of the different branches of the service, are ingeniously put forth by the author of the “ Essay on the Art of War,” who introduces an officer from each branch, as the advocate for his particular corps. In this fancied discussion, the cavalry officer thus supports his pretensions : “ The cavalry has, on its side, the two great springs of war, which ensure the success of the greatest enterprises—celerity and rapidity in evolution, impetuosity and effect in execution. The infantry is that inert and massive part of an army, which moves with effort, as if it borrowed from the earth, with which it is immediately in contact, the gravity natural to it. The cavalry is that assemblage of agile bodies, which, being connected with the earth, imitate, by the rapidity of their course, that of the heavenly globes, and communicate life and vigour to the rest of the army.—

There is another prejudice to be added to these, namely, that which exists in all Europe, against standing armies, and, upon which subject,

Sometimes it is necessary to make an impetuous onset, without allowing the enemy time to form; sometimes, by a precipitate march, to anticipate the possession of some important post; sometimes to take advantage of the enemy, by a prompt and rapid manœuvre. The cavalry is a kind of inundation, which spreads over a whole country; it impoverishes the enemy, by cutting off his convoys, and obstructing his communications; it insensibly undermines and wastes him; and, by producing constant alarms, compels him to fatiguing vigilance and observation: it was the cavalry which snatched the victory from the Roman Eagle, and prepared, at Cannæ, the tomb for more than 40,000 of her soldiers," &c. &c. The infantry officer then advances to reply, with the proposition, that the corps, which unites, in itself, all kinds of service; which brings to bear, indifferently, upon all occasions; now upon the heights—then in the plains; now upon the breach—and then in the camp, &c., is, without contradiction, the superior corps, the predominant corps, the most useful corps! This, he proves to be the *infantry*, by shewing, that *it alone* can operate without any of the others, and scarce any of the others operate but for it. What, he demands, is the principal use of the *cavalry*? It is to cover and support the *infantry*. What does the *artillery*, when it bombards the ramparts of a strong place? Why, it opens a passage for the *infantry*. What is the employment of the *engineers*, around a city besieged, but to facilitate the approaches of the *infantry*? It is a service, the most extended in its practice and employment of all others. The foot-soldier is the hero of winter, the hero of summer, the hero of the plain, the hero of the mountain! he gathers laurels at the points of the rock, in the declivities of the precipice, and in the thickness of the forest. What would have become of the proud Numidian horse, if, instead of the plains of Cannæ and Trasimenus, the Romans had chosen the heights and defiles of Casilium? If the war system of the wise *temporiser*, had always prevailed over the thoughtless impetuosity of *Emilius*

opinions are divided, even in the armies themselves.

The old disciplined soldiers of Philip II., under an Alba, it is said, yielded to the Netherlanders, who had taken up arms for their freedom.

The Americans of the United States withstood the standing army.

The renowned army of Germany, and its well-tried tactics, could not overcome the French National Guard.

Prussia's admired army fell in one battle, before those soldiers whom liberty had reared.

After, however, these old soldiers of liberty lay buried on fields of battle, and the new French armies were re-organized as standing armies, (in which the soldier, without phantom or exaltation, coldly follows the mere dictates of duty); these renowned armies, who had been accustomed to and Varro, Rome, from the height of her mountains, had seen Hannibal and his cavalry wasted at length, and utterly consumed," &c. &c. The author having thus brought forward an orator for each of the five military classes—cavalry, infantry, engineers, artillery, and light troops—proceeds to pronounce a final judgment on their respective claims; and after skilfully investigating the different arguments advanced in support of each, adjudges the first place to the *infantry*, the second to the *cavalry*, the third to the *engineers*, and the fourth and fifth to the *artillery* and *light troops*. The low place allotted here to the *light troops*, is widely at variance with that *Tirailleur* system of Bulow, which has been so ably controverted by M. de Malortie.

See Malortie's *Commentary on Bulow*, p. 109. Note.

T.

march through Europe victorious, were conquered, not unfrequently, by militia, (*landwehrmänner*) who grasped their arms inspired by hatred and revenge.

In Spain, the same causes have been followed by like results; and in South America, a similar war is yet pending* .

These facts, on which one rests, without considering the causes from which they have proceeded, are what seem to give weight to the prejudices against standing armies.

The institution of the *landwehr*, as it now exists in many German states, has called forth only a temporary paroxysm; in times of peace, where this paroxysm, which alone exalts it, is wanting, it must, of necessity, decline; even supposing, that we should not take into the computation the expense occasioned to the people by the equipment of these troops, and the circumstance of its giving occasion to holidays, by which the domestic economy is threatened; and in consequence of Sunday being the general day for exercise, religion and morals are undermined; by both together, the peace of families is disturbed, and consequently, the well-being of the state is shook in its foundation.

A state which places its entire dependence on an establishment of militia, (*landwehr*), will be overcome by every conqueror, in a single rapid operation.

It is war that forms these kind of troops, which history proves.

How long did the revolution of the Netherlands continue; and how many faults were necessary, on the part of Spain, before it obtained a footing?

Without the assistance of France, the North Americans would, perhaps, never have obtained their freedom.

The French National Guard conquered only in consequence of the disunion of the coalition.

The loss of the battle of Jena, was not so much the result of better tactics, as of superior strategics: the Prussian army had not formed in order of battle; but was attacked, and beaten, in detail.

In the years 1813, 1814, the French army yielded to superior numbers; at the same time the genius of fortune had abandoned them.

In Spain, it was the Duke of Wellington, and not the Spaniards, that conquered the French (1).

(1) The inefficacy of Spanish patriotism, to overcome the French, in the Peninsula, is thus candidly admitted by M. de Chambray, in his late learned Treatise on the Science of War, an avowal which does equal honour to his judgment and liberality. "De nos jours, pendant sept ans que Napoléon fit la guerre à l'Espagne pour l'asservir, ses troupes gagnèrent les batailles qu'elles livrèrent aux armées Espagnoles, et perdirent la plupart de celles qu'elles livrèrent à l'armée Anglaise. Les armées Espagnoles étaient pourtant nationales, remplies de patriotisme, et quelquefois de fanatisme: elle combattaient pour l'indépendance de leur pays, elles étaient animées de sentimens de haine contre les troupes de Napoléon. Les armées Anglaises, au contraire,

In South America, small bodies of troops withstand the independents.

Years of destruction—of anxiety—of alarm—are necessary, in order to create that pitch of heroism, which finally produces great results.

étaient composée de troupes de différentes nations, et dont une partie était mercenaire.”—(*Philosophie de la Guerre, par le Colonel Mis de Chambray, chap. i., pp. 25, 26*). It has very generally been alleged, that, in the late Peninsular war, the Spanish troops did not oppose that resistance to the French which the world was led to expect from their boasted patriotism and determined spirit, that a jealousy of British interference diminished their zeal, and that they latterly became mere inactive spectators of a contest, in which they believed England fought but for her own security. This allegation is most unjust, and can only have proceeded from deficient information, or illiberal feeling. The heroic deeds of Romana, Castanos, Alburquerque, Palafox*, Blake, Alvarez, and the ever vigilant Guerilla Chiefs, prove, beyond dispute, that the patriotism of the Spaniards was more than *nominal*; and if their unaided exertions were insufficient to expel the French from the Peninsula, it is the Spanish Government, and not the People, that should be charged with imbecility. The feelings of the Spanish people have been much misrepresented; the ignorance and overbearing conduct of our troops have, in many cases, induced deductions, which had their real origin in the conduct of the British; and thus arose the charges of jealousy and inertness, which, on inquiry, have been found to possess no solid foundation. That this was the fact, is most satisfactorily shewn, by the author of the “*Military Policy of the British Empire*,” in his

* When the French had got possession of the convent, Santa Egracia, in Saragoassa, General Lefebre demanded the capitulation in the following laconic form:—

“Quartel General—Sauta Egracia—La capitulation.” To which Palafox answered,—

“Quartel General—Zaragoassa—Guerra el Cuchillo,” (*war to the knife*).—Palafox.

Heroism is a hot-house plant, which thrives not without careful nursing.

War, as the last appeal of states, requires preparation.

observations on the state of Spain, in 1809. That enlightened writer, after citing many cases, both personal and derived from official documents, to prove the existence, among the Spaniards, of true patriotism, and good-will towards the British, thus concludes:—"The respectable and distinguished authorities, whose signatures appear to these papers", agree, that whatever jealousy or ill-will may exist in Spain, against the English, is to be traced to the government, or to its officers, who have created it for reasons which, as men, we cannot help resenting, but which may be considered as a necessary result of the circumstances under which they acted. It is also agreed, that the people of Spain shewed the best spirit; that they afford excellent materials for a good military system, and that they even possess the elements for a good political constitution," &c.—(*Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire*, by Colonel Pasley, Royal Engineers, part i., p. 279, note). Speaking of the gallant conduct of the inhabitants of Galicia and the Asturias, the same writer observes, "After these strong evidences in favour of the people of Asturias and Galicia, would it not be more candid in those officers of the British army, who, at the period of our retreat, believed that these people had no patriotism at all, to admit that they themselves were mistaken, than to persist in an error injurious to the character of so great a part of the Spanish nation? I must, for one, acknowledge, that the determined conduct of the people of these provinces has much surpassed my expectations."—(*Ibid*, p. 210, note). "The French," says Southey, "could have invaded no people whom it would have been so easy to route, none whom it was so impossible to subdue."—(*History of the Peninsular War*). Patriotism, however, is not a security against foreign invasion, nor a sufficient means of repelling it. The war-

* Documents relating to Spain and Portugal, printed by order of the House of Commons, in the months of March and April, 1810.

The arts of war, and policy, must act in accordance, in order to attain this end.

If a minister of war should plan a military establishment, without considering the resources of the state, and lays it down as a maxim, that the

like Swiss, in 1799, were as equally unable as the Spaniards to prevent the inroads of the French, and there are numerous examples in history to support the same position. The *patriotic* Romans were often beaten by the Carthaginians; the Athenians yielded to Philip; Greece fell before the Turks; the Poles, excited to the highest degree of exaltation, by the almost unparalleled *patriotism* of Kosciusco, in vain, resisted the perseverance of Souwaroff: this "little old man,"—

"A thing to wonder at beyond most wondering;
Hero, buffoon, half demon, and half dirt,
Praying, instructing, desolating, plundering;
Now Mars, now Mornus; and when bent to storm
A fortress, harlequin in uniform*."—

overcame Kosciusco, Poles, and patriotism.

A well regulated *standing army*, is the only solid protection of a state. Philip of Macedon conquered, by means of his *standing army*, the principal republics of ancient Greece, and the great empire of Persia; Carthage was successful, and Rome ultimately victorious, by means of a *standing army*: when the *standing army* of Rome degenerated into an undisciplined militia, it was unable to repel the inroads of the Germans and Scythians, who invaded the western empire: neighbouring states then became sensible of the advantage of *standing armies*, and the system was generally adopted by civilised nations. The soldiers of a *standing army*, no matter how long the period of peace, are always ready to face the most experienced veterans. "The Generals," says Adam Smith, "may sometimes forget their skill, but, where a well regulated *standing army* has been kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour."

T.

* Don Juan.

expense of it is unavoidable; or, if the public opinion be against the military, as consuming a considerable portion of the national resources; then would this accordance be still at a great distance.

The welfare of the state is the principal object of the sovereign; external safety is very essential to this welfare: but this external safety must not be attained at the expense of internal prosperity.

A standing army should never be made an object; but by its dependency, should only, in its dependent state, appear as a *means*.

The problem therefore is, to make the standing army a real school of instruction for war, wherein not merely a small number of citizens, but the whole nation should be brought up and educated for war, by means of each person capable of bearing arms taking his yearly course of duty.

A state can only expect from its young citizens, the defence of its independence; but these citizens must have a military education, which can only be accomplished by their absence, for at least one year, from their paternal hearth.

By such a war regulation, its proper station is assigned to that class, whose honourable and important distinction it is, to set at stake fortune and life, for the external security of their country.

The soldier would, after completing his course, and fulfilling the duties of the service, enter into the Local Militia, which would be only intended for defensive war.

By this disposition, the military regulation of a state is divided into two classes, offensive, and defensive.

No state can isolate itself, and be purely offensive, or purely defensive; both must therefore be united: the possibility is only *intimated* here, we do not undertake to demonstrate it.

Cavalry belong to the offensive means, and infantry to the defensive means, of an armed power.

Therefore, the necessity of keeping up cavalry in 'time of peace,' is generally acknowledged, even by those who are of opinion, that a state can exist with defensive means only.

Cavalry presupposes a careful organization; and cannot be easily formed, on the breaking out of a war (1).

There exist as many different views and opinions as to the form of cavalry, as there are points of view under which it may be considered.

(1) The necessity of keeping up a considerable, and effective body of cavalry, during peace, cannot be too much insisted on; the difficulty and delay attendant upon its formation require that little, if any difference, should be made between a *war* and *peace establishment* of cavalry. New raised troops, or regiments, can be of little service in the field: and if the cavalry is so reduced as to require such an augmentation, on the breaking out of a war, its *physical*, will be found sadly inferior to its *numerical* force. A battalion of infantry may be augmented, without deranging its action; but a few half-formed dragoons, a few unbroke horses, will throw a whole line of cavalry into disorder, and defeat every object of the most talented Commander.

T.

After different periods concerning this form have gone by, and that we have gone back from deep to extended formations; it has been finally determined, that the first rank only can contribute to the charge, and that no weight, or after-charge, can be effected by those placed behind; nor the rapidity increased, as mav. perhaps. be thought, with infantry.

The result of the experience of so many centuries, is, that the cavalry of all the nations of Europe (except the Turks), are placed in two ranks.

It is, therefore, unnecessary to say more on this subject; or what might be easier, to select from history the epochs of this arm,—we confine ourselves to the present times.

The English, French, Hanoverians, &c., adopt the division of companies, two of which form a squadron; the strength of a company is generally, 75 to 80 horses, consequently, that of a squadron from 150 to 160 horses (1).

(1) The author appears to be in error, as to the division of the Hanoverian and French cavalry; companies have been suppressed, in the French service, since 1815.

In the “Ordonnance Provisoire sur l’Exercice et les Manœuvres de la Cavalerie,” printed at Paris, in 1820, a French regiment of cavalry appears to be divided into squadrons, divisions, and subdivisions (*Pelotons*), corresponding with our squadrons, half squadrons, and divisions; the same work also directs, that “Lorsque l’escadron devra être exercé, il sera habituellement de *quarante huit files*, par conséquent chaque division sera composée de *vingt-quatre files*, et chaque peloton de douze.”

In 1816, the Hanoverian cavalry was formed into squadrons,

The Austrians form themselves into squadrons, two of which make a division; the strength of the Austrian regiments renders this arrangement necessary, a division often amounting to from 300 to 400 horses.

The Prussian cavalry was always, and is yet, formed into squadrons from 120 to 170 horses.

How much soever the forms may differ from each other, it should not be forgotten, that nothing is of importance, but what adequately accords with the two conditions.

(A) *Tactical*, and (B) *Economical*.

All on this head may be comprised in the following short sentences.

1. A regiment over 1000 horses, loses more in mobility, than it gains in strength.

The Colonel can, neither in respect to the discipline or manœuvre, sufficiently oversee it.

2. A regiment under 700 horses, has no power in a charge; and after a few attacks, is too weak to maintain its place, in the line, as a regiment.

3. The same applies to squadrons over 250, and under 150.

4. A regiment appears most moveable, divided into four squadrons, the squadrons divided into four divisions, each division into two sub-divisions,

each having one Rittmeister (*Captain*), one Staabs Rittmeister, (*Brevet Captain*), one First-Lieutenant, and two Second-Lieutenants.

T.

and these again subdivided into four smaller divisions, each consisting of four file.

The number four is very convenient, easy to be divided ; and was adopted by the Greeks.

By means of this continually recurring number four, the form is much simplified ; the squadrons will here consist of 128 privates.

This form, as well as the name *regiment*, was originally of German usage. Prince Maurice of Orange, commissioned certain officers to raise cavalry in Germany, over whom, by virtue of their contract, they had the government (*regiment*) ; (the unlimited command, together with all prerogatives). The Colonels then called these troops of cavalry, which they had themselves formed, their *regiment* !

The regiment was divided into parts, which were called squadrons, (*rittschaften*), and over which a Captain (*Rittmeister*), had the command.

The Colonel had a Lieutenant, as an assistant and substitute, in cases of absence or sickness, called the Lieutenant-Colonel (*Oberst Lieutenant*) ; he had also an officer, who had charge of the interior economy, the field guards, &c., and he was called the Major, (*Obersts Wachtmeister*). .

The *Rittmeister* (Captain), had, likewise, a Lieutenant, and a Serjeant ; the Cornet carried the standard.

Four squadrons made a regiment, which never exceeded a thousand horse.

The Greeks and Romans added to their cavalry of the line, small troops of light-horsemen, archers, and slingers.

The old knights had their esquires, and archers.

Louis XIV. took some of the best horsemen and marksmen out of the companies, and formed platoons of them; he called them *carabiniers*, and employed them as flankers.

The Hungarian Hussars are the legitimate light cavalry of Europe; the terms *skirmish*, to *skirmish*, were derived from their original manner of fighting.

The Prussian and Hanoverian cavalry, after they had acknowledged the sword as the chief weapon, formed always a number of the most active horsemen for skirmishing.

The French, in 1812, had in Russia, lancers, with their cuirassiers.

The Cossacks have made a figure in modern times.

The advantage which a certain number of skirmishers, that is, horsemen, who have attained activity, and generally, the manner of fighting in open lines, give to the squadrons, is evident.

But, as whole regiments and squadrons, as well in regard to the *personnel* as the *matériel* (where no national cavalry exists, Cossacks, Mamelukes, &c.), can never attain this perfection; it therefore appears better to select those only who possess the necessary requisites.

If, in the present day, entire squadrons of flankers, or skirmishers, were formed, they would soon resemble those life, or *élite* squadrons, which only maintain a superiority on parade, but not in the battle.

If the men and horses for such squadrons of skirmishers were chosen from the other squadrons, this rule would be as difficult as imperfect.

Every Captain regards that as lost, which, although for the general good, he loses from his own squadron.

He endeavours, therefore, to withhold the best men and horses, on whom he places his trust on the day of battle.

It is otherwise the case, if he forms a fifth, or skirmishing division for himself, which he considers as his property; which renders him service, and does him honour.

If a squadron is sent out, the skirmishing division goes with it.

The Captain can make occasional changes, according as a skirmisher, in the course of time, does not accord with the presupposition of his bravery and ability; or by dishonourable conduct, shews himself unworthy to be a skirmisher.

Besides, the full instruction of all, is not, by this mode, excluded; only, that these skirmishers, being more particularly attended to, are brought the nearest to perfection.

In this manner, the institution will reach to a degree of perfection, which neither squadrons of skirmishers, nor entire light regiments of that kind, can ever attain. However, when the regiment manoeuvres before an enemy, these fifth divisions should be formed into one squadron, and placed at the disposition of the Colonel.

With respect to interior economy and instruction—elements of service—the skirmishing divisions follow that of their squadrons. With respect to tactics, a separate squadron should be formed of themselves, under the command of an intelligent Brevet, or Second Captain.

Thus a Colonel has two arms: a regiment, consisting of four squadrons of line cavalry, for the absolute charge; and a squadron, consisting of four divisions of light cavalry, for skirmishing.

This system combines the attack, in open and close line, to a high pitch of perfection.

The attack in close line, is the charge of the first rank, with the couched lance, executed with that impetuosity, which must, at all times, insure a favourable result.

The attack in open line, is that of fire-arms; namely, the carbine, which, when skilfully used, is always destructive in its operations.

If Gustavus Adolphus considered it serviceable to unite fire-arms with the charge of cavalry, and, therefore, as has been already mentioned, placed

divisions of infantry in the intervals of the cavalry, (which custom, since the battle of Mollwitz, has been disused, merely on account of its inconvenience, and danger to the infantry); it is evident, that by means of the system here explained, the advantage is obtained, without its disadvantage being incurred.

These skirmishing divisions never form in line with the regiment.

From this union of two arms, a great advantage is derived: from the reciprocal assistance thus obtained, the cavalry acquire a degree of substantial force, which must have the most important results.

While the regiment charges, the skirmishers fall on the enemy in flank and rear.

They thus, by an effective fire, prepare the way for the attack of the regiment, weary the enemy's line, and throw it into confusion.

As they ride the best horses, they can fall on with determined bravery.

On a retreat, their duty is still more important; it is not meant, that in a regular battle, they would be of no consequence, nor be able to act.

They would certainly not decide a battle; but the decision of a battle was never expected from *light troops*.

The skirmishing divisions of the whole, or part of the cavalry of an army, according to circum-

stances, may be united, for the execution of single brilliant exploits.

Whoever knows, from his own experience, how much must be united—man, horse, weapon—to form such skirmishers as are here described; whoever has experienced the immense labour which such a formation requires, a formation which never could be attained in entire regiments or squadrons, will surely acknowledge the propriety of this system of having *divisions*, and not squadrons, of skirmishers.

These skirmishers, or fifth men, are as well in regard to the *personnel* as *matériel*—a true *élite*; and are, at the same time, a powerful lever for the ambition of the soldier.

When the regiment is in line, these four skirmishing divisions of the four squadrons, should be formed into one squadron. On reviews, this squadron should be placed on the right wing of the regiment; in action, one half behind the right wing, and one half behind the left wing (1). (See Plate 2).

(1) The formation and drill of skirmishers, is a subject which has long called for revision in the British service. How ridiculous are the exhibitions (*soi-disant skirmishing*), which our cavalry reviews and inspections present! and how can it be otherwise? It is not to be presumed, nor is it possible, that whatever men may happen to be upon the flanks, or in any other part of a squadron, regiment, or line, can be always such as are best appropriated for the peculiar and difficult duty of skirmishing.

The squadrons will thus become of greater strength than modern times are accustomed to.

Perfection, nay, mediocrity, in this service, is not easily acquired; a good horseman, a good swordsman, a good shot, intelligence, activity, intrepidity, &c. are necessary to the formation of a good skirmisher. How then can it be supposed, that men, taken indiscriminately from the line, can be qualified for a duty requiring so many qualifications? The author's suggestions, on this subject, demand the utmost attention, the division of the German cavalry into squadrons, each commanded by a Captain, renders an assimilation to his plan not practicable in our service; but a modification thereof could not but be attended with advantageous results. *Twelve men*, for instance, might be selected, from each troop, of known intelligence and activity, for the purpose of being instructed, and perfected in the duty of skirmishing; these men should be chosen from among the best riders, the most expert swordsmen, and the best shots in the troop; they should also unite the qualifications of intelligence and activity, which indeed are generally co-existent with the above-mentioned acquirements; the greatest attention should be paid to their constant practice in those several branches, where their excellence is expected and required; they should be made to acquire certainty of aim, by firing, from horse-back, at the target; they should be employed on responsible commands, to try their integrity and intelligence, and only retained in the situation when found fully deserving of it*. Skirmishers should, in fact, be *picked men*, the distinction would then be considered as *promotion*, and the system would not only furnish us with effective skirmishers, but diffuse general improvement among the men of the regiment, by the emulation which it would create.

T.

* A regiment of cavalry, according to the present establishment, would thus be enabled to take the field with a squadron of skirmishers, consisting of thirty-six file.

The strength of a squadron, from the Serjeant-Major downwards, would be about as follows.

- 1 Serjeant-Major.
- 1 Quarter-Master (1).
- 5 Serjeants.
- 5 Trumpeters.
- 10 Corporals.
- 10 Lance Corporals.
- 31 Skirmishers.
- 128 Privates.
- 2 Surgeons.
- 1 Farrier.
- 1 Saddler.
- 10 Supernumeraries, for the first casualties, which always occur, after a few days' march.

207 men.

The effective strength of a regiment in war, would amount, including the staff, from 860 to 870 horses.

If three regiments were united as a brigade, it


(1) The Squadron Quarter-Master (*Schwadrons Quartier-Meister*) in the German service, is the Pay-Serjeant to the squadron, similar to the French *Fourrier*: he keeps the accounts, superintends the delivery of provisions, the allotment of quarters, &c. &c.

T.

would, at the opening of a campaign, bring into the field 2,500 horses—namely, four-fifths line, and one-fifth light cavalry; a force which, put in motion, *à propos*, often decides.

The Commander of such a brigade may, with boldness and confidence, undertake any thing; for while he moves on to the attack, with his phalanx of 2000 men, the 500 light cavalry swarm around him, and protect his flanks and rear.

LECTURE VI



CONTINUATION.

THREE horses' breadth are considered equal to one horse's length; one horse's breadth to one pace; one horse's length to three paces, the pace being equal to two and a half feet.

In order to preserve the necessary distance for movement, between the ranks (for the ground upon which we manœuvre before the enemy, is seldom like that of the parade ground, in time of peace), one pace must be added to the length, and then four horses' breadth will be equal to one horse's length.

The result of this calculation leads to the division by *Fours*; however, in consequence of the awkward retiring of the second rank, in the wheeling, this method has had opponents at all times.

This retiring of the second rank not only tires the horses, but on uneven or marshy ground, is either impossible, or difficult to perform.

Kalkreuth, therefore, struck upon the division by *Threes*, because, in that case, an almost imperceptible reining back of No. 1 file of each *Three*, during the wheel, was of itself sufficient to perform it.

Other nations imitated the Prussian cavalry.

Experience, however, shews, that in flank marching by *Threes*, the distances are easily extended, or the horses cut.

Both methods have disadvantages, particularly, in quick deployments from close-column into line, the only movement, in fact, where the flank march, by *Threes* or *Fours*, is of importance (1).

The wheeling *about*! in presence of an enemy, can neither be recommended by *Threes* or *Fours*; because the division-leaders are not then in front of their divisions; and the Colonel is, therefore, left, on this occasion, to the discretion of the rear rank.

(1) A deployment by *Threes* cannot be otherwise than defective: no exertion, on the part of the officers or men, can prevent that *extension of files*, which is an inevitable attendant upon flank marching by *Threes*; hence, that *closing in*, after the *wheeling up*, which destroys the unity of all our *flank marches*, and gives to the movement of the best drilled regiment a loose and unsteady appearance. Many an unfortunate dragoon is blamed for apparent faults, which are only the natural consequences of that system according to which he is instructed, and which no attention of his could possibly prevent. Until the wheeling of *ranks by Threes* to a flank ceases to produce an *extension of files*, all attempts at precision in *deployment* are totally useless.

T.

At the battle of Denewitz, September 6, 1813, a light dragoon regiment, belonging to the army which Marshal Ney commanded, went about by *Fours*, under a fire of musquetry, and in face of a numerous cavalry of the enemy, which was in march. It was an experienced regiment; old officers were at its head; and eight days before, it had gloriously supported a brilliant engagement against four times the number. It did not retire in disorder, but continued the retreat, as it was ordered, at a steady walk; however, it made no halt!

At last, the Colonel and the rest of the officers, rode round the flanks, in front of the rear rank; made the regiment halt, and resumed the command.

Many officers of cavalry, therefore, prefer manœuvring by *Divisions*, before an enemy (1).

(1) The comparative merits of *Division* movements, and movements by *Threes*, have, of late, much occupied the attention of our cavalry-tacticians; and although the inconvenience and disadvantages of *Threes* are almost universally acknowledged by them, yet prejudice and habit have, hitherto, so far overcome conviction, that the necessary improvement, in this most important branch of our cavalry tactics, is yet withheld. Experience is the best director of the judgment, on most occasions, and in none may it be more confidently appealed to, than in the substitution here proposed by the author; for, on experience, Count Bismark's system is founded. Experience proves the inevitable extension of files, in *flank*, marching by *Threes*; the repeated destruction of the *telling-off* in action; the difficulty of performing the movement *Threes-about*, in deep ground, or with tired horses, and the serious inconvenience of manœuvring with the *rear rank* in *front*: these are the principal objections to the system now

These considerations lead to dividing by *Sub-divisions*; according to the before-mentioned strength of the Squadrons, the Divisions are sixteen file, consequently the Sub-divisions eight file strong; with eight files, closed up, wheels can be

followed by the British cavalry, and are certainly of sufficient importance to warrant an inquiry into the means, if any, of obviating such disadvantages: the author's system offers a remedy for each. In flank marching, by *Divisions*, or *Sub-divisions*, there is *no extension*; in manœuvring by *Divisions*, the *telling off* is *uninjured* by the casualties in action. In *going about*, by *Divisions*, the tired horse has every advantage; and in *retiring*, by *Divisions*, the inconvenience of having the *rear rank in front* is *totally obviated*. Dundas, in his Cavalry Regulations, seems to have fully acknowledged the advantage which moving by *Divisions*, or *Sub-divisions*, has over that by *Threes*; although he appears to doubt how far the former was generally practicable. In sec. 14, p. 43, of the 8vo. edition, he expressly says, "Although the nature of routes and roads, may sometimes limit common marches to be made on a very small front; yet flank marches near an enemy, or changes of position in presence of an enemy, cannot be effected with precision, firmness, or certainty, on a less front than ranks by *Threes*, or indeed, *when possible*, on a front of a *DIVISION* (or of a *SUB-DIVISION*, if the Squadron is strong, as from forty-eight to sixty files), for then the steadiness and correctness of pivot officers may insure the instant—*Halt! Wheel into line! and Advance!* upon the enemy."—(*Instructions and Regulations for the Formations and Movements of Cavalry*. Egerton. 1807). The doubt here expressed, as to the *possibility* of manœuvring on a front of a *Division*, or *Sub-division*, in the presence of the enemy, is fully cleared up, by the truly *practical* manœuvres attached to this work; all the changes of position, deployments, flank marches, formations, &c., are made upon a front never exceeding that of a *Sub-division* of eight files; and as the movements are founded upon experience, so are they admirably calculated for practice: far different from those complicated manœuvres of Dun-

made in all directions, in line, and in open or close column; and in flank marching, the breadth is the same as in wheeling by *Fours*, where eight men are in front.

das, which, like Chinese puzzles, only engross time and labour to the unprofitable end of forming useless combinations, the author's rational plan presents us with those movements only which are calculated for a service system, and dismissing all unnecessary and parade exhibitions, lays down, for the study of the young officer, manœuvres, the utility and acquirement of which, are within his comprehension.

Although the formation by *Threes* has lately been introduced into our infantry tactics, its inconveniences have been admitted by the eminent author of the revised regulations. "It may be observed," says Sir Henry Torrens, "that the formation by *Threes* is liable to the repeated derangement which the casualties in action cause in the telling off."—(*Field Exercises and Evolutions of the Army, as revised by Major-General Sir Henry Torrens, p. 107*). Old prejudices and habits have ever been the grand impediments to illumination and improvement, and in no place is this more conspicuous, than in our system of cavalry tactics. It may be urged, that the renowned deeds of the British army give us a just claim to originality of system; and that to adopt the improvements in tactics made by other nations, would be tacitly to acknowledge the imperfections of our own; but be it remembered, that the famed Regulations of Dundas are an almost literal translation of those of Frederick the Great; that the English rules for the rifle-service were originally taken from a celebrated German publication, and that, for our modern system of *military equitation*, we are also indebted to another country. "A mischievous error," says an enlightened writer*, "is gaining ground in the public mind: it is frequently very confidently asserted, that our tactics are brought as near to perfection as pos-

* Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, F. R. S., the translator of the French Tactics, and the author of several valuable Military publications.

In wheeling about, the Division-Commanders remain in front of their Divisions, as they wheel with one of the Sub-divisions; in flank marching, they are on the pivot.

This tactical telling off by Sub-divisions, renders that by *Threes* and *Fours* quite unnecessary; it not only simplifies the manœuvres, but also increases their precision and rapidity.

The telling off by *Twos* and *Fours*, should only be employed on a march.

There is yet an objection to be met, namely; that Divisions of sixteen files would be too strong, and those of twelve files would be more convenient for moving; the contrary is, however, the fact.

The column-march by Divisions in a trot, is considered the most difficult movement for cavalry; and this is exactly caused by the weakness of the ordinary Divisions of twelve files, for with Squadrons it answers well.

Therefore, when manœuvring, the Colonel is so often heard to call out, "Distance, Gentlemen! the distance must not be lost!" and, generally, at each wheeling-point, the distances are

sible. Let it be recollected, for a moment, that our system is entirely borrowed, either from the Prussian, in its principles, or from the French, in its arrangement of parts; and that the eminent judges of tactics, in these military nations, by no means deem their respective systems *complete*, and are constantly discussing their defects, and offering remedies for their improvement."

"Fas est, et ab hoste doceri."

lost; then an unsteadiness is occasioned, and the movement is badly performed.

The more regiments, the longer the column, and the greater the difficulty of preserving order and regularity of movement.

It can be easily explained.

A Division of twelve files, occupies, with the Non-Commissioned Officer, or Guide, thirteen paces in breadth.

In column, four paces are allowed for the horse of the Officer commanding the Division; eight paces for the two ranks, which make twelve; thus, one pace only remains for the movement (1).

A march of Divisions, of twelve files, in column, is, therefore, in reality, a march in close column.

It can be easily imagined, that this must cause great difficulty in a trot or gallop, and on every change of direction, must occasion checks.

The Saxon cavalry, on this account, manœuvres also by Half squadrons. With Divisions of sixteen files, which, with the Non-Commissioned Officers, or Guides, at the flanks, occupy eighteen paces: nothing but advantage can result, in whatever point of view it may be considered, without any possible disadvantage.

(1) In the Wirtemberg cavalry, the officers commanding Divisions are placed in front of them, and non-commissioned officers, called Guides (*Führer*), are posted on the flanks, these men are responsible for the distance and dressing.

Cavalry officers must be in front, on all occasions; and only on a retreat, should the Colonel and Squadron Officer remain in the rear; that is to say, on the side next the enemy, in order not to lose sight of him, and to remain master of the moment.

In 1814, a battalion of infantry, which was retreating during a hot engagement, in passing through a defile, was overtaken by the pursuing cavalry, and cut to pieces, because the Commander was at the head of the column, where he could neither see nor hear; and not where, in retreat, he ought to have been—at the rear of the column.

Those who prefer placing the Officers of cavalry on the flanks of the Divisions, give, as a reason, that the front appears clearer and better, which, however, has never yet been proved; but, conceding this, utility alone should determine.

The Officers are the leaders—the souls of a line; they must, therefore, be placed in a situation, where they can exercise their influence, freely and without impediment; this is particularly the case with such an arm as cavalry, which acts more from moral than physical force.

This cannot, however, be effected *in* the line, but *before* it.

Officers placed *in* the line, can no longer be considered as *leaders*; they are simply fellow-combatants.

The Prussian cavalry, which, from its brilliant deeds, may well be taken as an example, always placed the Officers *in front* of the line. The old knights were always before their banners.

That the Officers are thus exposed to greater danger, cannot be received as an objection; for we should entertain no very high opinion of an army, in the formation of which, care was taken for bringing off the officers in safety.

This pretext appears, however, in itself, groundless; for there is no protection against bullets, but fortune!

On the other hand, the advantages of a form, where the Commanding Officers are placed in front of the line, are self-evident.

They govern, as it may be said, the front. If the leaders are brave, and that we must suppose, then the whole line will be brave.

The Officers, seen by the men who are committed to their command, appear now most brilliant at the charge; the line in rear of them is their judge: the honourable ambition of being applauded by the men, impels them forward; and thus they become, what they ought to be, *encouraging examples to their men!* (1)

(1) Moral feeling being the source from which proceeds that enthusiasm and impetuosity so peculiar to good cavalry, no means should be left untried to increase it; that placing the officers *in front* must produce this effect, is indisputable—there is no British soldier who would not *follow*, where an officer

The moral force of a regiment depends upon the reciprocal confidence of the Commander and his men.

The Colonel of a regiment is the soul of this moral force.

What a regiment—what a family of commanders and soldiers, is that in which, both being animated by brave confidence, are influenced by no feeling, but that of military honour and renown !

As to the arming of the cavalry, opinions do not yet entirely agree. The sabre is of various construction: that which can be used alike for *cut* and *thrust*, appears to be allowed the most advantageous; as the dragoon, when singly engaged, may both cut and give point, and must be prepared to receive both from his adversary.

The pistol can only be considered as a weapon of necessity; its fire is uncertain, short, and would *lead*; and there is no officer so placed, who would not rival his followers in zeal and intrepidity.

“ If ought disturb the tenor of his breast,
’Tis but the wish to strike before the rest.”

Homer’s Iliad, B. 13.

The emulation, and mutual excitement, necessarily produced by placing the Officers in front of the line, would render the operations of cavalry much more brilliant—the manœuvres would also be better performed; a half-squadron Officer, as he is now posted in our service, can neither observe the particular movements of his own half-squadron, nor the general movement of the line: he is, in fact, little better than a flank man of the front rank, and must, therefore, feel his power diminished, and his exertions impeded.

T.

seldom efficacious. *One* pistol is sufficient for a dragoon, and the second holster should be applied to the carrying of cleaning materials (1).

The carbine is an important weapon for the attack of skirmishers in extended line. Experiments have shewn, that a rifle-barrel is not applicable to cavalry, in consequence of the difficulty in loading it; however, by the application of a pin (*kegel*) to the carbine lock, the necessary lightness and pliancy can be given to it, without which the fire has no certainty. A sort of *stop* might be made, which, keeping the cock steady, would prevent its going off of itself (2).

(1) For heavy cavalry, the pistol can only be considered as an incumbrance; indeed, there are few, if any, instances of advantage having been derived from that weapon, by either heavy or light cavalry on service; the holster would be much better applied to holding articles of necessities. T.

(2) The improvement here proposed in the carbine lock, is what our gunsmiths call, a *détente in the tumbler*, with a *stop* on the outside, similar to the construction of locks having *hair-triggers*; the *détente* facilitates the motion of the *sear* over the *bents* of the tumbler, and prevents it from stopping at *half-cock*, which would occur, if the trigger was easily acted on.

The manner in which the British government is imposed upon with regard to carbine locks, is really quite deplorable; instead of improving in their construction, we have absolutely retrograded: the locks which were issued thirty years ago, are infinitely superior to those of the present manufacture*: both the *tumbler*

* The date of the old carbine locks is 1797; they were the first issued to the heavy cavalry, after the long musquets were taken from them: the new pattern was issued in 1821, and intended to serve twenty years; these new locks are now, at the expiration of *nearly half* their period of service, *far inferior* to those issued in 1797.

The lance is only applicable to the attack and the charge, and then only in close line. A lance of eleven feet in length, is the true weapon of attack for cavalry against infantry. The French cuirassiers made a new era in modern history; at Essling, on May 21, 1809; their firmness saved the army

and *sear* of the modern locks, instead of being made of *steel*, are, nothing but *iron*, *case hardened*; the *hammer* is made of equally bad material; the *main spring* is in general defective, and the works from not being *freed*, become impaired by friction, and are constantly getting out of order. The consequence is, that after a few shots, not above half the carbines will go off! The improvement proposed by the author, would, no doubt, have the effect which he states; but if a carbine lock was *honestly* constructed, according to the present English principle, it ought to answer every purpose; an improvement might certainly be made in the *hammer*, which from the extreme friction at that part, is now so frequently found out of order: if the *hammer* was made of better materials, and a *bridge* added to the spring, the friction would be considerably diminished, and the *hammer* would be found to move with ease and certainty. The stiffness of our modern carbine locks, and the extreme difficulty in making the *trigger* act, is well known to every cavalry officer who has tried to fire off a carbine; even if he is so fortunate as to succeed in moving the cock, the *mainspring* is frequently insufficient to drive back the *hammer**. *Swivels* are also much wanting to the carbines of the heavy cavalry, at least, to those

* As the perfect action of the lock depends upon the adaptation of the elastic powers of the springs of the cock and hammer to each other, any want of accordance in the action of these springs, must render the lock imperfect.

The following simple expedient might be resorted to, to prove the elasticity of a carbine lock—suppose a given weight be determined on to represent the force required to cock the carbine, then let a spring steel-yard be applied, and the piece cocked by drawing it out: if the extension of the steel-yard is not greater than that which would be produced by the given weight, it will be evident that the spring of the lock possesses the necessary degree of elasticity—the steel-yard may be applied to the hammer in a similar way, and the elastic power of its spring may be determined by the length to which the graduated bar

from destruction. If they had been armed with lances, as the knights of former times, they would nearly have approached perfection, and, with their moral force, no infantry could have withstood them.

The long lance applied in close line, would make the cavalry again capable of attacking infantry with success.

The English infantry, under Wellington, in Spain and Portugal, had no dread of any cavalry but the lancers.

The best weapon, therefore, for skirmishers, would be the *carbine*, to fire and hit with which, on horseback, they must be much practised: and the best weapon for the line, a lance of eleven feet in length, such as is used by the Polish cavalry (1).

intended for the use of *skirmishers*; many of the ramrods now fall out, and are lost, when the carbine hangs from the belt, as may be seen on the skirmishers being ordered to "fall in." Arms, with such defects, are worse than useless; and the most zealous skirmisher, thus provided, must fail in his exertions. T.

of the steel-yard is drawn out in the act of pulling back the hammer—for if a certain weight has been previously assumed to express the requisite degree of elasticity in the spring of the hammer, the conformity of this weight with that shewn by the steel-yard, will prove that the lock has been properly constructed.

All carbine locks being subjected to this ordeal, previous to the issue, would be thus *proved* on those points where they are now so defective.

(1) "*De toutes les armes dont on se sert à cheval,*" says Montecuculi, "*la lance est la meilleure.*" This weapon is not yet properly estimated in the British service. An imperfect

It would be contrary to the intended design, to treat of all the objects connected with the formation of cavalry, such as clothing, horse-equipment, knowledge of its capabilities, and an ill-founded prejudice against its use, have conspired to render the lance absolutely unpopular with our tacticians, and perhaps, if a majority of opinions was now taken on the subject, it would be decreed, that a regiment of *Lancers* was more *ornamental* than *useful*; the history, however, of all ages, shews, that the lance is the most formidable, and the most effective weapon, that cavalry can be armed with. It was the distinguishing weapon of the days of chivalry; it was the principal arm of that cavalry, whom nothing but the Swiss infantry could resist; and, in modern times, it has been most successfully employed in the French armies. The misapplication of the lance, in our service, is a sufficient proof of how little it is understood. That weapon is peculiarly adapted for *heavy cavalry*; and in the hands of *light dragoons* upon *light horses*, is deprived of half its advantages. If the useless carbine, with its weighty appendages, was taken from our heavy cavalry, and a twelve-foot lance substituted in its stead, those troops would become, perhaps, the most formidable *line cavalry* in Europe. Both the *personnel* and *matériel* of the British cavalry, qualifies it, in the highest degree, for this description of force—the size, strength, and swiftness of the horse; the weight, steadiness, and moral force of the man—are qualities which should not be deprived of the means that would render them most effective. It may be urged, in objection to this change, that the substitution of the lance for the carbine, in our regiments of heavy cavalry, would deprive those regiments of the power of *skirmishing*, which circumstances might sometimes render necessary; but, if a modification of the author's skirmishing system was adopted, as has been suggested by the translator, in page 127, every regiment would then be provided with a *squadron of skirmishers*; and one squadron of men, who had been perfected in the duty of skirmishing, would be more serviceable than an entire regiment of such operators with the carbine, as we have at present.

&c. &c., as these depend upon the character of the nation, and the taste of the Generals; a few words may, however, be said here, as to recruiting and remounting.

It is of importance, in selecting recruits for cavalry, to choose those only, who, either volunteer, or who have been accustomed to horses from their youth, such as the sons of farmers; just as those only make good sailors, who have been accustomed to the sea from their childhood.

What is, for instance, to be expected from a stocking manufacturer, or a linen weaver, who consider the horse as a wild beast? it is well known, that these people never have confidence in their horses, but look upon them as their greatest enemies, against whom, for the future, they struggle for their life; they never learn to ride—never can balance themselves; but hang on the horse like a helpless lump, which, in order to preserve its equilibrium, unnecessarily wastes a great part of its strength, and on this account, is soon exhausted.

Therefore, we find always some horses in a squadron, who, at the slowest pace, sweat and tire themselves astonishingly; the horse becomes, at last, refractory against the ignorant and heavy hand of his rider; he hangs upon the bridle, overcome by the pain of his mouth, goes crooked, jumps, &c.

The rider, whose fear and anxiety increases,

clings still closer, and tires himself by sticking with his knees and heels, in order to prevent himself from falling.

Thus, the quietest horse becomes, at last, passionate, and will endeavour, either to get rid of his burthen, or to run away.

Such an ignorant rider often brings an entire squadron into disorder, which in a charge, must be productive of the most fatal consequences; added to which, a man who cannot manage his horse, will be unable to do any injury to the enemy (1).

The choice of the horse is not a less necessary object of attention.

If it were possible, there should be a few military studs in monarchies where the horses could be brought up wild, and never placed in a stall, until they were sent to the regiments.

In peace, horses are generally too much taken care of, and the greatest anxiety is shewn, to prevent

(1) Nothing can be more just than these observations on the selection of recruits. How much more effective would our cavalry be, if, instead of an indiscriminate enlistment, those men only were taken, who had been accustomed to horses from an early period; a total interdict should be put to recruiting for cavalry in manufacturing towns, where it cannot be reasonably expected to find men, who either know, or care any thing about a horse. The agricultural counties would always furnish a number of men, sufficient to keep up the strength of cavalry regiments during peace, and with our present reduced establishment, there is no reason why such a selection should not be made.

their catching cold : then, as soon as the field is taken, they are treated carelessly ; often they are made to bivouac, in the very worst weather, and without any necessity : what extremes, and what *contradiction* !

Cavalry, says Marshal Saxe, should be lightly mounted—they should be horses accustomed to fatigue—carry little baggage with them, and never aim at having very fat, or finely-proportioned horses (1).

(1) That a horse is not effective in proportion to his *fat*, is most true ; yet it would not be adviseable, to instil upon a dragoon, the principle that a *thin horse* is better than a *fat* one ; our horses are, as the author justly observes, “ too much taken care of in time of peace.” But this is more conspicuous, in the extreme caution which is observed as to their quantum of *exercise*, and the mistaken practice of crowding them into small unventilated stables, than with regard to *feeding* ; no injury to the service can result from the height of a horse’s *condition*, provided his *exercise* is proportioned to it ; three-fourths of the diseases of cavalry horses, during peace, are *inflammatory*, and proceed generally from *hot stables*, and *want of exercise*.

T.

LECTURE VII.

POSITION OF CAVALRY.

THERE are positions both in and out of action.

To the latter belong the camp and cantonments.

In camp-positions, cavalry should never have natural obstacles too near their rear, such as defiles, morasses, lakes, woods, rivers, villages, &c.; for should an unexpected and powerful attack be made on them, or a nightly surprise, there is a danger, among such natural obstructions, of being disgracefully defeated, before time can be found to form.

In cantonments also, for like reasons, the alarm place should never be on the side of the enemy, but in rear of villages and small towns.

Infantry, on the other hand, defend a town, a village, and particularly a defile, better at the entrance, than at the outlet.

Well chosen positions often oblige the enemy to leave his positions, or to give up his intention of attacking.

General Moore took up such famous positions on his celebrated retreat to Corunna, that the French, notwithstanding their superior force, never ventured to attack him (1).

Wellington was impregnable in his position near Lisbon.

The camp of Frederick the Great, at Bunzelwitz; the renowned camp of Gustavus Adolphus, at Werben, and at Nuremberg; as well as Wallenstein's camp, not far from that town, shew the highest imaginable talent in position.

In positions for action, it should be determined, whether intervals between squadrons are necessary and advantageous.

They are not absolutely necessary, but the form of position of all European cavalry, proves their utility.

(1) "When this suffering army," says Colonel Jones, "nearly exhausted by fatigue and privation, were put in position in front of Lugo, the enemy hesitated to commence the attack, and halted in position on the opposite ridge." In fact, the French, although superior in number, did not dare to attack, until the cavalry, and nearly all the artillery, had been embarked at Corunna.

*See Colonel Jones's Account of the War in Spain, &c.
Mr. James Moore's Narrative. Southey's Penin-
sular War, &c.*

The Austrians have intervals between their divisions; the French between squadrons; and so have almost all cavalry.

The mobility is increased by the intervals, but those should not be so great, as to diminish the essential strength of the charge.

The Prussian cavalry, at the period of its greatest fame, was formed without intervals.

Nine paces, which is the breadth of a sub-division, is sufficient distance between squadrons; and when that crowding arises, which generally occurs in a charge, and which lies in the nature of the horse, who is too apt to press in, these intervals are, in most cases, found very useful.

In proportion as the horse exerts himself, and increases his pace, he requires more room than was necessary for him when halted, or at a walk; during the trot, therefore, and still more at the gallop, the intervals close of themselves; so that there can be no openings for the enemy to take advantage of. These intervals, nine geometric paces, that is, the breadth of a sub-division, increases the power of manœuvring to a high pitch.

Without conforming too strictly to this rule, the intervals are better judged of by the state of the ground, the line of battle of the enemy, and, generally, by those circumstances which give to every battle *its character*.

Cavalry may take greater intervals when acting

on the defensive, but when offensively employed, should be more closed.

In peace, manœuvres may be performed sometimes with, and sometimes without intervals; and generally, with intervals at optional distances; for, as engagements are manifold and various, so must the art of position and motion be varied, in order that this art may be practised in peace (1).

(1) The manœuvres of a regiment during peace, should always be, as much as possible, assimilated to those which are generally found necessary in war. This truth was acknowledged to the fullest extent by the great Frederick, and is still acted upon by the present government of Prussia. In the peace of 1746, and previous to the seven years' war, the Prussian troops were regularly assembled every year; and in the fields of peace, were taught the grand evolutions and manœuvres of war. The infantry was exercised in various motions, and taught to attack in plains, and on heights; to defend villages and intrenchments, pass rivers, cover marches with reversed columns, to retreat, and in fine, to perform every movement which was necessary to be made in the face of an enemy. The cavalry was exercised in different attacks, close and open; was taught to reconnoitre, to search for forage, to form, and take points of sight on prescribed limits, &c.—(*See Posthumous Works of Frederick the Great, vol. ii., p. 17*). This practical system of drill, would not, certainly, be so easy to accomplish in England, where every John Bull may stand at his gate, and not only refuse you admittance, but prosecute, and convict you, if you dare to insist upon it: however, a much more instructive system might be adopted, than the one at present pursued. Galloping through Dundas's manœuvres, on Hounslow heath, can never teach dragoons how to oppose an enemy, to cover a retreat, to patrol a country, to take advantage of ground, to support infantry, to protect artillery, &c., &c. No sort of resemblance to any of the movements or operations likely to occur in war, are ever attempted by us: what is to pre-

If the General to whom the cavalry is entrusted, receives an order from the Commander-in-Chief, on the day of battle, to shew a wish of engaging the enemy on any particular point, in order to divert his attention from other points, on which it is intended to make a decisive attack, with another army, the General places his forces in deceitful threatening lines.

The Echellon position is here very useful.

The intervals may be increased, by which means the lines are lengthened, and yet appear full and multiplied.

The head of the Echellon is advanced towards the point intended to be threatened: in this position there is great command of manœuvre, and any point may be *threatened*, without attacking it. As

vent the cavalry, infantry, and artillery, from periodically assembling, at some unenclosed part of the country, and there practising, under an able and experienced officer, such movements as would give them some idea of what they are to expect on service. Really, unless a young Cornet is possessed with a considerable portion of *curiosity*, he is now led to believe, that changing quarters, is *going on service*; that being on guard, is being on *picquet*; and that a review at Hounslow, is a *general action*!

All this may contain

“The pride, and pomp, and pageantry of war;”

but it certainly bears no resemblance to those duties of a military life, which are of more difficult acquirement, and far more essential.

from this position, the attack may be as easily made as avoided, it naturally creates caution in the enemy, renders it necessary for him to take up counter-positions, and perfectly fulfils the intended design of making a demonstration, (*feint*).

Uneven ground may be advantageously employed to give an appearance of greater strength than really exists, and to increase the deception.

When, for instance, two lines are concealed towards the middle, behind rising ground, the enemy will believe that the space behind the rising ground, which lies between the two visible endpoints, is equally occupied.

In retreats, this manner of taking up a position, will often gain half a day.

On September 4, 1812, the Russian cavalry manœuvred in this manner with great ability.

It was placed in apparently great lines; the intersected country prevented a perfect view of it; the lines were every where lost behind the heights and small woods.

The French cavalry under Murat, which always marched, in this memorable war, in great masses at the head of the army, was obliged, in consequence of this position, to halt for several hours; until the first Corps d'Armée of Davoust came up, and a reconnoissance was made.

In the mean time, the visible parts of the Russian line were lost, and when the French advanced, all had disappeared (1).

In irregular ground, therefore, the intervals of squadrons may be increased without any disadvantage.

In a plain, cavalry should be placed as close as possible, for the science of position varies according to the description of the ground on which it is placed, and according to the positions which the enemy is taking, or has taken up; also, according as it is intended, either to charge the enemy, or parry his attack.

A General, who has only a certain number of regular positions and movements in his head, is easily embarrassed; because those which he has practised on the exercise ground, will not always answer.

True genius develops new manœuvres in every new position, according to circumstances.

The general principles of positions, movements,

(1) M. de Segur relates an almost incredible instance of Murat's temerity on this day. "On assure," says he, "que ce jour-là, par un de ces premiers mouvements dignes des temps de la chevalerie, il s'éleva seul et tout-à-coup contre leur (the Russian) ligne, s'arrêta à quelques pas d'eux; l'épée à la main, il leur fit d'un air et d'un geste si impérieux le signe de se retirer, que ces barbares obéirent et reculèrent étonnés."—(*Histoire de Napoleon, &c. tom. i. liv. vii., p. 362*). This is certainly the most wonderful instance, in modern history, of the effect of an "imperial air and gesture."

and engagements, are only guides to talent—only instruction for the application of tactics; for this application depends upon the fertility of the mind. The elements of the service (*regulations*), are only the *form*, to which talent gives life.

Its gift of combination elevates it above the prescription of Regulations. A Commander who has once reached this point, is, in the fullest sense of the word, *matured*.

Peace may certainly circumscribe him, but war re-establishes the true connexion, and shews, that the service does not give brilliancy to him, but he to the service.

Peace displaces the names that were of importance in war, and places others in their situations; because, as Lloyd says, the principal talent in peace consists in the art of pleasing, and the useful is neglected for the agreeable.

War scours away the ignoble parts, and exhibits people according to their personal value*.

If cavalry is placed in a plain, with the design of maintaining it, it is well to extend the first line, and form it with great intervals; but the second line should be closed up, and interspersed with twelve-pound batteries; and a third line should be formed, as a reserve, in columns of single regiments, as points of *appui*.

The second line then contains the real force of the charge.

* “ War for true soldiers.”—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

If the enemy advances, the first line* can be made to harass him in various ways, and involve him in partial engagements; but when the enemy's force increases, this line can gradually retire round both flanks of the second line, thus leaving the second line free, and exposing the enemy to the fire of artillery.

A most favourable position is thus obtained, for while the flanks of the real charge are strengthened, the flanks of the enemy are threatened, and now the attack may be commenced at pleasure.

The first and second line thus united, will form a line of battle, in the shape of a stretched bow (*ordre courbe*): should the enemy continue his movements, and present the appearance of a real attack, his intentions should be anticipated, and he should be attacked with one or both wings, according to circumstances; if the attack is made with one wing only, such a strength should be given to it, as to render it superior to the corresponding wing of the enemy, which it should be endeavoured to surround.

Should this flank attack succeed, it is now time to move the whole line forward, in order to derive advantage from it.

If it does not succeed, the defeated wing collects itself at the reserve.

Should the enemy now advance with his whole

* The skirmishers.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

line, he must be boldly attacked with that wing which has not yet been engaged; in this case, the artillery retires at the moment of the charge, but the reserve advances, and forms line on the point where both lines engage.

If a plain has been occupied, the artillery is placed in the first line, and this is made the line of attack, with small intervals; the second line, however, must not be placed at too great a distance, in order that when the first advances to the charge, the second may move up to the artillery.

It is of importance, that the position should not be so taken up as to endanger the flanks; but that, on the other hand, it may be expected to outflank the enemy.

General Sébastiani manœuvred successfully in this manner, with his corps of cavalry, against General Saken, at Schilda, on the 10th October, 1813.

While he placed his heavy cavalry in the middle, and his artillery in battery in front, he pushed forward both wings, extending them, and obliged General Saken to leave his position in a very short time.

When the Crown Prince, the present King of Wirtemberg, with the fourth and sixth corps of the great army, on the march from Vitry to Paris, met with the division of the army of Marshal Marmont, at Sondé St. Croix, on the 25th March,

1814. The cuirassier division of General Count Noslitz, deployed in the centre; General Count Pahlen's division deployed on the right; and the light cavalry division of Prince Adam of Wirtemberg, on the left.

The Wirtemberg horse artillery of twelve guns, was placed on a height, in the centre of this position, and opened a cannonade; at the same time, the Russian cavalry on the right, and the Wirtemberg cavalry on the left, advanced in echelon.

This position of the Crown Prince obliged Marshal Marmont immediately to abandon his, although he had a numerous corps of all arms.

The Crown Prince, without waiting for his infantry, followed the enemy with his cavalry, which was afterwards joined by the light cavalry of the guard under the Grand Duke Constantine; he pursued them to Allemens, a distance of fully twenty-four miles! The French frequently made an attempt to halt, at Sommesons, Conantrai, and Fère-Champenoise; the Crown Prince, however, gave them no time, but instantly attacked them, with his known impetuosity. Two large squares were cut to pieces, Marshal Marmont lost the greatest part of his guns, and the coming on of night alone enabled him to reach the heights of Allemens with the remainder of his army.

This day will be ever memorable in history, for it determined the whole campaign. Napoleon, though not present, was then conquered.

In a regular battle, the cavalry* must be placed in reserve; at the commencement of a battle, it must neither be exposed to cannon-fire, nor in general be brought into action. This rule seldom admits of an exception. The time for cavalry to produce great effects, is, when the line of battle wavers—when the fire of artillery has weakened it—when single points have become thinned—when the infantry is tired and exhausted, and the arms, in consequence of a long-continued fire, no longer go off with regularity, and therefore the fire begins to become uncertain: this is the moment to attack infantry with advantage, and the cavalry must then suddenly advance, and attack in masses. The hearing of the soldier is affected by the thunder of the cannon, and the long-continued fire of small arms, so that the word of command is heard and understood with difficulty. The smoke favours the unperceived advance of the cavalry; all which are co-operating circumstances; wherefore, at such moments, the mere appearance of the cavalry, when unexpected, frequently frightens the infantry, and makes the victory easy.

At the battle of Waterloo, a French division of infantry fled before two regiments of English

* The cavalry always meant, under this name, is that which is not part of the *corps d'armée*, but is formed in masses, and known by the name of *reserve cavalry*.

cavalry, without firing a shot, and left behind them thirty guns (1).

Before the invention of gunpowder, cavalry was employed immediately at the commencement of a battle; but, in the present day, it cannot be effectively used until the end, to insure the victory, and to profit by it (2).

(1) One of the most extraordinary instances of panic produced by the unexpected attack of cavalry upon infantry, is recorded by Marshal Saxe: "As the French army," says the Marshal, "was retreating, at the battle of Ramillies, in very good order, over a piece of ground that was extremely narrow, and bordered on both sides by some deep hollows, the cavalry of the allies pursued it, at a slow pace, as if they were marching to an exercise; the French moving, likewise, very gently, and formed, at the same time, twenty deep, or perhaps more, on account of the narrowness of the ground. In this situation, an English squadron approached two battalions of French, and began firing upon them; who, imagining that they were going to be attacked, immediately came about, and made a general discharge; the noise of which so alarmed the whole French army, that the cavalry took to flight at full speed, and all the infantry precipitated itself into the hollows, with the utmost fear and confusion; insomuch, that the ground was clear in an instant, and not a single person to be seen."

Reveries on the Art of War. London, 1757. p. 165.

T.

(2) Napoleon's grand error at Waterloo, was that of ordering his cavalry to charge *too soon*. He seems to have been afterwards aware of this error, and makes the following rather awkward apology for it, in his bulletin of the battle. "By a movement of impatience, so frequent in our military annals, and which has often been so fatal to us, the cavalry of reserve, having perceived a retrograde movement made by the English, to shelter them from our batteries, from which they suffered so much,

The position of cavalry, even in reserve, must always be formed in several lines.

To place cavalry on ground where it could be of no service, would bespeak little talent.

Frederick the Great, speaking on this head, in his instructions for carrying on war with advantage, says, "If cavalry is placed behind a morass, no use can be made of it; if it is placed too near a thicket, the enemy's infantry can conceal themselves in it, and fire from thence, throwing the cavalry into disorder, which is then unable to defend itself."

In positions, where the object is to support other kind of troops, the cavalry should be placed at a distance, in order that a charge may be executed with force; on this account, attention should be always paid to the nature of the ground, for a few hundred paces more distant, is of no consequence with cavalry, as it moves so quickly.

In retreat, cavalry should never be placed before the debouches, but always at some distance behind them, in order that when the enemy debouches, he may be impetuously attacked, before he has taken up his position.

crowned the heights of Mont St. Jean, and charged the infantry. This movement, which, made in time, and supported by the reserves, must have decided the day, being made in an isolated manner, and before affairs on the right were terminated, became fatal."

French Account of the Battle of Mont St. Jean.

T.

The cavalry action at Zdenich, in 1806, which the French make so much of, was the natural consequence of a faulty position which General Schimmelpennick had taken up, immediately before a wood.

Instead of retreating through this wood, with the greatest possible expedition, after he had ascertained the advance of the enemy, he accepted battle from a superior force, in this most unfavourable position.

LECTURE VIII.

MOVEMENT OF CAVALRY.

THE art of movement (manœuvring) consists in two parts :

(A) *Movement in March.*

(B) *Movement in Manœuvre.*

When troops leave their positions, whether it be camp or cantonments, and move into other positions, these movements are called a *march*.

When troops form, and arrange themselves in order of battle, either in the position which they had taken up, or on the march, the movements by which this is attained, as well as those which follow in consequence of them, are *manœuvres*.

Strategics shew the necessity for a change of position : positions should only be taken up upon strategical points*.

The movement from one position to another, may comprehend many marches.

* Strategical points are distinguished from points which are not so, by there being no possibility of turning them with impunity.

An army which has taken up a position upon a point not *strategical*, would be out-manœuvred by a skilful General ; or if it remained, would be taken as in a *cul de sac*.

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

These successive marches then become an operation; the new position which is taken up, is the object of this operation.

When strategics point out the necessity, direction, and object of this operation, and have designed the plan, then tactics are occupied with the execution.

It breaks up the army according to circumstances, into columns: these circumstances are, the ground over which the army marches, and the number of roads on which columns can move; as well as the greater or less probability of being attacked by the enemy during the movement.

Tactics also combine the columns according to the different kinds of troops, and according to the double object of safety of manœuvre, and convenience of the troops in performing it; these can, for example, be united, when the country is open, and the cavalry is at the head of the column; if the country is mountainous, and that it is necessary to place the infantry at the head, the convenience is disturbed.

Safety is the first consideration—convenience the second: it is here of importance, whether the movement be in advance or retreat.

In the tactical arrangement of these different considerations, great exactness is required; the least forgetfulness has often caused the greatest disorder.

To transport, with regularity, the immense

baggage with which armies incumber themselves, is one of the most difficult tasks.

The chief of the staff, on whom this duty devolves, sometimes meets with difficulties scarcely to be overcome.

The transport of baggage is tolerably organised with few armies; moreover, the officers are allowed too much baggage.

The baggage waggons of the officers, which endeavour to keep up with the regiments, press in between the columns, and stop up the defiles.

The wants of great modern armies exceed all calculation (1).

The reserve ammunition waggons are also very burthensome, and often impede the movement of the army.

(1) Although the wants and appendages of modern armies are much more numerous than they might be, or ought to be; yet those of ancient armies, and even of the armies in the last century, far exceeded them. Darius's march to meet Alexander was more like a theatrical procession than the advance of an army: this monarch had not only an absurd retinue of chariots, pike-men, boys, and *cavalry in robes**, but absolutely *his whole family circle*. "On each side of him," says Quintus Curtius, "marched two hundred of his relatives, then followed a chariot carrying Sysigambis, the mother of Darius, accompanied by his wife; as also fifteen large chariots bearing the king's children, with their governors and eunuchs, and his concubines, to the number of three hundred and sixty. Six hundred mules, and three hundred waggons were loaded with money; and the wives

* There was a body of cavalry, composed of men of twelve different nations; and another body called the *immortal*, amounting to 10,000, dressed in robes of cloth of gold,—See Quintus Curtius.

But the provision waggons, which drag after an army in immense columns, and at a prodigious expense, often carry nothing but mouldy bread, or meal that has long become useless: they are, really, only a burthen to the country, without serving the army.

The flocks of cattle poison the country, perish on the roads, seldom benefit, because they go too slow, and produce irreparable injury; while they infect and destroy the stock of cattle of the seat of war, and of all countries through which they pass.

So long as these magazine columns are not limited to four days' consumption (bread, rice, corn, brandy), and that to be transported as compact as possible, on *permanent waggons*—so long as all other

of the officers of state were all mounted on chariots." The Generals of Louis XIV. made war with all the comforts and luxuries of peace; immense suites, great trains of kitchen apparatus, toilettes appointments, &c., &c. One of the most extensive exposés of French military baggage, was made by Seidlitz at Gotha, in 1757, when he was so near finding Marshal Soubise at his soup.—"Il prit," says Jomini, "grand nombre de secrétaires, valets de chambres, officiers de cuisine, comédiens, coiffeurs, marchands de nouveautés, &c. Les bagages tombèrent également en son pouvoir; on y trouva des caisses entières d'eau de lavande, de sans-pareille; des parasols, des manchettes; des singes et des perroquets!"—(*Traité des Grandes Operations Militaires*, vol. i., p. 198). These might well bear the Roman name of *Impedimenta* *.

T.

* The general orders of Marshal Saxe are strongly illustrative of the nature of the baggage which followed his army. "There will be no play to-morrow evening, as the Marshal intends giving battle to the enemy." See *Voltaire*.

baggage, both belonging to these, and to the artillery, is not dismissed, the motions of an army will be ever impeded.

A soldier can carry with himself four days' provisions; consequently, an army is thus provided for eight days.

With this supply, and a proper use being made of the assistance which the country affords, in our cultivated land, every rapid operation may be executed.

War consists in a succession of operations; after each, some days of rest should be taken, even when no battle has been fought, because the strength of an army is finite.

During these halt days, the supplies are completed; and consequently, the provisions, in defensive warfare, from the magazines; in offensive warfare, from the places or provinces taken.

If provisions are daily served out during the operation, its success is thereby risked, for the operation is thus deprived of rapidity and strength.

Since there are no longer enlisted soldiers, except in England;—since, consequently, the armies are national; the system of limiting the soldier to his meagre portion, in the middle of a country overflowing with abundance, and, consequently, to make him suffer want, is by so much the less practicable; as on the day of battle we excite the soldier, by reminding him of his love of country.

The time is no more, when in Germany the sol-

dier fought on any side for payment (1); war has ceased to be a permanent occupation of the citizen, but has returned to what it formerly was with the old Germans, an occasional duty of every citizen.

A warm feeling of patriotism exists in the soldier, just because he is a citizen.

In order to increase this patriotism, even the private soldier has been encouraged by honorary rewards,—by the enticement of promotion, which was hitherto unknown to him.

To this system the French owed their victories, during their struggle against feudal right; to this system the nations owe their liberation from the French monarchy in the last war.

That partition-wall of absolute power on the part of the officer, and slavish obedience of the soldier, has disappeared.

The officers can now only excel the soldiers by great bravery, or superior talent; every other distinction loses its aim: *obedience may be extorted; confidence never!*

The judgment and opinion of a common soldier of his officer, is often more correct, and of more value, than that of officers of high or equal rank, where jealousy often causes reproach.

(1) Such were the soldiers of the thirty years' war, (*See Harte, Galetti, &c.*),—the cavalier very candidly confesses, that when he went into arms at the beginning of the civil war, he did not trouble himself to examine sides. "I was as glad," he says, "to hear the drums beat for soldiers, as if I had been a mere Swiss, who cares not which side gets the better, provided he receives his pay." *Memoires of a Cavalier*, vol. ii., p. 75.

The soldier is excited by ambition to imitate the deeds of his officer; boldly he fixes his eyes on his Colonel, and hopes to equal him.

The General looks down upon the hundreds entrusted to him, as rivals of his fame. What mutual inducements to valour!

But when this spirit, which is founded upon past deeds, produces general respect for the military, it must ensure it honourable treatment.

On the greatest exertions which are required of it, plentiful subsistence must be provided.

With a regular English army, that system of scanty portions is as long possible, as they are able to purchase provisions, by means of their high pay.

It is possible, without always depending upon the uncertain provision transport, which, as has been proved, destroys the country, by the prodigious demands on forage, and the little order and discipline which there exists, to form a requisition system, by which an army may support itself, during the execution of an operation, without ruining the country (1).

(1) "Celui qui a le secret de vivre sans manger," says Monteculi, "peut aller à la guerre sans provisions." This secret, however, has not yet been discovered; and so long as a certain supply of food is necessary for the support of life, particularly of a life attended with the physical exertions of a soldier in time of war, so long should such a system be supported, as would ensure his regular and adequate supply. That a dreadful want of provisions was frequently experienced by the British troops, during the Peninsular war, is a fact well authenticated. Many of their retrograde movements were caused by this privation. The Diplo-

But the soldier himself must not dare to supply his wants.

Discipline is very different from what is generally understood under that head; the civilian thinks that it consists in the Commanding Officer

matic Correspondence, published by order of the House of Commons, shewed that *absolute starvation* obliged the British army to retire across the Tagus, in 1809. "On this retreat," says Colonel Jones, "five days passed without an issue of bread; on some days, no food of any kind had been received, and, at most, a third, or one half of a ration*." This is the consequence of making war in our *liberal* manner. The following excellent observations of the intelligent writer alluded to, place, in a strong point of view, the difficulties under which an army labours, that proceeds on the equitable system of the British: "The French, therefore, whose practice it is to live at the expense of the inhabitants of the country wherever their armies may act, and on food furnished by requisition of the magistrates of the several districts on the inhabitants generally, found neither difficulty nor deficiency; the burthen was equally shared amongst the cultivators, or if otherwise, the blame was imputed to their own magistrates: whereas, the English, professing to pay for every thing, and employing their own contractors, were dependent on the exertions of individuals, and were frequently defrauded by them, as well as by the avarice of the proprietors; and always paid according to the scarcity of the article on the spot, &c. It may be doubted," he adds, "whether the English, professing to pay for every thing, or the French taking every thing by requisition, created most ill will."—(*Vol. i., pp. 251-2.* Note). Though this may be doubtful, one thing is at least clear, that the French succeeded much better than the British in procuring provisions; "for although our men," as Colonel Jones says, "professed to

* Although this short allowance was considered a great privation by the British, the Swedes of Gustavus would not have felt much inconvenience from it, for such was their frugality that they could subsist during *three months* upon the same quantity of provisions which would have been consumed in *one month* by an equal number of Austrians. See NAYLOR.

obliging the soldier to be content with his commissariat bread. Whether the army suffers from fatigue, or the want of necessary support, in consequence of the absence of ease and shelter; whether, on account of their bivouacing at a bad time of the year, contagious disorders spread among them, courage relaxes, and, finally, an army dissolves, is only to be found in the hospitals; and, consequently, the object of the war is defeated, and the evil prolonged—this the civilian does not think of; he does not see the consequences of which he himself will necessarily be one of the victims, but only the pressure of the moment: he does not see and honour in the soldier, that man, who, after fatiguing and dangerous labour, tired and exhausted from weather, hunger,

pay," both their professions and mode of payment, were little valued by the inhabitants, who, not being accustomed to *paper currency*, generally considered the receipts a mere imposition, and frequently sold them for one-tenth part of the value*. A well organised *Requisition System*, governed by an active and conscientious Commissariat, is the only sure means of providing for the subsistence of an army. The inhabitants are thus less injured—the soldiers are better supplied—plunder and violence are prevented—and, consequently, discipline is maintained †.

T.

* A *Bon*, of the value of 100 dollars, was not unfrequently sold by an ignorant Spanish peasant, to an English Commissary, for ten !

† An excellent treatise on the supply of armies, from the pen of General Couturier, will be found in the "*Journal des Sciences Militaires*," tom. iii. liv. ix., a work, which, from the interesting nature of its contents, and the talent of its contributors, stands pre-eminent among the military periodicals of the present day.

and thirst, cheerfully accepts a friendly reception, united with a meal seasoned by hospitality. Content and cheerfulness are always united in the soldier ; but the citizen does not consider him in this point of view.

In soldiers, he sees only a horde of rude rabble, sent upon the earth, as a scourge and plague. He receives them cold and sullen—covetous, and niggardly giving them what the law prescribes. No friendly word, or soothing attendance, excuses the want of a better meal. He knows not how to derive advantage from the affability of the soldier, by praising the deeds of the army. In a word, it is the fault of the citizen himself, when the soldier is what he, in his prejudice, considers him—*savage*.

Discipline is that regulation, by which troops, under the most unfavourable circumstances, continue true to their duties, and to their colours, in the execution of the orders given them. It is that steadfastness, which no idea of near or certain death can shake ; it is that exalted presence of mind, which never loses recollection, and by which that solid arrangement, that calmness, and that firmness is produced, which makes it impossible to disorganize a body of troops.

It is that union of all moral force, to a high pitch, which the physical is subordinate to.

Yes : it is humane ; it is fine ; it is praiseworthy ; when the General exerts himself for the

happiness of the country, whose misfortune it is to have become the theatre of war: it does honour to his heart! But when he attains this blessing, only by the ruin, the execration of his army, this good heart is then in danger of being called *weak*! and he neglects one of his first duties.

The General first appears when war is determined on, and, consequently, is not to be averted; the blame of this war, the misfortune of the people, the desolation of the country, does not fall upon him—he has not to answer for the plunder, the disease, the plague, and suffering of all kinds; the vice, and the general consequences of war. He enters the theatre of war, as the most extreme means for the object of the state: he forms with his army a separate world.

He passes through a country, as cold, circumspect, and tranquil, as if it was as free from suffering as the very maps of the theatre of war. He spares this country, merely to effect his object of obtaining assistance from it: he rejoices, and his heart beats with delight, when he can unite with this high and predominating object, the welfare of the country; but he destroys it when a higher object predominates, and silently grieves. *Thus did Wellington in Portugal, and Rostopschin in Moscow* (1).

(1) "When Lord Wellington," says Elliott, "fell back, after the battle of Busaco, followed by the enemy in great force, he adopted a plan for securing his own army, and harassing the

The General exists during the continuance of his command over men : peace first restores him to humanity.

THE art of movement of cavalry, in manœuvre, consists :

- (A) *In the art of forming the line from column—*
(Formation, Deployment, &c.)
 - (B) *In the art of moving the line in all directions ;*
and
 - (C) *In the art of re-forming column from line—*
(Formation of close column, &c.)
-

hostile one, which, however much to be lamented on the score of humanity, was admirably conceived ; as a military one, entirely justified by the usages of war, and inseparable from its calamities.”—(*Elliott's Life of the Duke of Wellington*, p. 333). Humanity is not always compatible with judicious military operations ; and although the system adopted by the distinguished Commander of the Allied troops, for the defence of Portugal, necessarily brought on the inhabitants' sufferings, which it must have been painful for him to witness as a man ; yet, as a General, as the Commander to whom was entrusted the defence of that country, who felt himself alone responsible for its preservation, the imperious necessity for the measures which he adopted must be fully acknowledged, and the execution of them entirely justified. “ He who admits,” says the same intelligent biographer, “ the necessity of war, cannot condemn even those sufferings and calamities, whose direct and manifest tendency it is to shorten its horrors.”

(A) *Formation.*

Troops arrive in column of march, on the ground where an engagement is to take place, either with an enemy already in position, marching into position, or to be expected there.

If, in the first place, the enemy's line of battle is already formed when the troops arrive, it must be reconnoitred under the protection of the advanced guard, and the assailable points or keys of the position must be sought.

It is important—indeed necessary, that the General of cavalry of the army should be present at these reconnoissances, in order to have a general view of the whole, when the Commander-in-Chief makes his dispositions for the battle.

In the formation of line, the General of cavalry must carefully distinguish, whether he be ordered to *attack* the opposite line immediately after the conclusion of a movement, or only to *paralyse* it.

In the first case, the intervals of the squadrons of the first line must be but small (nine paces), his object is to give strength to his line, and he is heedless of cannon-shot.

In the second case, the intervals may be greater; his object is to give a deceptive appearance to his lines, and he keeps out of cannon-shot.

If the attack is to be made immediately on the formation of the line, an endeavour should be

made to surprise the enemy, and to outflank him; by which the victory is prepared, facilitated, and frequently gained, as Frederick the Great often proved.

Here the rapidity of the cavalry appears so advantageous.

General Seidlitz determined the battle of Rosbach, by the quick deployment of the cavalry under his orders.

In the second case, where the enemy is in march when we arrive on the field of battle, the commander has generally full power to form his line under favourable circumstances.

In this case, the cavalry generally comes into action at the beginning of the battle, and, by rapid deployments, and still more rapid movements, it gains the heights and plains lying in front.

By this, a favourable charge is often effected, even at the commencement of a battle.

The Commander of the cavalry should take care to deploy his lines in such a manner, as that they should form a curtain in front of the army, in rear of which he can perfect his order of battle undisturbed.

The third case, when the enemy is expected on the field, allows of the formation of the line with every advantage.

(B) *Movement of the line.*

Front lines are divided into—1. Straight lines ; 2. Oblique lines ; 3. Curved lines.

When our front line is parallel to that of the enemy, it is called a *straight line*.

If the enemy is attacked with one wing of this straight line, while the other is kept back, our visual line will form an angle with that of the enemy, and constitute an *oblique line*.

Curved lines are those where the enemy is attacked with both wings, while the centre is kept back, which is the curve of the bow-string ; or when the centre is advanced, and the flanks refused—this is the curve of the bow.

1. Movements in straight lines, are the advance, the charge, and the retreat.

The greatest possible simplicity, is the principle of all movements (1).

In the advance in line, equality of pace, closeness, steadiness, and silence, are indispensable conditions.

A line of troops, thus marching, still and com-

(1) This is a principle acknowledged so far back as the time of Gustavus Adolphus, and still, not yet acted on by modern tacticians. Grimouard tells us, (*vol. i., p. 434*), “ *Simplicity in the construction of every military evolution, and rapidity in its execution, were justly considered by this consummate warrior, (Gustavus), as constituting the most important principles of tactics.*” See *Essai sur le Systeme Militaire de Buonaparte*.

posed, through the midst of death and destruction, frequently beneath a shower of balls, heedless of those falling near, and around them; the moans of their wounded, their dying, or their mangled comrades; and inspiring awe; is wonderfully in contrast with the thunder of the artillery, and the heaps of the slain.

The march in line, thus conducted, is the most requiring result of military steadiness and discipline.

The charge is the most powerful movement of a line of cavalry.

Its success depends upon rapidity, justly calculated, and progressively increasing, united with the most perfect dressing.

The longer the charging line is, the less should this movement be hurried.

The quicker the pace is, the more likelihood is there of the solidity and order being lost.

A charging line commences the *trot*, about 300 paces from the enemy, the leader previously giving the word of command—*the line will attack! guard lances! or carry swords!*—which gives force to the charge.

It shews composure, when the weapons of attack are kept quiet until the charge. The artillery also, does not load, nor the infantry make ready, until the attack really begins.

A hundred paces from the enemy, the gallop is sounded, which, with brave cavalry, is increased as it approaches. Bravery and cowardice

both increase in proportion as the moment of the attack approaches. The most valiant leader will generally be victorious, as we are to suppose, that his example will be a law for the line which follows.

The retreat requires circumspection; it is either made *en échiquier* or *en échelon*, in order that one part may be always opposed to the pursuit of the enemy, while the other retires.

It is important and decisive, on a retreat, always to follow the principle, of *never* allowing the enemy to charge; but as soon as he shews a disposition of so doing, to anticipate his intentions, and suddenly and forcibly to surprise and charge him.

This is no easy task, and requires tried regiments and determined Colonels.

Delay should not be created, by following up the enemy, after this charge; but as soon as it has succeeded, the retreat must be recommenced, in an orderly manner, and without loss of time.

If, on this occasion, the enemy was to be followed, new lines would be met with, and our army destroyed.

The object of a charge, during the retreat, is only to gain time for the execution of it, and to create respect in the enemy.

When the Duke of Wellington retreated from Quatre Bras, into the position of Waterloo, on the 17th June, 1815, the English life guards made

a brilliant and successful charge, on the French advance guard, by which the foremost squadrons were completely overthrown, and checked in the pursuit (1).

The retreat requires the greatest intelligence: prudence and bravery must here be more united than on any other movement.

1. Movements in oblique lines, are the echelon manœuvres.

The echelon, in which one flank is refused, while the other is advanced against the enemy, has been ever considered by the most talented leaders, as particularly advantageous for cavalry.

(1) The cavalry affair on the 17th, when Lord Anglesea made so successful a charge on the French advance guard, at the head of the household troops, furnishes us with a striking proof of the superiority which cavalry, armed with lances, has over light dragoons or hussars. The 7th hussars commenced the attack on this day, and twice charged the French lancers with the greatest gallantry; they were unable, however, to make any impression upon the troops opposed to them, and were repulsed with considerable loss. Lord Anglesea then renewed the attack at the head of the 1st life guards, and completely overthrew the enemy's advance guard. The Marquis, with every feeling to support the character of light cavalry, thus candidly admits the superiority of the French lancers. "However slightly I think of lancers, under ordinary circumstances, I do think, posted as they were, they had a most decided advantage over the hussars. The impetuosity, however, and the weight of the life guards, carried all before them."—(*Letter from the Marquis of Anglesea to the Officers of the 7th Hussars, dated Brussels, June 2, 1815*). "It is, at least, certain," says the author of Paul's Letters, "that, after the most undaunted exertions on the part of the Officers, seconding those of the Earl of Uxbridge, our light cavalry were found to suffer cruelly, in their unequal encounter with the

With echelons, one can deceive and manœuvre for a long time, without materially changing the position, or losing or gaining ground.

With single echelons, sudden attacks may be made from the line, according to circumstances.

The visual line may be easily changed, at discretion; consequently, the flank of the enemy quickly gained.

2. Oblique lines, or echelon movements, unite the advantages of making front on all sides—of quickly profiting by the weakness of the enemy—of choosing the point and moment of attack, (for echelons may be easily moved away from the enemy)—of surprising the enemy, without being exposed to a surprise.

In fine, they can be as successfully employed in retreat as in attack.

The manœuvres of the French, in the battle of Marengo, June 14, 1800, are proofs of this; and these manœuvres are worthy of the greatest admiration (1).


pondrous and sword-proof cuirassiers, and even with the *lancers*." (p. 153). These lancers, it should be remembered, were *light cavalry*, and if the simple addition of the *lance* gave them superiority over our hussars, how much more formidable would *heavy dragoons* be, if armed with that weapon! T.

(1) The corps of General Lannes effected its retreat *en échelon* over the vast plain of Marengo, in a manner which reflected the highest credit upon its discipline and bravery. "This corps," says General Gourgaud, "occupied three hours in retiring three quarters of a league, entirely exposed to the grape-shot of eighty pieces of cannon."—(*Memoirs dictated by Napoleon to Général*

3. Curved lines are also united with echelon movements.

Gourgaud, vol. 1. p. 295). *Echelon* movements, however, and what is called the *oblique order of battle*, are generally more *accidental* than *premeditated*; and as, after all successful results, we are too apt to attribute to talent and design, what is purely the effect of a happy coincidence of circumstances—the famous battle of Leuthen, which is so universally referred to by tacticians, as the *ideal* of *oblique* formation, and the *chef d'œuvre* of Frederick the Great*, will be found, on investigation, not to have been conducted on such scientific principles as is generally believed, and tactical rules deduced from that battle, would be as false as deceptive. A true view, and perhaps the only one which has been yet taken, of the disposition of the Prussian army, at the battle of Leuthen, will be found in the *Journal des Sciences Militaires*, from the pen of General Vaudoncourt. This distinguished writer, in conclusion of a most minute inquiry into the operations of Frederick on that day, observes, “On voit, par ce bref expose que *l'ordre oblique*, employé par Frédéric II. à Leuthen, n'a dû son succès qu'à une surprise complète, rendue possible, par la négligence et les fautes multiples des Généraux Autrichiens”† Captain Röscher, of the Prussian service, has demonstrated, in the most satisfactory manner, that the attack *en échelon* is not maintainable in theory; “for if,”

he says, “the *échelon c d*, advances within musquet-shot of the line A B, its flank *c* will receive a greater fire than its own‡, and will therefore insensibly describe an arch backwards; the platoon of the line



* Frederick has even got the credit of *inventing* the *oblique order of battle*, when it is well known, that this disposition of troops was constantly employed by Epaminondas and other ancient commanders; it was also adopted by Montrose, at the battle of Aberdeen, in 1644, and Folard, who wrote before the battle of Leuthen was ever thought of, says, that the *oblique order* is “*tout ce qu'on peut imaginer de plus rusé, et de plus sçavant dans la tactique*”

See *Commentaires sur Polybe*

† *Journal des Sciences Militaires*, tom 1, liv. 11, p. 328

‡ It will receive an *oblique* and *concentric* fire, to which it can only oppose a fire perpendicular to its front

The advance, *en échelon*, from both flanks, forms the curve of the bow-string.

The advance, *en échelon*, from the centre, forms the curve of the bow.

Both are movements of attack.

AB, which, in this case, pours so destructive a fire on the flank *c*, will not be prevented by the second *échelon ef*, this being at too great a distance to fire; nay, the two first platoons of the wing, *f*, would hardly venture to fire, from the fear of hitting the flank *c*. Thus the two opposite platoons of the line AB would shower their balls, without the slightest impediment, upon the unfortunate flank *c*; the leading *échelon* must, therefore, be beaten: 'and if,' says Bulow, 'the battle be continued with the bayonet, it is only requisite that a platoon of the line AB should, by wheeling, come upon the flank of the *échelon cd*, while the front is engaged, to overthrow that *échelon*, before *ef* could come up to its assistance: thus, the line AB will, in all probability, defeat the several *échelons* in succession'". But even allowing that the leading division should succeed in its attack, which, according to Bulow's principle of *concentric fire*, cannot possibly occur; it is not likely, that any attack *en échelon*, could long preserve its *obliquity*. The enemy would naturally endeavour to establish a *parallel order*; and unless some insurmountable obstacles presented themselves in the nature of the ground, he must succeed in gaining the flank *refused*, and thus establishing an *equality* of position. The rapid movements of cavalry, give it, certainly, a great advantage in *échelon* attacks; for, if the first squadron should be successful, the second can immediately profit by the confusion produced in the enemy's line. *Echelon* attacks, also, better enable cavalry to preserve order during the advance; but as, in most cases, cavalry should be only employed to take advantage of the faults committed in infantry, and to profit by its disorder, so should its modes of attack be limited to rapid and vigorous charges *in line*.

T.

* See Bulow's *Spirit of the Modern System of War*, translated by General de Malottre, p. 158, et seq.

Further, cavalry has often occasion to change the front, or to wheel.

These changes of front, and especially those backwards, are very important; because they are almost the only means of preservation against the threatened out-flanking of the enemy.

The flanks, or sides, are the weakest points of a line of cavalry, because it cannot, like infantry, be quickly formed, *en potence* (1); or, if it can, possesses then no security: when the infantry, after having been formed *en potence*, has its fire for protection, the cavalry can expect nothing less than to be overthrown by the charge which it waits to receive.

The predominating principle of cavalry, is *motion*; that of infantry, *position*.

A reciprocal endeavour is therefore made to gain the flanks, and to surround them; and he who succeeds in this attempt, generally gains the victory (2).

(1) Troops are ranged *en potence*, by breaking a straight line, and throwing a certain portion of it either forward or backward, from the right or left, according to circumstances, for the purpose of securing that line. Major James says, that it may be derived either from *potence*, a gibbet; or *potences*, crutches, or supports.

See *Military Dictionary*.

T.

(2) "Man," says Bulow, "is so formed, that he is not able to defend himself behind or sideways. Consequently, armies, whose first concern is to be able to defend themselves, in whatever posture they may be placed, cannot be expected to act easily in

A change of front forwards, on any division of the line, executed with rapidity, favours a surprise considerably; as one part of the line is thrown upon the enemy's flank, just as a similar movement backwards is a security against any possible movement of the enemy.

The right wing A. (first movement) is advanced to the attack, behind which a column of attack (C) is formed; the column C deploys (second movement) in *a b* oblique on the left flank of the enemy D E. (See Plate 3).

If this moment is neglected, neither steadiness nor bravery can save the flank, which will be surrounded by a rapid and bold attack.


In order to meet this attack properly, it must be quickly and correctly perceived.

The enemy must bring his left flank, E (third movement) into the position *c d*, by changing front on the right, left thrown back.

This movement must be covered by skirmishers, who will impede the deployment of the column C, or at least disturb it by their effective fire.

Simultaneous with these dispositions (fourth movement), a regiment, B, of the reserve, must be

those directions. It follows, that by taking the enemy in one of them, we easily conquer him. It is a principle, that a whole possesses the qualities of the parts which constitute it; and, of course, a battalion, or an army composed of men, is subject to the disadvantages, as well as possessed of the advantages, resulting from the form of man." -- *Malortie's Bulow*, p. 97.



formed into a column of attack (*close column from the centre*), advance at a gallop, and form in the line E—F; or, what is perhaps better, immediately attack the enemy*.

In battle, *minutes* are decisive; to know, and profit by these *minutes*, is the *talent for commanding*.

(C) *Marching off* (*Abmärsche*).

After the favourable termination of an engagement, the march from the field of battle to pursue the enemy is very simple.

Such a march is, however, difficult, when one is beaten.

There is no warlike operation so difficult as a retreat before a victorious enemy; and no operation gives a greater display to the fertility of genius (1).

* The execution of these different manœuvres is laid down in the third and fourth sections of the Exercise Book. In the cavalry action at *Mery*, 20th March, 1814, the light cavalry division of Prince Adam of Wirtemberg performed the first and second movement, and overthrew the cavalry of the French guard.

• AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(1) It was in his retreats that Lord Wellington so greatly surpassed Buonaparte. "For my part," said the Marquis Wellesley, "were I called on to give my impartial testimony of the merits of your great General, I confess before heaven, I would not select his victories, brilliant as they were; I would go to the moments when difficulties pressed on him—when he had but the choice of extremities—when he was overhung by superior strength. It is to his retreats that I would go, for the proudest and most undoubted evidence of his ability."

Speech of the Marquis Wellesley, Dec. 1812.

If *concentric* lines are favourable to an attack, *eccentric* are to a retreat*.

The more *column-roads* that exist in rear of a line of battle, the more favourable is it for a retreat.

Divisions of pioneers, led by officers of the staff, march in front, to mark out and level the different lines of retreat: the baggage follows them, and that gang of modern times, which is in

The retreat of Moreau, before the Archduke Charles, in 1796, although severely censured by Napoleon*, has been generally considered as an exhibition of great military talent. His passage through the Black Forest, and the dangerous defile of the Valley of Hell†, are certainly enterprises of the most hazardous nature, and reflect the greatest credit upon his military reputation. Sir John Moore's retreat from Saldanha to Villa Franca, in 1808, shewed great firmness, decision, and knowledge of tactics. Marshal Soult's, also, from Oporto, in 1809, would have been highly creditable to his talents and decision, if he had not suffered it to be disgraced by the most barbarous cruelties. "Marshal Soult's soldiers," says Southey, "plundered and murdered the peasantry at their pleasure: many persons, when the English arrived, were found hanging from the trees by the way side, who had been put to death for no other reason than that they were not friendly to their insolent invaders; and the line of their retreat might every where be traced by the smoke of the villages which they burnt."—(*History of the Peninsular War*, vol. ii. p. 317). The permission of such barbarity naturally qualifies

* Bulow.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

* See "Memoirs dictated by the Emperor to the Count de Montholon," vol. i., p. 40.

† When Marshal Villars was pressed, by the Elector of Bavaria, in 1702, to cross the Black Forest, he is said to have replied, "The Valley of Neustadt, which you mention, is that which is called the *Valley of Hell*; your Highness must therefore pardon me using the expression, but I have not sufficient of the *devil* about me to pass through it.

connection with it; then follows the reserve, ammunition, and the heavy artillery; a few squadrons of cavalry are necessary, to preserve the order of this immense train.

the estimation of Soult's military skill, and admiration of his talent is replaced by disgust at his inhumanity*. But the boldest, the most chivalrous, the most unparalleled retreat of modern times, is that of the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick. By a cowardly exception in the armistice of Wagram, the auxiliary corps of the Austrian army were abandoned to their fate, and the Duke of Brunswick found himself under the desperate alternative of contending with the armies of France, or of submitting to the oppressor of his country, and the destroyer of his family. The Duke, without hesitation, took the noble resolution of marching with his little troop from the heart of Bohemia to the shores of the North Sea, a distance of *five hundred miles*, through hostile governments, pursuing armies, and opposing citadels. Truly did this noble patriot feel, that

“ ——— Freiheit ist das höchste Gut
Ob's tausend Leben gilt.”

Theodor Körner.

On this memorable retreat, from 12 to 15,000 men were collected round less than a thousand partisans, wearied by long marches, and depressed by the alternative of defeat or exile—but they were patriots—they were led by a hero; and although about 6,000 of the enemy took up a position on the road to Lunenburg, for the purpose of cutting off the Duke's march; the gallant Brunswickers forced their passage through them, cleared their way to Bremen, and embarked for England without molestation. This intrepid warrior died as he had lived—the bravest of the brave—on the eve of the great day of Waterloo, at the head of the Black Hussars of Brunswick; he fell, a glorious example of unyielding patriotism. T.

* Soult did not prove himself so skilful in pursuit, as in retreat. The Marquis de la Romana retreated before him for three weeks; at the end of which time, Soult was obliged to give up the pursuit, and return.

The pernicious effects of too numerous a baggage train, on a retreat, is always felt. Strict orders, and strict Officers to execute those orders, without consideration, are necessary, in order to prevent dangerous stoppages.

If, even in advances against the enemy, obstructions of defiles by the carriages is of common occurrence, how must it be on retreats, where, in general, a panic terror unnerves this spiritless gang, in which poltroonry is found embodied.

What cannot proceed, must be abandoned without mercy.

If the field of battle is open, the cavalry covers the retreat of the army.

Great warlike ability of the Commander, and facility in manœuvring of regiments, appear brilliant on such occasions—meet with reward, and are favourable to the acquirement of fame.

The nearer the moment approaches for cavalry to commence its retreat, the more important is firmness.

Troops, which at such difficult periods lose their firmness, not only destroy others, but also themselves.

It has been already stated, by what movements cavalry retreat over plains.

If defiles are to be left behind, as soon as the rest of the army has passed a certain distance, the line is broken quickly into regiments, in order that it may retreat in column.

This movement must be concealed from the enemy as much as possible, by doubtful manœuvring.

If we are placed with parallel lines (the worst of all), before a defile, the regiment should retire from both flanks; the breadth of the defile determines the breadth of the divisions, of which the column is to be formed; if at this moment the enemy presses on; as is to be expected, and it is believed that there is not sufficient time for the retreat of the whole, a charge is made with one part, in order to force the enemy back, while the other continues to gain the defile, and to pass through it.

Nay; there are cases, where one part is sacrificed to chance, in order to save the other.

Without cavalry a retreat is very difficult (1).

(1) The unwearied gallantry and steadiness of the British cavalry, under the Marquis of Anglesea, on Sir John Moore's retreat, was the main protection of his army. The 18th dragoons were very conspicuous on this occasion; they were successful in six different attacks. Captain Jones, when at Palencia, even ventured to charge a hundred French dragoons, with only thirty British; fourteen of the enemy were killed, and six taken prisoners. The 10th hussars were also very distinguished on this retreat; on the 26th Dec. Colonel Leigh, with two squadrons of that regiment, attacked a strong detachment of the French advance guard, which had halted on the summit of a steep hill, near Majorga. One of Colonel Leigh's squadrons was kept in reserve; the other advanced briskly up the hill: on approaching the top, where the ground was rugged, the Colonel judiciously reined-in, to refresh the horses, although exposed to a severe fire from the enemy. When he had nearly gained the summit, and the horses had reco-

Xenophon felt very severely the want of cavalry on his famous retreat of the 10,000 Greeks.

In consequence of the surrounding enemy annoying him with impunity, and tiring his troops, thereby rendering his march difficult, and that according to his own words, nothing was to be gained by a victory, and every thing to be lost by a defeat, therefore no battle was to be risked; he formed a troop of dragoons, by selecting the best of the Officers' horses, and bat-horses, and placed on them the bravest men of his army.

vered their breath, he charged boldly, and overthrew the enemy, many of whom were killed and wounded, and above a hundred surrendered prisoners.—(See Mr. J. Moore's Narrative). Covering a retreat, is one of the most important duties of cavalry, and requires unremitting vigilance and activity. The German hussars have ever been celebrated for their perfection in this arduous service; and the history of the Peninsular war abounds with instances which support their fame. On the retreat of the English army into the lines, before Lisbon, the first hussar regiment of the King's German Legion was constantly employed on the rear guard. This regiment had seldom more than three or four hours' rest out of the twenty-four, the remaining time being employed either in marching, or engaging the enemy. The French were always able to oppose a force three times stronger than that of the Germans, and, in consequence of their superiority in cavalry, could bring forward, every day, fresh regiments to the pursuit. On the 16th September, 1809, Captain (now Colonel) Aly, and Lieutenant (now Major) George von Decken, attacked the enemy's rear guard, which attempted to debouch in great force from the village of Cortua, upon the high road, leading from Celorico to Coimbra, and, notwithstanding the immense numerical superiority of the French, the gallant Germans twice drove them back with great loss, and effectually prevented their advance. On the 1st October, the gallant Captain (now Colonel) George Krauchenberg, whose

The last French bulletins of the war in Russia, admit, that the loss in cavalry, during the retreat from Moscow, prevented intelligence of the enemy's movements from being gained (1).

name is identified with so many brilliant cavalry actions in the Peninsula, defended, with his single squadron, a defile leading from Soure to Coimbra, against an entire column of the enemy's cavalry, who wanted to attack the light division in its passage of the Mondego. The French made every effort to dislodge the hussars; they even posted a considerable number of dismounted dragoons on the heights, to fire upon them in flank—but without effect: the hussars repeatedly charged the head of the column, and as often drove it back; nor did Colonel Kranchenberg, although severely wounded, allow his squadron to make the least retrograde movement, until the light division had safely passed the Mondego.

“So turn'd stern Ajax, by whole hosts repell'd,
While his swoln heart at every step rebell'd.”

Homer's Iliad, Book XI.

These are two of many instances, where the Germans shewed their peculiar excellence in the arduous duty of covering a retreat*.

T.

(1) Cavalry is indispensable on a retreat; and no stronger instances of its importance, to either a pursuing or retiring army, can be found, than in the account of the British wars in India.

The superiority in cavalry which Hyder Ali had over the British, prevented any communication between Sir Hector Munroe and Colonel Baillie, who was marching to join him, while Hyder had almost hourly intelligence of Colonel Baillie's progress†.

T.

* For these, and several other highly interesting accounts of the actions in which the Hanoverian cavalry has been engaged, the translator is indebted to Major Cordemans, of the 1st hussar guards, whose kind communications from his valuable journal, have furnished the translator with much useful and important information.

† See Memoir of the late Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Scott, published in the Naval and Military Magazine of March, 1827.

LECTURE IX.

ENGAGEMENT OF CAVALRY.

ENGAGEMENT is divided into two principal divisions.

(A) *The engagement in open line*—(Attack of skirmishers).

(B) *Engagement in close line*—(The charge).

The formation of skirmishers is very important: in the third section of the second part of the Exercise Book, this formation is explained.

Firing and hitting with the carbine, on horseback, is very important.

Firing, while the horse is in motion, is without effect, and should not be allowed.

The skirmisher should rather ride up to a certain distance, halt, and turn his horse to the right; then, seizing his carbine at the butt, and bringing the sight and breech into line with the object, he should fire. Habit must bring him to

a facility in skirmishing, that holding his horse, taking aim, and firing, should be all, as it were, one act.

In most armies, too little attention is paid to the formation of skirmishers, which is, nevertheless, of the greatest importance.

It is known, that skirmishers, in rough ground, have stolen on foot, leading their horses, and have caused whole troops to yield.

In Alsace, in 1815, the skirmishers of the Wirtemberg cavalry, by their effective fire at Nieder-Otterbach, before Wissenberg, caused six French squadrons to give way; and a few days after, the Crown Prince took the town of Brumpt by dismounted skirmishers, who were opposed to infantry.

The mode of fighting of skirmishers does not allow of the line being very regularly preserved.

Skirmishers are formed in two ranks.

In an open country, there are fifteen paces between the ranks, and the same distance from one man to another.

All the skirmishers in the first rank are numbered—1; and those in the second rank—2.

Numbers 1 and 2, conduct themselves as inseparable friends—as principal and second.

Skirmishers must not remain long in one position; they should circle to the right after firing.

The word of command called *Appel!* is particularly intended for the skirmishers.

Battles create passion—particularly lucky ones.

This passion increases, in proportion to the previous resistance.

Unintentionally, and without perceiving it, every man pursues his opponent when the enemy gives way; he loses, in this manner, the connection with his regiment, and often atones for this imprudence, by captivity or death.

If the enemy has any where an ambush, all those who have thus dashed on, are lost.

The utility of skirmishers is principally—to commence and support engagements—to cover advances and retreats—to fall upon the enemy during an attack, in flank and rear—to disperse themselves on a march, in order to search the country, right and left of the front of the army—to observe the enemy—to pursue him—to form advance guards—rear guards—partisan corps, &c. &c. Services which require bravery, *sang froid*, understanding, cunning, activity, expertness in the use of the sword and good horsemanship, on the part of the men; and durability, lightness, pliability, quietness, and such like qualities, on the part of the horses.

If that attention was paid to the formation of skirmishers, which might be done, if it was endeavoured to bring them up with a truly warlike

character ; they would soon shine forth as a model for the rest of the cavalry, and immortalize the fame of their arms.

Skirmishers should be the favourite men of a regiment, nursed up, and tutored by ambition ; and with them, the boldest and most daring undertakings should be executed.

The charge is the principal movement of cavalry.

In the middle ages, the cavalry on both sides approached each other, to within thirty paces distance ; then fired with long pistols. At length, one side wheeled about, and the other remained.

Even in the first Silesian war, the Imperial cavalry was accustomed to trot up to within about thirty paces of the enemy, to fire off a pistol, and then seize their swords.

Frederick the Great, however, ordered his cavalry to attack the enemy impetuously, sword in hand, which was generally crowned with success ; his cavalry, which, in his first war, was very middling, acquired, by this mode of attack, a superiority so great, that no cavalry, of ancient or modern times, has ever equalled it (1).

(1) Frederick was the creator of his *cavalry*, and not of his infantry, as has been erroneously imagined : he brought the cavalry to greater perfection than any other General. Before

Seidlitz taught the cavalry of the King to perform infantry manœuvres.

The battle of Rosbach is an incontestable proof of the advantage of capability of manœuvring and bravery, united with the greatest possible rapidity, on an attack of cavalry.

The King not venturing, apparently, to engage so superior a force as the united French and Austrian armies, retreated, with every symptom of precipitation, and took up a position behind heights, which concealed the greater part of his army.

On the 3d September, 1757, about noon, the enemy advanced against the Prussians, confiding in his strength, and endeavoured to turn their left flank.

The enemy's column, at the head of which the cavalry marched, approached carelessly. General Seidlitz rushed suddenly forward with his cavalry, which had been concealed behind the heights, and fell upon the enemy with such valour and rapidity, and with such success, that one of the most brilliant victories was thereby gained, and the name of *Rosbach* rendered proverbial (1).

his time, the squadrons never went out of a *trot*, and used fire-arms more than their sabres.

See Bulow, p. 240.

T.

(1) The Prussians are certainly indebted for the victory of Rosbach to their gallant cavalry, and the able General who com-

There are four methods of attack, or of the charge :

1. The charge in a straight line.
2. The charge in an oblique line.
3. The charge in echelon.
4. The charge in column.

The charge in line is peculiarly the mode of attack against cavalry ; that in echelon and column, against infantry.

The charge in a line, parallel to the front line of the enemy, is always the safest with cavalry,

manded it. The vigilance and decision of Seidlitz were admirable : when he had reached the bottom of the Janus Hill, he perceived the enemy's columns, composed entirely of cavalry, making their appearance between Reichertswerben and Lundstadt, and that he had already gained their flank. Without a moment's delay, he formed in two lines, and advanced, although the infantry had not yet come up. The enemy, on discovering the Prussian cavalry, endeavoured to form line, but before it could be accomplished, Seidlitz charged the columns in front and flank, and completely routed them.—(*See Tempelhoff*). No battle, during the whole course of the war, caused such a particular impression as that of Rosbach. Friends and foes laughed at the Generals of the combined armies ; the Prince of Soubise was particularly the object of ridicule, as he had promised the King of France to send him Frederick as a prisoner : among many epitaphs produced by the wits of Paris, on this occasion, was the following :—

“ Frederic combattant d'estoc et de taille,
 Quelqu'un au fort de la bataille,
 Vint lui dire : nous avons pris—
 Qui donc ?——le General Soubise.
 Ah ! Morbleu, dit le Roi, tant pis !
 Qu'on le relache sans remise !”

who are animated by a good spirit and vigorous mind.

Cavalry can here exercise its whole force—*impetuosity*, unshackled by art.

The charge in an oblique line is particularly applicable, when our line is smaller than that of the enemy, to turn one of his flanks; but an oblique line, which is not constructed *en échelon*, requires great exertion to support it in action, and a separation is easily caused.

The charge *en échelon* possesses the important advantage of always keeping one part of the line in safety: the enemy can be fatigued, while our own strength is preserved.

This mode of attack, employed against infantry, disturbs the soldier, by the frequency of the charges, and induces him to expend his ammunition too fast.

The charge in column is to be employed against infantry, who are formed in masses (1).

The hatred which the Germans bear to the French, was strongly illustrated 'by a circumstance which happened in this battle. A Prussian hussar pursuing a French dragoon, perceived that he himself was followed by an Austrian, with an up-lifted sabre, ready to cleave his head. "German comrade," said the Prussian, "let me take this Frenchman." "Take him," said the Austrian, and galloped off.

See Archenholtz.

T.

(1) Too much attention cannot be paid to making cavalry perfect in the charge: the whole success of its operations depends

The Emperor Leo was of opinion, that our formation should correspond with that of the enemy, whether deep or extended ; but in general

upon that one movement. Much of the time which is now spent in changing front, throwing back flanks, and other manœuvres, totally unnecessary for cavalry, would be much better applied to making regiments advance steadily in line. The advance of a regiment of cavalry, in a line perpendicular to its front, with correct intervals, dressing, distance, and sufficient velocity, has ever been justly considered the most difficult movement it can be called upon to perform ; it is also the least practised, and hence, a perfect charge is so seldom seen. “ This manœuvre,” says Marshal Saxe, “ is to be performed with the utmost celerity ; cavalry must, therefore, be familiarised to it by constant exercise ; but it is above all things necessary, that they should practise galloping large distances ; a squadron that cannot charge two thousand paces at full speed, without breaking, is unfit for service : it is the fundamental point ; for after they have once been brought to that degree of perfection, they will be capable of any thing, and every other part of their duty will appear easy to them.”—(*Reveries on the Art of War*, p. 56). Count Turpin gives us an instance of the extraordinary degree of perfection to which the Prussian cavalry had arrived in performing this movement : “ J’ai vu,” he relates, “ en 1750, à Velau, en Prusse, cinquante escadrons, dont trente de dragons, et vingt de husards, en bataille sur une seule ligne, et sans aucun intervalle, au premier commandement cette ligne se mit en mouvement au pas, ensuite au trot, de là au galop et à toutes jambes, sans aucun flottement ; et au second commandement pour faire alte, cette ligne s’arrêta sans que la tête d’un cheval passa l’autre ! ”—(*Commentaires sur Montecuculi*, tom. iii., liv. ii., c. vi., p. 319). Such precision of movement would now be a rare sight, and can only be produced by constant practice of, and unremitting attention to, the advance in line. The mode laid down by Major de Roos, in his little work on the drill of the squadron, is decidedly the best that can be adopted to ensure a regular and effective charge. This Officer proposes that recruits should be first taught

the formations of a good military nation are extended, while those of a bad one are deep (1).

to make the advance in life *individually*; he places markers at such distances as the change of pace is generally made at; the recruits are ordered to trot, canter, gallop, &c., as they arrive at the respective markers; and thus each man is made to go through the whole operation of the charge, in his turn; the recruits then perform the same movement by files, threes, divisions, and half-squadrons, and lastly, the whole squadron advances to the charge*. No better mode could be devised for ensuring the co-operation of every individual man of the squadron, in this most essential movement; the errors in riding, dressing, distance, &c. are at once detected, and the faults usually committed in the charge, will inadvertently appear.

T.

(1) The diminution of depth in the formation of armies was the natural consequence of the invention of gunpowder, and the destructive effects of cannon fire. Among ancient nations, battles were generally decided by bodily strength; and there being then no concentric fire to apprehend, as in the present day, armies could assume with safety that deep formation which overwhelmed the enemy with its tremendous impetus and weight†. At present, as Bulow says, "the whole affair is over when one army has turned the flank of the other:" deep formations, however, are not even now so inappropriate as may be imagined; and absurd as the column of Poland may appear, it was by the employment of analogous masses that Napoleon was so often successful. In the order of battle laid down by Jomini, as that possessing at the same time the greatest degree of mobility and solidity, the corps destined for the attack is composed of two lines of bat-

* See Instructions for Squadron Drill, by the Hon. W. F. de Roos, Captain 1st life guards, Major of brigade, &c. &c.

† When Gustavus Adolphus departed from the dense formation, and drew up his men six deep, it was considered an innovation which nothing but his success could justify. Tilly and Wallenstein, his opponents, formed their infantry in solid masses, thirty deep.

Infantry will never await the attack of cavalry in extended lines, but will either form in column or squares.

When cavalry has occasion to attack infantry, formed in masses, it will be placed in open column of squadrons, with double intervals; and attack progressively.

The leading squadron receives the whole and first fire; if it remains steady, and penetrates the line, the second and third follow quickly after, in order to perfect the defeat.

Should, on the other hand, the squadron give way which commences the attack, as is generally to be expected, it must retire from both flanks, in order to leave the front of the second squadron clear; it must, however, re-form in rear of the column.

The second squadron should execute its charge with such rapidity, that the infantry cannot have sufficient time to re-load.

talions, each battalion being formed in *column* of Grand divisions. "La troupe d'attaque," says this writer, "aussi bien que la reserve ne sauraient être mieux disposées qu'en *colonnes* d'attaque par le centre; car la réserve, devant être prête à tomber sur l'ennemi au moment décisif, doit le faire avec force et vivacité, c'est à dire, en *colonnes*." (*Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires*, vol. iii. c. xxv. p. 357). The Duke of Wellington generally attacked with deployed lines, but these were sometimes of deep formation. The body of the guards which so successfully attacked the columns of Buonaparte's Imperial guard, at the close of the battle of Waterloo, was formed *four deep*; and the final attack of the British line on that day was also *four deep*.

It may be considered without illusion, that infantry, which believes the cavalry is flying away from its fire, and consequently is no longer careful, will be shaken; when, while re-loading, it suddenly sees through the smoke of the powder, a new line of cavalry.

If it is intended to attack artillery, the attack must be commenced against those troops who serve to cover it.

Guns which are separately posted, must be attacked in open lines.

Skirmishers advance in a curve, the extremities of which move forward. They fire little, but advance, apparently, without any design, until arrived under the fire of the guns, when they attack the battery with the rapidity of lightning, cut down the artillery men, and make the drivers bring the guns to their side.

In the battle of Strasburgh, 28th June, 1815, five guns were taken in this manner, by the skirmishers of the Wirtemberg cavalry.

Artillery is not near so formidable as it is generally believed, and deserves not that respect which troops often shew for it (1).

(1) Napoleon and his enthusiastic admirer Jomini, who has founded his principles of tactics on the Ex-Emperor's successes, are at issue on this point. "Une longue expérience," says the General, "a prouvé que le feu de l'artillerie est beaucoup moins meurtrier dans un bataille qu' on ne le pense communément."—"Les cannonades sont des complimens auxquels on répond sans peine *," &c. (*vol. ii. p. 326*). Napoleon, on the other hand, sup-

Artillery can only be successfully applied against stationary bodies; for moving ones are difficult to hit.

Six-pounders take effect at from five to nine hundred paces, point blank.

Cavalry, in a trot, moves six hundred paces in two minutes; how uncertain, therefore, must these lines of fire become, in consequence of the continued motion: a quick charging line of cavalry will suffer little from cannon fire.

“Vous m’avez donné un très beau spectacle,” said Napoleon, at the battle of Eckmühl, to the Bavarian General, who had taken a battery of thirty guns, with his brigade of cavalry.

Cavalry should never commence a charge with *half intention*, as if first to try whether the enemy will stand—that must be settled beforehand: to

ports the powers of the artillery, with all the zeal of an old member of that corps. “As to pretending to rush upon the guns,” says he, “and carry them by the bayonet, or picking off the gunners by musketry, these are chimerical ideas.”—“In a general system, there is no infantry, however intrepid, that can, without artillery, march with impunity the length of five or six hundred toises, against sixteen well placed pieces of cannon, served by good gunners.”—“We know not a single instance, in which twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, was ever carried by the bayonet.”

Memoirs dictated to General Montholon, vol. i. p. 287-8.

The opinion of the *master* ought certainly to be taken in preference to that of the *man*. T.

* Jomini qualifies these observations in the third edition, by stating in a note, that cannonades have latterly become *plus sérieuses*.

yield in open action never dishonours; but to advance with apparent bravery, and then to retire, faint-hearted, when the enemy shews resolution, dishonours and disgraces for ever.

If a charge is successful, no time for recollection must be given to the enemy. “Nothing is done as long as any thing remains to be done,” said Frederick (1). The impression which a successful charge of cavalry makes on the enemy, must be quickly supported, in order to give a decisive turn to the battle.

If cavalry could observe the disposition which its imposing appearance created in the enemy, and knew how to take advantage of it at the right time, the instances of that arm determining battles would be more numerous.

It is the talent of conducting which here determines, for often enough regiments burn with the desire of attacking the enemy; but leaders, destitute of military character, are at their head, and lose the valuable—the irrevocable moment—with empty considerations of *pro* and *con*.

The Prince of Condé, at the age of 22, beat the Spaniards at Rocroi, 19th May, 1643, by the impetuosity with which he led the attacks, at the head of his cavalry.

He commenced the battle, so that a corps of

(1) This was a proverb long before the time of Frederick.
“Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.”

Lucan.

musqueteers, which was placed in ambuscade on his right flank, by Don Francisco de Melos, the Spanish General, was cut down: upon which, he attacked the cavalry of the left wing of the enemy, drove it upon the second line, and cut both to pieces.

While the Prince sent a part of his victorious cavalry in pursuit of the flying enemy, and after he had collected the squadrons of the second line, and wheeled them to the left, he attacked the enemy's infantry in its uncovered left flank.

Several battalions were already rode down, when he heard that his left wing had been unfortunate, and was retiring in disorder; with the rapidity of lightning, he led his cavalry there, and in the most favourable moment, attacked the Spanish cavalry of the right wing, which had been thrown into disorder by a successful charge, liberated the prisoners, and put all to flight who escaped the sword.

The Spanish infantry, deserted by their cavalry, formed into a deep column, and retired.

Several attacks of the French cavalry were received with the whole camp artillery and small arms, and beat off.

Finally, however, this old steady infantry yielded to the repeated attacks of the Prince's cavalry; and 20,000 men of the best infantry of that time, which, under Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second, had made Europe tremble,

was almost entirely destroyed, by a cavalry, highly exasperated by the great losses it had experienced (1).

The rapidity of cavalry often changes the fortune of a battle, if the commander of any of those divisions of troops, who have not yet been engaged, preserves his presence of mind; at such moments every thing depends on falling *à tempo* on the enemy, who is pursuing our squadrons, in the intoxication of success.

These moments cannot be pointed out—they must be felt.

A single squadron may, at critical moments, perform miracles.

In the battle of Medellin, on the Guadiana, which Marshal Victor gained over the Spanish General Cuesta, in 1809, the French were already

(1) The circumstance which so much exasperated the French, is thus related in the *Histoire de Condé* :— “The Spaniards being surrounded, several officers, convinced that there was no longer any hope of escaping, quitted the ranks, and expressed by signs their readiness to surrender; no sooner was the Duke d’Enghien aware of their intention than he galloped towards them. Supposing that he was about to renew the attack, the Spaniards fired, but fortunately he escaped unhurt; exasperated at an act, which was naturally imputed to premeditated treachery, the French spontaneously rushed upon the enemy, and slaughtered numbers, before it was possible to restrain their ferocity*.”

Vol. i. p. 145.

T.

* A Frenchman inquired of a Spanish officer the number of their infantry before the battle. “You have only to reckon,” said the haughty Castilian, “the slain and the prisoners.”

retiring on all sides, when a Captain, at the head of a squadron of Hussars, attacked six Spanish squadrons, which were rapidly in pursuit, and overthrew them.

General Lasalle, who commanded the cavalry of Marshal Victor, took such advantage of this circumstance, that the most complete victory was gained (1).

When St. Louis saw his brother, the Earl of Anjou, in danger, at the battle of Massura, which began to wear an unfavourable appearance for him, he placed himself at the head of a squadron, rushed upon the Turks, overthrew all that were opposed to him, rescued his brother from the surrounding enemy, instilled new courage into his troops by this rapid act of bravery, and restored the battle.

(1) Colonel Jones, in describing this battle, tells us, that "the Spanish dragoons particularly distinguished themselves by boldness in the pursuit; but when the French, having arrived at a favourable point, faced about, they shamefully turned, and galloping past the infantry infected them with a similar panic, and in a moment the whole army dispersed, throwing down their arms, and seeking safety in disorderly flight" (*vol. i. p. 196*). "In no instance," says Southey, "was the panic of the Spaniards more fatal, or more unaccountable than in this; for the day was going on well, the infantry were in good heart, the advantage was on their side, and the regiments, which at this crisis disgraced themselves, and betrayed their country, had displayed both skill and courage during the retreat from the Tagus, and had distinguished themselves in the affair near Miajadas."

Hist. Peninsular War.

T.

The valiant Henry the Fourth attacked the cavalry of the enemy at Contràs with two squadrons, before whom, thirty noblemen, volunteers, armed with lances, placed themselves as a vanguard, overthrew his adversary, and afterwards, in order to derive advantage from the impression which this heroism made on the enemy, attacked the infantry with success.

There is an essential advantage—an endless strength, in the attack.

“In the soul of man,” says Cæsar, when he blames Pompey for having waited for him at the battle of Pharsalia, “exists a certain natural fire and impetuosity, which kindles and increases by motion: of this the General must avail himself,”

Cæsar was so convinced of the advantage of attack, that he boldly left even his intrenchments, and so soon as he was pressed, passed from the defensive to the attack, which always had a favourable result.

The most renowned Generals of all ages have acted according to the same principles.

Frederick expresses himself explicitly on this subject, in his instruction to the Generals of his army: “I allow, ’tis true, that the Prussian troops, as well as others, should occupy advantageous positions, in order to benefit by the artillery, but they must quickly leave their positions, and advance boldly towards the enemy, as soon as he really attacks; thus, instead of attacking, the

enemy is himself attacked, and his entire project defeated. The strength of our troops consists in the attack; and we should act unwisely not to employ this circumstance to our advantage."

History shews us that battles are much oftener gained by the attacking, than by those attacked (1).

By the attack, strength is elevated to power.

Fortune smiles upon, and favours the bold and courageous; and even when we are weaker than the enemy, it is best concealed by bravery and confidence.

The advantages of the attack consist,

1. In choosing the point and time of attack.
2. In being able to form the column of attack so as to ensure success; or,

(1) The advantage of being the first to attack is well expressed by Jomini: after laying down as an axiom, that "the fundamental principle of all military combinations consists in making a combined effort, with the greatest force, upon the decisive point," he states, that the first means of applying this maxim, is to commence the attack. "Le général," says this author, "qui réussit à mettre cet avantage de son côté, est maître d'employer ses forces où il juge convenable de les porter; celui au contraire qui attend l'ennemi ne peut être maître d'aucune combinaison, puisqu'il subordonne ses mouvemens à ceux de son adversaire, et qu'il n'est plus à temps d'arrêter ceux-ci, lors qu'ils sont en pleine, exécution. Le général qui prend l'initiative sait ce qu'il va faire; il cache sa marche, surprend et accable une extrémité, une partie faible. Celui qui attend est battu sur une de ses parties, avant même qu'il soit informé de l'attaque."

Traité des Grandes Operations Militaires,
vol. iii., c. xxxv., p. 345.

T.

3. To prevent the too great disadvantages of a failure.

The advantages of the attacked consist,

1. In choosing favourable positions.
2. Strengthening these positions by art.
3. In being able to draw the enemy into ambuscades.

The two first will not bear criticism.

A position is seldom found which nature and art render unassailable.

The famous Weisenberg lines were quickly and easily stormed.

The intrenchments at Essling, on the Danube, in 1809, were surrounded.

The intrenchments at Borodino, on the Moskwa, were taken and maintained.

The famous Mont-Martre has lost its importance.

Gustavus Adolphus found two positions, Wallenstein, Frederick, and Wellington, only one each, in which they could either not be attacked at all, or attacked without success; as for example, Wallenstein by Gustavus Adolphus, at Nuremberg (1).

(1) "Lines and retrenchments," says Marshal Saxe, "are works to which I am altogether averse, from a persuasion that the only good lines are those which nature has made; and that the best retrenchments are, in other words, the best dispositions, and the best disciplined troops." (*Reveries, chap. vii., p. 137*). The battle of Malplaquet shewed the inefficacy of intrenchments,

The third advantage, of drawing the enemy into an ambuscade, is very uncertain.

Although Hannibal succeeded a few times in decoying his enemies into an ambuscade, Sempronius at the Trebia, and Flaminius on the lake of Trasimenus, it was merely because these Generals were destitute of military talent and experience.

Such a feint can only succeed, when we are assured of the indiscretion and incapability of our enemy.

A General of ability is not to be enticed into an ambuscade ; and should he fall into an embarrassing situation, his fertile genius furnishes him with the means of getting out of it.

Hannibal escaped the stratagem of Fabius in the defile of Casilinum by stratagem : nothing remained for him but to return the way which he had come, and which Fabius had blocked up. The guide, who had led him through this valley, instead

even when well defended ; the French were here secured by three successive lines, and so hazardous an operation was the attack considered by the Dutch Deputies, that the Allied Generals found much difficulty in overcoming their objections to a battle being risked ; the resistance of the French on this occasion was the most determined, and worthy of the highest admiration ; at one time both parties were obliged to give way, and retire under cover of their respective cavalry, but the Allies at length prevailed, and got possession of the enemy's camp. This battle is another proof of the advantage which the attacking party has over the one attacked.

T.

of Casinum in Campagna, he caused to be nailed on a cross (1).

During the night he had 2,000 oxen driven to the top of a mountain; between their horns, bundles of dry wood, smeared with tar, were placed, and set fire to; while the Romans, as Hannibal expected, hurried to this point, where they believed the whole Carthaginian army was in march, and deserted the post which defended the entrance to the valley, Hannibal reached it undisturbed, and got through in safety.

In 1760, Frederick was shut up in his camp at Liegnitz, by four corps of the enemy, who intended to attack him on the 15th August.

In the night of the 14th, the King left his camp, surprised General Laudon, whom he defeated, and opened for himself the road to Breslau (2).

(1) The infliction of death upon the unfortunate guide was most unjustifiable, for, according to Livy, the true cause of Hannibal being directed wrong, originated in his not pronouncing correctly the name of the place to which he wished the guide should conduct him; this occasioned him to be led across the countries of Allifa, Callatia, and Cales; and the Carthaginian general found himself, to his utter astonishment, in the plains of Stella, where he soon discovered his error*. T.

(2) The situation of Frederick was here very critical. Daun, Laudon, and Lascy, lined the right bank of the Katsbach, and intercepted his communications with Breslau and Schweidnitz.

* "Sed Punicum abhorrens os ab Latinorum nominum prolatione, pro Casino Casilinum dux ut acciperet, fecit; aversusque ab suo itinere, per Allifanum, Calatinumque, et Calenum agrum, in campum stellatum descendit."

T. Livii., lib. xlii., cap. xlii.

Marshal Luxemburgh being lulled into security by false intelligence, was surprised at Steinkirk, by the Prince of Orange; but although his right wing had given way, his personal qualities, and the capability of manœuvring which his troops possessed, procured him the victory.

The surprise at Hochkirch also proves the effect of the personal qualities of the General, and the moral force of the troops (1).

He at first manœuvred to open them with Schweidnitz, but failing in that, he attempted to establish them with Landshut, in which he was also unsuccessful. He was without bread, and surrounded by forces three times the number of his own; and, in fact, when he marched from Leignitz, on the night of the 14th, it was more for the purpose of collecting provisions, and supporting himself upon the fortress of Glogau, than to attack the Austrians. Napoleon finds great fault with Frederick's manœuvres about Leignitz: "He had no base," says the Emperor, "no *point d'appui*: he was surrounded by forces of thrice his numbers; chance alone saved him; he was indebted to fortune only for his victory over Laudon, which extricated him from the perilous situation in which he had placed himself; and in this instance, he was much more fortunate than prudent."

See Historical Miscellanies, dictated by Napoleon to the Count de Montholon. T.

(1) General Ziethen saved Frederick and his army at Hochkirch. The King had depended upon the information of an Austrian Officer, with whom he was in league; but this traitor having been discovered by Daun, was made, on pain of death, to furnish Frederick with wrong intelligence. He accordingly wrote to say, that the Austrian army would remain inactive for at least a week. Frederick was therefore completely lulled into security; and although a deserter informed him that the Austrians were marching to the attack, he depended so much upon the first intelligence, that he went confidently to bed, and recom-

The actions at Krasnoi and the Beresina (1), in November, 1812, have had trifling results.

Vandamme was a victim to his indiscretion at Culm.

mended all his Generals to follow his example. Ziethen, however, was not so easily tranquillized: "Do you intend going to bed?" said he to the other Generals. "We were thinking of doing so," they replied; "the King seems certain that we have no danger to apprehend." "Well," said Zeithen, "for my part, I shall instantly order all the horses in my regiment to be saddled, and all my men to hold themselves in readiness." This example prevailed on two of the other Generals to imitate his conduct, and it was these three regiments that saved the King and his army.

See Thiebault's Original Anecdotes of Frederick the Great.

T.

(1) If Admiral Tschichagoff had made proper exertions to prevent the French army from passing the Beresina, the result would have been most fatal to it—he appears to have wandered with nearly the whole of his army from place to place, at a time when, of all others, he ought to have been stationary; he had but scanty information respecting the movements of the enemy, and took no advantage of the little which he had; the French began to pass the river on the afternoon of the 26th, and the march was continued without interruption from the Russians, during the whole of that night. Buonaparte had expected here a most obstinate resistance, instead of which he found that his operations were only interrupted by a feeble cannonade, which soon ceased entirely; and that the force under Tchaplitz, which was posted on the right bank, was totally insufficient to make any successful opposition to the landing of the French. Even with all these advantages, the passage of the French army across the Beresina, was truly terrific—this dreadful scene is thus described by Labaume:

"At length the Russians advanced in a mass, and drove in the Polish corps which had hitherto held them in check; at this sight those who had not already passed, mingled with the fugi-

The battle is that great act, where force, elevated to its greatest possible height, often produces effects which the most sanguine imagination could not have ventured to hope for. These effects not unfrequently astonish as much him who has produced them, as him whom the preponderance of this power has crushed and annihilated.

The battle of Jena is such an action, but has been far exceeded by that of Waterloo !

The action is a situation, where man, freed from humanity, excited by revenge, or the love of glory, according as the motives for war are well or ill founded, breathing only death and destruction ; destroys every thing which is opposed to his blood-thirsty rage.

Often does the importance of the moment rise to such a height and consequence, that it shakes thrones—overturns kingdoms—renders millions of men unhappy—and disturbs and destroys the arts and sciences for many years.

tives, and rushed precipitately towards the bridge. The artillery, the baggage waggons, the cavalry, and the infantry all passed on, endeavouring to push before one another. The strongest impeded the passage of the rest, or threw them into the river : all the sick in their way were unfeelingly trampled under foot ; and hundreds were crushed to death by the wheels of the cannon. Multitudes hoping to save themselves by swimming, were frozen in the middle of the river, or perished by placing themselves on pieces of ice, which sunk to the bottom. Thousands and thousands of victims driven to despair, threw themselves headlong into the Beresina, and perished in the waves," &c.

Circumstantial Narrative of the Campaign in Russia.

T.

LECTURE X.

OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY IN COVERING THE POSITIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF AN ARMY.

. CAVALRY has two different objects to attain : at one time, when the army is collected in a small space, to perform one of those great developments of power which form epochs in war, the cavalry, united in masses, is to make these explosions the more terrific and more destructive, by rushing on the enemy's line, at such moments when it has been already weakened and thinned by fire.

At another time, when the army, collecting its forces, either in preparation for a great battle, or for recovery after a battle, finds itself dispersed in an extended space ; the cavalry is to provide for the safety of the army.

This has led to the distinction of heavy and light cavalry.

The form of cavalry, explained in the 5th and 6th Lecture, abolishes this difference ; for each

regiment, each squadron; has *line* and *light* dragoons (1).

Each forms an entire solid body, supported by its light horsemen; who, hover about it, according to circumstances, and sometimes have to protect their own march, sometimes to reconnoitre that of the enemy.

Thus the Commander of the cavalry of an army is not restricted, but can freely employ the talent of his Generals and Colonels.

(1) The author's plan of establishing one description of cavalry only, would give a most desirable simplicity to its organization, and is peculiarly applicable to the British service. We have now, including the household troops, twenty-six regiments of cavalry, suppose each of these regiments completed to a war establishment of ten troops, containing eighty horses, and that from each troop, as has been before suggested, twelve skirmishers were selected*, the remainder being considered as cavalry of the line, or heavy cavalry, each troop would then consist of sixty-eight line cavalry; consequently, each squadron of sixty-eight files, and allowing for casualties, sixty-four files, this number would admit of the squadrons being told-off into four divisions of sixteen files, and eight sub-divisions of eight files each; the united force of the skirmishers would be ninety-six, or forty-eight files, which might be manœuvred in divisions of twelve files, if required—the whole force of heavy cavalry would then amount to 18,304, and that of the skirmishers to 2,496; the latter being to the former in the proportion of about 1-9, a force of light cavalry quite sufficient for the British army, which is never likely to be engaged in a Continental war unsupported by our Hanoverian allies;—their effective hussars, united with the British skirmishers, would form a body of light troops truly serviceable; while our mass of cavalry, being reserved for the attack in line, would be brought to act in that situation only for which it is so peculiarly suited.

T.

* See Lecture, v. p. 127, note.

He appoints those to the command of the outposts, who possess that strength of constitution, and activity necessary thereto; as well as that cunning, prudence, fertility of resource, and clearness of comprehension, without which, no one is fitted for the command of the advanced guard.

He keeps those with the reserve, who distinguish themselves by that obstinate bravery, which leads them to consider reflection as a burthen.

The General-in-Chief has an easy choice, as he has only to look to the intellectual power—the mind—for the form is the same in all regiments.

It has already been treated of in what manner cavalry in mass—reserve—united as a great whole, should be placed, move and fight, in order to maintain its place honourably in the order of battle; and how reanimate its fame, on the day of battle itself; by great exploits and glorious actions.

Cavalry must, therefore, be now exhibited in the operations, where at one time it has to protect the positions and movements of the army; at another, to observe the movements of the enemy.

If the army has taken up a position, the cavalry requires in this operation the assistance of the infantry:

In the movements of the army, however, the cavalry acts alone.

Light divisions, as they are called, composed of infantry and cavalry, impede the march, without being able to assist each other.

As, in such combinations, each arm is too weak in itself to operate powerfully; for the same reason, also, neither can rely on being supported by the other: thus, whole campaigns frequently pass over, without these *combined light divisions* acquiring any glory.

If the different arms are too much, and too anxiously intermixed, the confidence of each arm upon itself is undermined; self-confidence is, however, in entire armies, as well as in individuals, the moral force which leads to action and ensures success.

Motion is the element of cavalry; it is, therefore, to be employed upon every description of ground, so long as the army is in movement.

In 1692, the French Court gave the command of an army of one hundred battalions and forty squadrons to De Catinat, with which he invaded Piedmont.

To oppose to this army, Victor Amadeus had only eighteen battalions; but he had sixty-four strong squadrons.

After this Prince had seen through the plan of operations of the French, he threw himself into the Alps, passed over the mountains, crossed the Durance, took Gap, Ambrun, &c., and by that means obliged his opponent to give up offensive operations.

The brilliant expedition of General Seidlitz (which Archenholtz describes in so picturesque a

manner) against Gotha, strongly occupied with infantry and artillery, which he took, with fifteen hundred men, is a proof that a brave leader may, even with cavalry, attempt the most hazardous enterprises, when he knows how to regard circumstances, and to take advantage of opportunities. Seidlitz founded his subsequent fame on this act; but it covered Soubise with derision (1).

(1) The disposition which Seidlitz made of his little force at Gotha, evinced great ability. Having withdrawn to a short distance from the town, he placed the principal body of his cavalry in order of battle, and sent one regiment of dragoons to a defile half a mile in his rear, with orders to form an extended front in rank entire; the Allied troops in the mean time entered the town, and the Court being present, the French had an opportunity of displaying their wit and gallantry, in complimenting the ladies on their liberation from "the unpolished Prussians, who never quitted their pipes, and suffocated them with the smoke of tobacco." Seidlitz having now received reinforcements, resolved to advance, and attempt to dislodge the enemy: he sent the hussars forward to attack the advanced posts, and followed with the regiment of dragoons, in rank entire. The Generals were about to sit down to table when news was brought, that the enemy was in sight. The Prince of Hildbourghausen seeing this apparently grand line of cavalry, which Seidlitz had so skilfully arranged, imagined that the whole Prussian army was on its march to support him. Soubise was a commander of too much experience not to be convinced that hussars dare not attack infantry without support; and, therefore, having expressed his regret, that the unmannerly conduct of the Prussians should deprive him of the agreeable society which he enjoyed, he took a hasty leave, mounted his horse, and having forgot to make any dispositions for his army, he gave the word, "*Sauve qui peut*," and galloped out of the town, followed by his whole suite.

See Posthumous Works of Frederick the Great, Tempelhoff's History of the Seven Years' War, &c. T.

In the year 1793, the Duke of York had, for a moment, the idea of marching to Paris, with 150 squadrons.

General Czernitscheff, at the end of September, 1813, executed a bold, and in its effects, brilliant operation on Cassel, with about 2000 horses, and four light guns. Arrived before this residence, he attacked the infantry posted with six guns at Bettenhausen, with Cossacks and Izum's hussars. The infantry was either dispersed or made prisoners, and the guns were taken.

The King of Westphalia employed the moment of this action to escape with two battalions of the guard and 1000 cavalry.

Czernitscheff having taken the Leipsic Gate of the Residence by storm, allowed a free retreat to General Alix, but caused him to be accompanied by Cossacks for two miles.

The war of 1813 has exhibited brilliant and numerous deeds of partisan corps (1).

The operations of a Scheitter, Thielmann, Mensdorf, Platow, Czernitscheff, Wallmoden, Tettenborn, Dörnberg, Lützow, &c. &c., deserve to be studied by young officers.

(1) No partisans ever obtained such celebrity as the Guerillas in the Peninsular war—nothing was safe from their activity and address. Besides the destruction of various small posts, the cunning Marquisito surprised (in August, 1811) a regular garrison in St.

In order to secure an army in its positions and movements, the advanced-guard must also take up positions, move and fight. The fourth, or field-service book of the elements of service, will point out these positions, movements, and engagements; we shall here refer only to the principal points, and in the following order:

(A) POSITION.

1. Camp.
2. Cantoning.
3. Field-guard.

Ander; and soon after, the daring Empecinado* openly attacked and made prisoners, three battalions, in Calatayud. In the same month, Mina forced the Commandant of Ayerba to capitulate, with 800 men, having previously surprised, and nearly annihilated, a strong detachment which was coming to his relief. Even the fortified towns were no security against these intrepid partisans. The patient and enterprising Don Julian, drove away the cattle from under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo, and remaining in ambush, made the French Governor prisoner, who sallied out to retake them. Mina and Longa displayed manœuvres, sometimes for months together, in baffling the pursuit of more numerous bodies of French, which would have done credit to the most celebrated Commanders. The alternate boldness and prudence of their movements was quite unequalled.

*See Colonel Jones's Account of the War in Spain;
Southey's Peninsular War, &c.*

T.

* Various explanations have been given of this name: one account says, that upon finding his family murdered by the French, he smeared his face with pitch, and made a vow of vengeance. Another, that he was so called, because of his swarthy complexion. "But in the account of his life," says Southey, "it is stated, that all the inhabitants of Castrillo de Duero, where

(B) MOVEMENT.

(C) ACTION (1).

1. Van-guard.
2. Rear-guard.
3. Patroles,

1. By day.
- 2. By night.

 (A) POSITION.
1. *Camp.*

THE regiments composing the van-guard, are encamped in a semi-circle, before the visual line of the army—as much as possible, behind natural obstacles, rivers, &c.; beyond which, the field-guards only are placed.

With these tactical conditions, it should be endeavoured to unite those which facilitate the supply of provisions: water for the horses must not be wanting.

In summer, corn fields or firm meadow ground, in the vicinity of a clear running stream, and some high trees, which give shade, are the most

(1) In the German, *Gefecht*, this term is applied to the most trifling description of engagement, and may be considered to express what is called in our service *Affair*; the Germans have *Schlacht*, *Treffen*, and *Gefecht*, denoting the different degrees of engagement. *Schlacht* is applied to a general action, *Treffen*, to a particular action, or where a part of the army only is engaged, and *Gefecht* to a skirmish or affair of posts.

T.

he was born, have this nickname indiscriminately given them by their neighbours, in consequence of a black mud, called *pecina*, deposited by a little stream, which runs through the place; and the appellation became peculiar to him from his celebrity."

agreeable and most advantageous places for encampment, as they permit the quick formation of troops. In winter, the vicinity of villages, mills, farm-houses, &c., is to be preferred.

It is a bad custom to take up positions as the night is coming on, and when persevered in for an entire week, has most destructive effects on man and horse.

We can no longer discern where we are, and often scarcely know on which side the enemy is.

We seek after wood, water, straw, forage; but frequently in vain: the greatest disorders and excesses are, however, committed, when discontented troops like these, find single houses or a village.

If a General wishes to have order and discipline maintained also with regard to the inhabitants, he must bind himself to a regular time, and take up his camp at such a time of the day, that the provisions may be cooked before dark.

This was the custom in former times; but on the other hand, the armies marched off at day-break.

Wellington is the only General of modern times, who has never departed from this maintenance of his army, and support of their reputation, for well-ordered regularity.

Engagements and battles naturally make exceptions.

2. *Cantonments.*

Before a regiment or squadron has taken up its quarters in a place, the country must be reconnoitred; measures of safety, by the placing of field-guards, sending out patrols, &c., must be adopted—the alarm post appointed—the place divided into as many districts as there are squadrons—these districts numbered—and measures concerted with the local authorities for the support of the troops.

In 1809, on the evening of the battle of Eckmühl, a division (two squadrons) of dragoons, was surprised and cut down, because these precautions had been neglected (1).

If there are guns, a certain suitable division should encamp with them.

Whether or not the saddles should be taken off during the day, depends on the vicinity of the enemy, and such circumstances as can only be judged of in war itself.

(1) Count Wittingerode was surprised by the Duke of Brunswick, at Halberstadt, in consequence of the same neglect. The Grand Marshal had orders to march from Magdeburgh to Ham-
burgh, with a body of Westphalian infantry, to cut off the Duke's retreat: he was, however, so little alarmed at the rumours of his Highness's vicinity, that he marched without the usual precaution of patrols and videttes. His corps arrived at Halberstadt at the end of the second day's march, and immediately took up its quarters, very comfortably, in apparent security. Unluckily for the Grand Marshal, he had to do with no

The fourth book of the *Elements of Service* points out what conduct is to be observed on such occasions, and how, when a longer stay is made, in cantonments than one night, the measures of precaution are to be redoubled by strengthening of the field-guards, increasing the patrols, moving out before day-break, &c. (1).

3. *Field-guards:*

When troops occupy positions, field-guards are posted in advance for their safety; these are correctly placed when unseen by the enemy—they can observe every thing.

The field-guards plant piquets in their front; and, finally vedettes (double mounted sentries), form a 'chain which must be so constructed, that the ordinary man. The Duke was well informed of the force and situation of the enemy, and covering his march by the woods which run along the Hartz mountains, he appeared in full force before Halberstadt, at about six o'clock of a fine summer's evening. The Westphalians were at roll call, in foraging caps and unarmed. The Brunswickers thundered upon them in a moment, hundreds were sabred, and the whole arms and stores of the best appointed corps of the Westphalian army were taken. The Grand Marshal woke as from a dream, and found himself the prisoner of the sovereign whose retreat he came to prevent.

T.

(1) The work alluded to by the author, is entitled *Feld-dienst Instruction für die Kavallerie*, or Field Service Instruction for the Cavalry; in which is concisely given all the most important information necessary for the instruction of both officers and men, employed on out-post duty.

T.

country shall be fully commanded by it, and that nothing can pass through unobserved.

It follows of itself, that the principles which prevail at night are entirely different from those which prevail by day.

The first care of an officer, commanding a field-guard, consists in the precaution of not being surprised; which at night, and in stormy weather, requires the greatest activity.

Authentic reports are required of him; consequently, a correct eye and judgment are indispensable to him.

It often happens, but it is a great fault, that the outposts see double, and take 500 men for 1000. A small brigade of cavalry, with a few field pieces, observed at a distance, by an unpractised eye, often increases to a column of 10,000 men, in march.

The Officer, who can be convicted a few times of such an error, loses all trust.

Danger must not appear greater than it is. Courage must increase in proportion to the danger (1).

To alarm the army unnecessarily, is a crime which cannot be expiated.

(1) Such was the courage of David Gam, the celebrated Welsh Captain, who, when sent by Henry V. to reconnoitre the French army, before the battle of Agincourt (where their force was more than four times that of the English), reported only; "that there were enough to be killed, enough to be taken prisoners, and enough to run away."

The true mean, between precaution and confidence, is more difficult to describe than to feel.

To him who does not *feel* this mean, it cannot be shewn.

The old customary instruction for vedettes, to fire, even by day, upon every one that approached, and did not give the parole, appears to require some explanation: at least, it should be added thereto, that when a vedette *clearly* recognizes in the person approaching, *one of his own officers, who is perfectly well known to him*, he is not to fire, even should the officer be unfortunate enough to have forgotten the parole.

In general, firing upon every single man, by day, must not be permitted.

It appears quite too inexperienced, not to say timid, when a vedette rides up to every poor peasant, with an air as if his last hour was come.

B. MOVEMENT.

1. *Advanced-guard.*

The advanced, or van-guards, as well as the rear-guards, are, for an army in march, the same as the field-guards are for an army in position. The van-guard must move cautiously.

In Spain, in 1809, the 10th French Regiment of Chasseurs à Cheval, which incautiously followed the enemy too violently, as advanced guard,

was destroyed by the Spanish cavalry, which had been placed behind a village.

The proud Chasseurs à Cheval, of the imperial guard, under the command of Lefebvre Desnouettes, in Spain, were, on account of a similar indiscretion, and to the delight of the French soldiers, who gladly wished these haughty fellows any misfortune, partly cut down, partly driven back into the river, which they had swum over (1).

(1) The active and judicious operations of the advanced guard of an army, are often productive of the most important results. The rapidity with which Sir Stapleton Cotton followed Soult, in his retreat after the fall of Badajos, in 1812, precipitated the evacuation of Estremadura by the French army. The brigade of General le Marchant and Anson formed the advance of the British cavalry on this occasion, and defeated the French rear-guard at Llerena, on the 11th April, with considerable loss. On the night of the 10th, a party of the 12th light dragoons, under the command of Lieutenant (now Major) Chatterton, drove before them the enemy's advanced piquet, which had endeavoured to secure itself in Villagarcia, by barricading the bridge; and, on the following day, the whole French cavalry was defeated, and obliged to retire through Llerena. Nearly 250 prisoners, including several officers, were taken in this affair. The British regiments engaged were, the 3d and 5th Dragoon Guards, and 4th Dragoons, forming General Le Marchant's brigade; and the 12th, 14th, and 16th Dragoons, forming General Anson's brigade, which, on this day, was commanded by Colonel Ponsonby, of the 12th Dragoons.

Massena's rear guard suffered severely from the German hussars, on the retreat of the Marshal in 1811. On the 19th March, Captain Aly charged the enemy with such success, in the neighbourhood of Ponte-Marcella, that four officers and 300 men were taken prisoners; on the same day this rear guard was again attacked, and lost ninety men in prisoners. On the 20th, the

The advanced-guard must extend itself, and form a line of skirmishers, in order to clear the country, through which the line of march passes.

enemy was attacked by Captains George Von Decken, and E. Poten*, when twenty-four prisoners were taken. The affair of cavalry, at Morales, under General Sir Colquhoun Grant, in 1813, was a brilliant operation of the advanced guard of an army. The impetuous charges of the 10th and 18th hussars completely overthrew the cavalry of the French rear guard, and forced it to retire for many miles. This brilliant attack of the hussars is thus described by Sir Colquhoun Grant:—"The French cavalry appearing in considerable force near Morales, the 10th Royal Hussars were immediately brought forward, under the orders of Major Robarts, who attacked the advanced squadrons of the enemy in the most gallant manner: their front line made a determined resistance, but was instantly overpowered by the irresistible impetuosity of the 10th Hussars, which being now supported by the 18th (the 15th being in reserve), reached their second line, and drove it, with loss, to the heights, two miles in front of Morales." (See *Colonel Grant's Despatch to the Marquis Wellington, dated Morales, June 2, 1813*). The gallant General was wounded in this affair; and Lieutenant Cotton, a most promising young officer, of the 10th Hussars, was killed in the middle of the enemy's line.

T.

* An instance of magnanimity in a French cuirassier towards Major Poten, at Waterloo, is worthy of record; the gallant Major had lost his right arm previous to that battle, and on the 18th two Non-Commissioned Officers were specially appointed to save him from any imminent danger which he might encounter in an individual attack. In the confusion of the charge, however, Major Poten was separated from his supporters, and a French cuirassier was about to aim at him a mortal blow; being totally defenceless, he with the greatest presence of mind turned his right shoulder towards the cuirassier, and shewed his stump; this appeal had the desired effect, the cuirassier saluted the defenceless hero with the greatest respect, and rode off. On the arrival of the Allied Army at Paris, Major Poten one day recognised his friend the cuirassier, he immediately made himself acquainted with his Colonel, related the soldier's magnanimity, and was the means of the cross of the Legion of Honour being conferred upon this truly brave Frenchman.

Attention is to be paid to the time of the day, the nature of the country, and the weather, during the movement.

By day, in clear weather, and in an open country, movements are made with greater security and rapidity than by night, in rainy or foggy weather, or in broken ground, through mountains, woods, &c.

The advanced-guard should leave nothing unattended to: in villages, information must be demanded from gentlemen, priests, wood-rangers, magistrates, innkeepers, &c.; and, in the country, from shepherds, peasants, and every person that is met. From many answers, a conclusion may be drawn.

If the advanced-guard has occasion to send in a report, the man must be sent with it, who has himself seen what is to be reported; by which, the report is rendered more accurate.

This must particularly be observed in verbal reports, in order that the person, who takes the report, may be questioned as to the smallest circumstances.

2. *Rear-guard.*

To conduct the rear-guard well, is one of the most difficult tasks.

The force of cavalry consists in the charge; which, in this movement, is very uncertain in its consequences.

In defiles, the enemy who is pressing hard on us can only be kept back by bold and rapid attacks.

Such occasions often lead to the most brilliant events: in which, officers and soldiers earn great fame by bravery and presence of mind.

In order to animate the courage of the troops, and to give the pursuing enemy a lesson, an army, in retreat, should, from time to time, engage in small affairs."

On the 26th May, 1813, on the retreat from Görlitz to Schweidnitz, Prince Blucher attacked the advanced-guard of the French army.

While Colonel Mutins retired, with the real rear-guard, over the plain, behind Haynau to Steuditz, Colonel Dolfs remained, with twenty squadrons, covered by Schellendorf.

The burning of a windmill, at three o'clock in the afternoon, was the signal that the enemy was advancing, led by the division of Maison.

Colonel Dolfs rushed out so quickly from his ambuscade, and took the enemy so much by surprise, that he had no time to form masses. All who did not reach Michelsdorf, by a rapid flight, were cut down, or made prisoners, and eleven guns were taken.

All this was the work of a quarter of an hour. Colonel Dolfs, who, according to Gneisenau, shewed on this occasion talent that rendered him worthy of being placed beside a Seidlitz, was left dead, in the midst of the enemy.

On the 25th February, 1814, on the retreat of

the grand Allied army, from Troyes to Bar-sur-Aube, the Crown-Prince (King) of Wirtemberg unexpectedly attacked the enemy, advancing from Vendœuvres, with two squadrons, by which the enemy was driven back three miles (1).

(1) Perpetual vigilance, unyielding firmness, and invincible bravery, should be the constant characteristics of the rear-guard of an army. Cavalry cannot be placed in a more trying situation—subject to the repeated and uncertain attacks of the enemy, its vigilance and exertions are perpetually demanded; and, on the successful operations of the rear-guard, does the safety of a retreating army alone depend.

On the Duke of York's retreat, in 1799, Lord Paget's successful attack upon the advanced guard of General Simon, was of vital importance to the British army. Some skirmishing had taken place, and several pieces of cannon had fallen into the hands of the enemy, when Lord Paget, with only one squadron, made so gallant an attack upon the enemy's advanced guard, amounting to six times that of the British, that the French were totally repulsed, the prisoners were retaken, and several pieces of the enemy's cannon fell into our hands.

On the Duke of Wellington's retreat from Burgos, in 1812, the French cavalry so much outnumbered the British, that nothing but extreme zeal, and exertion, could have kept the enemy's rear-guard from pressing on the main body of our army. On the second day's retreat, Colonel Halkett's brigade of German light infantry, was the preservation of the British cavalry; for, although the 11th, 12th, and 16th Dragoons, repeatedly broke through the first and second line of the enemy, they were so overpowered by numbers, that courage was unavailing, and they were forced to retreat. Colonel Halkett, seeing the predicament of the British cavalry, formed his brigade into two squares, *en échelon*, leaving a space for the cavalry to pass through; and when the French, in their eagerness of pursuit, passed between the squares, the Germans poured so destructive a fire into their ranks, that the

3. *Patroles.*

The advanced-guard, whether stationary, or in motion, covers the country which it is in possession of—the horizon limits its sphere of action.

But this is not sufficient for the security of an army.

Therefore, the advanced-guard sends out patroles, who search the country in different directions, in order to increase the security of the army, by collecting intelligence without the horizon.

Hence it follows, that fighting cannot be the object of these patroles.

enemy immediately faced about, and fled in disorder, leaving between three and four hundred killed and wounded.

Colonel Von Linsingen's* determined resistance to the French advanced guard, at Alcoentra, is an instance of the protection which may be afforded by cavalry, to a retreating army. On the 9th October, 1810, this gallant Officer defended, with his single squadron, for the space of one hour and a half, an eminence, which a French Brigade of light cavalry made every effort to get possession of: he repeatedly charged the head of the column, and took two officers, and thirty men, prisoners; but the ground allowing the enemy to attack him in flank, he was, at length, obliged to retire. Colonel Linsingen had, however, the satisfaction to find, that his gallant resistance enabled the reserve piquets to take up an advantageous position; by which the enemy was effectually checked, and his advance prevented.

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* Colonel von Linsingen was at that time Captain in the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, of which he is now Lieutenant-Colonel, and A. D. C. to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.

A patrol must move quickly, accustom itself to see quickly, and to ask intelligibly, in order to be able to make a correct report.

Whenever it is possible, a patrol should not return by the way it has advanced, on account of its security.

A patrol avoids all inhabited places—follows the direction of the high roads, but at a distance, yet so as to have them within view.

Patroles must not be strong, from three to five men, or at most nine fulfil every previous design.

It is the enemy's interest *not to be observed*; this must, however, be done without his remarking it, and is only to be accomplished by a few men.

Lloyds observation on this point is well grounded; he assures us, that this *reconnoitring service* of an army, may be performed by 1500 men for an entire campaign.

A large party cannot march unobserved; it runs the risk of being cut off: a few men can conceal themselves; can observe without being observed; and, moreover, can get off through by-ways.

Whoever can patrol well, is master of the country, and superior to his adversary.

The enemy has equal claim to the country which lies between both armies.

Both sides have their patrols—their spies.

We must be careful with spies, particularly in

an 'enemy's country; lest they should be more faithful to the enemy than to us; and we should thus give our gold to traitors.

Mistrust, otherwise an odious quality, is a virtue towards the inhabitants, during war.

Young Officers must early acquire facility in the art of finding their station. Whoever has not learned how to find his station in a country, will feel himself awkwardly situated when separated from the army.

Clear day is a fog to him—every wood a labyrinth.

Perplexed and irresolute, he always judges and calculates falsely.

Incessantly applying to guides, by which his march is exposed, and who often, unfriendly enough, deliver him to the enemy, he blunders on in uncertainty.

He judges incorrectly of the directions which he receives, and the orders which are given him; what is right, he thinks left; his own reports are generally false, incorrect, and incomprehensible to his superiors.

The mode of acquiring expertness in finding out our station, is to abstract a country, by means of the imagination, and from single parts, to bring the whole to remembrance.

The art of military drawing develops the art of finding a station.

The draughtsman accustoms himself to recal

entire situations to his mind, by the skeleton of chosen fixed points, as is done in the military sketch book (1).

(C) ACTION.

1. *By day.*

Cavalry prevails in a free open country.

The skirmisher on horseback has here so important an advantage over the skirmisher on foot, that the latter can make no stand against him.

In broken ground, the skirmishers must be dismounted, and opposed to the enemy on foot, by which the equality of the fight is restored.

Cavalry skirmishers will even continue to have the advantage on foot, so long as the action is carried on with extended files. Less fatigued than the infantry skirmisher, unincumbered by a knap-

(1) Facility in finding our station is only to be acquired by a knowledge of military drawing: this art, as taught at the Senior Department of the Royal Military College, is, perhaps, one of the most useful acquirements an officer of the army can possess; it not only enables him to construct a military plan, but, from the extended observation of ground, distant objects, roads, rivers, &c., which it necessarily involves, enables him, with practice, at once to fix upon the principal points and features in any country, and to form, as it were, a *mental map* of the whole.

This branch of study, united with the short but practical course of mathematics, established at the Royal Military College, afford advantages to the Officers of the British army, of which all those who have availed themselves, cannot but be highly sensible.

sack, they will look forward to joining the reserve after the action, and mounting their horses. And although the carbine does not carry quite so far as the musquet of the infantry skirmisher, it is only necessary to go within shot of the enemy, in order to be certain of doing him as much injury as he can do us.

The cavalry skirmisher has his sabre to oppose to the bayonet.

On the 28th September, 1813, General Thielemann attacked Albrecht's large manufactory at Zeitz, which was occupied by infantry, with volunteer cavalry dismounted, at whose head was Prince Biron de Courland. To the Cossacks, were united, Hungarians, Bohemians, and Prussians. After a short carbine fire, the building was stormed, sword in hand, many were cut down, and one Colonel, fifty-five Officers, and one thousand men, made prisoners (1).

The Scotch infantry generally and confidently employ their long basket-handled sword in the attack, instead of the bayonet.

On the plain of Maida, in Calabria, in the summer of 1806, when Sir John Stewart, with 4000 English, beat 7000 French, under Regnier, a Scotch infantry regiment successfully attacked

(1) On similar occasions, the advantage would be found, of having, in every regiment, a body of such skirmishers, as has been proposed in a former chapter.

the 4th regiment of French chasseurs à cheval, with swords in their right hands, and musquets in the left (1).

(1) The battle of Maida, which is now so completely thrown into the shade, and even seldom mentioned, was one of the most brilliant victories that ever graced the British standard. On the memorable 4th July, 1806, 4800 British infantry, supported by six pieces of light artillery and eight mountain guns, without a single squadron of cavalry, defeated 7000 French infantry, and 3 or 400 cavalry, having the advantage of commanding ground, and being in possession of all the lines of communication. In this action, the power of British infantry was eminently conspicuous. Regnier had been repulsed with loss, but being able, from his superiority of force, to shew a greater front than the British, he endeavoured to out-flank their left; for this purpose, he made his cavalry wheel rapidly round their left flank, while his infantry threatened the front; to parry this effort, the British line inclined backwards on its left, and then firmly awaited the enemy's cavalry and infantry. At this critical moment, the two lines approached near enough to open their fire, and the day was about to be decided by a general charge, when the 28th regiment having been disembarked during the action, was most judiciously brought up by Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, to oppose the cavalry, and under protection of some rough ground, and broken trees, opened so destructive a fire, that they went to the right about. The British line immediately advanced, and after a few ineffectual discharges to oppose it, the enemy's whole army fell into the greatest confusion, and retired as quickly as the troops could move, leaving 700 dead on the field, many wounded, and a General Officer, with about 1000 men prisoners. The British only lost Captain Maclean, and forty-four men; eleven Officers and 271 men were wounded.

*See Historical Memoir of the Battle of Maida,
attributed to the pen of Colonel Jones, Royal
Engineers.*

If the advanced-guard, when prepared, meets with the enemy, it disposes itself according as the country is open or interrupted, and according as it has information of the strength and intention of the enemy, or can ascertain any thing by observation of his movements.

On such occasions, it must not omit to take possession of the commanding heights.

If the advanced-guard unexpectedly meets with the enemy, perhaps in ambush, the leading divisions should rush on him with resolution and impetuosity.

By this, the surprise which the enemy had prepared for us, recoils upon himself. This plan more frequently succeeds than miscarries.

It can be explained:

An enemy remaining concealed, generally does not see the advance of his adversary, and consequently, has no certain knowledge of his strength.

If, then, the ambuscade is impetuously attacked, at the same moment that it intended attacking, amazement will take possession of the enemy.

Besides, in retreat, the soldier easily loses his presence of mind, thinks more of his safety than of his fame, and believes *his own* destruction more probable than that of the enemy.

2. *By night.*

"If a field-guard in position, or a van-guard in march, is attacked, the enemy must be impetuously rushed upon, without the least time being taken for consideration.

The darkness of the night will crown this presence of mind with success.

Even the most resolute enemy will be surprised to find himself attacked, when he intended attacking.

Thirty horses would throw an entire column of attack into confusion.

The head of the enemy's column being defeated, and mixed with ours, would increase and extend the disorder.

The enemy astounded, would believe that his intended operation had failed, and give up all as lost.

This conduct may, with perfect reason, be expected from every Officer of the advanced-guard on such occasions.

If it is thought that the enemy will be found equally brave, cool, circumspect, and resolute as we are; is superior in force; and that the charge should fail, which is scarcely to be thought, and certainly only rarely happens; it is still always honourable to have exhibited the strength of our intentions in making the attempt.

The characteristic of bravery consists in never hesitating, when honour and duty are at stake.

The honour of an Officer, in the situation here mentioned, is truly at stake, and his duty commands him to attack the enemy with all the means in his power—to beat him back, or at least, to check him, in order that time may be gained to prepare for action (1).

(1) The superiority of the enemy should have no weight with an Officer of cavalry on such occasions. The spirited exertions of an individual have often changed the fortune of the day, and the vigorous attack of a small body of men, has frequently given the advantage to the party attacked, though inferior in number. The surprise which Count Reille attempted upon the advanced corps of Lord Wellington's army, at Las Rozas, on the 11th August, 1812, was completely defeated by the gallant conduct of General d'Urban and two regiments of heavy dragoons of the German Legion. The allied troops consisted of a brigade of Portuguese light cavalry, a battalion of light infantry and two regiments of heavy dragoons, King's German Legion, and Captain Macdonald's troop of horse artillery; the Portuguese and horse artillery were posted near Majalahonda, half a league in front of Las Rozas. The German dragoons were feeding their horses (which were nearly all unsaddled) in the town, and the battalion of infantry was also posted there. Suddenly, the Portuguese brigade came pell-mell into Las Rozas, bearing the guns unsupported, and followed by the French cavalry, which pursued them through the town, mixing with the Portuguese, and creating the greatest confusion. The alarm was immediately sounded; the German dragoons, although thus unprepared for an attack, turned out with a rapidity almost incredible, and immediately forming, charged the French cavalry with such success, that the enemy was completely driven back, and the guns recovered*.

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* For the above account, the translator is indebted to the kind communication of Captain Christoph Heise, of the Royal Hanoverian Jäger Guards.

War consists in deeds. In war, the question is not of *right*, but of *action*. The most active in deeds, is victorious: bravery and resolution lead to vigorous actions.

Nothing is, therefore, worse than irresolution.

LECTURE XI.

OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY, IN RECONNOITRING THE POSITIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY.

A. *Reconnoitring.*

RECONNOITRING is either open and forcible, or secret.

1, Open reconnoitring has for its object, the enemy's army, and position, taken as a whole: it is undertaken with divisions of such strength, that the enemy cannot prevent the attainment of the intended object.

The Commander-in-Chief is generally present himself; but the Commander of the cavalry of the army is always present on such occasions.

As soon as we come up with the enemy, his advanced posts should be quickly and impetuously attacked—overthrown in the first onset, and a commanding height taken possession of, from which the Commander-in-Chief, or his representative, can freely observe.

The retreat must be quickly performed; and secured by regiments and squadrons advantageously placed.

General Turpin has arranged a general disposition for reconnoitring.

He takes six squadrons: when arrived within four miles and a half of the enemy, he places squadrons close to the road, at intervals of a mile and half from each other.

As soon as he has actually reached the enemy, the leading squadron drives back his advanced posts, then extends itself into a line of skirmishers, while two other squadrons take up positions, and the commanding Officer reconnoitres the enemy.

Open reconnoitring is generally undertaken

- a.* Before a battle, in order to observe the position of the enemy, whether we intend waiting for his attack, or attacking him.
- b.* When the enemy retires without coming to action, in order to ascertain the direction of his march; or, if we wish to retreat, to conceal the retiring movement.

2. Secret reconnoitring has only single parts of the enemy's army, or his position, as its object. Intelligent Officers should be appointed on this service. From the fourth part of a squadron (a division), to two or three squadrons, according to existing circumstances, are to be employed.

Secresy of march is the first principle. The

march is generally performed at night, by cross roads, in order to arrive at the object of the reconnaissance before day-break.

Inhabited places are to be avoided on the march, which should be conducted round the enemy's posts; the horses are to be fed in woods, and care must be taken not to meet the enemy's patrols.

Safe guides are necessary—faithful spies can be of great service (1).

If it is necessary to obtain intelligence from the inhabitants, we must be enigmatical in our questions, in order that the real object cannot be guessed at; so long as the march can be observed by them, it should be conducted in a direction deviating from the one intended to be taken.

Should a secret reconnoitring party, in spite of

(1) Strada, Turenne, and Vauban, strongly recommend spies, for the purpose of gaining secret intelligence of the enemy's army. M. De Feuquiere observes, that spies are of many sorts: they are to be found in the cabinets of princes, in the closets of ministers, amongst officers of the army, and in the councils of generals; in towns belonging to the enemy, and in monasteries; some offer of themselves, others are found by the generals, or by the ministers; but the desire of gain is what chiefly encourages and tempts them to undertake their business.

"Spies," says Seelinger, "may be found amongst the following class of people:—

"Inferior shopkeepers,
Discontented clerks,
Men eager for money,
Men (if in an enemy's country) who have families, and
landed property.

"Jews are the worst people who can be employed: their reli-

all precaution, fall in with the enemy, without being covered, or being able to retire in good order, the enemy must be resolutely attacked by it.

If we are stronger than the enemy, he loses the advantage of wheeling about, flying off, and betraying us.

If we are weaker than the enemy, it is too late to wheel about, and no longer of use, the enemy is upon us before we can turn our horses.

Presence of mind leads on to the attack, by which time is gained—and time gained, decides.

This is particularly advantageous to us by night.

If it is day, and that we must leave the field, a wood should be sought, a halt made with confidence before it, and an appearance assumed as if infantry was concealed there.

The *alarm* should be sounded, the horses allowed to recover their wind, the detachment regulated, and moved slowly away.

gion forbids them to pursue business on a Saturday; and, as they scruple to take the oath of fidelity, it is much to be feared they utter untruths, almost as often as they open their lips."

The same author particularly recommends employing post-masters on this service; and observes, that trusty and intelligent women are fit persons to be made use of in procuring information. See *Military Guide*, by Major J. J. Seelinger, a little work containing many useful hints on out-post duty, and calculated to render much assistance to officers on active service.

A prudent and cautious enemy does not go blindly into woods. In the worst case, the party disperse, taking chance in flight, and calculating that the enemy cannot move faster than it.

It is, therefore, necessary, to make the detachment acquainted with the entire country, and, on each halt, to repeat an examination of the bearings.

Properly speaking, every Officer should carry a compass with him.

In these kind of highly interesting operations, many artifices and stratagems, as they are called, have been at all times exhibited.

The old military histories are filled with them. General Lukner, in the seven years' war, often reconnoitred in the garb of a peasant, or dressed as one of the enemy's hussars.

Such metamorphoses require precaution, and much cunning.

Optical illusions must be guarded against in reconnoitring.

A mass of troops, viewed in front, conceals all the divisions which are placed in rear of it.

Echelon positions, and positions *en échiquier*, deceive, and are difficult to judge of.

We should count the colours—the intervals.

To make correct observations, we must be acquainted with the form of the regiments, battalions, squadrons, and manner of encampment of the enemy.

By the reflection of the arms, clouds of dust,

&c., the direction of the movement of the columns is to be judged of.

If the reflection from the arms continues to strike the eye, the columns are moving towards us; if the glittering is interrupted, and only (the bayonets) visible above, the columns are moving from us.

Persons reconnoitring must endeavour to learn, whether the enemy's army is well provided for; whether a good spirit exists in it; whether it wishes for a battle, and so forth.

Whether the discipline is strict; whether the service is zealously or inertly performed; and what is said by the enemy.

This intelligence is obtained by means of prisoners, deserters, spies, inhabitants, &c.

Though individual reports deserve little credit, yet from many, we may combine and abstract the truth—we should never be tired of asking questions(1).

If the object of the reconnoissance is to make a military survey of the country, to mark out roads,

(1) Personal observation is more essential in reconnoitring, than the most extended inquiry. "An Officer sent to reconnoitre an army," says Colonel Macdonald, "must rely but little on the reports of others; and he is *himself* to examine, with extreme minuteness, the nature of the enemy's position." (*Experienced Officer*, p. 24, note). The necessity for personal observation, cannot be too much impressed upon the mind of an Officer so employed; by it his information will be always rendered more accurate, and his reports more satisfactory.

for columns, &c., Officers of the staff should be appointed for that purpose ; and the Officer of the cavalry escort then merely acts as commanding his troops (1).

(1) One of the most important results of a reconnoissance, was that which occurred at Villers-en-Couchée, in 1794, where the 15th Hussars so much distinguished themselves. His Royal Highness the Duke of York sent, on the 23d April, a detachment of cavalry, from his post at Cateau, to reconnoitre the enemy, who was reported to have assembled at the Camp de Cæsar, near Cambray. This detachment found the enemy in great force, and so strongly posted at the village of Villers-en-Couchée, that General Otto, who accompanied it, sent back for a reinforcement, which his Royal Highness immediately detached ; but it not arriving in time, General Otto felt himself obliged to attack the enemy, on the morning of the 24th April, with his advanced guard only, consisting of two squadrons of Austrian hussars, and two squadrons of the 15th Light Dragoons*. These troops charged the enemy's cavalry with such success, that finding a line of infantry in rear of the cavalry, they continued the charge without hesitation, and completely overthrew the French, who were obliged to retreat into Cambray, with the loss of 1200 men killed, and three pieces of cannon. (See *Despatch of H. R. H. the Duke of York, dated Cateau, April 25, 1794: Attestation of Lieutenant General Otto, respecting the action of 24th April, &c.*) The gallantry displayed by the 15th, on this day, has never been exceeded †. The Emperor of Germany, in reward of their unexampled bravery, presented the Officers with medals of the Order of Merit ; and

* The Austrian troops were part of the Imperial corps, Leopold Tuscano, consisting of 86 men ; the 15th Dragoons amounted to about 186 ; to which small force the French opposed 10,000 cavalry and infantry—a disproportion nearly equal to that at Poitiers.

† Colonel Aylett, in charging at the head of the regiment, was pierced through the body with a bayonet, and his horse was wounded in two places ; Captain Ryan's horse was severely wounded : Captain Calcraft's horse was shot in two places ; and the horses belonging to Captains Blount, Wilson, and Major Butler, were also wounded under them.

(B) *Surprises.*

When armies remain for some time inactive opposite each other, and the Commander in Chief can obtain no certain intelligence as to the designs of the enemy, surprises (*coups de main*) are ordered to be undertaken for the purpose of making prisoners, as much as possible, of Officers.

the name of *Villers-en-Couchée* became one of the distinguishing badges of this regiment. The presentation of the medals was accompanied by the following letter, from the Baron Thugut to Colonel Aylett:—

“ Sir,

“ The Emperor remembers, with satisfaction, the distinguished proofs of valour that you, and the other Officers of the 15th Light Dragoons, manifested on the 24th April, 1794, near Cambray. His Majesty regrets, that the statutes of the order of Maria Theresa, confirmed by constant custom, prohibits the *cross* of this order, strictly national, being conferred on Officers so worthy of being decorated with it; but wishing to give you, as also your honourable companions, a public mark of his particular esteem, his Majesty has commanded a medal to be struck, to perpetuate the remembrance of this brilliant action, and has ordered me to offer to them the only impressions which have been struck, except one, which is placed in the Imperial Cabinet of Vienna. In fulfilling the intentions of his Imperial Majesty, I beg you, consequently, to receive, for yourself, Sir, and to distribute to the other Officers, who, on the memorable 24th April, 1794, fought under your orders, the medals which I have delivered to Captain Ryan. I have the honour to join the assurances of the highest consideration, and have the honour to be, Sir,

“ Your most obedient humble servant,

“ LE BN. THUGUT.”

“ To Lieut. Col. Aylett,

“ 15th Light Dragoons.”

The 15th Dragoons were also opposed to an immense superiority

To undertake a *coup de main* with success, requires a knowledge of the enemy's posts; which it is intended to surprise, as well in position, as in connection with other posts.

This information is obtained by means of soldiers sent out in disguise—by spies—deserters.

If the enemy's post can be surrounded, there is a probability of the *coup de main* succeeding.

In this case, the fright caused by appearing in the rear, is of the greatest assistance.

Having many difficulties to overcome, is favourable to the success of a *coup de main*.

The stronger the position is, the less do troops anticipate danger.

Bad weather is one of the circumstances favourable to a surprise, because it relaxes the watchfulness of the troops.

Added to this, is the psychological remark, that a man, frightened out of his sleep, has seldom his senses about him in the first moment—that then disorder and confusion are unavoidable—ordering and obeying are equally difficult—for neither officers or men have their eyes half open, and clearness of vision is wanting to both: it is in numbers, at Emsdorf, in 1760, where, having just completed their establishment of 600 men, they routed a French force of upwards of 4000, and took 2000 prisoners*.

*See Historical Sketch of the 15th Regiment of
Light Dragoons. T.*

* It is stated that at this period, the privates of the 15th Dragoons were mostly composed of tailors, a fact which goes strongly to refute the common prejudice against the efficiency of the thimble knights on horseback.

therefore, easily to be comprehended why more surprises succeed than fail.

Whoever has experienced such fearful moments, is furnished with matter for many interesting remarks.

The campaign of 1813, furnishes many instances of successful surprises.

The sudden attack of the 'Austrians, on the 18th September, upon Freiberg, under Scheitter, was a brilliant operation.

The Italian General of Division, Pery, suffered himself to be surprised, in an unaccountable manner, in the afternoon of the 19th May, at Königs-warthe, by General Barclay de Tolly: the Italian division was broken, a great part made prisoners, and eleven guns lost.

The campaign of 1814, is also not entirely deficient in successful surprises on the part of the allies.

The affair at Epinal, on the 11th January, was a regular surprise by day, from which the Crown Prince, to his chagrin, could not derive advantage with his accustomed quickness; the ground on this side of the town, did not allow of the movement of cavalry.

The seven years' war is rich in bold operations of this kind.

The successful *coups de main* of the hereditary Prince of Brunswick, on the little town of Zierenberg, and that on the French corps of General

Glaubitz, encamped near Emsdorf, in Hesse, which the Hereditary Prince made prisoners in broad day—were brilliant operations (1).

(1) No plan was ever better concerted than that of his Serene Highness, upon Zierenberg. Having been informed, both by his own observation, and other intelligence, of all the enemy's posts, and their careless situation, he assembled the troops destined for the surprise, at about eight o'clock, on the night of the 5th September, 1760, at the stone bridge, near the Dymel. The cavalry consisted of two squadrons of the Greys, two of the Inniskillens, two of Busch, two of Melakouseby, and four of Bock. The whole under the orders of Major General Bock. The infantry, under the command of Major General Griffin, was composed of Maxwell's grenadiers, 150 Highlanders, Kingsley's regiment, and three other battalions; which last were posted with the cavalry, to cover the retreat. The British infantry was entrusted with the attack. Major Maxwell was ordered to force the Durenberg gate, with his grenadiers; Captain Grey, with the right wing of Kingsley's regiment, was to enter at the Warburg side; Captain Carlton, with the left wing, was ordered to pass through a breach in the wall, to facilitate the entrance of these two corps; and Captain M'Cleane, who commanded the Highlanders, was ordered also to enter at the breach, and endeavour to seize the person of the commanding Officer—such was the general disposition: but the activity and spirit of Kingsley's division, made the entrance at the breach unnecessary, for driving all before them, they came so close on the heels of the fugitives, that the enemy had not time to shut the gates; and Captain Grey, who was the first man in the town, advanced to let in Maxwell at the Durenberg gate, who had himself been equally successful, and was just coming in when Grey arrived. The French posts, which had been driven in by Maxwell, were thus between two fires, and were all put to death. M'Cleane and Carleton followed Grey in at the gate, and the latter, pushing for the church-yard, found the Commander, General Nortmann, at the head of 100 men, and made him prisoner. His men, at the same time (though four times stronger than ours), all gave way. The troops were

Lukner well understood how to take advantage of the favourable moment, and many surprises succeeded with him during the day.

That by Butzbach, in the Wetterau*, in 1760, he thus describes, "I gave orders to enter the gate at full charge; and if this was not possible, to gallop round to the Friedberg side, and try there."

It was a *fatality*, that out of a patrol of one Cornet and twelve men, we only took eleven; the Cornet and one man escaped us. *It was noon. I gave orders to pursue the Cornet, and force into the town with him, cost what it would. This was done. At the first onset, nothing was seen* but guards and infantry. My hussars cut them all down, crying out: 'Where is the enemy?' 'Outside the Friedberg gate,' was the answer.

not more than an hour in the town, and brought away three pieces of cannon, and 428 prisoners.

It is extraordinary that, in such a complete affair, executed in the dark, so few men should have been left behind or wounded. Among the latter was General Griffin, who commanded the attack, in which he received a bayonet wound in the breast. The other British Officers, who shared the honours of this day, were Colonel Boyd, Colonel Beckwith, and Lord George Lennox, whose horse was shot under him.

See Field of Mars. T.

* The Wetterau, or plain of the Wetter, is a country of Germany, situated between the principality of Hesse and the river Maine: it takes its name from the little river Wetter which runs through it.

T.

We rushed thither, and made still more prisoners."

Bulow, in his "Gustavus Adolphus in Germany," relates a very interesting *coup de main*, as well with regard to the rapidity of the previous march, as to the superior execution in general.

The King was in Würzburg, Tilly before Ochsenfurth.

Hanau was of importance to the King. He despatched Colonel Haubold with six troops, and a few hundred dragoons, to surprise this place, which was strong, and occupied by an imperial garrison.

Hanau is ten German miles distant from Würzburg.

Hanbold marched at five o'clock in the morning, from Würzburg, soon left the great roads, crossed the Maine, near Lengfeld, directed his march through Spessart, and the next day, between five and six o'clock in the morning, he surprised and took Hanau.

At a bad season of the year, in the month of November, he had marched ten German miles in twenty-four hours, without reckoning the circuitous roads, and taken a fortress, with all the warlike stores which it contained; the Commandant, Brandeis, was the only one of all the garrison, who remained in the Imperial service, all the rest entered into the service of the enemy, according to the custom of that time.

The King rewarded Haubold with the situation of Colonel of his Body Guard; he must, however, as often happens, very soon have forgotten this exploit, for Haubold became discontented, and afterwards went into the Imperial service."

Benningsen relates an instructive example of a successful *coup de main*.

In the summer of 1794, General Benningsen was at Trabe, in Lithuania; five miles from him, near the little town of Oschmen, lay a Polish corps.

Benningsen determined to surprise it.

He marched at three o'clock in the afternoon; at seven in the evening, after having gone two miles, he stopped for an hour at the little town of Olschau, to feed.

After he had resumed his march, he placed fifty Cossacks at some distance from the advanced-guard, who were preceded by three men, placed fifty paces in front of them.

The greatest silence was commanded; no firing was to be allowed: the fifty Cossacks who were at the head, were ordered, as soon as they were attacked, or met with any thing, to gallop off about the distance of a werst on the road, and there wait for the advanced-guard.

By this disposition, the first cavalry field-guard was cut off, as well as the second, and the march was continued through a wood.

When the General had reached the edge of it, he saw the enemy's corps, about 800 paces in front of him; before their position ran the river Oschmenka, the left flank was *appuied* upon the town of Oschmen: two new broad bridges led across the river.

In the camp, all was in motion; the cavalry had saddled and bridled: the Russians could observe every thing.

Day broke: the General formed two columns, and advanced, from the wood towards the bridges.

At last the sentries on the bridges fired.

Upon this, the Russian cavalry crossed the bridges at full gallop, and rushed into the camp.

The disorder was unbounded.

Six hundred men were cut down; the rest made prisoners: all the cannon, baggage, &c., were taken (1).

(1) Lord Anglesea's surprise of the French at Sahagun, was a bold and well-planned operation. His Lordship's division of cavalry was stationed twelve miles from Sahagun, where a body of the enemy's horse, amounting to 700, had been posted, and which body, Lord Anglesea proposed to cut off from the rest of the French army, by a rapid movement. He accordingly sent Major-General Slade, on the 21st December, with the 10th light dragoons, to approach the enemy by one road, while his Lordship, with the 15th dragoons, moving, with greater celerity, in another direction, reached Sahagun, and surprised one of the enemy's picquets; unfortunately, some men escaped, and gave the alarm, which afforded the French an opportunity of forming in an advantageous position outside the town. The strength of the post was particularly favourable to the enemy, from a hollow way, which opposed any regular charge of the British cavalry, and it was, therefore,

The design for a *coup de main*, like all others, is dependent upon the object of operation, and the lines which lead to it.

necessary to manœuvre, in order to gain the advantage of ground. Here the abilities of Lord Anglesea were exercised with effect; and having succeeded in improving his position, a charge was made upon the enemy's line. The force and rapidity with which the British cavalry rushed on to the attack, could not be withstood; the French line was immediately broken, and their whole force dispersed. Two Lieutenant-Colonels, and upwards of 190 men, were made prisoners. The loss of the British only amounted to eight men killed and twenty wounded.

See Life of Lieutenant-General the Earl of Uxbridge.

Unremitting vigilance of the out posts, is the only means of defeating any attempt which the enemy may make to surprise an army. To such vigilance was the light division, under General Craufurd, indebted for its preservation, when, in July 1810, the French attempted a surprise of the troops stationed near Marialba and Gallegos. A squadron of the 16th light dragoons, under the command of Captain Belli, furnished the extreme advanced posts, and was stationed near the village of Marialba. The 1st hussars of the King's German Legion, were stationed at Gallegos, a village about half a league in rear of Marialba, and were supported by the horse artillery under Lieutenant (now Colonel) Alexander Macdonald. The greatest precautions were taken, the cavalry was every night bridled up, the artillery horses were put to, and every morning, half an hour before day-break, the cavalry turned out, and formed in front of Gallegos.

On the morning of the 4th July, three-quarters of an hour before day-break, the picquets of the 16th dragoons were attacked by the enemy, in such superior force*, that they were forced to give way, and retire towards Gallegos: the enemy followed up his attack with such rapidity, that the dragoon who was entrusted with the report of the French advance, could not reach Gallegos before them, and both appeared at the same

* Nearly three regiments of cavalry.

Secrecy of march is an important condition. The safety of retreat must be ensured.

Small surprises are best executed soon after midnight; but great ones, a little before day-break.

A general place of rendezvous after the operation—a signal of recognition—a word—white handkerchief, or the like, must be previously determined on.

moment in front of the 1st German hussars, who were already formed. Captain Krauchenberg, whose squadron was posted a little in advance of the regiment, immediately led it on at full gallop, to within fifteen paces of the enemy's line, where he formed the whole squadron into a line of skirmishers. The hussars being thus brought so near the enemy, poured a most destructive fire into his ranks, and supported by a few well-served discharges from Lieutenant Macdonald's guns, succeeded in checking the pursuit of the French, and defeating the intended surprise. Strict orders having been given, not to engage any superior force of the enemy, the retreat was commenced to Alameda, and Captain Krauchenberg's squadron formed the rear-guard. The enemy formed all his cavalry into a column, and attacked the hussars with the greatest impetuosity, who retired, skirmishing, step by step, until arrived near a bridge, which led over some marshy ground; in order to pass this bridge without loss, Captain Krauchenberg put his squadron into a trot, ordering the skirmishers to follow him as soon as possible; the enemy's column advanced at a gallop, and passed the bridge, immediately behind the rear-skirmishers of the hussars. Captain Krauchenberg now re-formed his squadron, and continued his retreat, until the enemy had passed the bridge; about fifty paces from which, he suddenly wheeled about, charged the French, who were three times his force, and completely overthrew them, driving them over the bridge, and into the marsh. The gallant hussars were soon after supported by a battalion of riflemen, who had been judiciously placed in ambuscade by General Craufurd,

Firing must be forbidden—the enemy should be attacked rapidly with the lance or sword.

Success depends upon rapidity.

The smallest part of the troops, destined for the *coup de main*, at most the half, is to be actually sent into the place, to be surprised; the greater part should remain, outside, regularly formed up for action in order to be able to act according to circumstance.

Surprises in several columns generally fail, because all the columns seldom arrive at the same time, even when the watches are daily regulated.

In order never to be surprised, *all possibilities* must be previously brought to mind.

and who saluted the enemy with so destructive and unexpected a fire, that he thought it prudent to return to Gallegos, and give up the pursuit.

The following order was issued by General Craufurd on this occasion :—

“ DIVISION ORDERS.

“ *Val de la Mula,*

“ *July 5, 1810.*

“ Brigadier-General Craufurd, in making his reports to Lord Wellington of the affair that took place yesterday, did not fail to mention, in terms of merited praise, the gallant manner in which Captain Krauchenberg and Cornet Cordemann*, of the 1st German hussars, with only part of a squadron, charged about three times the number of the enemy's cavalry, close in front of a column; and he begs that Captain Krauchenberg, Cornet Cordemann, and the Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, who were engaged in this action, will be assured, that it caused the admiration of the Brigadier-General and all who saw it.”

T.

* Now Major in the Royal Hanoverian Hussar Guards.

In warlike operations, luck is necessary ; but fortune is a lady, and often changes without any reason.

One's own firmness is not powerful enough to fetter this mutable goddess (1).

(C) *Petty warfare.*

The strategical object of war is the defeat of the enemy*.

- (1) " Uncertain, coy, and hard to please,
And variable as the shade,
By the light quivering aspen made."

Such is fortune, without even possessing the redeeming quality which the poet allows to the lady

" When pain and anguish wring the brow,
A ministering angel thou." *Scott.*

The Cavalier Kniphausen said, that an ounce of good fortune was better than a pound of wit. T.

* Bulow says, but not with much depth of thought, " the object of war is peace." AUTHOR'S NOTE.

It would be difficult to find always so good a reason for nations going to war, as that which the Prussian General has given, and the precepts of Turpin have little influence where ambition predominates. " War," says that writer, " should be undertaken only for the defense of persecuted virtue, the punishment of successful wickedness, to curb ambition, or to oppose the unjust claims of superior power." Bulow's observation is equal to those of an amusing writer in a late celebrated periodical. " For what do nations go to war ?" says this minute inquirer into cause and effect, " a foolish question enough ! For what, but that they may fight ; and they fight, that they may make peace—without which they could not make war again : for, if it was not made for that, peace would be a very bad thing. *Per se* it is bad ; but being accessory to war, it is good. *Bellum, pax rursum*—then war again—and

War is divided into great and petty.

The object of the former is the enemy's army ; that of the latter, his lines of communication.

Great war consists in the operations of contending armies ; petty war is conducted by partisan troops, and its object is the *matériel*—the military stores and provisions (1).

so on." See *Monthly Magazine for March, 1827, article " War."* " There would be fewer wars in the world," said Henry the Fourth of France, " if every sovereign would visit his military hospitals the day after the battle." War, however, is an inevitable evil*, often necessary ; and when engaged in from the noble motive of liberating other countries from oppressive tyranny, or defending our own from foreign aggression, is as justifiable in its operation, as glorious in its success.

" Was giebt uns die weite unendliche Welt."

" Für des Vaterlands heiligen Boden?—"

Korner's Letzer Trost.

T.

(1) *Petty war*, or what the French call *la petite guerre*, is the war of posts ; it is carried on by a body of light troops, commanded by a person who is dexterous in the command of a party, expert at gaining intelligence, finding out his way, contriving surprises, &c. ; and who is from thence called a *partisan*. " This corps," says Major James, " should consist of from 1000 to 2000 men, separated from the army, to secure the camp, or to cover a march ; to reconnoitre the enemy or the country ; to seize their posts, convoys, and escorts ; to plant ambuscades and to put in practice every stratagem for surprising or disturbing the enemy." The Lusitanian Legion, which was so conspicuous in the Peninsula, for its effective operations under the command of the gallant Sir Robert Wilson, may be considered as coming under the denomination of a *partisan corps*. T.

* The inhabitants of Loo Choo seem to be the only exceptions to the inevitability of war. Captain Basil Hall says, that these amiable people have " neither wars nor weapons," which statement Napoleon would with difficulty believe.

The military stores and provisions are either collected in magazines, or follow the army; and, therefore, are to be found on the great roads.

A bold partisan—what Theobald calls a land-pirate (*landkaper*)—does not content himself with attacking, taking, and destroying, these endless trains of military stores; or even with retarding their march, and seizing them by partial surprises; he ventures, also, to attack the troops which follow the army as reinforcements—the depôts of cavalry, artillery, hospitals, &c.

One or more bold and able partisan corps may, in this manner, cause incalculable injury to the enemy; nay, they can even arrest the operations of an army—render them ineffective, and induce movements of retreat.

The duty of partisan troops, is to weaken the enemy in every possible way; and all means are allowed to effect this object.

Petty warfare is carried on with light troops.

In general, these troops are volunteers, whose service is only binding during the war.

Discipline is seldom one of the qualifications which distinguishes partisan troops.

The choice of the Commander is the most important point; for, as in all other cases, so also with light or volunteer troops, every thing depends upon the personal qualities of the leader.

To discern and to select talent, is a great art;

but once directed to activity, it should be left ~~unstacked~~*.

The greatest possible freedom of action should be given to a partisan.

Upon this choice, it generally depends, whether this land-piracy—the operation of partisan troops—assists to fulfil the real object of the war, or only confines itself to causing alarm among the defenceless inhabitants.

Honour is the principal produce of the former—*money* of the latter.

Man yields much too easily to the seduction of being rich.

The less liberality is to be expected from Princes, the quicker and more certain will the opportunities of becoming rich be taken advantage of.

On this point, the English shew a knowledge of human nature, for they unite *honour* and *money*.

All conquerors, and all usurpers, have known how to connect their interests with these two talismans.

They are the two open approaches, to defend which, a man seldom possesses sufficient strength of mind; for nothing in this world is so thoroughly real as interest!

Partisan troops, along with the before-mentioned operations, must direct their attention to reconnoitring.

* “War for the true soldier.”—AUTHOR’S NOTE.

Seizing on couriers, diplomatic persons, interrupting despatches, &c.—all are included in the operations of partisans.

The line of conduct to be observed on such operations, may be found in many valuable military works, for much has been written on the subject of petty war (1).

(1) Some of the best works on this subject are “ *Le Traité sur la Petite Guerre*, par Grand Maison; *Le Partisan*, par Jenny; *Principes sur la Petite Guerre*, ouvrage ajouté aux Instructions du Roi de Prusse; *La Petite Guerre*, par M. le Capitaine Knock; and *Le Chasseur à la Guerre*.

T.

LECTURE XII.

PRINCIPAL EPOCHS IN THE HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

THE Scolothians, a Scythian nation, are said to be the first who had the hardihood to tame that fine animal, the horse, which gave rise to the fable of the Centaurs among poets and mythologists (1).

(1) Virgil gives the Lapithæ* credit for this daring act.

“ Frena Pelethronii Lapithæ gyrosque dedere
Impositi dorso, atque equitem docuere sub armis
Insultare solo, et gressus glomerare superbos.”

Georgics, lib. iii.

“ The Lapithæ, to chariots add the state
Of bits and bridles ; taught the steed to bound,
To run the ring, and trace the mazy round ;
To stop, to fly, the rules of war to know ;
To obey the rider, and to dare the foe.”

Dryden.

This, however, is all nonsense ; the employment of horses, both for riding and driving, is frequently alluded to in the Old

* The Lapithæ were a people of Thessaly, who inhabited the environs of Larissa and Mount Olympus, and were so called from Lapitha, the daughter of Apollo.

Since then, according to Buffon, pompous palaces have been assigned it for habitations.

When and where horses were first used in battle, is not pointed out (1.)

Testament; the Canaanites, to whom Joshua gave battle at the Waters of Merom, had horsemen as well as chariots; and the Arabs may certainly claim a better right than the Scythians to the honour of having been the first horse breakers. As to the Centaurs, their history appears to be involved in glorious uncertainty. The most inquisitive and judicious of the ancient antiquarians, says Mitford, appear to have been at a loss what to think of the Centaurs. Strabo calls them ἀγρίων τι φύλον (savage), a mode of expression implying his uncertainty about them. Hesiod and Homer seem to have known nothing of their equine form, and never speak of them as a savage race. The Scholiast on Homer, indeed, says, that where Nestor is speaking of mountain beasts destroyed by Theseus, he means the Centaurs; but this interpretation is as unwarrantable as unnecessary, for the meaning of the words, in their common acceptation, is obvious. In the Odyssey, we find the Centaur Eurytion mentioned, with the honourable epithet of ἀγακλυτός (illustrious), which is not likely to have been given to one of a tribe of mountain beasts or hairy savages; he got drunk, certainly, but it was in good company. Pindar describes the Centaur Chiron as a most paradoxical being, which yet, in the fourth Pythian, has been defined in two words—φῆρθεῖος (a godlike wild beast). But even in Xenophon's time, it appears, the term Centaur did not of itself describe the imaginary animal, half-man and half-horse; for that author, wanting to particularise such creatures, never calls them simply Centaurs, but always Hippo-Centaurs (horse-Centaurs).—(See Mitford's *History of Greece*, vol. i., sec. iii., p. 29. Note). Heyne derives the word Centaur from κεντεῖν τὴν ἀνδρᾶν (spurring or lashing the air), and supposes it to have been given to one of the Thessalian tribes, in consequence of the great velocity of their movements. T.

(1) Horses were, no doubt, first used in battle upon the wide

It appears merely probable, that cavalry fought at the famed siege of Trôÿ, although Homer does not speak clearly on that subject (1).

open plains, where civilization began, such as Assyria, or the Tartarian Steppes. Assyria was a powerful empire when the Greeks fed upon acorns; and it is impossible to fix any period for events which are so completely lost in the obscurity of early history.

T.

(1) Homer appears to be sufficiently clear on the subject: all his heroes either fight in chariots, or leap from them to engage the enemy on foot, as did Paris, Agamemnon, Teucer, Ajax, &c. Nestor forming the army for action, composes the first line of chariots; in the second, he places that part of the infantry in which he had the least confidence; and forms a third line of the most approved troops, which were heavy armed infantry, formed in close order, many ranks deep*. No person of Agamemnon's time is mentioned by Homer as riding on horseback, except Diomed, when with Ulysses, he captured the horses of Rhesus:—

Καρπαλίμῳ δ' ἵππων ἐπεβήσετο κόπτε δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς
τόξῳ τοὶ δ' ἐπέτοντο θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν.

ΙΛΙΑΔΟΣ. X. l. 513.

“ At once he mounted. With his bow the steeds
Ulysses plied, and to the ships they flew.”

Cowper.

It is certain that Homer was well acquainted with riding, for a feat of horsemanship is mentioned in a simile, B. xv. l. 679. Riding on horseback was, however, little practised, and some centuries passed over before it was applied in Greece to military purposes, the mountainous ruggedness of the country preventing any extensive use of cavalry, except among the Thessalians, whose territory was a large plain.

T.

* Such a body of troops is generally called a *phalanx*, and Homer applied this term equally to the Trojan and Grecian troops.

See Iliad.

Thus much is certain, that the brave Scythians descended from the renowned Amazons(1), and from the *women* conquered by Hercules at Thermodon, who existed before the Trojan war, were accustomed to ride, and fought partly on horseback.

(1) The existence of these warlike ladies is very doubtful. Montfaucon, after relating the many wonderful stories which Herodotus and others have told of their achievements, thus concludes: "Nous ne nous arrêtons point à ces faits trop connus, et que plusieurs regardent comme fabuleux: il y en a même qui vont jusqu'à douter si les Amazones ont jamais existé;" it has also been said, that the Amazons burnt off the right breast, lest it should impede their skill in drawing the bow; however, the figure of the Amazon, Hippolyta, upon the arch of Severus, has not suffered this loss, and Montfaucon says it is the same with all that he had ever seen.—(*See Antiqu. Expliqu. Vol. iv., liv. iii., chap. iv., art. v., p. 82*). It is highly probable that the word Amazon is not Greek at all, but like many other words, pressed into the language, from an Eastern origin, and a fable devised as usual to account for the punning derivation which they gave it*. Spain has, however, produced a real Amazon, and the heroism of Augustina Sarragossa may vie with any of the female exploits recorded by Herodotus or Diodorus Siculus: this intrepid woman, when the soldiers hesitated to re-man the guns, at the siege of Sarragossa, in 1808, rushed forward over the wounded and the slain, snatched a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, and fired off a twenty-six pounder; then jumping upon the gun, she made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege; and her fellow-citizens, stimulated to fresh exertions by this daring act of intrepidity, instantly rushed into the battery, and again opened a tremendous fire on the enemy; indeed, the loss of women in this siege, was fully proportionate to that of the men: the Countess Burita formed a female corps for the relief of the wounded, and for the purpose of carrying provisions to the soldiers, and this young, delicate, and beautiful woman, was fre-

* Αλφα (without), and μαστα (a breast).

The Greeks had little cavalry. The defeat of the Macedonians at Messene and Ithome, is entirely to be attributed to their deficiency therein (1).

quently seen attending to the duties she had prescribed to herself, in the midst of the most tremendous fire of shot and shells; the idea of personal danger did not produce the slightest effect upon her, and she persevered in her benevolent and patriotic purpose with the most unshaken firmness.

See Elliott's Life of Wellington.

But the valorous acts of Mary Ambree, exceed all that have yet been recorded of female heroism.

"Shee led up her soldiers in battaile array,
'Gainst three times theyr number by breake of the daye;
Seven howers in skirmish continued she:
Was not this a brave bonny lasse, Mary Ambree?"

She filled the skyes with the smoke of her shott,
And her enemies bodyes with bullets soe hott;
For one of her owne men a score killed shee:
Was not this a brave bonny lasse, Mary Ambree?"

See Old Ballad, entitled, "The valourous acts performed at Gaunt by the brave bonny lass, Mary Ambree, who in revenge of her lover's death did play her part most gallantly:" This ballad is published in the third volume of "Reliques of Ancient English Poetry."
T.

(1) The translator has in vain endeavoured to obtain an account of the defeat of the *Macedonians*, alluded to by the author, and therefore concludes, that the battles referred to, must be those fought between the *Lacedæmonians* and *Messenians*, as related by Pausanias, one of which took place in the plains of *Messenia*, and the other near the mountain *Ithome*; in the latter, the *Lacedæmonians* are stated to have sustained a complete defeat, but no mention is made of cavalry having been employed on either side; the *Messenian* archers appear to have

The wars with the Persians first made them attentive to this subject,—just as the Romans perceived the advantage of cavalry, when taught by Hannibal.

Agesilaus, King of Sparta, was the first who in the wars with the Persians, increased his cavalry.

The Asiatic nations have always had a numerous cavalry; and even at the present day, it is not uncommon for the Mahrattas, whose united force of cavalry is considered 200,000, to appear in the field with from 60 to 80,000 horses*.

Asia appears to be the real father-land of the horse; for it is there only, where it arrives at the most perfect and regular beauty.

With regard to Tactics, the Thessalians, and other Grecian nations, according to Cælian, formed their cavalry in the shape of lozenges and wedges.

The invention of the wedge-shaped position is attributed to Philip, father of Alexander the Great.

Alexander, however, departed from this formation the victory.* “The light armed troops of the Messenians,” says Pausanius, “beat and transfixed with their darts, those of the Lacedæmonians who kept their ranks, suddenly overturned those that pursued them, and assaulted them from behind, as they were returning to their own troops; at last, the Lacedæmonians, being wearied with the length of the battle, and disordered by the unusual manner of fighting of the Messenian light-armed troops, broke their ranks and fled.”—*B. iv., c. xi.*

T.

* History of Tippoo Saib.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

tion, and with his shallow lines of cavalry, conquered the deep formed lines of Darius.

Afterwards, the cavalry of all the other Greek nations was also formed more shallow; never, however, under four, or above eight ranks.

The squadrons of Hannibal were sixty-four strong, which number formed in four ranks, made sixteen files.

The turma of the Romans had, according to Vegetius, eight files and four ranks, ten turmae formed a legion (1); the distances between the turmae, were equal to their front.

(1) The author is here under some misconception, the Roman legion contained both infantry and cavalry; and, according to Vegetius, the number of the latter far exceeded that stated by the author. Gibbon gives the following clear detail of the number of cavalry attached to an imperial legion.

“The cavalry, without which the force of the legion would have remained imperfect, was divided into ten troops or squadrons; the first, as the companion of the first cohort, consisted of 132 men, whilst each of the other nine amounted only to 66: the entire establishment formed a regiment, if we may use the modern expression, of 726 horse, naturally connected with its respective legion, but occasionally separated to act in the line, and to compose a part of the wings of an army.”

*Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. i.
chap. iii., pp. 13, 14.*

Vegetius expressly says, “his decem cohortibus legio plena fundatur, quæ habet pedites sex millia centum, equites septingenta viginti sex.”

Vegetius, de re Militari, lib. ii., c. vi.

The turma consisted of thirty-two men, and reckoning the decurion, or officer, thirty-three; the cavalry of the first cohort

In the battle of Pharsalia, the unfortunate Pompey united four *turmæ*, in order to form broader and stronger masses; but Pompey did not attack, therefore his cavalry, which was superior in numbers to Cæsar's, was of no service to him.

The employment of gun-powder produced a great reform in tactics.

Berthold Schwartz, a Franciscan monk of Cologne, is generally named as the inventor of gun-powder.

Long before his time, however, inflammable materials had been used, in order, by their power, to sling stones and iron bullets; as for instance, in 1342, when the Moors were beseiged by the Castilians, in Algesiras, and of which Villasis says—"that the iron bullets had such force as to cut away the men's limbs as if they had been cut off with a knife, and that the powder with which they fired, was of such a nature, that the wounded died immediately.

The Greek fire had, together with an addition of pitch, rosin, and naphtha, all the component parts of the present powder.

It is, therefore, wrong to fix the first use of gunpowder to the year 1380, for it has been

must therefore have contained four *turmæ*, and the cavalry of the remaining nine cohorts, two *turmæ* each; thus twenty-two *turmæ* formed the cavalry of an imperial legion.

shewn that the Arabians had a much earlier knowledge of it than the Europeans (1).

At the siege of Ptolemais, in Syria, 1290, the Egyptians threw Greek fire out of 300 machines.

The Moors made the Spaniards acquainted with the use of Greek fire; from the latter it went to the French and English, and from these to the Germans (2).

(1) That gunpowder was known to the Arabs, has been clearly proved by the Count Rzevuski, who gives the actual receipt for the making of it: this curious document, he states to have found in an Arabic manuscript, written, as he says, in the time of the Crusades of St. Louis*.

Description de la composition qu' on met dans les canons.

Savoir: salpêtre 10, Charbon 2 drachmes; soufre une drachme et demie. Pilez-le bien et remplissez-en précisément le tiers du canon. Faites faire un refouloir de bois chez le tourneur, suivant le calibre de l'embouchure du canon, et introduisez-le avec force. Vous y mettrez ensuite le boulet ou la flèche (incendiaire) et vous mettrez le feu a la poudre contenue dans la chambre du canon. Il doit etre perforé a la profondeur de la lumière, car' s'il etoit perforé plus bas, ce seroit un defaut et malheur alors à celui qui tire!

*Extrait d'une lettre de M. le Comte Rzevuski à
M. de Hammer.*

This letter will be found in the first volume of that valuable work entitled, *Mines de l'Orient*. T.

(2) The Greek fire, which gave rise to the Congreve rocket, is supposed to have been the invention of some of the Arabian chymists; something like it is mentioned in Quintus Curtius; a proof, says von Hammer, that the Arabians or Persians have more claim to the invention of it than the Greeks, is, that the principal ingredients named in the receipt, are not originally of European origin, but of the interior provinces of Persia and Arabia.

Joinville says, that the Greek fire was thrown from the bottom

* Louis IX., or St. Louis, returned from his first crusade in 1264.

According to the Chronicle of Lübek, the town-house of that place was blown up, in consequence of the carelessness of the powder-maker in 1360.

So early as 1372, the Augsburgers fired out of twenty metal cannons on the Bavarians, who besieged them.

From all these circumstances, it is evident in the first place, that those persons err who fix the first employment of gunpowder in the year 1380. And, secondly, that the pious Berthold Schwartz, a great naturalist and chemist, was not the inventor thereof, but that it is probable he only

of a machine called the petrary, and that "it came forwards as large as a barrel of verjuice, with a tail of fire issuing from it as big as a great sword, making a noise like a dragon flying through the air; and from the great quantity of fire it threw out, giving such a light, that one might see in the camp as if it had been day."

The following lines, quoted by Grose, shew the general opinion of its properties—

Pereat ó utinam ignis hujus vena,
Non enim extinguitur aquâ, sed arenâ,
Vixque vinum ácidum arctat ejus fræna.
Et urinâ stringitur ejus vix habena :
Ignis hîc conficitur tantum per paganos,
Ignis hic exterminat tantum Christianos,
Incantatus namque est per illos prophanos,
Ab hoc perpetuo Christe, libera nos.

Monachus Florentinus de Expugnat Acconensi.

Dr. Meyrick gives the receipt by which Greek fire was made in the reign of Edward III. ; it is taken from the original MS. in the British Museum, of J. Anderne, an eminent surgeon in the service of Edward.

See Critical Inquiry into Ancient Armour, by S. R. Meyrick, L.L.D., F.S.A., &c., vol. ii., p. 39. T.

improved it; we can therefore absolve him from the sin of inventing this destructive compound (1).

A hundred and fifty years were necessary, in order to make the use of fire-arms general.

Since the employment of gunpowder, seven principal periods in tactics are denoted*.

The first begins with the employment of cannon, and extends to Charles the Eighth's campaign into Italy, or from the beginning of the fourteenth, until towards the end of the fifteenth century.

In this period, when the art of war began to revive from that state of barbarism into which it had sunk since the downfall of the Roman Empire, c

(1) We may not only give the pious monk absolution, but return him thanks for the signal service his reputed discovery has rendered to mankind, and the cause of humanity. Compare ancient battles with modern—look to the slaughter of the one, and that of the other; the horrid butchery and deadly enmity which individual encounter caused in the one case, and the comparative trifling loss, and mutual good humour, which attends modern battles; such a consideration would shew, that so far from the invention of gunpowder being a sin, it was one of the most beneficial discoveries to mankind, which has ever been made. “Nations,” says Hume, “by its means, have been brought more to a level; conquests have become less frequent and rapid; success in war has been reduced nearly to be a matter of calculation; and any nation, overmatched by its enemies, either yields to their demands, or secures itself by alliances, against their violence and invasion.”

T.

* History of the Art of War.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

occur, the wars of the Spaniards against the Moors, the English against the French, and finally, the Italian Republics against each other.

The cavalry, consisting of the nobility, constituted, at that period, the flower of the army, and was the support of princes and of their kingdoms.

At the storming of fortresses, or when important posts were to be occupied and defended, as well as on all such occasions generally, when a bold and resolute soldiery was required, the knights dismounted and fought on foot.

The Count of Normandy would not venture to besiege Quesnoi in 1340, because the garrison consisted of knights (1).

Besides knights and squires, there were also

(1) The splendour and extent of victories, says Pere Daniel, was always denoted by the number of knights, squires, and other gentlemen, who had been killed or taken, “En telle ou telle rencontre, disent les historiens, tant de chevaliers furent tuez, tant de sergens, (servientes), furent pris.” The strength of a garrison was also expressed by the number of knights or other gentlemen which it contained—“On jetta dans telle place qui étoit menacée de siège, vingt chevaliers, cent sergens, &c.”—(*Hist. de la Mil. Francoise*). The circumstance of the knights dismounting, is a strong argument in favour of what has been advanced in a former observation on the comparative merits of infantry and cavalry*, and which is thus supported by the learned author above quoted—“Je crois encore que cette coutume s’introduisit peu à peu, et que d’abord en certaines occasions où la cavalerie ne pouvoit agir, et où l’on auroit eu besoin de quelque infanterie brave et vigoureuse dont l’on manquoit en ce tems-la, les chevaliers, les ecuyers et d’autres gendarmes mirent

* See Lecture iv., page 88, note.

archers, who were, in fact, the vassals of the knights, and who being lighter armed, and riding lighter horses, served as light horsemen (1).

The knights were completely armed, and rode what were called war-horses, which were also covered with an armour of iron plates (2)

The head coverings of the horse appointments were often very splendidly ornamented with gold and silver.

pied a terre, et s'acquirent de l'honneur ; qu'on reconnoit comme autrefois l'utilité et la nécessité d'une bonne infanterie dans les batailles ; et que n'y en ayant point de telle, la gendarmerie voulut bien y supplier."—*T. i., liv. v., p. 223.* T.

(1) At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the cavalry of the European armies was divided into heavy and light horse ; the men composing the former were called *men-at-arms*, those of the latter, *hobilers* ; the men-at-arms were so called from their being armed *de cap à pied* ; they were composed of the tenants in capite, holding by military service, or their substitutes (*servientes*) : the hobilers were so called from their riding little horses termed hobbies ; they consisted of the yeomen, and formed the light cavalry of the army. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, the men-at-arms were termed launcers, and the hobilers demi-launcers. At the close of the reign of James I., the heavy cavalry received the denomination of cavaliers, from the intercourse with Spain ; and soon after, that of pistoliers, from the peculiar weapon with which they were armed.

See *Critical Inquiry, &c., vol i., p. 174. ; also, Skelton's Illustrations of Arms and Armour.* T.

(2) This tactical arrangement of centuries generalizes facts to too great an extent ; *entire* plate-armour did not make its appearance until the beginning of the fifteenth century ; and chain-armour first became covered with plates at the beginning of the fourteenth century.—See *Critical Inquiry, &c.* T.

At the siege of Harfleur, Count St. Pol had a horse's head covering (1) that cost 30,000 dollars; the Count St. Foix had one of 15,000 dollars' value; both were inlaid with precious stones*.

These men of iron carried a long strong lance armed with an iron head, a sword, dagger, and pistol; a battle-sword five feet long, which hung at the saddle, and a mace, (battle-axe, hammer, or hatchet) (2).

The formation for battle was very simple, they fought man to man.

Every armed knight sought out his opponent and rode against him with couched lance, in order to throw him out of the saddle, or to make him prisoner.

The esquires, or armour-bearers, followed as a kind of second rank—as seconds to their knights, whom they assisted in battle, and brought them

(1) Called *chanfron* or *champ frein*.

T.

* History of France.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(2) The author has not been provided with correct information as to the offensive arms used by the cavalry at this period; the men-at-arms did not carry pistols before the middle of the sixteenth century: the long sword, termed *wyn-brot*, bread-earner, as well as arming-sword, by the English, was worn at the side; the shorter one, called *estoc*, hung at the saddle bow: the greatest length of the former was three feet and three-quarters, as is clearly shewn in Skelton's Illustrations; see also, the representation of Louis XII, in Montfaucon's *Monarchie Française*. In addition to these, either the mace, battle-axe, or hammer, (*martel de fer*), was carried. See *Critical Inquiry*, &c.

T.

fresh arms and other horses, when the former became unserviceable, or the latter were killed, without directly fighting themselves (1).

(1) The translator has been unable to find any authority for this statement; and the descriptions of all battles which took place during the period alluded to, would seem to lead to a different conclusion.

The line or battail at Cressy (1346), is thus described by Doctor Meyrick :—"The archers were drawn up in the form of a herse*, about 200 in front, and 40 deep. The Prince of Wales stood at the bottom of the herse on foot, among his men-at-arms, as a solid square, having on his left the Earls of Arundel and Northampton, with a force of 7000 troops, consisting of men-at-arms, billmen, and archers." (*Critical Inquiry, &c.*, vol. ii., pp. 15, 16). Now the men-at-arms were composed of both Knights and Esquires, as the different ordinances of that period will shew; consequently, in the order of battle described, they must have been intermixed, and that the Esquires, so placed, should have been only inactive spectators of the battle, is not to be easily credited; but further inquiry will clearly prove, that the Esquires bore an equal share with the knights in the engagement. Mills, in describing the battle of Otterbourn, which was fought on the 21st July, 1388, states, on the authority of Froissart and Buchanan, "there was neither Knight nor Squire but that did his devoir, and fought hand to hand."—(*History of Chivalry*, vol. ii., p. 80). Again, (p. 81), "They wished to take alive Thomas Felton, an English Squire, whose valour excited their admiration;" and Sir John Chandos is stated, in p. 62, on the authority of Froissart, to have been killed by a French Squire. Mr. Nicholas, in his most minute and valuable description of the

* When troops were drawn up in form of a herse, it was generally with their spears projecting from every possible direction; the word is derived from the French herise, and signified a bristled portcullis or gate cover, which was let down over the inner gates after the enemy had forced the portcullis; it was composed of transverse pieces of wood, with spikes projecting from their points of intersection.

However, these esquires, animated with a noble desire of glory, sought an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, in order to obtain the honour-

battle of Agincourt, gives a full detail of the order of battle of both armies, from a number of corroborating and indisputable authorities. Among others, he quotes St. Remy, an eye-witness, who states, that it was ordered the army should be formed into three lines, that is to say, the advance-guard, the main body, and the rear-guard. In the advance-guard, were placed about 8000 bacinets, Knights and Esquires, and a few archers; and in the main body were placed a number of Knights and Esquires. —(*See Historical Account of the Battle of Agincourt, by N. H. Nicholas, F.S.A., p. clxxxix*). The same author furnishes us with another, at least, *presumptive*, proof, that the Esquires were something more than providers of arms and horses: “Eighteen Esquires of the French army, led by Brunelet de Masinguehem, and Ganiot de Bournoville, bound themselves by oath, that when the two armies met, they would, with their united strength, force themselves sufficiently near to the King of England to strike the crown off his head.”

Historical Account, &c., clxxxvi.

The mistake of always considering Esquires in their original office of armigeri, or armour bearers, is common to many writers who have treated on this subject, and arises from a confusion of historical periods, which they will not endeavour to arrange. Pere Daniel has fallen into this error: and most of the writers who uphold him as an authority, have blindly followed his statement, without troubling themselves to make further inquiry. At the commencement of chivalry, every one who could afford to keep a horse, was a Knight; as society advanced, that rank became of importance, and those who aspired to the office, were obliged to attend on such as had actually attained it: they carried for the Knight his shield or his armour, until he arrived on the field of battle, hence they were called Scutiferi, Escuyers, or Armigeri. Such was the case in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In the thirteenth century, the duties of a more menial kind, previously performed by the Esquire, fell upon the page, and an infe-

able order of knighthood, by some exceedingly gallant action.

Thus, if the enemy escaped the knights in the first rank, or was the conqueror, he fell into the hands of these brave youths.

So emulous a desire of glory produced the most brilliant deeds.

rior servant, called a coustrel, from the long knife with which he was armed ; and the service of carrying the shield, &c., of the Knight, was performed by Esquires only on occasions of state, and at tournaments, which continued to be the practice until the beginning of the seventeenth century. Esquires were, no doubt, disposed in battle, according to the orders of the Commander of the army, or the Marshal who acted under him ; and although they, as well as the archers, coustrelers, &c., attended those Knights to the muster, whose quota they formed, it is evident, that once enrolled, they must have acted in that part of the army to which they were attached, and under the orders of that particular Officer who happened to be appointed to command them. This clearly appears, in an ordinance of Henry VIII., " for a retinue of speres or men at armes," preserved in the Cottonian Library, the very first statute of which says, " Every of the said gentlemen shall have his harneys complete, and all other habiliments mete and necessary for him, with two double horses at the leeste for himself and his page, convenient and necessarye for a man of arms ; also his coustrell, with a javelyn or demye-launce, well armed and horsed as it apperteyneth. And theye shall obeye, in everye condicion, the Captaine that shall be ordeyned and deputed by the King's Highness, or his deputie Lieutenant, to have the rule, conduite, and gov'nance of themm, in all things that theye shall be commanded to doo in the King's behalf."

Here it is not *the Knight* whom they are ordered to attend and obey, but the " Captain that shall be deputed by the King." On the levying of troops for war, the proprietors of land covenanted to bring so many Knights, Esquires, archers, &c., and this num-

Nothing was known of scientific movements until Charles the Bold, that warlike Duke of Burgundy, compiled an exercise-book, in 1473.

He taught the cavalry to attack in close and extended order, or to link the horses and fight on foot.

An engagement was generally commenced by single brave knights going forward and challenging opponents' from the enemy's army, in order to raise the courage of their own side (1).

The Staff was at that time very simple: the

ber varied extremely, as appears by the list of the troops which attended Edward III. to the siege of Calais in 1347. In this roll we have

| | | |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------|
| Richard Lord Talbot, Commander. | { | 1 Banneret. |
| | | 14 Knights. |
| | | 92 Esquires. |
| | | 82 Archers. |
| Sir John Barkley, Commander. | { | 1 Knight. |
| | | 3 Esquires. |
| | | 4 Archers. |

See Roll of Calais, edited by Edward Rowe More.

An Esquire might accidentally find himself posted near his own Knight, and would then naturally feel more anxious to serve him, than those in whom he did not take so great an interest; but there is no authority whatever for assuming that the Esquires were invariably placed in rear of their respective Knights, or that they bore no part in the battle.

T.

(1) This might sometimes have been the case, but it is very doubtful if the engagement generally commenced by single combat.

T.

Commander-in-chief was the prince himself; under him was a Field-Marshal for the cavalry, a General for the infantry, and a Master of the Ordnance for the artillery.

Princes had also a Marshal at the head of their households.

There were no military writers at this period—none but the regulations of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy; of Louis the Seventh of France, and the well known Ziska, General of the Hussites, have been transmitted to posterity.

The second period—from Charles the Eighth's campaign in Italy, to the beginning of the wars of the Netherlands, or from the end of the fifteenth, to the middle of the sixteenth century, comprises the wars of the French, Spanish, and Germans in Italy.

Chivalry gradually declined: the entire education of the nobility at that time, was directed to the formation of a warlike character.

The sons of the knights served first as pages, and afterwards as esquires, in the courts of princes and celebrated knights.

Their whole occupation consisted in making themselves acquainted with the use of arms, and with the manners of a knight.

The transition from page to Esquire, was subject to certain solemnities, at which the new Esquire was girded with a consecrated sword.

The conferring of knighthood was still more ceremonious ; the most important appendage was a pair of gold spurs (1).

During peace, the tournaments served the knights for practice ; here they fought with blunted

(1) Fauchet states, the Knights' spurs were *gilt*, and that they alone were permitted to wear them. " Mais aujou-d'huy," he adds, " ils sont aussi communs à tous ceux qui en peuvent acheter, que la soye (iadis parement des Roys et Dames illustres) à toutes sortes de gens."

Origines des Chevaliers, &c.

Du Cange gives a long account of the ceremony attendant upon the making of a knight *hors de l'armée*, which it appears was considerably diminished when the army took the field, or when a battle was expected. Froissart relates an amusing instance of a most wholesale manufacture of Knights, which took place at Vironfosse. The armies of Philip de Valois and Edward King of England, were drawn up in order of battle, when a hare jumping up in the middle of the front rank of the French army, caused such a shouting among the soldiers, that those in the rear imagined the battle had commenced, and immediately several Knights were made on the spot. ~~The~~ Count de Haynault, says the historian, on his part, made fourteen. However, no battle took place, and these Knights were ever after called *les Chevaliers du Lièvre*.

Knights had the power of conferring the honour of Knighthood, even upon those of the enemy's army. Pere Daniel relates, that when the Earl of Suffolk was taken prisoner at the siege of Jargeau, by William Renaud, he asked the victor before surrendering himself, " Are you a Gentleman?" to which William replied that he was. " But are you a Knight?" added the Earl. He answered " No." " I should like you to be a Knight before I surrender myself," said the proud Chevalier, who accordingly dubbed his adversary on the spot, and then gave himself up as his prisoner.

weapons for prizes, which were given by ladies : other knights were placed ready to rush in between the combatants if the sham-fight threatened to change into a real one (1).

(1) The practice of converting the tournament into a deadly combat, occasioned an oath to be imposed upon all Knights, that they would frequent tournaments solely to learn military exercises.—(See *Du Cange on Joinville*). This did not, however, prevent the occasional death of a Knight on such occasions, which the priests, who were violently opposed to jousts and tournaments, always took good care to record ; serious and fatal accidents also occurred : the accidental death of Henry II. of France, in 1559, in a tournament, is supposed to have hastened considerably the decline of chivalry* ; and when in the following year Prince Henry de Bourbon Montpensier was killed by his horse falling under him, while careering round the lists, tournaments ceased altogether in France. The nature and effect of tournaments is thus described by Jeffry of Monmouth, *lib. ix.*, c. 12 :—“ Many Knights famous for feats of chivalry were present, with apparel and arms of the same colour and fashion. They formed a species of diversion, in imitation of a fight on horseback ; and the ladies being placed upon the walls of the castles, darted amorous glances on the combatants. None of these ladies esteemed any Knight worthy of her love, but such as had given proof of his gallantry in three several encounters. Thus the valour of the men encouraged chastity in the women, and the attention of the women proved an incentive to the soldier's bravery.” The French ladies were much more extravagant in their demands upon knightly valour, than those fair dames described by Jeffry of Monmouth : in the *Life of Lord Herbert of Cherbury*, it is stated, that his Lordship was very much annoyed at Paris by a Monsieur Balagny, who received more attention from the ladies than he did. They used one after another to invite him to sit near them, and when one lady had his company awhile, another would say, “ you have enjoyed him long enough, I must have

* Meyrick.

Thus was that courage formed which never calculated the number of the enemy, but only its desire of fighting; hence arose that equanimity in the greatest and most appalling dangers, that insensibility to bodily pain—hence in general those warlike virtues, which after ages only gaze at and admire, without possessing the strength of will to appropriate to themselves (1).

him now." The reason of all this favour was, that he had killed eight or nine men in single fight!—p. 70. T.

(1) George Withers thus describes, in the person of Britannia, the feelings of the English nation on the decline of chivalry.

"Alas! who now shall grace my tournaments,
Or honour me with deeds of chivalry?
What shall become of all my merriments,
My ceremonies, shows of heraldry,
And other rites?"——

Prince Henry's Obsequies, El. 31.

England had not, however, so much reason for bewailing the departure of "mailed Knight and trusty Squire;" her armies possessed a far more effective force in the gallant archers—to them are we mainly indebted for the victories of Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt; here their unerring arrows aimed at the horses of the French cavalry, threw the enemy's army into such confusion, that the utmost efforts of the Knights were unavailing. The Scotch men-at-arms also sustained a complete defeat from the English archers at the battle of Hallidown-Hill, in 1333.

"Nor paused on the devoted Scot
The ceaseless fury of their shot;
As fiercely and as fast,
Forth whistling came the grey-goose wing,
As the wild hail-stones pelt and ring
Adown December's blast."

Scott.

It is to be regretted that, with the errors of those times, the virtues also have departed.

After Charles the Seventh, in 1445, had established the first standing cavalry, consisting of fifteen *compagnies d'ordonnance*, and that the other powers had followed this example, the practice of calling out the knights ceased of itself (1).

(1) Charles VII. was very apprehensive as to the result of this experiment; against the success of which, a most serious difficulty presented itself in his inability to pay the troops whom he had thus formed: he also feared, that those officers and soldiers whose services he found it advisable to dispense with, would form independent corps, as in the time of Charles V.; and consequently, that he would be obliged to employ force to disperse them. Both difficulties were fortunately overcome; the towns and provinces consented to bear the expense of the established companies, and the remainder of the troops were prevented from organising any systematic resistance to the government, by the Provosts and Marshals of the provinces posting themselves with their archers on the great roads, and preventing any union among the disbanded troops. "Le Roi fut obéi" says Pere Daniel, "et ses ordres furent si bien executez, qu'au bout de quinze jours il ne parut presque plus de soldats dans les chemins, et tous se dispersèrent chacun de leur côté." These "Compagnies d'Ordonnance" consisted each of 100 lancers, or men-at-arms, to each lance were attached—three archers, one coustillier, and a page, these formed the "lance garnie," and were all mounted; thus each company was composed of 600 men; and consequently, the fifteen companies amounted to 9000 men, exclusive of volunteers, who often increased the company to 1200. Each man-at-arms had four horses, one for his valet, another for his baggage, his war-horse, which, as well as his armour, always remained with the regiment, and a hack, or pony, to perform his journies on. Each archer had two horses; all the men-at-arms, and some of the archers, were gentlemen. The

The cavalry now consisted of hired soldiers, who were commanded by knights (officers).

The heavy cavalry, the lancers, or spearmen, were still fully armed; they wore close helmets, with plumes and golden decorations, and still rode war-horses, covered with iron plates.

The light cavalry appeared under various names and forms—arquebusiers (*schützer*), light horse, chevaux légers, &c. &c.; these were lighter armed, and instead of lances, carried fire-arms (1).

About this time, the Venetians established a new kind of light-horsemen, who gave much trouble to the French; these were the Albanian: they rode light Turkish horses, were dressed as Turks, and well knew how to use a sort of pike, of eleven feet in length; their fame increased rapidly, and Louis XII. took 2000 of them into his service, when he marched against the Genoese (2).

companies were commanded by Captains, under each of whom, was a Lieutenant, and a Guidon, or Ensigne; situations which were always filled by persons of the highest birth.

See Pere Daniel, vol. i., p. 155.

T.

(1) The light cavalry was known in England by the name of Hargobusiers or Arquebusiers, so called from the arquebuss with which the men were armed. Markham, in his "Souldier's Accidence," says, "the second sort of horsemen, of which many troops are compounded, are called hargobusiers, or carbines; these men ought to be the best of the first inferior degree, &c.; for offensive armes they shall have an hargobus of three foot three inches long, and the bore of twenty bullets in the pound," &c.

T.

(2) These light troops went by the name of Estradiots, or

In Hungary, the hussars appeared, and soon made themselves formidable. According to an ordinance, about the middle of the fifteenth century, every *twentieth* man was obliged to take the field: these horsemen were called hussars, from the Hungarian word *husz*, which signifies *twenty*; they have suffered little change since their origin.

When the cavalry became a fixed standing corps, its position for battle was changed.

The German cavalry was the first that changed from the position in one rank to that in mass, which so long obtained, until at last it was evident that deep formations were of no advantage to cavalry.

In forming up a body of troops for battle, they were placed as broad as long. The lancers oc-

Stradiots, in France and Italy. Philip de Comines thus describes them:—"Estradiots sont gens comme Genetaires, vêtus à pied et à cheval comme Turcs, sauf la tête où ils ne portent cette toile qu'ils appellent turban; et sont dures gens, et couchent dehors tout l'an et leurs chevaux. Ils étoient tous Grecs venus des places que les Venetiens y ont: les uns de Naples de Romanie en la Morée, autres d'Albanie devers Duras, et sont leurs chevaux bons et tous de Turquie." In the military work attributed to M. de Langey, the pike used by these troops is called an "arzegaye, ou bâton ferré par les deux bouts." With this, says the author, they were enabled, when dismounted, "de faire la fonction de piquiers contre la cavalerie." Pere Daniel derives the name Estradiot, or Stradiot, from the Greek word *στρατιώτης*—(a soldier), which etymology is supported by the above account of their origin.

T.

cupied the first ranks, and the flanks of the masses, behind which the arquebusiers were placed (1).

To commence an engagement, or to reconnoitre the enemy, patrols were sent out, for which service, every tenth arquebusier was taken. The infantry had also its patrols, who, uniting with those of the cavalry, formed a line in front of the army, under the protection of which the masses were placed in order of battle, and prepared for action.

As soon as the battle had actually commenced, these patrols (called by the French "*enfants perdus*") retired on both flanks, in order to cover them (2).

(1) Pere Daniel states that, according to the Cavalier Melzo, whenever the ground permitted, the arquebusiers were always placed before the lancers, who did not advance until the former had fired, and given sufficient space by opening out. The lancers, he says, were then supported by the cuirassiers, behind whom, another body of arquebusiers was placed.—(*Vol. i., p. 233*). This, of course, depended upon the fancy of the General.

T.

(2) The "*Enfâns perdus*" were probably an imitation of the Roman *Velites*, who were sent out in front of an army, to skirmish before the battle commenced. They were not, however, as the *Velites*, a separate body of troops, but merely volunteers from the different corps. Pere Daniel tells us, that it often happened, more offered their services than were required, in which case they drew lots, "*pour ne point causer de jalousie, et ne point offenser ceux qu'on n'auroit point agréer.*"

Vol. i., p. 234.

T.

The cavalry was not yet formed into regiments, but was divided into Cornet's (1) troops, or companies, which a Captain commanded; such a

(1) The term Cornet appears to have been formerly applied to any body of cavalry that was furnished with a cornet, or standard. The word is evidently derived from the Italian *cornio*, which, in the "Vocabulario della Crusca," is stated to be "una insegna di corapagnia di cavalleria, ed é piccola é di forma quadra." Hence the application of the term to the Officer who carried the standard. The strength of a Cornet of horse appears to have varied from 100 to 300 men. In Prince Maurice's Instructions for the encampment of a regiment of Horse, it is stated, that "a Cornet containing a hundred horsemen, must have a place of 300 feet deep, and 70 broad;" and that "a greater cornet, consisting of 140 heads—(or it may be 150), must have a row of huts more," &c.

*Principles of the Art Military, practised in the
Warres of the United Netherlands, p. 37.*

Davila, speaking of the battle of Ivry (1590), says, "The Duke of Mayenne, with his Cornet and 400 Gentlemen, which, in all, made 700 horse," &c. The cavalry, at this time, seems to have been always enumerated by Cornets. In B. viii., p. 635, the same author states, "The King having appointed twenty Cornets of horse, and four regiments of foot for the Duke, reserving all the rest of the army, which he was to lead himself," &c. The white Cornet was the peculiar appendage of royalty. "The Sieur de Rodés, a youth of great expectation, who carried the Royal white Cornet."—(*Davila, p. 902*). Markham is very minute in his instructions regarding the Cornet. "The Cornet shall carry, charged, on his right thigh, his Captaine's Cornet, which (being a private Captaine), should be compounded of colour and metal impaled; the substance of the Cornet should bee of damaske, &c.: if the Cornet belong to a great Officer, it shall then bee of one entire colour," &c.

Souldier's Accidence.

T.

squadron consisted of from 200 to 250^{*} horses; from four to five squadrons were commanded by a Colonel of horse: the Colonels were under the orders of the Field-Marshal. The latter chose a substitute from among the Colonels—the Lieutenant Field-Marshal, The pay was considerable, and sufficient to live upon.

The Colonel of 1000 horse, had,

| | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|--------------|
| monthly | - | - | 400 gulden*. |
| Lieutenant-Colonel | - | - | 100 ditto |
| Commissary | - | - | 40 ditto |
| Colonel's Secretary | - | - | 24 ditto |

The Captain had half-a-gulden

for each horse of his
squadron; hence, for

| | | | |
|------------|---|---|-----------|
| 250 horses | - | - | 125 ditto |
|------------|---|---|-----------|

This was done to induce him to keep his squadron always complete.

| | | | |
|-------------------------|---|---|------------|
| The Lieutenant received | - | - | 40 gulden. |
| Cornet | - | - | 30 ditto |
| Chaplain and Quarter- | | | |
| Master, each | - | - | 16 ditto |
| Serjeant | - | - | 40 ditto |
| Corporal | - | - | 25 ditto |
| Private | - | - | 12 ditto |

* A gulden is about the value of two francs.

| | | | |
|-------------------------|---|---|--------------|
| Farrier, Armourer, Sad- | | | |
| dler, each | - | - | 12 guildens. |
| Trumpeter, or Kettle- | | | |
| Drummer | - | - | 16 ditto(1). |

Every Colonel was also allowed eight halberdiers (*trabanten*), and every Captain two; and for each of whom they were further paid eight guildens. These halberdiers, or body-guards, were

(1) The pay of the British cavalry about this period, was much higher, in proportion to the price of provisions, than it is at present. The following list, taken from the Harleian MSS., No. 6844, shews the pay of both the heavy and light cavalry, in the year 1557, reign of Philip and Mary :—

| | £ | s. | d. | |
|-----------------------------|---|----|----|-----------|
| General of the horsemen | 3 | 6 | 8 | per diem. |
| Captain of armed horsemen | 0 | 10 | 0 | |
| Lieutenant | 0 | 5 | 0 | |
| Standard-bearer | 0 | 3 | 4 | |
| Surgeon | 0 | 2 | 0 | |
| Trumpeter and Private, each | 0 | 1 | 6 | |
| Captain of light horsemen | 0 | 6 | 0 | |
| Lieutenant | 0 | 3 | 0 | |
| Standard-bearer | 0 | 2 | 0 | |
| Surgeon and Trumpeter, each | 0 | 1 | 6 | |
| Light horseman | 0 | 1 | 0 | |

At this time, the average price of wheat, per quarter, was about 10s. of our present money; and now (May, 1827), the average price of wheat is from 56s. to 57s. per quarter.

very necessary at a time when the mercenaries were so disposed to mutiny*-(1).

The third period of the art of war, comprises the great war of independence of the Netherlanders, from 1568, to the general suspension of 1609.

Here fought on one side, art, and an army formed by the experience of more than fifty years' war, under the government of Charles V. and Philip II. ; and on the other side, the Netherlanders, living only by trade and the arts of peace. The Netherlanders appeared a contemptible foe to the haughty Spaniards; but this very circumstance, and the continual arrear of pay on the Spanish

War Book.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(1) In the reign of Elizabeth, the Captain-General, or Commander-in-Chief of the English army, was allowed thirty halberdiers for his body-guard; the General of cavalry, fifteen; and the Captain-General of lances, ten: the halberdiers were paid 8*d.* per diem.—(See *Grose*). These troops appear to have been only employed as body guards, and were very gaily attired.

“The Duchess appointed him a guard of thirty *halbardeers*, in a livery of murrey and blue, to attend his person.”

Bacon.

“The King had only his *halbardeers*, and fewer of them than used to go with him.”

Clarendon.

See Johnson's Dictionary, fol. 1756.

T.

side, were favourable to the Netherlanders. The war was protracted. In the same proportion that the Netherlanders were formed by the war, the discipline and bravery of the Spaniards was relaxed. This war was followed by great changes in tactics (1).

In this war, the Netherlanders could not furnish the necessary number of lancers and spearmen, because, if no other reason existed, in consequence of the difficulty of procuring horses suitable to that service (2).

(1) "Never was there a more unequal contest, than this which was now begun between the inhabitants of the Low Countries and the Spanish monarch; and never was the issue of any dispute more contrary to what the parties had reason to expect. On the one side, a people, consisting chiefly of manufacturers and merchants, inhabiting a country of small extent, and already much exhausted by a long continued exercise of tyranny and oppression: on the other, the richest monarch of the age, who was master of the most numerous and best disciplined forces, commanded by Generals distinguished above their contemporaries, by their consummate skill in the art of war."—(*Watson's History of Philip II.*, vol. i., p. 428). The fates of England and France were alike dependant upon the result of this protracted war; and it is more than probable, if Philip had yielded to the counsels of the Duke of Parma, the United Provinces would have returned to their allegiance, and Spain, thus acquiring an important addition to her already exorbitant power, would eventually have been enabled to overwhelm France, and make even the British isles tremble for their safety. Happily for Europe, Philip was too much blinded by flattery and ambition, to regard the wise counsels of the sagacious Farnese, and to this may be attributed the defeat of his boundless designs for conquest and sovereignty.

T.

(2) Pere Daniel adds another reason for lancers not being em-

Prince Maurice of Orange, therefore, did not give any lances to the horsemen, who were at that time raised in Germany; and endeavoured to counteract this disadvantage, by making them more moveable. He, therefore, gave them long butted pistols. When the Spanish lancers charged, the German horsemen fired a volley; then opened out quickly from the centre, and fell upon the attacking enemy with the sword, from both flanks, which manœuvre was generally successful (1).

played by Prince Maurice. The attack of lancers, he says, requires open and firm ground; and the country where the Netherlanders carried on war, was, for the most part, broken, and enclosed. The extreme poverty of the Dutch was, perhaps, also a cause of the change alluded to.

T.

(1) It was in the battle of Turnhout, 1597, that Maurice first introduced this practice, to which Grotius ascribes the great facility with which the Spaniards were overpowered; for the victory was gained entirely by the horse, and the infantry only arrived in time to divide the spoil. It appears, however, from Davila, that the general mode of attack practised by the Reiters was, after firing, to retire behind the army to which they were attached, and not, as the author states, to attack the enemy in flank with the sword. The principal cause of Henry's success, at the battle of Ivry, 1590, proceeded from the Reiters being unable to perform this manœuvre. "As soon," says Davila, "as they had discharged their pistols, they fell off, according to the custom of their discipline, turning to get behind the body of the army, as they had received orders from their General; but not having found the passage open, as by directions it should have been, by reason of the narrowness of the intervals between the squadrons, rushed upon and disordered that great body of

The Prince called this cavalry, which contributed so much to his victories, *cuirassiers*, after the cuirass which the men wore, as defensive armour. They had a sword made to cut and thrust.

The lance disappeared by degrees; but more from necessity, as no war-horses could be procured, than from any acknowledged disadvantages of that weapon; on the contrary, the lance was called the queen of weapons (1), but it was considered only useful in the *charge*.

Fifty light-horsemen were added to the cuirassier squadrons, and called after the weapon which they carried, *carbineers*. The fire-arm—carbine—which they used, was about four feet in length, and their principal weapon (1).

lances wherewith the Duke of Mayenne followed them to charge the battel.”—(*Historie of the Civill Warres of France*, B. xi. p. 901). Their mode of attack is again alluded to by the same author, in describing the order of battle of the army of the League :—“ And before all were two squadrons of Reiters, led by the Duke of Brunswick, and by Bassompier, who were to charge, and wheel off after their wonted manner, and so, passing between the two wings, should fall as a reserve, and rally themselves in order, that they might return more fresh into the battell.”

Book xi., p. 897.

T.

(1) “ La lance est la reine des armes pour la cavalerie.”

Memoires de Montecuculi, liv. i., c. ii.

T.

(1) Pere Daniel states, on the authority of M. de Montgomeri, that the carbineers, in the reign of Henry IV. of France,

They were drilled to load at full speed, and were required to hit their mark on horseback. The pistol served them only in case of necessity, and the sword only in close contact. Their destination was to annoy the enemy when at a distance.

These carbineers were placed on the flanks of the squadrons, and prepared the way for the charge by their effective fire, or endeavoured to avert the consequences of an unsuccessful charge.

The employment of carbineers, led, at a later period, to the establishment of dragoons; for the carbineers, on rapid enterprises, were often obliged to take infantry behind them on their horses.

An example of this kind occurred in the operations of Count Louis of Nassau on Bergen, in Hennegau; where 500 horsemen took an equal number of infantry behind them.

were attached to the *light* cavalry. “Un certain nombre étoit comme incorporé dans un compagnie de chevaux legers, ou plutôt y étoit joint sans être du corps.” Again, “Ces carbins attachés à une compagnie de chevaux legers, quelquefois jusqu’au nombre de cinquante,” &c.—(*Vol. i., liv. iv.*) They were placed, the same writer states, on the left of a light-cavalry squadron, and advanced, on a signal from the Captain, to within 200 paces from the enemy’s squadron, if the latter was composed of lancers—if of cuirassiers, they advanced 100 paces farther; they then fired by successive ranks, and retired in rear of the squadron to which they were attached.

See Histoire de la Milice Françoise.

Prince Alexander of Parma, to obviate the inconvenience which attended placing two men upon the same horse, when, in 1552, he wished to surprise the Duke of Alençon, mounted several companies of infantry on pack-horses, and thus hastened towards the enemy (1).

It being found advantageous to bring infantry quickly to any desired spot, in order thereby to surprise it, several divisions in the armies were mounted.

These mounted foot soldiers were called *dragoons*, probably from a comparison to the imaginary monster, the dragon, when, with burning matches, and fire-arms obliquely slung across the shoulder, they rushed along with the rapidity of lightning (2).

(1) Captain Haly gravely recommends, that infantry, on a retreat, should be taken up behind hussars, and thus situated, should *continue their fire!*—(See *Military Observations, by Captain Aylmer Haly, of the King's (own) Infantry. Egerton. 1801.* One would scarcely expect this in the nineteenth century.

T.

(2) Pere Daniel, who wrote in the time of Louis XV., says, dragoons are of French origin, and were first raised by the Mareschal de Brisac, in 1600. He *supposes* they were called "*dragons*," from the velocity of their movements, and the rapidity with which they ravaged a country, thereby resembling the fabulous monster of that denomination. Sir James Turner, who published his book called "*Pallas Armata*," at the end of the reign of Charles II., says, "For what they got the denomination of dragoons, is not so easy to be told, but because in all languages they are called so. We may *suppose*, they may borrow their name from

They always fought on foot, and only left with their linked horses a certain guard.

dragon, because a musketeer on horseback, with his burning match, riding a gallop, as many times he doth, may something resemble that beast which naturalists call a fiery dragon."

"Draagoon," says Johnson, "n. s. (from the Roman *Draconarii*), a kind of soldier that serves indifferently either on foot or horseback."

Johnson's Dictionary, corrected by Todd.

Ménage was the Doctor's authority for this derivation, which he did not trouble himself with investigating, for Vegetius would have told him that the *Draconarii* were standard-bearers of the Roman cohorts. "Dracones etiam per singulas cohortes a *draconarii* feruntur ad prælium"—*Vegetius de re Militari, lib. ii., c. xiii.* Furetiere, by way of correcting Ménage, says, the word dragoon is most probably derived from the German, *tragen* or *draghen*, which signifies *infantry carried*, to which Ménage justly replies, *draghen* has no signification in German, and *tragen* does not mean infantry carried, but simply *to carry*.

Dictionnaire Etymologique.

"Le nom de dragon," says M. de Schauenburg, "paraît avoir été donné à cette arme, parce que les premiers dragons ou plutôt les premiers fantassins qu'on a mis à cheval, portaient sur leurs casques l'effigie d'un dragon."

Tactique de la Cavalerie, par le Comte de Bismark,
p 225 Note.

The translator, anxious to obtain the real derivation of the word *dragoon*, which it appeared impossible to establish, from so many conflicting authorities, consulted Dr. Meyrick, author of the elaborate and valuable work on Ancient Armour; to that learned gentleman's research, he is indebted for the following apposite remarks, and most satisfactory derivation, which are enhanced by the kind and ready manner in which they were communicated.

"It appears to me," says Dr. Meyrick, "that Count von Bismark has adopted the *suppositions* of Pere Daniel, and Sir James Turner; this is not an uncommon mode of proceeding with

We find them first under this name at a reconnoissance which Henry IV., as King of Navarre, made, with 400 light cavalry, and 500 dragoons.

historians, and often tends to mislead ; for we frequently find, that the progressive increase of a conjecture, terminates at length in the assumption of a fact. Among many instances of the kind, may be adduced an amusing one, which originated in the reign of Henry IV. Walsingham, a contemporary, states, that on the accession of that King, it was intended there should be a tournament at Windsor Castle, and that the friends of Richard II. meant, on that occasion, to destroy him ; a later writer, improving upon this, says, the tournament absolutely took place ; and Hall, in the reign of Henry VIII., to complete the story, actually describes the costume and equipment of the combatants !

“ Let us, however, seek for earlier authority than Pere Daniel, and Sir James Turner, on the subject of *dragons*. Markham, who published his ‘ Souldier’s Accidence,’ in 1645, speaking of dragoons, says, ‘ And for offensive armes, they have a *payre* dragon, fitted with an iron work, to be carried in a belt of leather, which is buckled over the right shoulder, and under the left arm, having a turnell of iron with a ring, through which the piece runneth up and downe, and these dragons are short pieces of sixteen inches the barrell, and full musquet bore, with fire-locks or snap haunces.’

“ Grose absurdly says, ‘ this piece derived its name from the species of soldiers by whom it was carried,’ whereas, the inverse of this is the truth. The carbineers were so named from the carbine, the lancers from the lance, the bombardiers from the bombard, the engineers from the engines, &c. ; and so the dragoniers (as they were sometimes termed) or dragoons, were called from the dragon.”

A dragon, nearly similar to the weapon described by Markham, forms part of Mr. Meyrick’s valuable collection of ancient armour, with the sight of which the translator has been much gratified : except in the length of the barrel, which is only eleven inches instead of sixteen, it entirely corresponds with Markham’s description, having a wheel lock (often called a fire-lock, before

The German cavalry of the Prince of Orange was the model: it was imitated on all sides. The northern nations were the last to adopt the change, and remained long fighting man to man. Nay, the Swedes, Danes, and Norwegians, broke their horses to take part in the fight, by biting and kicking. Horse-fights were kept up, as bull-fights in Spain, and the Knight of the victorious horse obtained the prize.

The pay, during the Netherlands' war, of more than forty years, was very sufficient. With the Spaniards, the Field-Marshal had, monthly, 500 crowns, or French dollars; and as Commander of a squadron, 86 crowns in addition.

the invention of those now used), and a monster's head forming the muzzle. Markham speaks of the year 1645, and from the costume upon the dragon in Mr. Meyrick's collection, it appears to have been about the year 1600, which will account for the difference of size. Dr. Meyrick infers, that it was called dragon from the formation of the muzzle, because the culverine (*colubrina*), serpentine, falcon, falconet, &c., were so denominated, from the heads of those animals being the respective ornaments at the mouth. These were taken from the tubes for ejecting the Greek fire, which were similarly embellished; and, from the annoyance which they caused the Crusaders, gave rise to the stories about Knights, and what, Sir James Turner says, *naturalists* call a fiery dragon!

A full description of the dragon in Mr. Meyrick's collection, accompanied with a beautiful engraving, will be found in "*Skelton's Illustrations of Arms and Armour*," a publication which does infinite credit to the artist, and as it contains delineations of perhaps the most perfect collection of ancient armour in existence, must prove, when completed, of inestimable value to the historian and antiquary.

T.

| | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|-------------|
| The Lieutenant-General | - | - | 200 crowns. |
| And as Captain | - | - | 86 ditto. |
| Captain | - | - | 80 ditto |
| And for a Servant | - | - | 6½ ditto |
| Lieutenant | - | - | 25 ditto |
| And for a Servant | - | - | 6½ ditto |
| Cornet | - | - | 15 ditto |
| And for a boy | - | - | 6½ ditto |
| Private | - | - | 6 ditto |

And six crowns bounty.

The rations were valued at $\frac{1}{4}$ crown, and were given, one-half in money, the other in kind; namely, sixteen pounds of hay, three measures of oats, and two bundles of straw.

| | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|-------------|
| A Field Marshal received | - | - | 40 rations. |
| And as Captain | - | - | 10 ditto |
| Lieutenant-General | - | - | 20 ditto |
| And as Captain | - | - | 10 ditto |
| Captain | - | - | 10 ditto |
| Lieutenant | - | - | 6 ditto |
| Cornet | - | - | 4 ditto (1) |

The fourth period comprises the thirty years' war, the *pretext* for which, according to Bulow,

(1) The pay of the British army underwent a considerable change in the reign of Elizabeth; the pay of some ranks was much diminished, while that of others was increased; in the list

was the *happiness of heaven*; but the *motive*, the goods of the earth, from 1618 to 1648 (1).

of the army in Ireland, under the Earl of Essex, signed by the Queen, 24th March, 1598, we have—

| | £ | s. | d. | |
|---------------------------------------|----|----------------|----|-----------|
| General of the horse | 10 | 0 ^r | 0 | per diem. |
| Lieutenant-General of ditto | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| Captains | 0 | 4 | 0 | |
| Lieutenants | 0 | 2 | 6 | |
| Cornets | 0 | 2* | 0 | |
| Horsemen, each | 0 | 1 | 3 | |

It is remarkable, that a troop consisted then of exactly the same number of Officers and men which compose the present establishment, viz., three Officers, and fifty-five men.

T.

(1) Principle, and political attachment, appears to have been utterly disregarded by the gallant Cavaliers of the thirty years' war; that country which afforded the best prospect of plunder, was readily adopted as the mother country, and patriotism, with a most accommodating versatility of sentiment, immediately transferred its exertions to the new cause. "A Cavalier of honour," says Captain Dalgetty, "is free to take any party whilk he may find most convenient for his own peculiar." And the party chosen by these honourable Cavaliers, was always that which afforded the best pay and the most plunder;—

"For pleas of right let statesmen vex their head
 Battle's my business, and my guerdon bread;
 And with the sworded Switzer, I can say,
 The best of causes, is the best of pay.

Donne.

Such was the principle of the times, and the difficulty sometimes of supplying this only security for adherence, led to the most frightful excesses, which the Commanders were obliged to

* Ensigns, at that time, received only 1s. 6d. per diem.

When peace had been restored to the exhausted nations, by a cessation of hostilities for only nine years, which took place after the great war of the Netherlands had devastated the banks of the Rhine, for above half a century, a new war broke out, which can only be considered a continuation of the former.

As in that war, Maurice of Orange, so in this war, Gustavus Adolphus, that warlike King of Sweden, was the creator of new tactics (1).

tolerate, as the only means of appeasing their mutinous troops. Banner was frequently unable either to pay or feed his army, and was thus reduced to the painful necessity of conniving at the commission of every crime, which lust or rapacity could inspire.

See Galetti.

T.

(1) Gustavus Adolphus made a greater progress in tactics, and the art of war in general, than any Commander before or since his time. His expansive mind viewed objects on an extended scale; he first introduced that order and regularity in military operations, which insured a unity of action, and prevented the confusion which, before that time, frequently arose from the failure, or disorder, of particular divisions of an army. With him did the idea originate, of clothing soldiers well and regularly. Tilly's doctrine was "a ragged soldier, and a bright musquet," following, no doubt, the maxim of the ancients, "Horridum militem esse decet." Gustavus exceeded all his contemporaries in the science of an engineer; he reduced the enormous regiments of 2000 and 3000 men, to 1200, and afterwards to 1008. The invention of the column is attributed to him; the system of firing by platoons; the use of leathern portable artillery; the substitution of pouches for bandiliers. He first thinned the immoderate depth of ranks; established regular pay; founded a manufactory of arms; improved the field service of the cavalry; shortened

The lance had entirely disappeared. When Gustavus Adolphus entered Germany, the Swedish cavalry consisted of cuirassiers and dragoons.

The Imperial cavalry consisted of cuirassiers, carbineers, dragoons, and hussars.

The hussars were magnificently dressed; not only the head-appointments of the horse, the pistols, sabre, and tasche, but also the buttons on the pelisses and jackets were of massive silver, besides being richly decorated. In their caps, they wore herons' feathers (1).

the musquet into the carbine; changed the armour into head and breast-pieces; reformed the match-lock; and abolished the pike.

It is singular, that although each of the Generals of Gustavus was brought up by him, and although those who were opposed to him were constant eye-witnesses to every branch of his military skill, yet, after his death, the art of war declined, nor was it until the days of Montecuculi and Turenne, that it exhibited the least sign of re-animation.

See Harte's Gustavus Adolphus.

T.

(1) The Polish hussars, in the reign of Charles XII., appear to have even exceeded the author's description. "They march," says Voltaire, "attended by several valets, who lead their horses, which are adorned with bridles, plaited with silver and silver nails, embroidered saddles, saddle-bows and stirrups gilt, and sometimes made of massive silver, with large housings, trailing after the Turkish manner." These hussars are only to be exceeded by the Emperor of Austria's body guard, whose splendid equipment has obtained them the appellation of the *silk hussars*. It would be difficult to point out the advantage of all this finery,

An imitation of this cavalry was commenced; the divisions into regiments, of German origin, became general. About this time, mounted musketeers and fusileers were established in France, who received arms with the newly invented flint-lock.

In consequence of this lock having been first employed in the army by the French, it received the name of *French-lock* (1).

unless it be that of insuring recruits among the lovers of trash and tinsel.

“ That puny fop, trimmed cap-a-pee,
 Who loves in the saloon to shew
 The arms that never knew a foe.
 Whose sabre trails along the ground,
 Whose legs in shapeless boots are drown'd,
 A new Achilles, sure the steel
 Fled from his heart to fence his heel.

Who comes in foreign trashery
 Of tinkling chain and spur,
 A walking haberdashery
 Of feathers, lace, and fur.”

Scott.

T.

(1) The author, no doubt, alludes to the lock known in England by the name of fire-lock, supposed to have been invented in France, about the year 1630, but of which invention there is no satisfactory account; indeed, it is difficult to fix the exact periods at which any of the improvements in fire-arms have taken place, for we constantly find both the old lock and its successor, employed at the same time. Although the fusil was introduced into the French army in the reign of Louis XIII., there are plates of Louis XIVth's soldiers, armed with wigs and match-locks; it

Until the middle of the thirty years' war, it was still the order to form cavalry in from four to eight ranks.

Gustavus Adolphus departed from this rule, and fixed it once for all in three ranks (1).

In the intervals, platoons of infantry, fifty and upwards strong, were placed (2), as well as light guns.

is therefore evident, that the fire-lock was, at that period, by no means in general use in the French army, and the observations of the Duke of Albemarle, on military affairs, compiled in 1646, shew, that we were almost as slow in its adoption; yet, an original portrait of a republican Officer, said to be Cornet Joyce, in the possession of Dr. Meyrick, represents him with a fire-lock pistol. It is, however, evident, that the Duke of Albemarle was aware of the discovery of the fire-lock, although he does not appear to have considered it any very great improvement upon the snaphance, for in p. 34, of his Observations, he says, 'The Lieutenant of the Ordnance and others, should have companies of fire-locks or snapances,' &c.

The snaphance was supposed to have originated with some Dutch poachers, who could not afford to purchase the wheel-lock, and were apprehensive that the match-lock would expose their nightly maraudings; they called it snaphaens, from the low Dutch word, *snap* (steal), and *han* (a fowl). Exact delineations of these several locks will be found in Skelton's Illustrations.

T.

(1) According to Harte, the last change which Gustavus made in the formation of his cavalry for action, was that of placing it in four ranks; speaking of the battle of Lutzen, he says, "It was the King's custom, at this period, to make his battle-lines only *four-deep* in cavalry, and six in infantry."—(*History of Gustavus Adolphus*). Harte is celebrated for his correctness in detail.

T.

(2) The author appears to have generally inferred, that the

When the advancing enemy was thrown into disorder, by the effective fire of the musketeers and guns, the cavalry rushed upon the enemy, sword in hand, and generally overthrew him.

This disposition was well calculated to oppose the Imperial cavalry, which, being heavily armed, could move but slowly.

practice of placing bodies of infantry between those of cavalry, originated with Gustavus Adolphus, but there are many authorities to shew that it is of much older date. The Greeks employed this disposition of their troops; it was afterwards adopted and constantly practised by Hannibal. Xantippus thus opposed Regulus at the battle of Tunis; and the Romans, after the battle of Cannæ, followed the same system. At the battle of Pavia, in 1525, fifteen hundred Spanish arquebusiers, placed among the squadrons, were the sole cause of the defeat of the famous French gens d'armes.—(See *Folard*). At the battle of Ivry, 1590, Davila states, that “the King knowing the enemy's army abounded with a number of lancers, &c., he divided his cavalry into many squadrons, to render the encounter of the lancers less effectual; to every body of horse, he joined squadrons of foot, to the end that the hail of small shot might not only favour his own men in the encounter, but that, falling among the enemy's, it might make them weaker,” &c.; which remedy, the author adds, “did that day give proof how considerable it was in effect.”—(*B. xi.*, p. 893). Gustavus Adolphus, therefore, acted on the encouragement of all these examples, and he was thus enabled to withstand the formidable Austrian cuirassiers, at the battle of Leipsic: the Duke of Weimar, and all the pupils of Gustavus, followed the same system: Montrose imitated these: Turenne made the same disposition at Sintheim, in 1674, and afterwards at Ensheim: and lastly, Frederick the Great, in imitation of his predecessors, but with less success, placed platoons of infantry between his squadrons of cavalry, at the battle of Mollwitz.

T.

In order to be still more superior to the best-mounted Austrian cavalry, the King ordered his troops, as soon as the Austrians were in motion, to charge them quickly, sword in hand.

He did not allow those half-wheels, half-halts, those caracoles, on which, according to Wallenhausen, the cavalry of that time prided themselves over much, and the design of which was to draw on them the first fire of the enemy; but was justly of opinion, that the quicker a line of cavalry falls on the enemy, the less it will suffer from its fire (1).

The Imperial cavalry profited by dear-bought experience; and at Pfaffenhofen, in 1633, the Lorrain-cuirassiers defeated the cavalry of the Elector Palatine at the very first charge.

On particular occasions, they returned to the charge in deep formations.

In the engagement at Jankowitz, in 1645, the Swedish General, Douglass, formed a column of attack, of three squadrons, placed one behind the other, in order to overthrow an Imperial

(1) Caracoling was, however, still adopted for particular purposes. Monro relates that "His Majestie commanded out the most part of his cavalerie, to make a *caracolle* betwixt us and Berleine, fearing General Tillie, with his armie, might come behind us, whiles we were ingaged with the towne."

*Monro, his Expedition with the worthy Scots' Regiment,
(called Mac-Keyes' Regiment).*

regiment of infantry, which had long withstood the attacks of the Swedes. This was effected.

There does not appear to be any certain information as to the pay at this period; thus much only we know, that a higher rate of payment existed for the cavalry than for the other arms (1).

The fifth period comprises the wars of the French in Italy, in Germany, and in the Netherlands; as well as the Northern and Turkish

(1) Harte gives some account of the pay during the thirty years' war, which was comparatively much higher than at present. A Colonel of a Swedish regiment of infantry received about 380*l.* per annum; a Lieutenant-Colonel, half that sum; a Captain, 128*l.* per annum; a private, something under 6*d.* per diem. The Imperial pay was still higher: a Colonel of cavalry had near 800*l.* per annum; a Lieutenant-Colonel, 200*l.*; a private cuirassier, 11*d.* per diem; a private of infantry, 5½*d.* per diem. The pay of the Imperial army, however, was subject to constant stoppages, and generally very irregular, which rendered, perhaps, that of Gustavus equally desirable. "Howbeit," as Captain Dalgetty says, "a Cavalier of fortune might thrive indifferently well in the Imperial service, in respect his private casualties are nothing so closely looked to as by the Swede; and so that an Officer did his duty on the field, neither Wallenstein, nor Pappenheim, nor old Tilly before them, would likely listen to the oburgations of boors or burghers, against any Commander or Soldado by whom they chanced to be somewhat closely shorn." In fact, the Austrian Commanders endeavour to compensate the soldiers for their want of pay, by permitting them to ravage the country, and rob the inhabitants.

wars; a period of ninety years—namely, from 1648, to 1738.

Nearly an hundred years had the two wars lasted; that of the Netherlands and the thirty years' war; and they were now finally terminated by the peace of Westphalia. Germany, inexhaustible in her resources, had been devastated by them in all directions.

The results of this conflict were—

For the Princes—Secularization of ecclesiastical property.

For religion—Wavering faith (1).

For the Priesthood—Entrance into civil life by marriage.

For the people—Greater mental freedom.

Standing armies were the immediate consequence of a war of such long continuance.

During these five periods, two hereditary enemies were known in Germany—the Turks and the French.

The former, by their attacks on the Imperial House of Austria; the latter, by their attacks on Germany itself, and by their inflexible intention of making the Rhine their boundary.

The French now made a greater advance in tactics than all the other Powers.

(1) The Protestants most strongly object to this doctrine.

The wars of aggression of Louis XIV. quickly developed the art of carrying on war.

Generals were formed who 'shine in military history.

Opposed to a French Turenne, Luxembourg, and Condé, stand Montecuculi, Marlborough, and Eugène of Savoy (1).

(1) There was an extraordinary similarity of circumstances attendant upon the lives of Turenne and Montecuculi. They were nearly of an age; they had the same sort of education; both served as private soldiers, before they obtained commissions; they were alike gifted with extraordinary genius, judgment, presence of mind, and coolness of temper; having become Captains by study, they fought by rule, and seldom left any thing to fortune; they were both adored by their respective troops, who always appeared more inspired by love for the General, than duty to the Sovereign. These two Commanders esteemed and feared one another; neither could hope to derive advantage from the errors of his opponent; and both alone depended for victory upon their personal genius and military skill. When Montecuculi heard of Turenne's death, he is reported to have said, "A man has died, who was an honour to mankind."—(*See History of Marshal Turenne*). Turenne was the instructor of the great Marlborough, who fully profited by his brief experience under so able a master. With limited, and often inadequate means, he accomplished the greatest objects; infused harmony, union, and strength, into a heterogeneous mass of different nations; and notwithstanding the obstructions which he met with in the petty passions of those with whom he was connected in command, and the limited views of the powers whose advantage he was labouring to promote, he yet may claim the merit of having humbled France, in the height of her power, routed her disciplined armies, of having gained every battle in which he engaged, and reduced every fortress which he undertook to besiege*.

T.

Louis of Baden, fortunate against the Turks, was less so against the French; however, he was equal to a Vendôme, Catinat, &c.

Louis XIV., who, for a hero, dedicated too much of his time to the ladies, luckily for Germany, committed monstrous errors.

The choice of his Generals, which a Maintenon influenced, proves very clearly that he did not possess the qualification of discovering military talent, and placing it in its appropriate situation (1).

Feuquieres gives an interesting description of these ill chosen Generals of Louis XIV.

Rochefort and Humière held the chief command, because the Minister of War, Louvois, was their friend. Sourdis, Villeroi, and others,

(1) The reign of Louis XIV., which French philosophers have dignified with a comparison to the brilliant ages of Augustus and Leo X., exhibited a concentration of all that is vicious, profligate, and degrading. The talent of his Generals caused the first military operations of Louis to be attended with success; which, afterwards lost by the weakness of his government, and the abuses of his favorites. Few men's characters, says an eloquent historian*, have been less understood than that of Louis XIV. "A studied display of theatrical pomp has been mistaken for grandeur and magnanimity; and the murderer of the Protestants, and the incendiary of the Palatinate, has been held up to the world as a model of heroism; and adorned with the appellation of GREAT, because he was haughty, profuse, and ostentatious: a lover of pageantry, a friend to magnificence, and strutted more majestically upon the stage of royalty than any contemporary

* Naylor.

were obliged to be recalled. La Troussé only escaped this fate by death. Feuillade cost the King of Spain the Italian provinces, and the King of France monstrous sums of money, his heavy artillery, and more than 25,000 men. Bouffleurs lost Cologne, Liege, the Meuse, Gelderland, and Limburg, and retired. Tallard lost Bavaria, by the battle of Höchstädt, and, luckily for France, was taken prisoner. Tessé, who was sent to the assistance of Spain, brought that kingdom to the brink of destruction.

The cavalry underwent little change during this period. Louis XIV. established mounted grenadiers (1); his brilliant guards can only be

Sovereign. Yet, if we strip off the robes and trappings of state, we shall find a miserable compound of superstition and voluptuousness : when young, wallowing in pleasure, with Asiatic licentiousness, under the guidance of a dissolute mistress ; but no sooner were his passions blunted by age, than the court of Paphos assumed the gloomy appearance of a Carthusian convent ; and the most gallant of Princes, submitting to the fetters of an antiquated prude, affected austerities which would have disgraced the puny understanding of a bigoted friar."

T.

(1) A similar corps existed in the British service, in the reign of James II., called horse grenadiers. These troops acted as a company of grenadiers did to a battalion of infantry—they were armed with musquets and grenades ; and when brought into action, dismounted, linked their horses, fired, and then threw their grenades by ranks ; the centre and rear ranks advancing in succession through the intervals of their file leaders.

After the Revolution, and disbanding of the army, in 1698, the English cavalry consisted of life-guards, horse grenadier guards,

considered remarkable, on account of the immense sums which they cost.

A Captain of the Garde du Corps had 24,000 livres per annum ; these guards consisted of all arms united, and appeared very brilliant on parade.

The rest of the cavalry selected, out of the squadrons, the best shots, who, acting as riflemen with rifle-barrelled arms, were destined, by individual effective fire, to annoy the enemy, even when still distant.

The strength of regiments varied in the different armies. The Austrians had even at that time the strongest regiments, from 1200 to 1800 horses. Among other nations, the establishment fluctuated between 400 and 900 horses.

horse, and dragoons, till 1746, when a regiment of light dragoons was raised. In the same year, the 3d and 4th troops of horse-guards were disbanded, and three regiments of horse reduced to the pay and service of dragoons : the latter, as some compensation for their loss of pay, received the title of *dragoon guards*, and were given precedence over all dragoons. In the year 1788, four regiments of Irish horse were similarly reduced, and placed on the same establishment. The first regiment of Irish horse, consequently, became the 4th regiment of dragoon guards ; and the 4th regiment of Irish horse the 7th dragoon guards. Thus were formed the seven regiments of dragoon guards, as at present existing.

The regiments of Irish horse were also distinguished by the appellations of blue, black, green, &c., according to the colour of their facings.

See Grose's Military Antiquities, vol. i. ; Military Library, vol. ii.

The Swedish regiments, under Charles XII., amounted throughout only to 1000 horses.

During this period, the torch of war blazed in the north of Europe, at various intervals.

Swedes, Poles, Brandenburgians, Moscovites—fought alternately on the plains of Poland and the Steppes of the Ukraine.

Charles XII., that chivalrous monarch, rejected all defensive arms, so that his cavalry, with which he produced such great effects, consisted almost entirely of dragoons.

He, whose restless warlike character always pressed forward, was not contented with making the cavalry, without any connection or dependence upon other arms, but from *confidence in itself*, and without firing, charge the enemy's cavalry at full speed; he led it equally against intrenchments, and batteries, and always with success (1).

Charles XII. knew that, by the rapidity of

(1) Charles XII. appears to have had an abstract love for fighting. Neither natural or artificial obstacles could check his impetuosity. Voltaire relates many instances of his crossing rivers at the head of his troops; among others, is mentioned the astonishment he caused the Russians by passing a river near Hollosin, where they were intrenched behind a morass. "Charles," says the biographer, "did not wait for the assault until the rest of his infantry came up, but threw himself into the water, at the head of his foot guards, and crossed the river and the morass, with the water sometimes above his shoulders. While he thus marched against the enemy, he ordered his horse to pass round the morass, and fall upon them in flank. The

motion, the natural vivacity of the majority of mankind is increased ; and often mounting to a blind fury and fool-hardy enthusiasm, leaves no

Muscovites, amazed that no barrier could defend them, were at the same time routed, both by the Swedish horse and foot."

History of Charles XII., p. 160,

In a letter appended to the English translation of Voltaire's Charles XII., the following amusing description of this extraordinary man will be found :—" He is a tall, handsome gentleman, but immoderately dirty and slovenly ; his behaviour and carriage more rustic than you can imagine in so young a man should be : and that the outside of his quarters should not bely the inside, he has chosen the dirtiest place, and one of the saddest houses, in all Saxony. The cleanest place is the court before the house, where every body is to alight off their horses, and is up to the knees in dirt. His horses have rough coats, thick bellies, and switch tails. The grooms that look after them seem not to be better clothed, nor better kept, than the horses ; one of which always stands saddled for the mighty monarch, who runs out, commonly, alone, and bestrides his steed ; and away he gallops, before any one else is able to follow him. Sometimes he will go about forty or fifty of our English miles in a day, bespattered all over with dirt, like a postilion. His coat is plain blue, with ordinary brass buttons ; the skirts pinned up behind and before, which shews his Majesty's old leather waistcoat and breeches, which, they tell me, are sometimes so greasy that they may be fried. He wears a black crape cravat, but the cape of his coat is buttoned so close about it, that you cannot see whether he has any or no. His shirt and wristbands are commonly very dirty, and his hands are commonly of the same colour. His hair is light brown, very greasy, and very short ; never combed but with his fingers. He sits upon any stool or chair he finds in the house ; and begins his dinner with a great piece of bread and butter ; then drinks, with his mouth full, out of a great silver old-fashioned beaker, small-beer, which is his only liquor. Between every bit of meat he eats a piece of bread and butter, which he spreads with his thumbs. He is never above a quarter of an hour

time for consideration, or calculation of danger—that at such a moment, death loses its terrors—and *Victory!*—but with living colours presents itself to the soul of the wildly-rushing warrior.

The Turks who, by their invasions of Hungary produced a sensation, had a numerous cavalry, which never made an attack, but in swarms of from five to six thousand.

Dexterity in the use of their crooked sabre, united with the highest degree of activity and rapidity in their horses, gave them a determining superiority, and generally the victory. However, the power of withstanding them was acquired, and at present, they do not enjoy much consideration.

The sixth period includes the three Silesian wars—namely, from the beginning of the first Silesian war, to the first campaign of the French revolutionary war; or from 1740 to 1790.

at dinner; eats like a horse—speaks not one word all the while. His bed-chamber is a very little dirty room: no sheets nor canopy to his bed; but the same quilt that lies under him, turns up over him. His writing-desk is a slit deal. He is a very handsome man, but very whimsical and positive; which makes all the allies afraid of him; for he risks himself and his army, as easy as another would fight a duel," &c.

Character of the King of Sweden, in a Letter to the Right Hon. Lord ———. (See Hist. Chas. XII. London, 1732).

T.

The other wars which happened at this time, are unimportant in the history of cavalry.

Prussia appears, for a century, to have been only employed in preparing herself for the brilliant part which she acted under Frederick II.

To the great Elector, Frederick William, the Prussian military power is indebted for its origin.

The Count von Schwarzenberg sent him away from his court, under the pretext of forming a General of him; but in reality, for the purpose of getting rid of a dangerous observer.

He grew up, as it were, in a camp, and even in his boyish days, was present at the sieges of Breda and the Schenkenschantze.

Arrived at the government, the Elector endeavoured to infuse a new spirit into the army; was enabled, in 1672, to promise the republic of Holland an auxiliary force of 20,000 men, and left behind him, at his death, a well-organized army, of near 30,000 men.

When Frederick the Great (1) ascended the throne, he found the army about 80,000 strong.

With this army, which, under Leopold of Dessau (2), had become drilled to a degree of preci-

(1) Called by the Germans *der Einzige*—the unequalled.

T.

(2) The Prince of Dessau may be considered as the founder of the modern system of tactics, and to his exertions in the remodelling of the Prussian army, Frederick is indebted for the means which enabled him to act so brilliant a part on the theatre

sion in movement, until then unknown, and to an uncommon facility in the loading and firing of musquets—Frederick entered upon the theatre of his deeds, in 1740.

The two first wars passed quickly by. Frederick had also powerful allies.

But when the third Silesian war had broken out, in 1756, the King, forsaken by almost all his allies, stood alone, unmoved as the oak, braving the storm.

On one side, his natural *coup d'œil*—the unity and power of his will—the habit of his troops to remain firm in all situations—to execute every movement, even in the tumult of battle, with an admirable precision—the never-shaken confidence in their kingly leader—the enthusiasm produced by having *such a King* at their head, whose brilliant genius regarded all. And on the other side, the division, weakness, and unconnectedness of the enemy's plans of operation—their partial and lukewarm mode of execution—enabled Frederick II. to retire from this bloody seven years' conflict,

of war. The Prince of Dessau invented the iron ramrod, and the equal step; both of which improvements so materially contributed to Frederick's success at Mollwitz: he also reduced the formation of the infantry from four to three ranks; and thus increased the effect of musquet fire. Frederick afterwards improved the infantry, by giving it more lightness and facility of movement; but the foundation of the new system was laid by the Prince of Dessau.

T.

crowned with fame, and without loss of territory (1).

These remarkable events form a peculiar, ever-memorable period in the history of war. Frederick rose above all prejudice, became the creator of new tactics, and made his army a model for all others.

He began with formation. The infantry was placed in three—the cavalry in two ranks. Between the squadrons, were intervals of from nine to eighteen feet; in formations on perfect plains, the King would often allow no intervals, and the charges were then made *en muraille*.

(1) "History," says Wraxall, "presents no object so truly interesting as Frederick, during this war, opposed to two Empresses and three Kings; making head, at the same time, against Austria, Russia, Sweden, France, Saxony, and the German empire. The immense disproportion of force between the parties; the length of time which the contest lasted; the wonderful activity, energy, and resources displayed by Frederick; and finally, his triumphant termination of a war, which threatened the total destruction of the family of Brandenburg: all these circumstances tend to astonish, and to fascinate the mind." It has been asserted by historians, that Frederick the Great had a natural aversion to war; and that, at the battle of Mollwitz, in 1741, when he was twenty-nine years of age, he fled from the field, at the moment when the Austrian cavalry charged his infantry; the signal valour, therefore, which he so often displayed afterwards, must have been the effect that entire command which he had obtained over himself in the most trying situations.

See Tableau de Frédéric.

T.

At the commencement of the seven years' war, the regiments of heavy cavalry amounted to 881 effective horses; those of hussars to 1653 horses. The former were divided into five, the latter into ten squadrons.

With regard to the formation and arming of the cavalry, every nation followed different principles.

The hussars alone remained every where alike, according to their original model—the Hungarians.

Generally, however, all cavalry carried carbines and pistols; the straight sword was the usual side-arm. That worn by the Prussian cuirassiers and dragoons, weighed $2\frac{1}{2}$ pounds, without the scabbard; the blade was $38\frac{1}{4}$ inches long. The side-arm of the Imperial cavalry weighed $2\frac{1}{2}$ pounds; the straight blade was 36 inches long (1).

The armour of the cuirassiers having progressively become lighter, was finally changed into a simple breast-plate.

(1) It is strange, that the advantage of a long sword is not yet known to the improvers of our cavalry arms, or if known, is not acted on. The length of the sword now worn by our heavy cavalry, is only thirty-five inches! and those of the life-guards, who have the power of using, and would be naturally supposed to require a much longer blade, than men of less height and strength—do not exceed *thirty-two inches*! Added to this, the articles are of bad construction, and if any service was required of them, must all go to the grinding-stone. A heavy dragoon's sword should not be less than thirty-six inches

In the seven years' war, the Hungarians established mounted riflemen, who carried rifles with conical touch-holes, invented by Godfrey Hantsch, of Nuremberg, and rendered important service in the army of the Duke of Brunswick.

Marshal Saxe, in the first half of the eighteenth century, re-introduced among the French, the lance, which had long disappeared, and called the cavalry which was thus armed—Hulans.

The King of Prussia, for the special purpose of opposing a similar description of cavalry to the Cossacks of Russia, established, in 1745, spear-men, or lancers, and called them—Bosniaks.

It is true, that the Hulans had, for a long time, constituted the only cavalry of the Poles; but the middle of the eighteenth century is the period when the lance (which had for a long time lost its importance, but only because it was imagined that a full-armed horseman could alone carry a lance(1), and on which subject there at present

long, and such men as the life-guards could well manage one two inches longer. The new sword, lately given to the Officers of the 1st life-guards, is an excellent weapon; the blade measures thirty-seven inches: that worn by the Officers of heavy dragoons, is also much superior to the one used by the privates, being thirty-six and a-half inches; but it is of too slight a manufacture to be very effective.

T.

(1) Such was the idea of Montecuculi; and the principal reason which he gives for the lance having been discontinued, the armed horsemen, as he states, requiring a horse of great strength, a servant, and other conveniences. Count Turpin

exists such difference of opinion), was re-established in its good old rights. Since this period, it has always been more general, and justly, provided it is only used for the *close charge*.

does not consider these sufficient reasons for giving up the use of so important a weapon, and shews, that instead of there being any necessity for a lancer to be armed *de pied en cap*, an absolute advantage results from his not being so. “ Plus il sera libre dans ses mouvemens, moins le cheval qui le porte aura de poids sur lui, et plus le coup de lance sera vif et ajusté.”—(*Commentaires sur Montecuculi*). Count Turpin then suggests a flexible breast-plate, &c. Armour, however, of any kind, must be a decided inconvenience and disadvantage to a lancer, in consequence of the position which he is obliged to assume when charging; it also adds considerably to the weight which the horse has to carry, and is highly objectionable for any cavalry. It is strange, that armour should have been given to the British life-guards, immediately after they had proved its inefficiency; after they, unaided by such defences, had torn the laurels of Waterloo from the cuirassiers of France. Armour must be a decided impediment to the efficiency of a dragoon on service. The enormous weight*—the constant cleaning required—the pain which its inflexibility must cause under fatigue—are circumstances which alone qualify its advantages in action. These advantages, also, have been much over-rated; and perhaps it will one day be shewn, that the British life-guards are more to be feared when their natural strength, weight, and activity, is allowed full freedom of action, than when such qualities are constrained by the incumbrance of a cuirass. King James I. observed, in praise of armour, that it not only protected the wearer, but also prevented him from injuring any other person; and there can be no doubt, that however invulnerable a cuirass may render a cavalry soldier, his *active* properties are thereby much reduced. But if our gallant

* The largest sized cuirass worn by the life-guards weighs 15 lbs.; the smallest 12 lb. 6 oz. A life-guardsman, in marching order, weighs upwards of 25 stone! supposing the man to weigh personally 13 stone.

During the sixth period, they commenced to place great importance on the formation of cavalry.

Since the disappearance of Knights, horseman-

life-guards are destined to be secured in steel, at least, let their defences be of more convenient, if not of more elegant construction. At present, when decked with the cuirass, these really fine men all appear *hump-backed*. Let the modern back-plates be compared with those of ancient times, and it will be observed what care was then taken to preserve the graceful form of the human figure. But it is to the breast-plates that attention should be particularly directed, as those worn by the life-guards are highly defective; their want of saliency renders them of little use in resisting musquet-shot, nay, it is even doubtful whether they are proof against bullets fired in an oblique direction; the arm-holes being enlarged for freedom of action, exposes that part of the shoulder, where a sabre wound would prove of most serious consequence; the front-plate, not lapping over the back, leaves another space open to the attack of the enemy; and, in fact, there is nothing to prevent a good swordsman from quickly putting a cuirassier *hors de combat*, either by cutting at the upper part of the arm, or giving point between the aperture of the plates, in his side. These several defects could all have been prevented at the period of construction; no difficulty presented itself in increasing the saliency; a moveable gusset of steel, similar to that used in the reign of Henry VIII., might easily have been added to the arm-holes, and the uncovered space in the side was easily obviated, by making the front plate lap over, according to the ancient method. It is very doubtful whether a cuirass increases the real courage of a soldier; the confidence which its security gives him, would naturally diminish, when in action it happened to get injured, or rendered ineffective; he would feel like a soldier without his weapons, and more readily give way to panic and alarm. The best sort of cuirass, as Marshal Saxe says of retrenchments, is personal courage and discipline.

T.

ship had become quite neglected: Count Melfort in France, and Seidlitz in Prussia, directed their attention to this error.

After the peace of Hubertsburg and Dresden, riding-houses were begun to be established with every regiment, and rough-riders and riding-masters to be appointed. It was evident that horsemanship could alone lead to facility of manœuvre.

Seidlitz, who was yet Major of the Natzmer hussars, after the second Silesian war, in 1747, occupied himself particularly with the Officers. He got over the prejudice that education would injure their authority, and soon convinced them, that they would only gain respect thereby. Seidlitz, observed by his great King, rose quickly from step to step, notwithstanding the prejudice of seniority; and in spite of the rising envy, which, from old custom, hangs like lead upon talent, in order to retard its ascent.

Seidlitz soon beheld himself removed to a sphere of action, where his great talents could enable him to move without impediment; where the Prussian cavalry, raised by him to a height till then unknown in history, was enabled so essentially to contribute to the successful result of a severe contest of seven years, to fortify the crown of the King, and help to elevate his high military fame.

Seidlitz taught the cavalry not only the use of

arms, but also to perform the manœuvres of infantry.

Since that time, never equalled, he remains the highest model, which an Officer of cavalry can aspire to.

At the autumn manœuvres, which Frederick held annually, after the peace of Dresden, that which was newly learned, was practised and discussed. Here the talents of the senior and junior Officers had an opportunity of being displayed, and the King became acquainted with them.

The praise of their admired King, encouraged those who distinguished themselves to redouble their zeal; the indolent were here strictly and justly reprimanded.

The King laboured with Seidlitz, Saldern, Gaudi, &c., after the autumn manœuvres were ended, in order to point out the defects which had been discovered; and these Generals were then obliged to render the new ideas of the King more perfect.

In the order of battle, the King departed from the general prejudice of placing the cavalry on the flanks.

Whether, in the two first Silesian wars, he did not either quite understand the strength of the cavalry, or had not generally employed it for great operations, which, however, was at that time owing to the little power of moving which

it possessed. The King acted on entirely different principles in the third Silesian, or seven years' war, when Seidlitz was at its head.

In 1756, at Lowosiz, Frederick placed his cavalry in two lines, behind the infantry, and from this time, laid it down as a principle, that on the day of battle, the cavalry should be united in a large mass upon one point.

Among the other armies, during these wars, actions of single cavalry parties, and regiments, worthy of being handed down to military posterity, occurred; but on a large scale there was nothing done. *There was but one Seidlitz!*

The action of the Austrian General, von Römer, at the battle of Mollwitz, is an exception, and proves, still farther, the assertion which has been so often repeated in these Lectures—that the secret of producing great effects by cavalry, lies in the *personal qualities* of the leader (1). The brave talented Römer fell too early for the fame of a cavalry, which had always been distinguished by an excellent *matériel*.

(1) Segur mentions a striking instance of the opposite effect produced by different Commanders upon the same troops. When Murat upbraided Junot for his inaction, after crossing the Prudiszi, Junot alleged in excuse, that he had no orders to attack, that his Wirtemberg cavalry was shy, its efforts feigned, and that it would never be brought to charge the enemy's battalions. These words Murat answered by actions; he rushed on at the head of those troops who, with a different leader, were quite different men; he urged them on, launched them against the Russians.

At the battle of Minden, in Westphalia, which the Duke of Brunswick gained, Lord Sackville neglected a fine moment; he had the power of driving the French into the Weser, with the Anglo-Hanoverian cavalry.

His pride and his jealousy of the Duke prevented him from destroying the enemy, and acquiring great fame. Lord Sackville renounced his own glory, because he would not assist in increasing that of the Duke's (1).

overthrew their traillieurs, and then, returning to Junot, said, "Now finish the business: your glory, and your Marshal's staff are still before you."

History of Napoleon, &c., vol. i., p. 258.

The success of the Russian troops is, perhaps, affected more than that of any other, by the conduct of the General who commands them. Their inequality of action during the campaign in Holland, in 1799, can alone be attributed to this cause. How strangely contrasted, also, is their inactivity, and apparent want of bravery, under General Essen, with their unwearied exertions and determined intrepidity under Moreau!

T.

(1) Lord George Sackville's conduct at Minden was most unwarrantable. Just before the allied infantry had advanced to that memorable charge against the French cavalry, which has been already referred to*, Duke Ferdinand sent Captain Winzingerode, his Hessian Aide-de-camp, with an order to Lord George Sackville, to march with the right wing of cavalry, and form a line behind the infantry. Lord George did not understand how this march was to be made, and hesitated to obey the order, which, as the Aide-de-camp thought, he delivered in a very clear manner, and fully persuaded that Lord George under-

* See Lecture iv., p. 90. *Note.*

The custom of firing a volley before the charge, was discontinued by the cavalry during the seven years' war.

This example of the Prussians carried other nations along with it; the endeavour was to excel in rapidity,

The French had two modes of attack—close and

stood it, he immediately left him. No sooner was Winzingerode gone, than Colonel Ligonier came, with an order from the Duke, for his Lordship to march, with the cavalry under his command, and profit by the disorder which had been caused among the enemy's cavalry; upon which his Lordship advanced: but Colonel Fitzroy arriving with another order, saying that he was to advance with the British cavalry only. Lord George told them that their orders disagreed. "In numbers, my lord," said Fitzroy, "but their destination is the same—to the left." Neither of these gentlemen could tell which came last, but both were positive in their injunctions. Upon this, Lord George went to the Duke himself, and having received the order from his own mouth, proceeded to obey it; but it was now too late to be of any service; the French had already retreated in good order before the little gallant body of infantry, and not being molested by the cavalry in their retreat, were enabled to regain their former position, and thus avoided the decisive blow which it was intended was to have been made on them. A few days after the battle, Lord George Sackville resigned his command, and returned to London: he was soon after deprived of all his military employments, and the Marquis of Granby placed in his command. His Lordship was afterwards, at his own request, admitted to trial by court-martial, on which he was found guilty of disobedience of orders; but the Court incurred the charge of partiality, and the odium of being under the necessity of proving his Lordship's guilt, in order to justify the taking away his commissions.

See Field of Mars.

T.

in a trot, which they called *en muraille*; or at speed, and dispersed, or *en fourageur*.

It is remarkable, that in proportion as the European cavalry confined itself exclusively to the sword, the Turkish cavalry adopted fire-arms. One would almost think, that each mistrusted their own manner of fighting; and indeed, it proves great respect for an enemy, when we adopt his form, or his tactics.

The Turkish cavalry, in the wars against the Russians, and afterwards against the Austrians, formed a close line of skirmishers before their Pulks.

The most part of these skirmishers carried rifles; and by means of their excellent horses, displayed uncommon activity.

The Pulks remained behind this line of skirmishers, as it were, in ambush, and rushed with incredible rapidity on the enemy, as soon as they saw him thrown into disorder by the fire of their skirmishers*.

An excellent manner of fighting, which deserves to be duly estimated; and indeed, the advantage was almost always on the side of the Turks.

The seventh, or last period of the art of war, from 1790 to our time, comprehends the war which lasted a quarter of a century, devastating

* Count Veterani's Campaigns in Hungary.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

Europe from east to west, and from north to south, and terminated by changing the relation of every state—but has left them unsecured.

In that land only, where the flame of war and revolution first blazed, was an effort attempted, to make every thing appear, immediately after the catastrophe, as it had done before that period. *There* they endeavoured, for a time, to persuade themselves and others, that such monstrous revolutions had been only dreamed of.

True, the real effects of so extensive a war, may first appear at a later period; but mental freedom still continues to strike deeper and stronger roots!

The old hereditary enemies of Germany of the fifth period, are no longer dangerous.

The prayer against the Turks has fallen into silent disuse.

So long as the noble, peaceful Bourbons reign over France, so long—as far as depends upon them—will the white flag of peace wave.

Every power is finite, and subject to established laws; so that after the maximum of exertion, follows that of exhaustion*.

The south of Europe has lost its *physical force* by a too long use of it; the great North, sensible of its most high power, stands strategically formed!

* “Principles of Strategics.” This truth is attested by record, else why did France ever yield?—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

An old, but very important observation, has acquired, during this war, mathematical certainty; namely, that a war against the French, must be carried on *offensively*.

The Frenchman, courageous, impetuous, nay, even terrible in attack, on the contrary, does not possess that cold-blooded, quiet, circumspection, and endurance, which is so indispensable in a defensive war.

A cautious, but not the less uninterrupted offensive, must be the ruling principle on all projects of operation against the French (1).

(1) The French have, with much judgment, generally endeavoured to become the *attacking* party. They thus not only derived the usual advantage of that system, but adopted the mode of warfare which was peculiarly suited to their national character. The French soldiers are impetuous, but their courage requires excitement, to which *motion* so much contributes. Abstract motion, however, is not sufficient to impel the French soldier into action; he must be first excited by the example of his Officer; and was it not for the extreme and universal gallantry displayed by the Officers of the French army, few instances of impetuous courage would be recorded on the part of the men. It has been said, that "the French Officers will always lead, if the men will follow;" and there have been instances where the former have nobly sacrificed their lives to produce this effect. How different is the feeling from which a British soldier acts on the day of battle! It is not to any gallant example of his Officer that he is indebted for bravery; perhaps he does not think much better of his Commander, than of himself; the courage of an Englishman is innate; it is a national instinct; coexistent with, and inseparable from, the man himself, and requires no artificial excitement to bring it into action. "L'Angleterre," says Count Turpin, "est elle peut-être la nation où la bravoure se soutient

At the end of this long conflict, which, during its continuance, had assumed such various forms and names; in which all the nations of Europe had been engaged; and which, on the other side of the sea (South America), now continues in its original form of *war of freedom*; as it began there (North America), opinions are more than ever divided, as to the preference which should be given to line or column-positions in attack.

Had Folard yet lived, he would have felt the pleasure of seeing that the French, in the first years of the revolution, following the natural instinct of men, to crowd together into deep positions, on visible dangers, generally attacked in deep masses.

These masses got the names of columns; but were, however, often nothing but heaps of men crowded together in disorder.

On the retreat from Moscow, the French army marched in such masses.

When Marshal Ney was pressed before Torgau, after the battle of Dennewitz, the troops formed masses without orders.

General Morand, who endeavoured to escape depuis plus long-tems."—(*Commentaires sur Montecuculi*). "Our nation," says Dr. Johnson, "may boast, beyond any other people in the world, of a kind of epidemic bravery, diffused equally through all its ranks; we can shew a peasantry of heroes, and fill our armies with clowns, whose courage may vie with that of their General."

T.

the danger of being crushed in the masses, remained, hanging by his clothes, on a pallisade.

Rogniat, and after him Deker, have lately published their opinions on columns, in admirable works.

The second lines, according to circumstances, but always the reserves, may be most advantageously placed in columns for order of battle. Columns are easily moved, and can be quickly disposed of (1).

(1) Opinions diametrically opposite, have been given by the most distinguished military writers, upon the subject of attacks *in column*; and both parties have founded their arguments upon examples furnished by the late war. Napoleon, following a system from which Jomini has since deduced his theory of military operations, generally concentrated a body of troops upon one point, and attacked in column. The Duke of Wellington, on the contrary, always deployed previous to the attack; and the battle of Waterloo is, perhaps, the only instance where his lines exceeded the usual formation of *two deep*. Wellington has never been beaten! The French lost the battle of Esling, by attacking the centre of the Austrian line *in column**. Massena's columns shared the same fate at Busaco†; Victor's at Barrosa‡; even the Spaniards broke two columns of the French army at St. Marcial§. The repeated advances of Napoleon's columns at Waterloo, failed in their object; and although, at the close of that memorable day, the chosen columns of the Imperial guard advanced with a determined bravery that would have done honour to the troops of any nation, the first volley from the British guards literally knocked them back with its shock; a second volley threw them into greater confusion; they waited not to receive the attack, but suddenly turning, fled in disorder||. These facts naturally shake our faith in the column theories of Messrs. Bulow and Jomini. An undisciplined mob, or an army possessing little

* Rogniat.

† Southey.

‡ Elliott.

§ Jones.

|| Boyce.

At the battle of Foksan, in 1789, the Austrian army was formed in squares of battalions: the Turks sustained a complete defeat.

In Egypt, Buonaparte placed his infantry six deep, in order to withstand the Mamelukes.

At the battle of Lützen, Napoleon formed oblong squares, in order to oppose the numerous cavalry of his adversary (1).

Generals of superior talent do not blindly depend upon certain institutions, nor debase themselves as slaves of certain systems; but make the whole empire of tactics tributary to them.

Since Louis XIV. commenced to increase the number of Officers, the example has been generally followed.

moral force; may be appalled by the formidable appearance of a column advancing to the attack, and give way from mere apprehension; but the several actions in Spain, Russia, and Belgium, during the late war, have sufficiently exhibited, that no such effect can be produced, where courage and discipline are found united. Rogniat justly says, "Tout ordre est bon contre des troupes qui ne se defendent pas; il suffit de marcher. Si vos adversaires sont tellement lâches, que votre aspect seul leur fasse prendre la fuite, il ne s'agit que de marcher et non pas de combattre; et l'ordre le plus favorable à la marche est celui que vous devez préférer, sans perdre de temps à vous déployer; mais ce-ci ne s'appelle plus faire la guerre, c'est poursuivre de la canaille."

Considerations sur l'Art de la Guerre, chap. vi., p. 216.

T.

(1) These are instances of defence, and afford no argument in favour of the attack in column; huddling together in crowds, is the instinct of beasts and barbarians.

T.

A natural consequence of this augmentation, was the lessening of the pay. It is true, the senior Officers, the real Leaders, received high payment; but the Subalterns scarcely received enough to support them miserably; of late years, the pay of the higher ranks has also diminished.

Before the age of Louis XIV., when under the name of Officer, a Leader was always understood, the following only existed. Commanders-in-Chief, Field-M Marshals, Colonels, Captains, and their substitutes—Lieutenants.

As assistants to these Officers, there were Under-Officers—Serjeant-Majors, Serjeants, Corporals, &c.

Louis XIV. was a conqueror; and endeavoured, by the enticement of promotion, to give new wings to ambition.

A conqueror requires and excites ambition; a defender requires and excites patriotism.

Napoleon superseded every Officer who was either taken prisoner or fell sick; whoever was not present with the army, was not counted, and lost his promotion; thus the number of Officers increased without end.

Napoleon could do this, because he did not think, with Montecuculi, that “to carry on war, one must have money” (1); but with Cato, “War

(1) “L’argent,” says Montecuculi, “est cet esprit universel qui, se répandant partout, anime et remue tout; il est virtuellement toutes choses : c’est l’instrument des instrumens, il sait

maintains war!" He must have done so, because the conscripts could only be led against the enemy, and, as it were, reformed for "cannon-food," as Bulow remarks, by many experienced Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.

Young Soldiers, and old Officers, who are experienced, ambitious, blindly devoted to their Generals, intimately acquainted with all the casualties of war,—form the best régiments for a conqueror (1).

In this seventh period, the cavalry remained

enchanter l'esprit des plus sages, et calmer la fureur des plus féroces."—(*Vol. i., liv. i., chap. ii.*). A certain person says, this author having been asked how many things were necessary for war, replied, 'three—money—money—money!'

T.

(1) Both Count Turpin and Marshal Saxe are strenuous advocates for keeping up a large establishment of Officers. "It is a manifest advantage," says the former, "to have many Officers in an army; the expense is certainly increased, but the utility which they are of, ought to prevail over the poor economy which would result from lessening the number. In every well-constituted military state, the number of Officers should be fixed, and always on a war-establishment, in order that it may be neither augmented in war, nor diminished in peace.—(*See Commentaires sur Montecuculi*). Marshal Saxe goes farther, and is against any reduction of either men or horses in cavalry régiments. "The cavalry," he says, "are to be subject to no manner of change or reduction, for veterans, both in regard to men and horses, are the best, and recruits of either absolutely useless: notwithstanding, therefore, they are an expense to a nation, their consequence renders it indispensable."

Reveries on the Art of War.

T.

almost entirely in the same form which it had assumed in the preceding one.

The French chasseurs-à-cheval are nothing but light cavalry, and only differ from hussars in their dress.

It is the same case with other nations, whatever name has been given to the light cavalry.

The Hungarian Hussars, the Polish Hulans, and the Russian Cossacks, can alone be considered as national troops.

The Cossacks have acquired some reputation; and attempts to employ them even in a charge, have sometimes been successful. The Cossack regiment of the Imperial Russian guard, made a fine, steady attack in line, at the battle of Leipsic.

The dragoons have lost their original destination of fighting on foot, as well as on horseback. Among the English and French only, are examples known of this description of force being sent on foot, in order to be mounted on their arrival at the theatre of war.

The French restored to their heavy cavalry, entire cuirasses of polished iron; this cavalry, which only charged in a trot, has made a figure in the world. Napoleon employed it frequently in taking batteries and retrenchments, nay, even strong redoubts, Its fame in the French army rose to such a height, that "*brave comme nos cuirassiers*," became a proverb.

The French dragons, for some time degenerated, regained moral force in Spain; and in 1813-14, acquired respect.

The Austrian cavalry, whenever it was led with talent, always renewed that fame which it had obtained, by the sanguinary engagements of many centuries.

At the battle of Würzburg, September 3, 1796, Wartensleben passed the Maine, with twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers, attacked the French cavalry under Bonneau, overthrew it, and thus decided the victory.

At the battle of Leipsic, the Austrian cuirassiers, under Nostitz, covered themselves with glory.

On the 16th October, at one o'clock in the afternoon, Nostitz, having scarcely passed the Pleisse at Gröbern, attacked the lancers and dragoons of the French guard, overthrew them, and then broke several squares of infantry of that guard.

The English cavalry, with respect to the *matériel*, excels all other that we know of; and with utility, unites also beauty (1).

(1) The British cavalry ought to be the best heavy cavalry in Europe; but until the rage for heavy hussars, and light lancers, has subsided, and attention is directed to perfecting the heavy cavalry, little improvement can be expected in this branch of our service. It is, perhaps, not generally known, that the horse-appointments of what is called in England—a hussar, exceed in weight those of a heavy dragoon; and that, consequently, in

The Duke of Wellington is endeavouring to give this cavalry what it is yet in want of,—facility of manœuvring in great lines. Colonel Ponsonby,

those regiments of hussars, where the men average at or above 12 stone (which is the case in some regiments); the entire weight of a hussar, in marching order, is greater than that of a heavy dragoon. This inconsistency will best appear from the following statement:—

| | <i>st.</i> | <i>lb.</i> | <i>oz.</i> |
|---|------------|------------|------------|
| Weight of horse-appointments, arms, &c., of a private of hussars, in marching order, averaged from 8th and 15th hussars | 7 | 2 | 1 |
| Suppose hussar to weigh | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Total in marching order | 19 | 2 | 1 |

| | | | |
|--|-----|----|----|
| * Weight of horse-appointments, arms, &c., of a private of heavy dragoons, averaged from 1st dragoon guards, 6th dragoons, and 2d dragoons | 6 | 7 | 11 |
| Suppose heavy dragoon to weigh | *12 | 6 | 0 |
| * Total in marching order | 18 | 13 | 11 |

Thus the British heavy dragoon is absolutely the most capable of acting as a hussar,* and would be still more so, if his cumbrous helmet and horse-appointments were reduced to a reasonable weight. A complete set of the present heavy dragoon horse-appointments averages from 38 to 40 pounds, which unnecessary load is principally caused by the huge clumsy saddle, that forms

* The average made from the weight of three privates of heavy dragoons, now on duty at St. John's Wood, namely, 5th dragoon guards, 7th dragoon guards, and royal dragoons, in full dress, was only 12 stone; but as, in other regiments, the general weight is much greater, 12st. 6 lb. has been adopted as a fair average of all heavy dragoon regiments.

The average weight of the 4th dragoon guards is upwards of 13 stone; but this regiment contains probably larger men than any other heavy dragoon regiment in the service, and is only to be exceeded by the household troops, or perhaps the 10th hussars.

who displays talent, would make a General of cavalry; he commanded a lancer regiment with

so conspicuous a part of the equipment. The helmet weighs from 3lb. 8oz. to 4lb.; is completely top heavy, and in windy weather is with difficulty kept on the head. The horse appointments might be reduced with advantage both to the horse and rider, by the substitution of a light hussar saddle for the one now in use, which would also considerably improve the position of the dragoon, when mounted. Taking away the carbine and pistol, with their appurtenances, and substituting a lance, would again diminish the weight.

lb. oz.

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
| The average weight of a heavy-dragoon carbine (including bayonet), when loaded, is | . | . | . | : | . | 8 | 0 |
| Pistol loaded | . | . | . | . | . | 3 | 2 |
| Pouch and belt, with 27 rounds of ammunition | . | . | . | . | . | 6 | 0 |
| | | | | | | | <hr/> |
| | | | | | | | 17 2 |
| | | | | | | | <hr/> |

The lance at present in use weighs from 4 to 5lbs. Was this even so increased in length as to weigh 7lbs., there would still be a diminution of more than 10lbs. by the change.

If, as is generally allowed, the principal effect of a charge of cavalry arises from the velocity of its movement, any regulation tending to diminish that velocity, must be injurious; and when we see hussars of six feet high, mounted upon seven stone of appointments, and heavy dragoons, encumbered with carbines, bayonets, and an enormous saddle, it is evident, that rapidity of movement is, in both cases, sacrificed.

A long coat will not make a heavy dragoon, nor a short jacket, a hussar; attention should be directed, on enlistment, to the particular description of cavalry for which the recruits are intended. Too much anxiety is exhibited for displaying tall men, who are seldom so well proportioned, active, or capable of enduring fatigue, as men of a smaller or middle size. The horse is also impeded in his action by this extreme burthen of legs and leather; and the consequence of such a mistaken anxiety for

the army in France, and accompanied the Duke of Wellington in his inspections (1).

By such dispositions, the consequences of which will appear in the future, a great General shews himself.

height and size' is, that the greater part of our cavalry are mounted upon horses which are not equal to their weight. "The smallest sized men," says Marshal Saxe, "are the best; because it has frequently been proved, that a horse which will carry a man thirty leagues in a day, whose weight does not exceed eight or nine stone, will hardly be able to carry one of from ten to twelve stone, half the same distance; and in swiftness, will lose from 100 to 150 paces."

LANCERS should constitute the standard cavalry of England; no nation possesses such materials for their formation—no nation possesses such means of bringing them to perfection; if solid squares of infantry are ever to be penetrated by cavalry, it is to be performed by lancers; not, however, armed with such weapons as they use at present; but with a lance of sufficient length to overcome the infantry bayonet, which, thus opposed, would be no longer formidable.

For the several details which have been here given respecting the weight of appointments, size of men, &c., the translator is indebted to the kind assistance of Colonel Taylor and Captain Meyer, of the cavalry riding establishment, as well as to Major Chatterton, of the 4th dragoon guards.

T.

(1) Colonel Ponsonby commanded the 12th light dragoons, (now lancers), in the Peninsula, and always evinced great ability for commanding cavalry. At the battle of Waterloo he made a most successful charge with his regiment on part of the French division of Dürutte, which caused a severe loss to the enemy, and contributed much to heighten the confusion into which the whole right wing of the French army had been thrown. See "Historical Sketch of the Campaign," by Captain Batty, who gives a most interesting description of the attack, contained in a letter ad-

It was thus that Frederick the Great formed his General of cavalry for the seven years' war, in the peace, between the second and third Silesian war.

The Russian cavalry will be able to lay just claims to being the first in the world, when, at a future time, intellectual power shall be united with the physical and moral force which it at present possesses.

The Polish cavalry stands on an eminence as a model.

Prussia feels the importance of good cavalry, and at present expends vast sums and much care on its *matériel* (1).

The Bavarian cavalry, in consequence of Polish remounts, which it has received for many years, is in an excellent condition.

dressed to Lady Besborough, in the appendix to his work. One passage of this letter contains the following strong evidence in favour of the lance: "The lances, from their length and weight, would have struck down my sword long before I lost it, if it had not been bound to my hand."

T.

(1) The expense attendant upon the Prussian cavalry is very considerable, in consequence of the frequent remounts which are required. The horses of the regular cavalry being constantly ridden by recruits, are soon rendered unserviceable, and consequently the demand for horses is much increased. At present the Prussian government are endeavouring to remount the cavalry in the country, and have established studs at Berlin, Königsberg, and Graditz; but the horses for the cuirassier regiments are still purchased in Holstein and Mecklenburg.

T.

The King of Wirtemberg, perceiving the spirit of the times, has given a new form and new regulations to his cavalry: good remounts are still wanting*.

The Baden cavalry consists of fourteen squadrons, the detail and individual instruction of which is excellent.

The cavalry of the kingdom of Saxony is destroyed, by the political storms which that country has experienced. The long-established fame of the Hanoverian cavalry has been brilliantly supported by the deeds of the German Legion (1).

* * This cavalry is armed with lances eleven feet in length, with the exception of the skirmishers (5th division), who have long carbines,—those armed with lances, have supports which are fastened to the right pistol holster. Skirmishers and dragoons have a cut and thrust sword, and only one pistol, all according to the Fifth and Sixth Lectures.

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

(1) The formation of the German legion took place in 1803, after the occupation of Hanover by the French. A capitulation entered into between Mortier and Marshal Von Walmoden Gimborn, General of the Hanoverian forces, stipulated that the Hanoverian army should be disbanded; and the officers, being thus deprived of the power of serving their country under her own banners, followed the Duke of Cambridge to England soon after the capitulation. To the Duke was entrusted the charge of forming the King's German Legion; and too much praise cannot be given to his Royal Highness for the manner in which he executed his commission. The corps was originally intended to have been only one regiment of Hanoverians; but the number of volunteers so increased, that in September, 1805, it amounted to nearly 10,000 men, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery.

The Belgian cavalry has yet had no opportunity of making itself known.

The Swedes and Danes, in modern times, have seldom been engaged on a theatre of war favourable to cavalry.

The Italian nations have no pretensions to good cavalry.

The Spanish and Portuguese cavalry partake of the fate of the nations to whom they belong—relaxation (1).

of which the Duke of Cambridge was appointed Colonel in chief, and Colonel of the first battalion. This gallant corps served with distinguished merit in Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Gibraltar, Spain, Italy, Sicily, Brabant, Malta, Flanders—and on the plain of Waterloo added unfading laurels to its former fame.

The brilliant services of the German legion on so many occasions, and, more particularly, the distinguished part it bore in the glorious victory of Salamanca, obtained for the officers permanent rank in the British service; which gracious act of his Majesty was thus announced to the army:—

WAR-OFFICE, AUGUST 10, 1812.

“ In consideration of the King’s German legion having so frequently distinguished themselves against the enemy, and particularly upon the occasion of the late victory obtained near Salamanca, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent is pleased, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, to command, that the officers who are now serving with temporary rank in the several regiments of that corps, shall have permanent rank in the British army from the date of their respective commissions.”

T.

(1) This is rather too sweeping a verdict upon the Spanish and Portuguese cavalry, between which a material difference exists. The Spaniards, from their superiority in horses, have always had

The Turks have given up the part of conquerors, and since that time, their empire is sinking (1).

The Mamelukes, a peculiar sort of cavalry, gave the French a good deal of trouble in Egypt; it is a question, whether they will fight any more for the interest of the Sublime Porte.

With regard to the grand operations of cavalry, since the sixth period, they seem rather to have retrograded than advanced: little genius—little intellectual force has been displayed!

a much superior cavalry to the Portuguese, and, although without the advantage of British discipline, often shewed much spirit and order in their movements during the Peninsular war. The Portuguese are wretchedly mounted*—their country is totally unfitted for the operations of cavalry; and, from these circumstances, the cavalry service in Portugal is not looked upon with that degree of respect, which it is in other countries, but the *personnel* of both nations is the same: both contain the very best materials for making good troops; and, although the Spanish infantry appeared to less advantage than the Portuguese in the late war, it was more owing to their proud rejection of our discipline, and of the proffered services of our officers, than to any deficiency in personal bravery. These haughty patriots absolutely preferred being beaten as Spaniards, to being indebted for victory to the introduction of our tactics, and to the subjection of British discipline.

T.

(1) The Sultan has overcome the janissaries, and may do more.

T.

* A distinguished British officer, who commanded a brigade of Portuguese cavalry during the war, observed to the translator how much he was struck, on returning home, by the superiority which the English stage-coach horses exhibited over those of his brigade.

Napoleon formed his cavalry into independent corps, among the Commanders of which were some very talented Generals, who have performed single acts of brilliancy; but that *high, all-surpassing talent of a General-in-Chief of cavalry*, has been always wanting. They never understood, in the French armies, that cavalry can only produce results by manœuvre; thus, neither the physical force of this cavalry—its united masses—nor the high elevation of its moral force—was of avail. In consequence of a want of talent to manœuvre it, this cavalry was placed in the battle as food for cannon; and after it had shewn the greatest proofs of steadiness and intrepidity, single cuirassier regiments were taken to charge batteries at a slow trot, as if it was glorious to gain every victory with the greatest possible loss.

These faults have been repeated at every battle; and the failure of the exertions of the French cavalry at Waterloo, is solely to be attributed to the bad position in which it was placed, being exposed from the beginning of the action, to the effects of cannon fire (1).

(1) The failure of the French cavalry at Waterloo was owing to its being prematurely brought into action. Napoleon, after his advantages at the commencement of the battle, when he was so confident of victory as to dispatch a courier to Paris with intelligence that the day was won, ordered his immense cavalry to charge the centre of Lord Wellington's line, which he believed could not resist so powerful a shock; and although he soon saw his error, yet the inflexibility of his character would not allow

This deficiency of talent to manœuvre large masses of cavalry, in such a manner as to ensure success, has been felt by all European armies in the last wars; therefore, so few decisive actions have taken place; therefore, it is so justly said in the Second Lecture, "Seidlitz was a perfect General of cavalry; but many a century may pass away before a second will be formed in the same army" (1).

him to recall the gallant troops, who were thus so unnecessarily sacrificed. "Il aime mieux," says Rogniat, "faire détruire assez inutilement sa cavalerie sous le feu des Anglais que de la faire replier."

T.

(1) The deficiency of good cavalry officers in the British army is much to be lamented, and may be attributed to two principal causes; first, the defective means which are employed to form officers of cavalry; and, next, the general want of exertion among the officers themselves, in acquiring any knowledge of their profession. It is not to be supposed, that the routine of parades, or the mechanical practice of drill, though carried to the greatest extent and perfection, can ever enable an officer to command a regiment of cavalry, or even a smaller body, with any advantage. The circumscribed limits of field-day tactics, call for no greater exertion of intellect than may be reasonably expected from any private dragoon, who has learned to know his right hand from his left; and the extent of instruction being thus confined, induces the greater part to believe, that further information is unnecessary. Hence arises that complacency in ignorance, and that stagnation of military talent which distinguishes so many of our cavalry officers, the greater part of whom would, no doubt, if a proper mode of instruction was adopted, become conspicuous in their profession.

The English service, in time of peace, affords little means for the improvement of a cavalry officer—at most, he can but accom-

This is a *truth*, and one like it never ceases to be truth, though it be ever so much opposed.

A superannuated father seldom comprehends the manner of acting of his son, and has always

plish the knowledge of Dundas' manœuvres; and when perfected in the practice of these, he looks in vain for the application. The young officer hears his elders talk of positions, picquets, attacks, out-posts, &c., but he can only depend on his imagination for an idea of their nature: to seek for information in books he cannot be expected—Dundas has already administered to him a *quantum suff.* of theoretical instruction, and he looks forward to absolute war as the only illustration of those duties, whose minutest details he ought to have been previously made acquainted with. But are the means of giving instruction to the British officers then so scanty? Is military talent to be thus prohibited cultivation?—England does possess ample means of affording instruction; and, although not so well circumstanced for that purpose as many of the continental countries, yet contains many situations suited to the extended movements of troops, and the full exercise of *practical* manœuvres. But if such a plan as has been before suggested* be considered objectionable, either from its unpopularity, as infringing too much upon the privileges of Englishmen, or from any other cause, then should officers be allowed the means of gaining that information in other countries, which they are denied at home. The annual reviews at Berlin afford the best school of instruction for a cavalry officer which is to be met with in any country; the autumn drill, indeed, of the armies of all the German states, must be viewed by every military man with advantage. Here some practical lessons might be acquired, and the additional benefit derived, of becoming acquainted with a language which should be indispensable in the education of every military man. Cavalry officers should be *sent* for instruction, and not *permitted* to go for amusement to Berlin: then could they be held responsible for improve-

* Lecture vii., p. 150. Note.

occasion to find fault with him. The son is not, on that account, disturbed; he continues to follow his own ways; but he will be patient with the peevish father, and, above all things, never forget his respect and duty to him.

Young Officers will find, in the Exercise Book, which has been pointed out in the Third Lecture, the new movements circumstantially explained, and rendered comprehensible by plates.

May they neither hurry too quickly over that Exercise Book, or these Lectures.

ment; and the professional progress evinced on their return would at once exhibit the extent of their military genius.

Another reason which tends much to diminish the number of British officers capable of commanding cavalry, is, the constant transitions which are made from one branch of the service to the other. An officer has, perhaps, exhibited some knowledge of the cavalry duties, and has evinced a predilection for that particular service, when he is transferred, or accepts of promotion, in infantry; here he is obliged to commence, perhaps at a late period, a new course of study, with a strong prejudice in favour of the service he has left, and a consequent disinclination to engage very warmly in the duties of his adopted corps. Such a man will never gain celebrity in infantry; whereas, in the service to which his talent and inclination particularly attached him, he might have become a distinguished officer.

Talent for commanding cavalry comes like the splendour of the comet, to dazzle and disappear; when, therefore, the faintest glimmering of its light appears visible in the military hemisphere, we should hail its approach and avail ourselves of its lustre.

T.

ELEMENTS OF MANŒUVRE

FOR

A Cavalry Regiment;

BEING

AN APPENDIX

TO THE

LECTURES ON THE TACTICS OF CAVALRY.

BY A COLONEL OF CAVALRY.

— — — — —
WITH TWENTY PLATES.
— —

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,

BY MAJOR N. LUDLOW BEAMISH.

**" Plus les mouvemens et les changemens sont dégagés, petits et simples,
plus ils sont estimés."**

MONTECUCULI.

T

ELEMENTS OF MANŒUVRE

FOR

A CAVALRY REGIMENT.

“THE art of movement of cavalry in manœuvre,” as it is said in the Eighth Lecture, page 173, consists—

- (A). *In the Art of forming the Line from Column—*
(Formations. Deployments).
 - (B). *In the Art of moving the Line in all Directions,*
and—
 - (C). *In the Art of re-forming Column from Line—*(Formation of close Column, &c.)
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WORD OF COMMAND.

EVERY Manœuvre has four words of Command.

1. The caution—which the Colonel gives, and the Squadron Officers repeat, viz.: *Regiment! Squadron!*
2. Nomination of the manœuvre, which the Colonel alone gives, viz.: *Take ground to the right by divisions!*
3. Preparation for the manœuvre, which is given by the Squadron Officer alone, as—*Divisions right wheel!*
4. Execution of the manœuvre, which is given by the Colonel, and repeated by the Squadron Officer, as—*March! Halt!*

Officers commanding divisions, give the word of command only when the squadrons are broken into divisions; also in all successive movements, and in all formations.

Should the extension of the line, wind, or noise, prevent the words of command from being heard, every Commander of a regiment, squadron, or division, must be directed by whatever he hears or sees on the flank, from which the word of command proceeds.

In extended lines, it is often ordered, that they should be directed by the regiments or squadrons at the head.

When the Commander of a line has not fixed the pace, every movement, commencing from a position, is performed at a walk : if the line is in motion, the movement is executed at the same pace at which the line was marching, with the exception of squadron formations, or breakings of the line, which are always executed at a quicker rate.

LINES AND POINTS.

LINES formed by troops are divided into front lines, and lines of march.

These lines have, like all others, two points; one of which forms the right, and the other the left, of a line of battle, or the head and rear of a line of march.

The point upon which a column commences to form itself into line, is called the *point of appui*; that on which the extremity of the line rests, is called the *point of view*.

The interval which separates these two points, forms the *line of direction*, and the extremities become the points of direction of the front.

A march in line has also its line and points of direction.

In extended lines, immoveable, conspicuous, and distinct objects should be chosen for points of direction; such as a steeple, a single house, a tree, &c.; and when a line of battle is to be determined, Adjutants must gallop off, to

place themselves as intermediate points of the whole line, and at the same time as points of *appui* for their own regiments.

A Line of Direction is thus determined.

(A). When one point only is given. (Plate IV).

A tree (A), or a dragoon (*a*), being chosen as a point of direction, the Adjutant (*b*) gallops in this direction, and places opposite, and fronting him, a Non-commissioned-Officer (*c*), if the latter has not placed himself so as to cover the point of direction, *b* gives him the necessary signal, either to move to the right or left, until he is correctly placed.

(B). When two points are given, the intermediate points are thus determined.

Let *a*, *b*, be the moveable or fixed points.

The Adjutant *c*, and a Non-Commissioned-Officer *d*, march at division distance, towards the new line of direction, in such a manner, that *c* looking to his right, dresses upon *d* and *a*, while *d* looking to his left, dresses upon the point *b*.

c and *d* continue their march, and at the moment when *d* no longer sees the point *b*, because *c* is immediately before it, and consequently covers it, *d* gives the word *Halt!* and the intermediate points are found.

When a regiment manœuvres alone, it is sufficient to indicate these points, by adding to the nomination of the movement the words *right or left*; and in fact by this means the point of *appui* of a line of battle is shewn, or the point of direction of a column, that is to say, all the movements of a line about a point, marching from a point, or *appuying* itself on a point, are named after this point. For example, *Right-wheel! Change front to the right! by the right, march! Echelon from the right! Form line to*

the right! &c., because in all these cases the real or intended point of *appui* is the right.

This point may also be conceived to exist within the line itself, reckoning from the flank. For example: *On the first division of the second squadron, change front to the right!* *On the fourth division of the third squadron, change front to the left!* Here the second word of command, which names the movement, expresses also the point which the Commander has chosen within the line.

The commands of *left*, *right*, *forwards*, *backwards*, are perfectly easy of comprehension; the front line of a regiment is also its *visual line*, the four principal sides of which are *right*, *left*, *front*, *rear*.

The direction of all movements in advance or retreat, is indicated by the addition of *right* or *left*, to the word of command; the direction of a column is *right*, when the right wing leads, and *vice versa*.

If all that has been hitherto said, has appeared intelligible, the following manœuvres will be found of the most simple nature, as they are in fact deduced from the simplest principles of tactics.

In all the manœuvres which are contained in the three following sections, an enemy's line is always understood to exist, against which the march is directed, or from which the retreat is made.

SECTION I.

FORMATION OF THE LINE FROM COLUMN.

FIRST MANŒUVRE.

Open Column.

FIRST FORM. (Plate V).

To form line to the front, from column of divisions, right in front.

(*Movement of Attack*).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Form Line to the Front on the first Division of the second Squadron!*
3. *Right Squadron: Divisions three-eighths right wheel!*
Remaining Squadrons:—
By Divisions one-eighth left wheel! First Division of the second Squadron, Forward!
4. *March!*

The first division of the second squadron, advances the distance of its own breadth, halts, and is correctly dressed by the Division Officer; the remaining Division Officers (1)

(1) The officers commanding divisions are here understood.

of the second, third, and fourth squadrons, as soon as their divisions have completed the eighth wheel, give the words *Forward! March! Guide, Right! (1)*. When the right wing of the second division of the second squadron has arrived at seven paces distance from the left wing of the first division of that squadron, the words of command are given—*Left Wing Forward! March!* and the eighth wheel being completed—*Forward! March!* and immediately after, *Halt!* the other divisions follow, and proceed in the same manner.

The first squadron retires after its divisions have wheeled three eighths of the circle, and forms line inversely, as soon as the fourth division has arrived the distance of its front behind the new direction: the squadron then wheels by divisions to the right about, and is dressed to the left.

* In all formations the divisions remain two horses' length behind the new line of direction, for experience has shewn that the dressing is quicker and more correctly performed by the Squadron Officers, than by the commanders of divisions.

As soon as the fourth division of the second squadron halts, the left flank Guide of that squadron places himself upon the line which the first division had taken up, and when dressed, the Squadron Officer commands, *Right!*

(1) In the Wirtemberg cavalry, every division has two guides (führer) placed on the flanks. These men are responsible for distance and dressing, and also perform the duty of markers. *Guide right!* or *left!* has the same signification as our word of command, *eyes right!* or *left!* and denotes the flank to which the dressing is to be made. The officers commanding divisions are always in front: their duty is to lead their respective divisions in the direction, conformable to the manœuvre ordered. In the charge, the division officers of the line, or lancer cavalry, rein back half a horse's length into the ranks, and the squadron officer alone remains in front.

dress! March! upon which the three divisions yet in rear of the line, advance upon it.

The divisions of the remaining squadrons all remain behind the line, and as soon as each fourth division arrives, the Squadron Officers place the *Guides* of both flanks of their squadrons, upon the line, and proceed in the same manner as the officer of the second squadron.

This dressing is important, and should be executed with expertness and rapidity.

A Field-Officer should ride along the line in order to see whether the dressing is correct; after which the Colonel gives the word *Steady!* this word of command is conclusive, and the heads are again turned to the front.

Colonels of regiments should never occupy themselves with the execution of the manœuvres, which is the duty of the Field and Squadron Officers; they should rather during peace endeavour to acquire the habit which is of so much importance in war, solely to command; and to give their whole attention to the ground on which the enemy may appear.

SECOND FORM. (Plan VI).

Formation of line to the rear, when retiring in column of divisions, right in front.

(*Movement of Defence*).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Form Line to the Rear on the first Division of the first Squadron!*
3. *Divisions, one-eighth Right Wheel!—First Division of the first Squadron, Forward!*
4. *March!*

As long as this manœuvre is a front formation in inverse

order, the execution of it is similar to that of the first form; when each squadron has arrived on the new line of direction, it wheels without loss of time to the left about by divisions, each independently, without waiting for the others, so that the first squadron has already taken up the line when the second has scarcely arrived, and the third and fourth are yet in oblique march.

This manœuvre, executed in the manner here laid down, and employed on a retreat, permits a part of the line to be brought quickly against the advancing enemy, while no part of the ground is lost which the head has already gained.

As soon as the second word of command is given by the Colonel, a Field Officer proceeds to the division of direction, and sees that the prescribed line is preserved; with oblique lines, this is less easy than appears at first sight.

On the entry into a new line of direction, the Squadron Officers must always place themselves at the extremity of that flank of their squadron from which the dressing proceeds, that is to say, at the extremity of the right flank, when the point of *appui* is the right, and on the extremity of the left flank, when the point of *appui* is the left (1).

(1) Such is the mode of dressing prescribed in our cavalry regulations*, and which can neither be supported on principles of tactics or utility. Exclusive of the glaring inconsistency of making the squadron officer turn his back to the *point d'appui*, or base, this system of dressing admits of other serious objections:—1st, The squadron officer being dependent upon the distant marker for the prolongation of the line, any slight variation in the position of that marker's horse, will destroy the alignment. 2d, A marker thus exposed, stands little chance of retaining his position before an enemy, whose skirmishers will naturally endeavour to unfix a point which is made so necessary to the formation of the line. 3d, The position which the squadron officer assumes in dressing, is calculated to throw off its ground the very base upon which

* See Dundas, sec. 35, p. 99. 8vo. ed.

The formation of line from a column left in front is evident from the foregoing.

The different formations of line to a flank, for example, of a column right in front, *to the left* by wheeling, or to the right either by *inversion*, or formation to the right, are pointed out in the squadron drill; the changes of direction and front of a column, are also considered as understood.

The author will introduce here those manœuvres only which are authorised by tactics; and, in the execution of which some end is apparent, the preparatory and intermediate movements are passed over, as also those ingenious

the line is to be formed. 4th, The error of one squadron officer causes that of all the rest; and, lastly, It is quite impossible for any one of the squadron officers to be certain, that their squadrons are formed in the prolongation of the base. Dundas seems to have been so much aware of the imperfection of this mode of dressing, that he has provided for it, by ordering a correction to be made from the other flank, "by a field-officer moving quickly close along the front, from the flank to which eyes were turned to the other flank." (See sec. 17, p. 64.) If this is, as thus evidently admitted, the most certain method of dressing the line, why should it not be adopted at first? Indeed, the inconsistency of Dundas, in this part of his instructions, is a sufficient condemnation of the system; for, after directing that the dressing is to be made from the last formed squadron, to the distant point, he says, sec. 17, p. 68, "Nothing is more false than to make a general rule of always coming up to the squadron before one, without considering whether such squadron is or is not truly halted and formed; it is, therefore, to the general line that every one must endeavour to conform, and not to the false one, which may be given by single squadrons or regiments." These observations are most true, and the only certain mode of ascertaining whether the squadrons are "truly halted and formed," is to dress to the base, which gives the direction of the general line.

Dressing to the distant point, instead of to the base, is about as rational as attempting to build a house from the roof, instead of the foundation. There can be no certainty of the line being formed in the true direction; and if the dressing does luckily succeed, it is more to be attributed to the corrections of the adjutant or serjeant-major, from the distant flank, than to the exertions of the squadron officer.

combinations of evolutions which are only practicable on parade, and never under the fire of cannon.

SECOND MANŒUVRE.

Deployment from Close Column.

FIRST FORM. (Plate VII).

Formation of line to the front from a close column, right in front.

(*Movement of Attack*).

1. *Regiment !*
2. *Form Line to the Front on the second Squadron !*
3. *Right Squadron—Divisions, Right Wheel !*
Third and fourth Squadrons—Divisions, Left Wheel !
4. (*Trot—Gallop*)—*March !*

As soon as the officer of the second squadron sees his front clear, he commands, *Squadron, March !* and advances it half a squadron's breadth beyond the line upon which the first squadron stood.

This advance is made at a quicker rate than that which is ordered for the deployment.

The three other squadrons which had broken into divisions at the word *March !* and after which had received the word *Forward ?* continue their flank movements to the right and left, each preserving the distance which is prescribed to them in line.

The squadron-officers give the word *Front !* at the proper time ; those whose squadrons were before the squadrons of direction (here the first squadron), place themselves on their left flanks, and command *Guide, left !* and those

whose squadrons were behind the squadron of direction, (here the third and fourth squadrons) place themselves on their right flanks, and after the word *Front !* command *Guide, Right !*

The word *Halt !* is given at the distance of two horses' length in rear of the new line, and when the guides are correctly dressed, *Right or Left, Dress !*

A column formed left in front is conducted on the same principle, but *vice versa*.

The squadrons in front deploy to the left ; those in rear to the right.

SECOND FORM. (Plate VIII).

Formation of line to the rear from close column, right in front.

(*Movement of Defence*).

1. *Regiment !*
2. *Form line to the Rear on the fourth Squadron !*
3. *Divisions, Left Wheel !*
4. *March !*

Fourth Squadron, Left Counter-March !—Halt !—

Front ! Left, Dress !

Third Squadron, By the Left, March !

The second and third squadron advance to their proper distance, and march up to their position in line, dressing by the left.

The deployments of a close column to the right and left, are the same as formations to the right and left.

Every column can deploy in an oblique line.

SECTION II.

MOVEMENT OF THE LINE.



THIRD MANŒUVRE.

March in Line.

FIRST FORM. (Plate IX).

MARCH to the front.

(*Movement of Attack.*)

1. *Regiment !*
2. *The Line will Advance !*
3. *Forward ! (1).*
4. *March !*

Should the Colonel wish for any other pace than the walk, he adds it to the second word of command :—

2. *The Line will Advance at a Trot !—Gallop !*
3. *Trot !—Gallop !—Forward !*

It is the rule, that when no squadron is mentioned as the squadron of direction, the dressing is taken from the

(1) This would seem an unnecessary addition, after the line had been ordered to advance.

right, but the Commanding Officer may appoint any other squadron to direct.

The Guide of the squadron of direction gets a point from the Field Officer, on which to march, and while he seeks for intermediate points, he is obliged to maintain himself on a straight line; if he marches incorrectly, a wavering and pressure ensues, and the advance in line is badly executed.

The officers in front must not trouble themselves with the line which follows them. If the officers continue dressed, the regiment will be so likewise.

The first sixty to eighty paces are performed at a moderate pace, in order that the Commanding Officer may judge whether the point of view is perpendicular to the front of the line.

If the intervals become narrower, the point of view is taken too much to the left; if greater, too much to the right. The Colonel gives orders to the Adjutant for correcting the error.

The longer the line, the more difficult the advance; particularly when at a quick rate, as at a trot.

Every squadron must preserve its distance from the squadron of direction; if this is lost, the march in line cannot succeed.

The preservation of equal intervals between squadrons is of less importance; however, each Squadron Officer is responsible for the regularity of his squadron.

Should an obstacle appear in front of a division or squadron, it immediately doubles back, according to the directions given in the squadron drill for the passage of obstacles, without waiting for orders.

When the Colonel wishes to halt the line, he commands, *Regiment! Halt! Guides upon the line!* upon which the

Guides advance the breadth of a division beyond the line of Officers, and are dressed by the Field-Officer; after which the word is given, *Right—(left)—dress! March! Steady!*

It is important that the squadron Officers should not take up their dressing from that of the squadron next them, but dress on the whole line. (See Lecture VIII., p. 177).

If the object of the advance is to attack the enemy, the trot is commenced at 300 paces from him, adding to the word of command, *Attack!* One hundred paces from the enemy the gallop is commenced; and when at the distance of thirty paces, the word *Charge!* is given.

At the same moment, skirmishers are thrown out on each flank of the enemy's line.

If the enemy is defeated, the Colonel orders the *assembly* to be sounded; upon which all halt, and assemble round the standard.

The skirmishers pursue the enemy, acting according to circumstances.

Colonels of regiments and Squadron Officers should never, for a moment, forget how important it is to preserve their regiments and squadrons *united* on the day of battle; to assemble them after the charge; and always to be in readiness to make front against the enemy, and to oppose the new lines which he may bring forward.

Cavalry should never allow itself to be attacked, but must endeavour to charge before the enemy.

As soon as the charge is sounded, the officers of lancers, who were in front, place themselves on the right wing of their divisions, in such a manner that the croups of their horses are in the ranks.

The Squadron Officers remain in the centre, in front of their squadrons.

The Colonel is always *in front* of his regiment; the Adjutant and Trumpeter near him; the Standard follows the Colonel.

The Field-Officer is in rear of the centre of the regiment.
(8th and 9th Lecture on the Tactics of Cavalry).

SECOND FORM.

MARCH to the rear.

(*Movement of Defence*).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Retire by Sub-divisions from the right—(left).*
3. *Subdivisions right—(left)—about wheel!*
4. *March!*

The Division Officers wheel with their divisions; the Squadron Officers and the Colonel remain in rear of the line. The Guides, that is to say, the Squadron Guides, only, wheel independently, in order to remain always on the flanks.

After the wheeling, the words *Forward!—March!* are given by the Squadron Officers; and thus the original line is resumed.

FOURTH MANŒUVRE. (Plate X).

March en Echelon—(Movement of Attack).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Advance in Echelon of Squadrons from the Right (or Left).*
3. *Second or Fourth Squadron—Forward!*
4. *March!*

The remaining squadrons follow this movement at the distance of the breadth of a half-squadron.

The line is re-established on the *appel* being sounded.

The echelon march is as easy as important. (Tactics of Cavalry, Lecture VIII., page 179).

FIFTH MANŒUVRE. (Plate XI).

Retreat en Echiquier—(Movement of Defence).

1. *Regiment !*
2. *Retire by Alternate Squadrons, or en Echiquier.*
3. *Second Line, by Sub-divisions, Left about Wheel !*
4. *March !*

The wheeling about being completed, the Squadron Officers give the words of command, *Forward !—March !—Guide Right !*

The uneven-numbered squadrons (1st and 3d) compose the first line ; the even-numbered (2d and 4th) compose the second line.

The Colonel commands the first line, and a Field Officer the second line.

The second line marches about 300 paces to the rear, where it fronts, by wheeling its subdivisions to the left about.

As soon as the second line has fronted, the Colonel commands,

1. *First Line !*
2. *Retire by Sub-divisions !*
3. *Sub-divisions—Right about, Wheel !*
4. *March !* &c. &c. &c.

An enterprising enemy would choose this moment to attack ; therefore the first line trots up to the intervals of the second and then retires at a walk, 300 paces in rear of that line, where it fronts.

This movement of retreat is covered by skirmishers.

When one line passes through the intervals of another, the latter (if the enemy is near) advances fifteen paces.

During this retreat, the first line always wheels to the *right about*, and the second line to the *left about*.

When the Colonel orders the *appel* to be sounded, the line most retired forms up to the one in front.

SIXTH MANŒUVRE.

Change of Front.

CHANGES of front are wheelings—marches in curved lines—but because wheels cannot be performed with a greater front than that of a squadron, the converse movements of a regiment, or greater lines, are called changes of front. (Tactics of Cavalry, Lecture VIII., page 184).

FIRST FORM. (Plate XII).

Change of Front, Forwards—(Movement of Attack).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Change Front to the Right, on the first Division of the first Squadron!*
3. *Divisions—one-eighth Right Wheel! First Division of the first Squadron, Right Wheel!*
4. *March!*

The division of direction, after having wheeled, advances the distance of its front, halts, and is dressed.

After the other divisions have completed their one-eighth wheel, the Squadron Officers give the words *Forward!—March!* The manœuvre is afterwards conducted according to the 1st Manœuvre, 1st Form, 1st Section.

If the change of front is only to be *one-eighth*, the words of command are, (Plate XIII).

1. *Regiment !*
 2. *Change Front to the Right, on the first Division of the first Squadron, one-eighth of the Circle.*
 3. *Forward ! First Division of the first Squadron, one-eighth right wheel !*
 4. *March !*
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SECOND FORM. (Plate XIV).

CHANGE of front by throwing back the wings (1).

(*Movement of Defence*).

1. *Regiment !*
2. *Change position on the first Division of the first Squadron, Left thrown back !*
3. *Divisions—five-eighths left about, wheel ! First Division of the first Squadron, Left wheel !*
4. *March !*

The division of direction halts after the wheeling, and marks the new direction of the line.

The remaining divisions, after having completed the wheel, proceed according to the first manœuvre. Second Form, 1st Section.

In all movements where one flank of a line is thrown back, the wheelings of the divisions at the commencement of the manœuvre, are made from the *point d'appui*, but the line is re-formed by wheeling towards the *point*

(1) In the German, *frontveränderung rückwärts*, the literal translation of which, *change of front backwards*, would not sufficiently express the author's meaning.

d'appui; therefore the visual line is restored, by wheelings to the same hand as was wheeled to in retiring to execute the change of front.

In the change of front on the right, left thrown back, the divisions wheel five-eighths to the left about, and reform by wheeling to the left about.

The changes of front on the left, right brought forward, and on the left, right thrown back, are *vice versa*, but are executed according to the same principles.

It is evident, that a change of front made upon any division of the line, can take place, one part of the line being advanced, and the other thrown back. The divisions of the advancing line wheel one-eighth, those of the retiring line five-eighths.

SEVENTH MANŒUVRE.

Passage of a Defile.

If a regiment, marching in line, wishes to take up a position in presence of an enemy, and that it meets with a defile in front, it should pass through it by squadrons, half squadrons, divisions, or even with a smaller front, according to the width of the defile, by advancing from the centre; because this movement is favorable to the quick formation of the line, after the defile is passed.

FIRST FORM.

PASSAGE of a Defile in front.

(A). .Open Column. (Plate XV).

(Movement of Attack).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Pass a Defile in Front, by half Squadrons from the centre!*
3. *First and second Squadrons: Divisions, Left wheel! third and fourth Squadrons: Divisions, Right wheel! The fourth, Division of the second Squadron, and the first Division of the third Squadron, forward!*
4. *March!*

The column passes through the defile with the front of a half squadron, and observes the distance necessary for a column marching by divisions.

The fourth division of the second squadron, and the first division of the third squadron, unite on the march by inclining to the right and left.

The remaining squadrons follow the movements of the centre.

If the defile should appear in front of any other division of the line, the divisions, which it is intended should form the head of the column, are pointed out in the second word of command.

In this case one wing is stronger than the other; therefore the rear divisions pass the defile without doubling.

Formation.

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Form line progressively to the Front on the head of the Column!*
3. *Right—Left—Form!*
4. *March!*

(B). Passage of a Defile in close Column. (Plate XIII).

(Formation of the Column).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Form the Column of Attack!*
3. *First and second Squadrons: Sub-Divisions, three-eighths Left wheel! Third and fourth Squadrons: Sub-divisions, three-eighths Right wheel!*
The second half Squadron of the second Squadron, and the first half Squadron of the third Squadron, Forward!
4. *March!*

The two centre half squadrons of the regiment advance the distance of their breadth, uniting during the march, by inclining to the right and left, from the leading squadron, and halt.

The first half squadron of the second squadron, and the second half squadron of the third squadron, unite at the distance of a sub-division, in rear of the head of the column, and form the second squadron.

The second half squadron of the first, and the first half squadron of the fourth squadron follow, in the same manner, and form the third squadron of the column: and lastly, the first half squadron of the first, and the second half squadron of the fourth squadron, form the fourth in the column (1).

Each Squadron Officer remains with the first half of his squadron, and takes the command of the newly formed squadron, of which his first half squadron forms a part.

The manner of forming this column on the march is self evident.

(1) This is a slow method of advancing in double column from the centre, and might be more expeditiously performed by wheeling the divisions inwards, as in Sir Henry Torrens' system, sec. 86.

Deployment of the Column.

1. *Regiment !*
2. *On the Centre, Form Line to the Front !*
3. *Leading Squadron—Forward ! Remaining Squadrons :
—By Sub-divisions, Right and Left, Wheel !*
4. *March !*

The two centre half squadrons advance the distance of their front, resuming their interval, during the move, by inclining to the right and left ; they then halt, and are quickly dressed.

The half squadrons of the right wing, which have wheeled by sub-divisions to the right, as well as those of the left wing, which have wheeled by sub-divisions to the left, continue their flank-march until they have arrived opposite their places in line, when the word *Front !* is given, and they take up the alignement according to rule.

On the march, the line is formed according to the usual manner of formation.

SECOND FORM.

PASSAGE of a Defile in the rear.

(*Defensive Movement*). [8th Lecture, pp. 188, 189].

WHEN a regiment, pursued by the enemy, meets, on its retreat, with a defile in rear of its centre, it will pass it by successive movements ; commencing with the divisions of the flanks, in order to conceal its manœuvres, and to keep one part of its front opposed to the enemy.

FIRST MOVEMENT. (Plate XVII).

1. *Regiment !*
2. *Pass a Defile to the rear by Sub-divisions from both flanks.*
3. *First and fourth Squadrons : Retire by successive Sub-divisions !*
4. *March !*

The first sub-division of the first squadron will wheel to the right about, and the eighth sub-division of the fourth squadron to the left about. These two sections will march obliquely, and in the most direct line towards the defile.

The remaining sub-divisions will follow this movement, as soon as they find sufficient room to perform the wheel about.

As soon as each squadron is in column, the Squadron Officer gives the words, *Trot—March !*

The second and third squadrons perform the same movement ; but they do not commence until the first and fourth squadrons are formed in line on the other side of the defile.

The regiment will consequently become formed in two lines. The skirmishers cover the retreat, as is described in the plate.

SECOND MOVEMENT. (Plate XVIII).

As soon as the first and fourth squadrons have passed the defile, they form in line, to make front against the enemy.

The Field-Officer, who had taken the command of these squadrons will give the words of command :

1. *Squadrons !*
2. *Form line to the rear, on the rear of the Column.*
3. *First Squadron, by Sub-divisions, three-eighths Left wheel ! Eighth Sub-division, Left-about, wheel ! Fourth Squadron, by Sub-divisions, three-eighths Right wheel. First Sub-division, Right-about, wheel !*
4. *March !*

As soon as the wheeling is completed, the squadrons will form line to the front.

According to this manner of re-forming the line, an interval, of the breadth of a division, will be left between the two squadrons, through which the other line will retire. This line will retire 200 paces, and form parallel to the first and fourth squadrons, as has been explained.

The Colonel will decide, according to circumstances, whether the regiment shall continue to manœuvre in two lines, or re-form in one line.

In the first case, the movements are to be executed round both flanks ; as will be explained in a supplementary manœuvre to this section. In the latter case, the first squadron will wheel by sub-divisions to the right, and the fourth squadron by sub-divisions to the left, and resume their places on the flank of the regiment, by marching obliquely to the rear.

Should a regiment find itself obliged to pass a defile which is situated behind either of its flanks, it is performed by retiring from the right, and marching towards the left, if the defile is there situated ; or from the left to the right, should the defile be in rear of the right flank.

This movement is performed by divisions, or sub-divisions, according to the width of the defile.

SUPPLEMENTARY MANŒUVRE.

Advance and retreat in two Lines.

THIS manœuvre belongs to the evolutions of lines, for except in the case mentioned in the seventh manœuvre, a regiment will rarely find itself in such a situation as to manœuvre in two lines.

Tactics suppose many lines (Third Lecture, page 63, *et seq.* Seventh Lecture, page 155, *et seq.*).

When, therefore, serious engagements are anticipated, the cavalry must be placed in two, or even three lines, accordingly to circumstances; for one-line of cavalry may, by some disaster, be overpowered.*

When the column is to deploy, the General determines upon what regiments and squadrons the line is to be formed (1st & 2d Manceuv., Sec. 1).

The second line must be kept at such a distance from the first*, that any check experienced by the latter should not affect the second line, nor cause it to be thrown into disorder by fugitives from the first line, thereby preserving its capability to charge.

FIRST FORM. (Plate XIX).

ADVANCE.

(*Movement of Attack*).

1. *Second Line !*
2. *Advance from both Flanks by Divisions, (half Squadrons, &c.) !*
3. *As soon as the Colonels of the second Line have repeated this word of Command, each gives the necessary Orders to his own Regiment, so that upon the Word*
4. *March !*
being given by the Commander of the Brigade, the Line forms two Columns, right and left in front.

The heads of these columns move round both flanks of the first line, and as soon as the columns have arrived at

* The distance of the fire of a six-pounder, or two minutes at a trot, or 600 paces, may be considered the medium distance.

the distance of from five to 800 paces, in front of that line, the words of command are given :—

1. *Second Line !*
 2. *Towards the Centre, form Line to the Front !*
 3. *Word of Command of the Colonel, 1st Manœuvre, 1st Form, 1st Section.*
 4. *March !*
-

SECOND FORM. (Plate XX).

RETREAT.

(*Defensive Movement*).

1. *First Line !*
2. *Retire by Divisions, &c., from both Flanks.*
3. *The Colonels give their Words of Command, so that on the Word*
4. *March !*
of the Commander of the Brigade, the Line forms two Columns, Right and Left in Front, and facing to the Rear.

The heads of these columns move round both flanks of the second line, and when they have arrived at the distance of from five to 800 paces in rear of that line, it is commanded—

1. *First Line !*
2. *Towards the Centre, form Line to the Rear !*
3. *Word of Command of the Colonel, 1st Manœuvre, 2nd Form, 1st Section.*
4. *March !*

The column of the right wing resumes its place by wheeling to the right-about after forming line, and the column of the left wing, by wheeling to the left-about.

SECTION . III.

FORMATION OF OPEN AND CLOSE COLUMN.

(*Eighth Lecture, page 185, et seq.*).



EIGHTH MANŒUVRE.

Open Column.

FIRST FORM.

ADVANCE.

(*Offensive Movement in pursuit of the Enemy*).

1. *Regiment !*
2. *Advance in Open Column of Divisions, (half Squadrons, &c.), from the Right or Left !*
3. *Divisions, Half Squadrons, &c., Right or Left Wheel !*
First Division, Forward !
4. *March !*

The object of this manœuvre being an advance, it is therefore unnecessary, and only loss of time, to give the word *Halt !* after wheeling, as the column must be again put in motion.

When the wheel is completed, the Squadron Officers give the words—*Forward! March! Guide Left!*

SECOND FORM.

RETREAT.

(*Defensive Movement, abandoning the Field of Battle*).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Retire by Divisions, &c., from the Right or Left!*
3. *Divisions, Right or Left Wheel! First Division, Right (Left) about, Wheel!*
4. *March!*

Marching to a flank from the right or left is self evident.

NINTH MANŒUVRE.

Formation of Close Column.

FIRST FORM. (Plate XXI).

FORMATION of close Column to the Front.

(*Movement of Attack, pursuing the Enemy*).

1. *Regiment!*
2. *Form Close Column, Right in Front, on the second Squadron.*
3. *First and second Squadrons, Forward!—Third and fourth Squadrons, by Sub-divisions, three-eighths Right Wheel!*
4. *March!*

The second squadron advances the breadth of a sub-division, and halts.

The first squadron advances the breadth of a division, and wheels by sub-divisions to the left. The Squadron-Officer places himself on the right flank of the left sub-division, in order to be able to give the words of command, *Halt—Front—Left Dress!* when the left of his squadron shall have arrived in line with the left of the second squadron.

The second squadron now takes its distance, the third squadron places itself behind the second, and the Squadron-Officer, who gives the word, *Right Wing, Forward!* and immediately after, *Forward—March!* as soon as sufficient room is obtained to follow the new direction, halts at the head of the left flank of the second squadron, allowing his squadron to pass him, in order to be able to give the words *Halt—Front—Left, Dress!* when his last sub-division reaches him; upon this he takes his distance.

The fourth squadron follows, and proceeds as the third. If the Colonel names the first squadron for direction, the second conforms to what has just been prescribed for the third; the third and fourth squadrons follow.

The squadron of direction always advances the breadth of a sub-division; except when the fourth squadron directs, which then stands fast.

In this case the third squadron advances the breadth of a sub-division, and places itself in front of the fourth, by wheeling its sub-divisions to the left.

The second and first squadrons follow this movement. The distance of squadrons in close column, should be always the breadth of a sub-division (1).

(1) This is one of the many important changes in cavalry tactics, which the author has proposed. A really close column, formed according to the system of Dundas, is one of the most unmeaning com-

If the column is to be formed left in front, (Plate xxii.), the words of command are :—

1. *Regiment !*
2. *Form close Column, Left in front, on the third Squadron.*
3. *First and second Squadrons: Sub-divisions, three-eighths Left Wheel!—Third and fourth Squadrons: Forward !*
4. *March !*

In order to gain time, the close column may be formed upon one of the flank squadrons during the march in line, without halting.'

The squadron of direction continues its direct march, the remaining squadrons wheel by sub-divisions to the right or left, place themselves, by increasing the pace, in rear of the squadron of direction ; are ordered to *Front*, take their proper distance, and then resume the pace of the squadron of direction.

SECOND FORM. (Plate XXIII).

FORMATION of close Column to the rear.

(*Movement of Defence, the Field of Battle being abandoned to the Enemy*).

1. *Regiment !*
2. *On the March, form close Column to the Rear; Right in Front, on the 1st Squadron !*

binations in the whole eighteen manœuvres. The horses have scarcely room to move; the half-squadron officers have literally not sufficient space to change their flank, and may consider themselves extremely fortunate, if their persons or appointments escape uninjured from this compressed mass of men and horses. Such a formation is, to cavalry, altogether misapplied, and would appear to be solely intended to destroy its vital principle, *motion*.

3. *Sub-divisions, Right Wheel !*

4. *March !*

First Squadron: Right, Counter March!—Front!—

Guide, Left ! (continuing the march).

Second Squadron, (still in march), Right Form!—Guide

Left ! when its distance is taken.

The third and fourth squadrons follow the same movement.



CONCLUSION.

THE manœuvres, with great lines, are to be deduced from the manœuvres of a regiment; for such evolutions are nothing else than the combined manœuvres of several regiments. (Supplementary Manœuvre, sec. ii.). They cannot differ materially from the latter, and therefore all the elementary manœuvres, contained in these pages, which are considered as indispensable for a cavalry regiment, are, with those exceptions which are self-evident, applicable to evolutions of lines.

The cases in which these elementary manœuvres are applicable to the ground, and the enemy, must be committed to the talent of the General.

The choice of a General is the most important operation of the Commander-in-Chief.

Peace is not favourable to this operation; for talent is then too often lost in the slow, imperceptible advance of promotion.

In the moment of danger, the value of the proper man is estimated; but then he frequently is no longer to be had.

He who arrives at the station of a Commander, by no other merit than that of seniority, has proved little just pretension thereto.

What Frederick the Great said of the prejudice in favour of nobility, applies, with not less justice, to the prejudice

in favour of seniority. “What? Title and birth?—Every thing depends upon personal merit!!” (1).

Besides, the qualities which are required from a General are so well known, that we are astonished how those, to whom fortune gives the power of choosing, can so often mistake, and be deluded.

The Emperor Leo required from a General, that he should be “frugal, moderate, laborious, bold, but cautious and clever; neither too young nor too old; not avaricious nor low minded; and not given up to trifling things (detail). He required a noble soul, aspiring to eminence---an unprejudiced mind, and a sound, durable constitution. A General should be able to speak extempore before an assembly, free from passions, that of *fame alone excepted!!!*” Should these qualities be so difficult to recognise?

Talent is positive—but moral is relative; for what appears morally good to one, is condemned by another; that which lies between the two extremes of good and evil, is that immense field of morality, upon which the passions whirl men about; and these same passions, which produce actions, decide also the judgments. Therefore we so seldom find calm and correct judgments.

The author, in laying down his pen, is only anxious

(1) The system which Gustavus Adolphus followed, with regard to promotion, is the only one which can be considered just; in his army there were but two means of advancement—seniority and merit—the former was always superseded when found undeserving of promotion, but the latter never failed to meet its reward. Birth, rank, patronage

“Et genus, et proavos, et quæ non fecimus ipsi”

were all alike unavailing.

T.

about one point ; and that is, whether he be rightly understood, or not*.

However, his feelings tell him, that many noble persons, in whose breasts a heroic heart beats, and who are anxious about truth, have perfectly understood, and will in future understand, him.

These men the author calls his friends—of these he takes leave ; and commits the truths contained in his *Tactics*, as well as in these *Elements*, to their support and protection.

* A certain General acknowledged, with much naiveté, that “ the Lectures on *Tactics* were very pleasant reading—there were some pretty anecdotes in them ; but that the title was incorrect—for there is nothing whatever of *Tactics* in them, and one can learn nothing out of them.”

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

THE END.

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
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
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
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


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
Formation of Line to the Rear on the first Division of the first Squadron.






Engelbrecht in Eng. Command. Co. 1878

March in Line





Change of Front to the Right, the Quarter Circle.





Figure of Front to the Right, the Eighth of the Circle.

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
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

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
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


Passage of a Defile to the Front.







Passage of a Defile to the Rear. First Movement.




Passage of a Defile to the Rear Second Movement.



Formation of Close Column Right in Front



Formation of Close Column, Left in Front.



Formation of Close Column to the Rear

